J.K.
Unspecified 9/11-related security alert!
Fri Sep 19 01:16:10 2003
64.140.159.196

What do the Venezuelans know that we don't know?

President Hugo Chavez Frias cancels visit to Washington and New York ahead of unspecified 9/11-related security alert!
http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=11087

Foreign Minister (MRE) Roy Chaderton Matos has confirmed that the President's visit to Washington and New York, scheduled for next week, has been canceled for "unspecified security reasons." Chavez Frias had been expected to take part at a meeting of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Venezuelan officials are refusing to give specific details of the quoted "security reasons" but it has been rumored for several days that the trip would be put off due to a heightened risk of a terrorist attack on the United States to parallel the infamous 9/11 tragedy.

President Hugo Chavez Frias has himself given some indication of the scope of the "security reasons" saying that there have been "sufficient indications revealed to determine that this is not most appropriate time at which to visit the United States" and that on the basis of intelligence reports, his staff has decided to take relevant decisions with regard to the US schedule ... "we must always take care, to anticipate whatever circumstance that could possibly occur in whatever part of the world that could affect us."

"Security is just one element in the judgement ... it is permanently under review ... its just the same for whichever Head of State and for whatever important public figure."

Asked about the fact that he has still not been received by President George W. Bush at the White House in Washington, Chavez Frias says that although he has visited the United States most times during his Presidency, there are 180 other countries in the world and he (Chavez) does not believe that the President of the United States has met all of their Heads of State ... "no matter, it's a reality with which we can perfectly live with ... we can travel to the US; and attend our business in the US; and attend to US interests with us without summit meetings ... it's the reality we live with and you should not make it a matter of excessive speculation."

Foreign Minister Chaderton Matos says that it isn't worthwhile to even discuss statements made in a Miami Herald editorial by former US Caracas Embassy counselor for public affairs, Philip Parkerson. Nevertheless it is generally understood that Parkerson's animosity against Venezuela may have come from an undiplomatic scandal in Caracas after which Parkerson was ushered quickly back home to the United States last year. He had served in Caracas under three US Ambassadors -- John Maisto, Donna Hrinak and lately Charles S. Shapiro. "Parkerson is a now only another North American citizen who has expressed his opinion ... we can easily refuse his lies with the truth!"

Meanwhile Executive Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel has been somewhat more forthcoming in his complaints against "US government officials who continue to participate in acts of destabilization against the government of Venezuela."

"It is incredible that they participated in the conspiracy which led to the April 11 coup d'etat and it is even more incredible that they continue to involve themselves in further acts of destabilization while we have fulfilled all our undertakings with regard to control of drugs-trafficking and terrorism ... on top of that we have been reliable suppliers of oil to the United States."

J.V. Rangel insists that there have been repeated comments made which by some officials in the Bush administration which question the government of President Hugo Chavez Frias ... "these statements are based on information which has been distorted by the national opposition and powerful sectors in the United States that seek to lay their hands of the Venezuelan oil industry!"
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

UNITED STATES

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTIVE

18



27 July 1993

See Letter of Promulgation for instructions on reproduction
or release of this document

OPC: xxU1
CLASSIFIED BY NSA.CSSM 123-2
DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION
REQUIRED

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SECRET
27 July 1993

ANNEX D

TESTING OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (U)

SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

1.1. (U) This annex applies to the testing of electronic equipment that has the
capability to intercept communications and other non-public information.
Testing
includes development, calibration, and evaluation of such equipment, and
will be conducted, to the maximum extent that is practical, without
interception or
monitoring of U.S. persons.

SECTION 2 - PROCEDURES

2.1. (U) The USSS may test electronic equipment that has the capability to
intercept communications and other information subject to the following
limitations:

a. To the maximum extent that is practical, the following should be used:

(1) Laboratory-generated signals;

(2) Communications transmitted between terminals located outside the
United States not used by any known U.S. persons.

(3) Official government agency communications with the consent of an
appropriate official of that agency, or an individual's
communications with the consent of that individual;

(4) Public broadcast signals, or

(5) Other communications in which there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy (as approved in each instance by the NSA General
Counsel).

b. Where it is not practical to test electronic equipment solely against
signals described in paragraph 2.1.a, above, testing may be conducted,
provided:

(1) the proposed test is coordinated with the NSA General Counsel;

(2) the test is limited in scope and duration to that necessary to
determine the capability of the equipment;

(3) no particular person is targeted without consent and it is not
reasonable to obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to
the surveillance; and

(4) The test does not exceed 90 calendar days.

c. Where the test involves communications other than those identified in
2.1.a and a test period longer than 90 days is required, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act requires that the test be approved by the
Attorney General. Such proposals and plans shall be submitted by USSS
elements through the General Counsel, NSA, to the Director, NSA/Chief,
CSS for transmission to the Attorney General. The test proposal shall state
the requirement for an extended test involving such communications, the
nature of the test, the organization that will conduct the test, and the
proposed
disposition of any signals or communications acquired during the test.

2.2. (U) The content of any communication other than communications
between non-U.S. persons outside the United States, which are acquired
during a test and
evaluation shall be:

a. retained only for the purpose of determining the capability of the
electronic equipment;

b. disclosed only to persons conducting or evaluating the test; and

c. destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the testing.

2.3. (U) The technical parameters of a communication, such as frequency,
modulation, and time of activity of acquired electronic signals, may be
retained and used
for test reporting or collection-avoidance purposes. Such parameters may be
disseminated to other DoD intelligence components and other entities
authorized to
conduct electronic surveillance, provided such dissemination and use are
limited to testing, evaluation, or collection-avoidance purposes.




[Page E/1.]

SECRET

USSID 18
27 July 1993

ANNEX E

SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS (U)

SECTION 1 - GENERAL

1.1. (U) This annex provides the procedures for safeguarding the rights of
U.S. persons when conducting SIGINT search and development activities.

1.2 (S-CCO) The USSS may conduct search and development activities with
respect to signals throughout the radio spectrum under the following
limitations:

a. Signals may be collected only for the purpose of identifying those
signals that:

(1) may contain information related to the production of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence;

(2) are enciphered or appear to contain secret meaning;

(3) are necessary to assure efficient signals intelligence collection or to
avoid the collection of unwanted signals; or,

(4) reveal vulnerabilities of United States communications security.

b. Communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States
or originated or intended for receipt by U.S. persons shall be processed in
accordance with Section 5 of USSID 18, provided that information
necessary for cataloguing constituent elements of the signal environment
may be
processed and retained. If such information does not identify a U.S.
person, information revealing a United States communications security
vulnerability may be retained.

c. Information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the
signal environment may be disseminated to the extent such information does
not
identify U.S. persons. Communications equipment nomenclature may be
disseminated. Information that reveals a vulnerability to United States
communications security may be disseminated to the appropriate
communications security authorities.

d. All information obtained in the process of search and development that
appears to be of foreign intelligence value may be forwarded to the proper
analytic office within NSA for processing and dissemination in
accordance with relevant portions of USSID 18.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
SECRET



[Page F/1.]

CONFIDENTIAL

USSID 18
27 July 1993

• Elite Sponsored Terrorism and the New World Order — Paul Joseph Watson, Fri Sep 19 02:58