US Created al-Zarqawi Myth
Jennifer Schultz
Thursday 10 November 2005
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/111405B.shtml
The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-
Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass
movement."
The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-
Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass
movement."
(Photo: spacewar.com)
The United States created the myth around Iraq insurgency leader
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and reality followed, terrorism expert Loretta
Napoleoni said.
Al-Zarqawi was born Ahmad Fadil al-Khalayleh in October 1966 in
the crime and poverty-ridden Jordanian city of Zarqa. But his myth
was born Feb. 5, 2003, when then-Secretary of State Colin Powell
presented to the United Nations the case for war with Iraq.
Napoleoni, the author of "Insurgent Iraq," told reporters last
week that Powell's argument falsely exploited Zarqawi to prove a
link between then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. She
said that through fabrications of Zarqawi's status, influence and
connections "the myth became the reality" - a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
"He became what we wanted him to be. We put him there, not the
jihadists," Napoleoni said.
Iraq's most notorious insurgent, Napoleoni argues, accomplished
what bin Laden could not: "spread the message of jihad into Iraq."
In an article of Napoleoni's in the current November/December
issue of Foreign Policy, she said, "In a sense, it is the very
things that make Zarqawi seem most ordinary - his humble upbringing,
misspent youth and early failures - that make him most frightening.
Because, although he may have some gifts as a leader of men, it is
also likely that there are many more 'al-Zarqawis' capable of
filling his place."
The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-
Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass
movement."
Al-Zarqawi became "the icon" of a new generation of anti-
imperialist jihadists, she said.
The grand claim that al-Zarqawi provided the vital link between
Saddam and al-Qaida lost its significance after it became known that
al-Zarqawi and bin Laden did not forge a partnership until after the
war's start. The two are believed to have met sometime in 2000, but
al-Zarqawi - similar to a group of dissenting al-Qaida members -
rebuffed bin Laden's anti-American brand of jihad.
"He did not have a global vision like Osama," said Napoleoni,
who interviewed primary and secondary sources close to al-Zarqawi
and his network.
A former member of al-Zarqawi's camp in Herat told her, "I never
heard him praise anyone apart from the Prophet [Muhammad]; this was
Abu Musab's character. He never followed anyone."
Al-Zarqawi's scope before the Iraq war, she continued, did not
extend past corrupt Arab regimes, particularly Jordan's. Between
2000 and early 2002, he operated the training camp in Herat with
Taliban funds; the fighters bound for Jordan. After the fall of the
Taliban, he fled to Iraqi Kurdistan and set up shop.
In 2001, Kurdish officials enlightened the United States about
the uninvited Jordanian, said Napoleoni. Jordanian officials, who
had still unsolved terrorist attacks, were eager to implicate al-
Zarqawi, she claimed. The little-known militant instantly had
fingerprints on most major terrorist attacks after Sept. 11, 2001.
He was depicted in Powell's speech as a key player in the al-Qaida
network.
By perpetuating a "terrifying myth" of al-Zarqawi, the author
said, "The United States, Kurds, and Jordanians all won ... but
jihad gained momentum," after in-group dissension and U.S. coalition
operations had left the core of al-Qaida crippled.
In her article, Napoleoni says, "[Zarqawi] had finally managed
to grasp bin Laden's definition of the faraway enemy, the United
States." Adding that, "Its presence in Iraq as an occupying power
made it clear to him that the United States was as important a
target as any of the Arab regimes he had grown to hate.
"... The myth constructed around him is at the root of his
transformation into a political leader. With bin Laden trapped
somewhere in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Zarqawi fast became the
new symbolic leader in the fight against America and a manager for
whoever was looking to be part of that struggle," she wrote.
The author points to letters between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden
that have surfaced over the past two years, indicating the evolution
in their relationship, most notably a shift in al-Zarqawi which led
to his seeking additional legitimacy among Sunnis that bin Laden
could help bestow.
In late December 2004 - shortly after the fall of Fallujah - the
pan-Arab network Al-Jazeera aired a video of what was bin Laden's
first public embrace of Zarqawi and his fight in Iraq.
"... We in al-Qaida welcome your union with us ... and so that
it be known, the brother mujahid Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the emir of
the al Qaida organization [in Iraq]," bin Laden declared.
Napoleoni believes that al-Zarqawi, however, is still largely
driven by the romantic vision of a restored Caliphate, and that his
motives still are less political than some other factions
participating in the Iraq resistance.
She questions whether he has actually devised a plan for "what
he will do, if and when, he wins."
*********************************************************************
WORLD VIEW NEWS SERVICE
To subscribe to this group, send an email to:
wvns-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
NEWS ARCHIVE IS OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW
http://finance.groups.yahoo.com/group/wvns/
======================================
THE CHARLES GOYETTE SHOW 12/12/05
9:30am - 10am Imad Khadduri - Iraq Elections http://abutamam.blogspot.com/
Guest: Imad Khadduri,
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-12-12-Charles-03.mp3
========================
2005-12-12-Charles Another day of outstanding talk radio!!!
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/index.cgi?2005-12-12-Charles
Message Board by American Patriot Friends Network [APFN]
