rainesco
the guy who had to have the cake: Condi-Man Bob Joseph
Mon Jul 14 16:17:22 2003
67.30.97.86

[[On Wolf Blitzer today, Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment, nailed Bob
Joseph (who "works for" Condi Rice) for his insistence on having the
Nigerian nuke in the speech. No wonder Condi made that call from Africa leaning
on G. Tenet, who obliged a few hours later with self-inflicted wounds.

Some background.]]

"...we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans using the best
intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those
who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action."

The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director, Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and
Homeland Defense, National Security Council; Transcript, Session 1 - October 16,
2002, Security Challenges in the New Reality

[[Read the speech you probably didn't hear last fall (see below in full)]

==========

Tenet accepts blame for Bush's erroneous Iraq weapons allegation

http://www.statesman.com/nationworld/content/news/071203/0712iraqweapons.html

(snip)

"Before Bush's speech, conversations between the CIA and White House over
whether to include the African reference were held between Bob Joseph, a
National Security Council nuclear proliferation expert, and Alan Foley, a CIA
proliferation expert, government officials told The New York Times.

"There is still a dispute over what exactly was said in their
conversations. Foley was said to recall that before the speech, Joseph asked him about
putting into the speech a reference to reports that Iraq was trying to buy
uranium from Niger. Foley replied that the CIA wasn't sure that information
was right.

"Joseph then came back to Foley and pointed out that the British had
already included the information in a report. Foley said yes, but noted that the
CIA had told the British that it wasn't sure that information was correct.
Joseph then asked whether it was accurate that the British reported the
information? Foley said yes."

==========

[[Curiously, both Alan Foley and Buzzy Krongard received CIA mention in
March 2001. Even more curiously, Foley's expertise was in the same field as
Bob Joseph: Sovietry.]]

Loeb, Vernon. "CIA Is Stepping Up Attempts to Monitor Spread of Weapons."
Washington Post, 12 Mar. 2001, A15. [ http://www.washingtonpost.com ]

DCI George J. Tenet last week announced the formation of the Weapons
Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center, to be headed by veteran
Soviet military analyst Alan Foley. The Center, with "500 analysts,
scientists and support personnel," will "focus on nonproliferation and arms
control issues."

Loeb, Vernon, and Greg Schneider. "Colorful Outsider Is Named No. 3 at the
CIA." Washington Post, 17 Mar. 2001, A3. [ http://www.washingtonpost.com ]

On 16 March 2001, "A.B. 'Buzzy' Krongard, a cigar-chomping former
investment banker and martial arts enthusiast, was named ... executive director of
the CIA.... Krongard ... joined the agency three years ago as a counselor
to [DCI George J.] Tenet."

[[Could be some "personal history" between Foley and Joseph?]]

==========

Interview with Ambassador Robert G. Joseph
conducted by Leonard S. Spector
(The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001, Volume 8 Number 3
Copyright ?????? 2001 by Monterey Institute of International Studies)

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/83/jos83.htm

BACKGROUND
Ambassador Robert G. Joseph is Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Proliferation Strategies, Counterproliferation, and
Homeland Defense, U.S. National Security Council Staff. He is recognized as a
leading member of the group of Republican defense strategists whose writings
helped to shape the national security outlook of candidate George W. Bush.
Since joining the Bush administration, Ambassador Joseph has played a key
role on such issues as developing a new strategic framework with Russia and
improving coordination of U.S. counterproliferation initiatives.

Prior to joining the National Security Council (NSC) staff, Dr. Joseph
served as a Professor of National Security Studies and Director of the Center
for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University. In
the previous Bush administration, he held the positions of U.S. Commissioner
to the Standing Consultative Commission on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty and Ambassador to the U.S.-Russian Consultative Commission on
Nuclear Testing. In the Reagan administration, he held several positions within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy.

(snip)
NPR: .... We also have a more urgent situation because of the anxiety
over the biological and chemical weapons in Iraq and Iraq's known support for
certain terrorist organizations.

=========

http://www.ifpafletcherconference.com/marines2002/joseph.htm

"Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction in a New National Security
Strategy"

The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director, Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland
Defense, National Security Council


Pfaltzgraff: ????????? I want next to turn to Dr. Robert Joseph. This topic is,
of course, a logical outgrowth of what Steve has already told us when he
mentioned weapons of mass destruction. We asked Dr. Joseph to talk about the
topic, "Countering WMD in the New National Security Strategy."

Bob Joseph is Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense in the
National Security Council. He previously was the Director of the Center for
the Counterproliferation Research at National Defense University. He is a
person whom I have known for more than 20 years and, in fact, I should add
that I first met him when he came up to teach for an academic year at the
Fletcher School more than 20 years ago, as a matter of fact.

So we have known each other for a long time. So it is a great pleasure and
an honor to welcome Bob Joseph as our next speaker.

Joseph: Once again, it is the late Bob Joseph. Bob, thank you very much
for that very generous introduction and the kind invitation to be here today.
It is a pleasure to take time away from the office and come and listen to
others on the key issues that you have identified for this conference.

Last month the President released the first National Security Strategy
Document of his administration. It differs substantially from his predecessors
in two fundamental ways. First our strategy rejects the long-standing and
what I believe to be false dichotomy between power and values. From the
very first paragraph the document emphasizes the goals of universal human
rights and the President's personal commitment to promoting political and
economic freedom as the appropriate model for national success.

In this context the document acknowledges the unparalleled political and
military strength of the United States and emphasizes the need to use this
strength, not to create unilateral advantage but to promote a peace and
security that can improve the conditions of all societies. But perhaps the
greatest difference that this document presents from those of the past is in
the description of and the prescription for defending against today's
threats.

Here the impact of the events of September 11th are very clear. The war
against terrorism and against terrorists with global reach and, indeed,
perhaps weapons of mass destruction is a new type of war that requires us to
think differently about or enemies and to harness new tools and methods to
defeat them. But the origins of the administration's strategy for dealing with
contemporary threats and especially weapons of mass destruction in the
hands of both rogue states and terrorists pre-date September 11th.

In his first major address on security policy, given at the National
Defense University in May of 2001, the President outlined the need to move
beyond cold war approaches to security, both to defend against new threats and
to seize new opportunities for peace. The President, in that speech, could
not have been more explicit with regard to the need for new concepts and for
new tools for dealing with the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

While the NDU speech was often mischaracterized by critics as all about
missile defense, it was much more than that. It was a call to move beyond the
cold war thinking to take into account contemporary threats that do not
represent simply lesser cases of the old Soviet model. Rogue states represent
qualitative different types of threats. Compared to the Soviet leadership,
their leaders are more risk prone.

Their leaders view weapons of mass destruction differently than the Soviet
Union had perceived them. These weapons are viewed by rogue states as
weapons of choice, not as weapons of last resort. And so deterring and
defending against these threats will be more difficult than in the past with the
Soviet Union. There are no mutual understandings with these states. There are
no effective lines of communications with them.

Moreover, the dynamics of deterrents are much different than in the cold
war. Remember that we wanted to keep the Soviet Union from expanding
outwards. Our new adversaries want to keep us out of what they consider to be
their regions, to deny us the ability to come to the assistance of our friends
and allies in these vital regions if they are attacked.

By their own calculations, these leaders believe that they can do this by
holding a few of our cities hostage. This is not about a quest about a
first strike capability against the United States as we knew it in the old
days. Rather, our new adversaries seek only enough destructive power to
blackmail us so that we will not come to the help of our friends who would then
become the victims of aggression.

The NDU speech also emphasized the goal of changing fundamentally our
relationship with Russia. A major part of that speech stressed the opportunity
for historic change in our relations. The President made very clear that he
intended to change the basis of our relationship from mutual vulnerability
to mutual interests, from confrontation to cooperation. And it was in this
context that the President called for an end to the 1972 ABM Treaty, a
treaty that not only prevented us from defending ourselves from new threats,
but also prevented us from establishing a new and positive relationship with
Russia.

Today, after having withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, we do have a different
relationship with Russia. We have created a partnership against terrorism
in which Moscow does not object to the stationing of American forces on
territory of the former Soviet Union. We have signed an historic arms reduction
treaty. And, even more importantly, we have agreed that future treaties
are no longer necessary because we do not threaten each other.

We have agreed on a much-expanded Russian participation in NATO. Those who
predicted that the sky would fall last December, and there were many of
them, when the President announced our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
couldn?????????t have been more wrong. There is no arms race. There is arms reduction.
There is no confrontation with Russia, only more cooperation including our
missile defense.

Four months after the NDU speech, the war on terrorism was forced upon us.
From the beginning this war has had an important WMD element. This element
has grown in importance as we have learned about Al Qaeda's growing
interest in acquiring from rogue states and other sources chemical, biological,
and radiological weapons for attacks on us. This threat of terrorists armed
with weapons of mass destruction, is made more clear when one compares the
list of states seeking WMD with the list of states that sponsor terrorists.


The lists are virtually identical. And it was for this reason that the
President committed in his December speech last year at the Citadel, not to
allow the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to acquire the
world?????????s most dangerous weapons. It is why the President tasked Dr. Rice and
Governor Ridge to work together to develop a comprehensive national strategy
to combat weapons of mass destruction.

And this is the strategy that is outlined in the National Security
Strategy Document. This strategy has three principal pillars. The first is counter
proliferation, to develop and deploy the capabilities to deter and defend
against the full spectrum of WMD threats. We must insure that key
capabilities, detection, active and passive defenses, and counter-force capabilities
are integrated into our defense and homeland security posture.

Counterproliferation must also be an integral part of the basic doctrine,
training, and equipping of our forces as well as those of our allies to
insure that we can operate and prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed
adversaries. Counterproliferation can no longer be a specialty or an afterthought.
The threat to the homeland, to our friends and allies, and to our military
forces abroad, will not allow this luxury.

The second pillar is strengthened nonproliferation against the spread of
WMD to rogue states and terrorists. The President's National Security
Strategy puts new and needed emphasis on counterproliferation. But that does not
mean that we will reduce our effort to prevent rogue states and terrorists
from acquiring WMD materials, technology or expertise in the first place.
The President has expanded nonproliferation and weapons reduction assistance
to the states of the former Soviet Union asking more for this purpose in
the FY '03 budget-request than ever before. The president also successfully
proposed to his G-8 colleagues, the global partnership against the spread
of weapons and materials of mass destruction under which the United States
has pledged $10 billion dollars for nonproliferation assistance over the
next 10 years. The need is too great for the United States alone. We welcome
our partners' commitment to take on a fair share of this burden. Our
nonproliferation efforts also mean enhancing in meaningful ways multi-lateral,
nonproliferation treaties and regimes.

That includes strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, through
increased funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency and promotion
of the additional protocol. It does not include signing up for arms control
for the sake of arms control. At best that would be a needless diversion of
effort when the real threat requires all of our attention. At worst, as we
discovered in the draft BWC Protocol that we inherited, an arms control
approach would actually harm our ability to deal with the WMD threat.

The third pillar is effective consequence management to respond to the
effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states. We must develop
and maintain the ability to reduce, to the extent possible, the potentially
horrific effects of WMD attacks at home and abroad. Doing so is essential
in its own right. We also believe it will increase our ability to deter such
attacks by persuading our enemies that they cannot achieve their desired
objectives.

Finally, the National Security Strategy is clear-headed about what the
contemporary WMD threat may require militarily. Given the immediacy and
potential magnitude of the threats, and the value our enemies place on weapons of
mass destruction as weapons of choice, we can no longer rely on a reactive
posture. We must, if necessary, act pre-emptively. We will not do so in
all cases.

And our use of force will be deliberate in measure to eliminate a specific
threat to the United States, our friends or allies. The best summation
that I know of the administration's appro