WHITE HOUSE
BRIEFING: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ
Tue Jul 22 21:11:15 2003
208.152.73.195


SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL HOLDS BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ, AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE
JULY 18, 2003
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/07/wh071803.html

SPEAKER: SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Today I do want to walk through a document today that we have released, as well as take any other questions you have about the speech-making process here in the White House. I know that there's been a lot of questions about the developments of the State of the Union address; about what the President has been talking about; again what the President reiterated yesterday and has on many occasions about the clear and compelling case that he outlined not only before the United Nations Security Council, which resulted in the Security Council passing Resolution 1441, but also the information in the case that was provided to the United States Congress, which they used to cast their vote; as well as the information which the President shared to the American public, as well as the world in the State of the Union address.

What you have here today is the key judgments from the National Intelligence Estimate. The National Intelligence Estimate is the work product of about six intelligence agencies that pulled together all the information -- this is a particular one with regards to the weapons of mass destruction program of Saddam Hussein, as you see. It is titled "Iraq's Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction." And in this document it is the key judgments they have made about the WMD program. Also included in that, in the back that I will talk about is the specific sections of the uranium acquisition.

The NIE, itself, is about a 90-page document based upon thousands and thousands of pages of intelligence from a wide spectrum of capabilities that our government has -- whether it be human intelligence, technical intelligence, foreign intelligence. All those different data points are crystallized -- not all can be included in one document -- but are crystallized in the National Intelligence Estimate, and then summarized in the key judgments.

And as you can see here, at the very first, as it says in the Intelligence Estimate, "We judge that Iraq has continued it weapons of mass destruction programs, in defiance of U.N. resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions. If left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade." It also cites in there, "See INR alternative view at the end of the key judgments." Again, INR is one of six agencies that participate in this process. And the NIE process allows for footnotes and for dissents on any particular aspect if they so choose.

It goes on to say, "We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf War starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's said WMD programs."

This has been a key part of the concern the President has outlined on many occasions, that the denial and deception of the regime has always been a concern to our government, to many governments, because of lack of cooperation with inspectors, the throwing out of inspectors in 1998, and the thwarting of the job the inspectors had done, so eloquently presented by Secretary Powell. It has always been a concern of the United States government and other governments, as well.

As you go through these bullet points, you see if you go down toward the bottom part of page five, it says, "Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons, or sufficient material to make any" -- it's really page one, but it's page five because that's what it was in the NIE -- I apologize -- "he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors departed, December 1998."

As we go through, at the top of the next page, this is a summary, not entirely inclusive because there's a 90-page report that follows this, but these are some of the key bullets that underline the reconstitution of the nuclear program.

"Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in, and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors, as well as Iraq's attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines and machine tools provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program.

"The Department of Energy here agrees that the reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway, but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program," as we said and as Secretary Powell pointed out during his presentation to the U.N. Security Council. He said that there was a discussion about the aluminum tubes both with the IAEA, as well as within our own government -- both the INR, the State Department intelligence bureau, as well as the Department of Energy, both felt -- had different technical beliefs about the use of aluminum tubes. But the consensus, including the CIA, stated as it reads in this document.

"Iraq's efforts to reestablish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel, as well as activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway. All agencies agreed that about 25,000 centrifuges based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire would be capable of producing approximately two weapons worth of highly-enriched uranium per year."

And as President Bush said last night, as we stated many times before, the history on this is very important, that in 1991, after the Gulf War, IAEA and others had no conclusive evidence of a nuclear weapons program being as far along as they ultimately learned through defectors and through others that came forward in the wake of the Gulf War. That underestimation was only revealed through those efforts postwar. And that's a very important construct to remember, and it's a very important construct for policymakers to consider when they make judgments on policy.

And that's exactly -- this document, as well as reams of other information that may not be included in this document, but have been shared with the intelligence communities, with the intelligence committees in the Congress; many of this information is also in other forms, in various formats -- in the U.N. Security Council, in other foreign governments' own intelligence-based reporting. And that's why you've had a history of actions being taken by several of these bodies, whether it be the more than dozen resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council demanding Saddam Hussein to come forward with his weapons program; whether it be the prior administration in 1998, and the subsequent vote in the 1998 Congress that resulted in air strikes being committed by that administration; or by the reams of information and the totality and compelling case that was provided before the United States Congress that they used in making their vote known and cast this past fall; and obviously, the information the President has shared with the public.

It is a clear, it is a compelling case that, as the President has stated time and time again, after the events of September 11th, that this war on terror will be aggressively pursued, that policymakers in this administration will not put the security of the American people at risk by putting our hopes and desires in the hands of dictators and madmen who have weapons of mass destruction and ties to terror. And that's why he has aggressively pursued this war, as eloquently put by Prime Minister Blair, as well as President Bush yesterday, both in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, and many other parts of the world as we fight al Qaeda.

And this information is a critical aspect of the decision-making process that policymakers have to make. These are analytical judgments made by analysts in various agencies. And policymakers take this information and then they have to make judgments based on policy. The President has been very forthright in that, in talking about the policy judgments our country is required to make in a post-9/11 world. And we will continue to pursue those policies to make America safer.

As you see in here, as I've said, stated, the footnotes have been provided by an alternative view -- and I'll read for you, state INR alternative view of Iraq's nuclear program. "The Assistant Secretary of State for INR believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon- related capabilities.

The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of U.N. inspectors, or to project a time line for completion of activities it does not now see happening. And as a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon."

And again, it goes into the much publicly known aluminum tube case. And as you can see below that, based on this information that they have, they make judgment levels, high confidence, moderate confidence, low confidence, as you talk about the various parts of the key judgments that are outlined before it. And I think it's important on the INR dissent -- like I said, it was one of six agencies, and based upon the history that we learned in 1991, policymakers have to take that in consideration when they make judgments.

But I will cite -- I will go to the Cincinnati speech where the President addressed this very specific issue. In the Cincinnati speech that's been talked about, earlier in the fall when it was delivered, he said, "Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know exactly. And that's the problem. Before the Gulf War, the best intelligence indicated that Iraq was eight to ten years away from developing a nuclear weapon. After the war, international inspectors learned that the regime has been much closer, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993. The inspectors discovered that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons program, had a design for a workable nuclear weapon, and was pursuing several different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb."

He goes on to talk about some of the things that are in the NIE. He says, "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls the "nuclear mujahideen," his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at a site that had been part of its nuclear program in the past, and that it's attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."

He goes on to say, "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount of highly-enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam would be in a position to blackmail anyone he opposes -- who opposes his aggression. He'd be in a position to dominate the Middle East. He'd be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists."

That is, I think, as he said -- he goes on to say, "Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we want to confront it now. And there's a reason. We've experienced the horrors of September the 11th. We have seen those that hate America, willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing; in fact, they would be eager to use a biological or chemical or nuclear weapon."

Back to the NIE. As we said, in addition to the key judgments that were provided, if you will flip to page 24, as stated at the bottom -- and again, this is an excerpt from a broader part of the body of the NIE. We felt this was important to provide as a --

QUESTION: We don't have page 24.
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