Rep. Waxman
(Cont'd) More Questions for NSA Rice
Thu Jul 31 20:03:33 2003
64.140.158.233

Given what we know now, this statement is impossible to understand. Contrary to the assertion in the NIE, the CIA repeatedly urged you, your staff, and the British government not to use the uranium claim in public in the days immediately before and after the NIB was issued. On September 24, 2002, for example, the British government issued a dossier with the first public allegation of Iraq's attempt to obtain uranium from Africa. We now know that the CIA told the British not to use the claim in its dossier. According to CIA Director Tenet:

"{I]n the fall of 2002, our British colleagues told us they were planning to publish an unclassified dossier that mentioned reports of Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in Africa. Because we viewed the reporting on such acquisition attempts to be inconclusive, we expressed reservations about its inclusion, but our colleagues said they were confident in their reports and left it in their document."14

Director Tenet's statement demonstrates that the CIA did not have confidence in the claim prior to the issuance of the NIB, at least based on evidence available to the agency. According to the Washington Post, the CIA also warned Britain that its analysts considered the "reports on other African countries to be 'sketchy.'"15 Yet the claim somehow made it into the ME.

After the NIE was issued, the CIA immediately began raising objections to the uranium claim. On October 4, 2002, the CIA issued a White Paper that was derived from the text of the NIE. This White Paper excised specific sections based on classification concerns. The uranium allegation was taken out, not because of classification issues, but because the CIA did not have confidence in its accuracy. According to CIA Director Tenet:

"An unclassified CIA White Paper in October made no mention of the issue... because we had questions about some of the reporting. For the same reasons, the subject was not included in many public speeches, Congressional testimony and the Secretary of State's United Nations presentation in early 2003."16

It is unclear how the CIA could be so certain about the uranium claim on October 1 when it delivered the NIE, and yet argue so strenuously against using it just three days later in the White Paper. The CIA also raised more objections to the public use of this claim in the days that followed the release of the White Paper. We know from Mr. Hadley, for example, that the CIA raised repeated concerns with the President using the allegation in his October 7 speech in Cincinnati. As described above, these concerns were set forth in two memos to you and your staff on October 5 and 6. CIA Director Tenet apparently felt so strongly about the questionable nature of the allegation that he telephoned Mr. Hadley personally on October 7 to ensure that the allegation did not appear in the President's public speech.
I therefore request answers to the following questions:

(1) What role, if any, did you and your staff play in drafting, editing, reviewing, or approving the uranium statement in the NIE before it was delivered to Congress?

(2) What role, if any, did officials from the Department of Defense play in drafting, editing, reviewing, or approving the uranium statement in the NIB before it was delivered to Congress?

(3) What role, if any, did the Vice President or his staff play in drafting, editing, reviewing, or approving the uranium statement in the NIB before it was delivered to Congress?

(4) Based on your investigation of this matter since it was revealed that the Niger documents were forgeries, how do you explain that the uranium statement was included in the NIB in such strong terms, while the CIA simultaneously objected to the claim in the British dossier, in memos to you and your staff, and in a telephone conversation to your deputy?

The State Department Fact Sheet

Just as the uranium claim mysteriously appeared in the NIB despite the CIA's protestations about its accuracy, the claim also appeared in a State Department Fact Sheet two months later despite objections from the State Department's own intelligence bureau. The Fact Sheet, entitled "illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council," was issued on December 19, 2002.17 It listed eight key areas in which the Bush Administration found fault with the weapons declaration that Iraq submitted to the United Nations on December 7, 2002. Under the heading "Nuclear Weapons," the Fact Sheet stated:

"The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?"

As you know, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is the State Department office responsible for analyzing intelligence and making recommendations to the Secretary of State. According to Greg Thielmann, a former director of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs at INR, his office "had concluded that the purchases were implausible and made that point clear to Powell's office." 18

The declassification of the NIB confirmed that the State Department made these conclusions as early as October two months prior to the release of the Fact Sheet. According to sections now publicly available, the NIB stated that intelligence officials at the State Department believed "claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are... highly dubious."19

On April 29, 2003, Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, stated in a letter to me that the State Department's December 19 Fact Sheet including the claim referring to Niger "was a product developed jointly by the CIA and the State Department."20 Contrary to this account, however, the CIA has denied that it had a role in the creation of the Fact Sheet. Senior CIA officials told the Washington Post that they objected to including the Niger claim:

"When the State Department on Dec. 19, 2002, posted a reference to Iraq not supplying details on its uranium purchases, the CIA raised an objection, 'but it came too late' to prevent its publication, the senior intelligence official said."21

As in the case of the NEE, these circumstances indicate that an unidentified Bush Administration official or officials succeeded in inserting the suspect uranium claim into a State Department document in the face of objections from the Department's own intelligence analysts. There appears to be a continuing dispute between the State Department and the CIA over who was responsible.

I therefore request answers to the following questions:

(1) Were any National Security Council officials or staff involved in the creation or editing of the Fact Sheet? If so, identify these individuals and describe their involvement and responsibility with respect to the Fact Sheet.

(2) Are you aware of any other officials that were involved in the creation or editing of the Fact Sheet? Please identify any such officials and describe their involvement and responsibility with respect to the Fact Sheet.

(3) Who cleared the Fact Sheet's section relating to Niger?

(4) What communications, if any, did National Security Council officials have with State Department, CIA, or Defense Department officials regarding the Niger claim being included in the Fact Sheet, both before and after it was issued? Please describe the content of any such communications, and between whom and when such communications took place.

Conclusion

I look forward to your response to the questions in this letter and my June 10 letter.

Sincerely,
Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member

1 Meet the Press, NBC News (June 8, 2003).
2 This Week with George Stephanopoulos, ABC News (June 8, 2003).
3 Face the Nation, CBS News (July 13, 2003).
4 President Defends Allegation on Iraq, Washington Post (July 15, 2003).
5 Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing on Iraq Weapons of MassDestruction and the State of the Union Speech, FDCH Political Transcripts (July 22, 2003).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Why We Know Iraq Is Lying, New York Times (Jan. 23, 2003).
9 The White Rouse, Press Gaggle with An Fleischer and Dr. Condoleeza Rice aboard Air Force One en Route to Entebbe, Uganda (July 11, 2003).
10 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update (Mar. 7, 2003) (online at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/  2003/ebsp2003nOO6.shtml).
11 Letter from Piet de Klerk, Director, Office of External Relation and Policy Coordination, IAEA, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (June 20, 2003). See also What Little Intelligence Was New on Iraq 's Suspected Weapons Has Been Called into Question, Associated Press (July 13, 2003).
12 See 5OU.S.C.A. § 402.
13 Meet the Press, NBC News (Mar. 16, 2003).
14 Central Intelligence Agency, Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence (July 11, 2003) (online at http://www.cia.gov/cialpublic_affairs/press_release/2003/prO7  112003 .html).
15 CIA Asked Britain To Drop Iraq Claim; Advice on Alleged Uranium Buy Was Refused, Washington Post (July 11, 2003).
16 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 14.
17 US Department of State, Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi
Declaration to the United Nations Security Council (Dec. 19, 2002) (online at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/l 611 8pflhtm).
18 (Over)selling the World on War, Newsweek (June 9, 2003).
19 Uranium Claim Was Known for Months to Be Weak; Intelligence Officials Say 'Everyone Knew' Then What White House Knows Now about Niger Reference, Washington Post (July 20, 2003).
20 Letter from Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Apr. 29, 2003).
21 CIA Says It Cabled Key Data to White House; But Officials Say Document Lacked Conclusion on Iraqi Uranium Deal, Washington Post (June 13, 2003).