New York Times
Weapons of Mass Confusion
Fri Aug 1 18:14:21 2003
64.140.158.181


August 1, 2003
Weapons of Mass Confusion
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/01/international/worldspecial3/01CND-GORDON.html


CAMP DOHA, Kuwait, Aug. 1 — There is a bold and entirely plausible
theory that may account for the mystery over Iraq's missing weapons of
mass destruction.

Saddam Hussein, the theory holds, ordered the destruction of his weapon
stocks well before the war to deprive the United States of a rationale
to attack his regime and to hasten the eventual lifting of the United
Nations sanctions. But the Iraqi dictator retained the scientists and
technical capacity to resume the production of chemical and biological
weapons and eventually develop nuclear arms.

Mr. Hussein's calculation was that he could restart his weapons programs
once the international community lost interest in Iraq and became
absorbed with other crises. That would enable him to pursue his dream of
making Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region and make it
easier for him to deter enemies at home and abroad.

"This is the leading theory," said Gary Samore, director of studies at
the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and a
former nonproliferation expert on the National Security Council under
President Bill Clinton.

American intelligence experts are still in Iraq trying to determine the
status of Mr. Hussein's weapons programs, so it is premature to be too
categorical about what they will find. What the theory offers, however,
is a new way to make sense of the testimony of captured Iraqi officials
who claim that weapons stocks were eliminated, Mr. Hussein's pattern of
grudging and partial cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors
and his longstanding ambitions in the region.

If true, it means that the Iraqi threat was less immediate than the
administration asserted but more worrisome than the critics now suggest.
And it means the decision to use military force to pre-empt that threat
was not an urgent necessity but a judgment call, one that can be
justified as the surest way to put an end to Iraq's designs but still
one about which ardent defenders of the United States' security can
disagree.

It is already clear that much of the recent debate over Iraq's weapons
programs has been too simplistic. In recent months, the discussion of
Iraq's intentions seems to have oscillated from one extreme to another.
Iraq was described by hawks before the war as a nation that was an
imminent threat to the United States, bristling with chemical and
biological weapons, or C.B.W., as intelligence agencies call them. Now
the administration's critics seem to suggest that the absence of weapons
stocks means that the Saddam Hussein regime had somehow abandoned its
goal to be an assertive regional power.

Neither portrait seems accurate. Certainly, the portrait of Iraq that
was initially put forward by the Bush administration appears to have
overstated the immediacy of the danger. In building its case for
pre-emptive military action, the White House suggested that Iraq had
weapon stocks and could provide them to terrorists, who could use them
to attack the United States. But American intelligence concluded that
Mr. Hussein was unlikely to conspire with terrorists to attack America
and would do so only if his regime was threatened. It now seems
virtually certain that Iraq did not have the stocks to provide weapons
of mass destruction, despite the Bush administration's repeated
contention that it believes it will find them.

"Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting
terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. against the United
States," says the declassified version of the National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq's weapons program, which was prepared in October.
"Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be
deterred he probably would become much less constrained in adopting
terrorist actions."

Some of the technical analysis behind the White House charges was also
challenged in the estimate. President Bush suggested in February that
Iraq could launch drones with germ weapons from ships at sea and use
them to attack the United States. While much of the American
intelligence community supported that assessment, there was one notable
exception: the intelligence arm of the United States Air Force, which
has a real claim to expertise in this area since the Air Force has
experience in operating advanced drones, also called unmanned aerial
vehicles.

"The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air
Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing U.A.V.'s primarily
intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare
(C.B.W.) agents," the declassified version of the estimate notes. "The
small size of Iraq's new U.A.V. strongly suggests a primary role for
reconnaissance, although C.B.W. delivery is an inherent capability."

But while the White House presented the most alarming interpretation of
the available intelligence, it is important to note that the dominant
view within the American intelligence community was that Iraq in fact
had stocks of poison gas, was continuing its effort to make germ weapons
and desired to become a nuclear power. This was not a view that was
intended only for public consumption. It was a strongly held assessment
within the American military community.

The failure to uncover weapon stocks also does not mean that Iraq's
hands were clean. Important questions remain. Why did Iraq only
grudgingly accede to inspections under the threat of military invasion
if it had nothing to hide? And why did it restrict access to its weapons
scientists?

David Kay, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is involved in
the American effort to unravel the mystery over Iraq's weapons programs,
told Congress on Thursday that American intelligence specialists were
making progress. He said that the Iraq Survey Group, which the
administration has established to investigate the issue, will not
present its findings until it has three types of evidence: multiple
Iraqi sources, documents and physical proof.

In the meantime, a plausible theory is that the Iraqi dictator was
trying to strike a subtle balance between averting a war and preserving
Iraq's military options for the future. Destroying the stocks would
deprive the United Nations Security Council of a reason to authorize
military action to oust the regime, he calculated. But Mr. Hussein
continued to believe that the programs were essential to his strategic
ambition to dominate the Persian Gulf and to his efforts to fend off
internal and external challenges to his rule.

The Shiites were well aware that Mr. Hussein's forces had gassed the
Kurds and had more to fear from a regime armed with weapons of mass
destruction than one that no longer possessed such stocks. Or so the
theory goes.

It is possible, of course, that Mr. Hussein might have concluded he
could accomplish those ends simply by maintaining a sense of ambiguity
over his weapons efforts and not continuing the programs themselves.
Some notable specialists, however, believe that Iraq was keeping open
the option of getting back into the weapons game.

Robert J. Einhorn, a former top State Department official on weapons
proliferation, says his hunch was that Mr. Hussein had been trying to
preserve a "rapid reconstitution capability."

Amatzia Baram, an Israeli expert on Iraq and Mr. Hussein, has reached a
similar conclusion. The Saddam Hussein regime, he said, seems to have
ordered the destruction of its weapons stocks while retaining its cadre
of nuclear scientists and forbidding them to leave the country.

"Was it only to retain his deterrence or also to keep the option for
nuclearization later on?" Mr. Baram asks. "I think both. Saddam without
a regional ambition is a reformed man, and I don't think he was
reformed."


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