Taking stock
Fifteen DCIs' First 100 Days
CIA History Staff
Editor's Note: These brief sketches convey some sense of
the pace and preoccupations of 15 Directors of Central
Intelligence (DCIs) in their first 100 days. No regular
cycles or predictive patterns emerge; some DCIs eased
into their jobs, while others found themselves suddenly
reacting to wars, scandals, or investigations.
Nevertheless, DCIs Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Colby,
and Gates managed major changes in CIA's structure and
mission in the 100-day span.
The History Staff in CIA's Center for the Study of
Intelligence originally prepared this work in January
1993 as a background paper for the new DCI, R. James
Woolsey. Seven of the staff's historians, Nicholas
Cullather, Gerald Haines, Scott Koch, Mary McAuliffe,
Kevin Ruffner, Donald Steury, and Michael Warner,
drafted the individual sketches, and the staff's chief,
J. Kenneth McDonald, edited them into final form. A few
changes have been made in the original version for
editorial and declassification reasons. Although this is
an official CIA History Staff product, the views
expressed--as in all of its works--are those of the
authors and editor and do not necessarily represent
those of the CIA
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/100Days.html
Robert Gates

Robert Gates, the first DCI from CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence, entered office on 6 November 1991 at age
48 with the future of the Agency and his own
professional integrity in question. Both factors helped
account for the intensity with which he approached his
first 100 days as DCI.
The failed coup of August 1991 had led to the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the Soviet empire,
and the end of the Cold War. With the sudden demise of
the CIA's chief target, the Agency unexpectedly found
itself searching for a new role. This urgent situation
was exacerbated by the rocky state of the US economy,
which produced growing demands to reduce the burden of
military and intelligence establishments.
Following Casey's resignation in 1987, President Reagan
had nominated Gates as DCI, but questions about his role
as Casey's DDCI in the Iran-Contra affair forced Gates
to withdraw his nomination. Four years later, President
Bush again nominated Gates, to succeed William Webster.
This time, Gates faced charges that he had politicized
intelligence estimates to conform more closely to his
own world views and to those of the Republican President
he had served. After committing himself to unbiased and
objective intelligence analysis, and to a more
forward-looking and open CIA, Gates received the
Senate's confirmation. Now, he had to live up to his
promises.
Gates recognized the diverse new problems that the
Intelligence Community had to address, from foreign
technology development and high-technology transfers to
world environmental concerns. Keenly aware that US
security objectives had changed dramatically, he knew
that the CIA needed to prove itself to an American
public that now questioned both its necessity and its
highly secretive culture. Thus, in his first 100 days as
DCI, he quickly assessed future intelligence priorities
and needs, identified available resources, and
recommended organizational changes as well as new budget
and legislative proposals.
To improve performance he established a multitude of
Intelligence Community and CIA task forces. These
included interagency task forces on imagery, human
intelligence collection, and National Intelligence
Estimates, as well as on coordination of various
activities within the Intelligence Community and the
restructuring of its staff. Gates set up CIA task forces
to expand human intelligence capabilities, improve
support for military operations, provide near-real-time
intelligence to senior policymakers, and raise the
quality of intelligence publications. He also announced
CIA task forces to improve internal communication,
increase openness, and address concerns about real or
perceived politicized intelligence.
By February 1992, Gates had already made many
restructuring changes aimed at carrying out his task
forces' recommendations, as in replacing the Office of
Soviet Analysis with a new Office of Slavic and Eurasian
Analysis. With an eye toward better relations with
Congress and the American people, he announced a
precedent-breaking openness policy for CIA, which
provided more accessibility to the media and public,
increased contacts with academia, and a markedly more
liberal declassification standard for CIA records of
historical significance.
==================================
Senate Hearing on Gates Nomination Gets Underway
By Bill Rodgers
Washington, D.C.
05 December 2006
watch Gates report / Real broadband - download
watch Gates report / Real broadband
watch Gates report / Real dialup - download
watch Gates report / Real dialup
http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-12-05-voa37.cfm