M.F. Abernathy
Anti-Draft Activist Kills His Wife -- Conclusion
Sun Dec 21 16:31:46 2003
216.19.126.7

The trial court concluded appellant suffered from a chronic mental disorder and was delusional at the time of the crime. It noted that Drs. Koshkarian and Jaffe agreed appellant was aware his act was criminal. Indeed, its very criminality was central to the motive for the act. The court appears to have determined that the doctors' finding of insanity was based on their conclusion [***29] appellant did not believe his act was morally wrong because it was carried out for a greater good. Thus, in their minds appellant was unable to distinguish between what was morally right and what was morally wrong.

The court stated if it were to apply the American Law Institute test of insanity, it would find appellant insane because he lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. n5 Under the test defined by section 25, subdivision (b), however, appellant was sane.

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n5 "'A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.'" ( People v. Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d 333, 345, quoting A.L.I.'s Model Penal Code, section 4.01, fn. omitted.)


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Following its conclusion that appellant was aware of the nature and quality of his [***30] act, the court stated: "That gets us to the second prong, and I think there's a legal issue here of what does the term 'wrongfulness' mean. If the term 'wrongfulness' means moral correctness, social benefit, that would be one thing. I think the law is clear that the term 'wrongfulness' means violation of the laws of the state . . . ." The court continued: "There are acts that people thought were moral that, however, violated the laws. And the purpose of the insanity defense, I think, is not to allow moral judgments or differing moral values to be the standard of insanity. The question, I think, is a narrow question: Does the defendant know and understand that the act is wrong?" The court concluded appellant understood his act was criminal and found him sane at the time of the crime.

It appears the trial court believed that in the context of section 25, subdivision (b), the term "wrong" meant legal and not moral wrong. While there is much good sense in the trial court's position, and while that rule is followed in some jurisdictions (see, e.g., State v. Crenshaw (1983) 98 Wn.2d 789 [659 P.2d 488, 489]; State v. Hamann (Iowa 1979) 285 N.W.2d 180, 182-184; [*1274] [***31] State v. Boan (1984) 235 Kan. 800 [686 P.2d 160], -- see also Note, Returning to M'Naghten, supra, Ariz. L.Rev. at pp. 146-147; Goldstein, The Insanity Defense, supra, at pp. 51-53; LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, § 4.2, pp. 442-444; A.L.I., Model Pen. Code, § 4.01 and com., pp. 163-186), it is not the position enunciated by Skinner. The trial court, therefore, erred in concluding that "wrong" in the sanity context means criminal rather than moral wrong.

In order to address the question of prejudice arising from the trial court's error, it is necessary we further define the concept of moral wrong as it applies to determinations of sanity in order to determine whether a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached had the trial court applied the proper standard. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243].)

[**923] (5b) Although seldom addressed by the courts, which have generally left the word "wrong" undefined in jury instructions, the question is whether moral wrong is to be judged by society's generally accepted standards of moral obligation or whether [***32] the subjective moral precepts of the accused are to be employed. While the inherent "slipperiness" of the terminology in this area may leave some doubt, it appears most courts mean that the defendant is sane if he knows his act violates generally accepted standards of moral obligation whatever his own moral evaluation may be. (Compare, State v. Skaggs (1978) 120 Ariz. 467 [586 P.2d 1279, 1284]; State v. Corley (1972) 108 Ariz. 240 [495 P.2d 470, 472-473]; Com. v. Banks (1987) 513 Pa. 318 [521 A.2d 1, 14]; Chase v. United States (7th Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 141, 148; State v. Hamann, supra, 285 N.W.2d at pp. 182-184; United States v. Segna (9th Cir. 1977) 555 F.2d 226, 232-233; see also LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at pp. 442-444; Goldstein, The Insanity Defense, supra, at pp. 51-53; Note, Returning to M'Naghten, supra, 30 Ariz. L.Rev. at pp. 147-148.)

Again, while not entirely clear, it appears California follows the rule that moral obligation in the context of the insanity [***33] defense means generally accepted moral standards and not those standards peculiar to the accused. In Skinner the court cites with approval an opinion by Justice Cardozo which states: "'Knowledge that an act is forbidden by law will in most cases permit the inference of knowledge that, according to the accepted standards of mankind, it is also condemned as an offense against good morals . . . .' ( People v. Schmidt (1915) 216 N.Y. 324, 338-340 . . . ." ( People v. Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d 765, 783-784, fn. omitted.) This quote seems to suggest that general moral standards and not personal ones are determinative. (See Note, Returning to M'Naghten, supra, Ariz. L.Rev. at p. 148.)

[*1275] In People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 734 [7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645], in the context of a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of legal sanity, the court stated: "Dr. Francis' testimony can reasonably be understood to mean that in his opinion defendant, although recognizing that his conduct did not accord with social standards of right [***34] and legal standards of justification, felt that [the victim] might attack him at some future time and therefore, according to defendant's personal, prison-influenced standards he was 'justified' in eliminating [the victim]. The fact a defendant claims and believes that his acts are justifiable according to his own distorted standards does not compel a finding of legal insanity. [Citation.] This is necessarily so if organized society is to formulate standards of conduct and responsibility deemed essential to its preservation or welfare, and to require compliance, within tolerances, with those standards."

We conclude in California "wrong," in the sanity context, means the violation of generally accepted standards of moral obligation. While we agree with the commentators that in most instances legal wrongfulness and moral wrongfulness are equivalent, this is not always the case (see Goldstein, The Insanity Defense, supra, § 4.2 at pp. 51-55; LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, supra, at pp. 442-444) and a defendant is free to argue, in the terms of section 25, subdivision (b), that while he was able to distinguish between legal right and wrong he could not distinguish [***35] between moral right and wrong.

(3d) In finding the defendant sane, the trial court repeatedly commented appellant's motivations were "crazy" but that appellant, nonetheless, recognized his acts were illegal. As we have noted, the court stated that were the American Law Institute test still in effect, it might have found appellant unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and would have found appellant insane. Appellant's explanation for killing his wife was liberally sprinkled with comments indicating her death would contribute to some higher good. He described his dealings with the [**924] government as a war and his wife as a soldier in that war. While the center of appellant's motivation was to be charged with a serious crime and thus be provided a forum to espouse his ideas, he at one time stated that if aware of the facts of his crusade, no jury would convict him. We believe these facts can be interpreted as a belief by appellant that while his act was illegal, it did not violate generally accepted moral standards. We believe, therefore, if the trial court had used the proper standard regarding knowledge of wrong contained in section 25, subdivision (b), it is reasonably [***36] probable a more favorable verdict for appellant would have been returned. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

[*1276] The verdict of murder in the first degree is affirmed; the case is remanded for a new hearing on the issue of sanity.