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medical examiner: Health and medicine explained.
Screen AlertHow an ounce of Rx prevention can cause a pound of
hurt.
By Darshak Sanghavi
Posted Tuesday, Nov. 28, 2006, at 11:41 AM ET
http://www.slate.com/id/2154563/
Last month, the New England Journal of Medicine reported that
performing annual CT scans on smokers and others at risk for
lung cancer could prevent "some 80 percent of deaths from lung
cancer." Yet the American Cancer Society and National Cancer
Institute still haven't endorsed this strategy. Frustrated, Dr.
Claudia Henschke, the study's lead author, recently told the New
York Times, "I don't get what the resistance is." Why should
such promising results prompt more study and not immediate
action?
Most people take for granted that an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure. Today, a routine trip to the doctor is
essentially a visit for numerous screening tests. The idea is
that problems caught early can be treated and cured early. High
blood pressure may indicate a risk for heart attacks in the
future; mammograms may catch early breast cancers before they
metastasize; blood routinely taken from newborns may indicate
metabolic problems before brain damage results.
But the truth is that screening tests are just like any other
drug or medical procedure, with potentially deadly risks that
must be balanced with the potential benefits. The same people
who would agonize over the decision to take estrogen-replacement
therapy, for example, don't think twice before getting a
mammogram. However, as the data indicate, they sometimes should.
Screening tests can cause harm in two major ways: false-positive
diagnoses and unnecessary treatment of benign conditions.
Unfortunately, these problems can be masked because a
little-known but vital error pervades almost every major study
involving screening for deadly diseases, especially cancers—and
makes the tests appear better than they really are.
First, due to statistical reality, even highly accurate
screening tests have many false positives. Take a random airport
test for cocaine that correctly identifies 99 percent of cocaine
smugglers and correctly excludes 99 percent of nonsmugglers, and
assume about 100 smugglers enter an airport of 100,000
passengers. Among smugglers, 99 would have a positive test, and
one would be negative. But among law-abiding travelers, 999
would have false-positive tests. Thus, only 99 out of 1,098
people who test positive, or less than 10 percent, are real
smugglers. So, a lot of innocent people endure fruitless
internal body-cavity searches. If all you care about is catching
smugglers, the results are great, since only one escapes. But if
you focus on the harm to bystanders, the screening procedure
seems pretty draconian.
In principle, a mammogram works the same way. Almost 10 percent
of annual mammograms are considered abnormal. According to a
1998 study from the New England Journal of Medicine, almost one
in five women who do not have breast cancer will have a biopsy
after about a decade of mammograms, and almost one-third will
have some form of additional testing stemming from a
false-positive breast-cancer screen.
The second danger of screening tests is overdiagnosis and
overtreatment. For example, the most common pediatric solid
tumor worldwide is neuroblastoma, which develops in roughly one
in 7,000 children. Most parents discover their child has it only
when they notice a large mass in the abdomen. But decades ago,
researchers realized that even tiny neuroblastomas often secrete
hormones similar to adrenaline into a child's urine. They
hypothesized that screening all healthy infants' urine for the
hormones could help find tumors that were still very small and
possibly curable. The Japanese Ministry of Health was the first
to try this; beginning in 1984, it tested the urine of Japanese
infants and soon found hundreds of small neuroblastomas—which
were promptly treated by surgery and chemotherapy.
Under great pressure to follow suit, Canadian and American
officials decided instead to perform a controlled study of
almost half a million infants and published their findings in
2002. Infants from Quebec were screened. Infants from other
areas weren't. When the groups were compared, the results were
shocking. Twice as many screened infants were diagnosed with
neuroblastoma, compared to other infants. But despite aggressive
treatment, the overall death rate from the cancer was the same.
Screening didn't save lives. All it did was identify infants
with harmless neuroblastomas that would have melted away without
treatment—and subjected them to surgery and chemotherapy. One
example of the human toll: During the study, a Canadian child
suffered brain damage from surgery for a neuroblastoma that
might have disappeared on its own, and fell into a persistent
vegetative state.
In short, it would have been better for the infants as a group
if their tumors had not been detected by urine screening. In
2005, economists from McGill University in Montreal calculated
that Canada and the United States avoided almost $600 million in
costs and the unnecessary treatment of almost 10,000 infants by
not plunging into the screening program as Japan had.
As the Japanese Ministry of Health learned, the only way to
assess the value of screening is by clinical trial, where a
screened group gets compared to an unscreened group to see who
ends up healthier. (Henschke's recent study of CT scanning,
alas, had no unscreened group.) Without careful trials, unproven
screening mushrooms. And it's impossible to uproot once
established. Today, for example, most healthy laboring women are
screened with fetal heart monitors for early brain asphyxia in
fetuses, which might be relieved by cesarean section. Yet
despite a five-fold increase in C-sections since the screening
became routine, cerebral-palsy rates in babies remain unchanged.
Without adequate data, prostate-specific antigen tests for
prostate cancer have proliferated wildly among middle-aged men;
their impact on heath is anyone's guess. The American Diabetes
Association recommends screening all patients over 45 years for
diabetes. Yet there is no evidence that this improves health.
Which brings us to a fundamental problem with the screening
studies themselves. As of 2002, only 16 randomized clinical
trials of adult cancer screening had ever been done, and all of
them concerned either chest X-ray screening for lung cancer,
mammography for breast cancer, or fecal blood testing for colon
cancer. (Conspicuously absent were trials for Pap smears, PSA
screening, colonoscopy, rectal exams, and testicular
self-exams.)
In a revealing 2002 paper in the Journal of the National Cancer
Institute, William Black and colleagues from Dartmouth-Hitchcock
Medical Center explain how those randomized studies—which form
the backbone of some screening guidelines—actually emphasized
the wrong outcome. Routine chest X-rays, for example, are
supposed to reduce the death rate from lung cancer, and that's
what the studies typically measure and report. Studies also
routinely show that mammograms reduce breast-cancer deaths. But
that's not really what people care about. What they want is an
overall lower death rate. What good, after all, is a test that
may lower the risk of lung-cancer death but increase the overall
risk of death from side effects, such as pointless operations
(as in neuroblastoma)?
Unfortunately, according to the Dartmouth analysis, none of the
studies demonstrated any measurable overall reduction in
mortality from cancer screening. Most worrisome, in half the
studies, the overall mortality rates tended to be worse in
screened groups than in unscreened groups—erasing any benefit of
screening.
Without better studies on which to base national screening
policies, efforts to prevent disease may do more harm than good.
It's hard to hold off on strategies as seductive as CT scanning
to detect early lung cancers and study them further. But if we
don't—to paraphrase—we must be prepared to accept the
consequences of going to war with the data we have, instead of
the data we really need.