Tuesday, November 22nd, 2005
Colin Powell's Former Chief of Staff Col. Wilkerson on
Haiti: Defends U.S. Role in Ouster of President, Claims
Aristide's "Will to Power is Excessive Even Obsessive"
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http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/11/22/1515240
We speak with Colin Powell's former chief of staff,
Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, about the overthrow of
Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 2004.
Wilkerson defends the U.S. role in Haiti at the time.
Aristide has maintained he was ousted in what he calls a
modern-day kidnapping in the service of a coup d'etat
backed by the United States. [includes rush transcript]
* Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, served as chief of staff to
Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005.
RUSH TRANSCRIPT
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AMY GOODMAN: We're talking to Colonel Lawrence
Wilkerson, former chief of staff of former Secretary of
State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005. Now, in this time,
Colonel Wilkerson, not only did we see the invasion and
occupation of Iraq, but we also saw the democratically
elected president of Haiti ousted, President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. And you were the chief of staff
of Colin Powell at the time. Bill Fletcher of
TransAfrica has said about Powell's legacy, quote, “Why
was he leading the charge, pushing President Aristide
out the door? Why was he not instead using his office as
a way of stabilizing the situation and bringing about
peace?” What do you know of what happened February 29th,
2004, when the Aristides were forced out of the country?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: I will have to tell you that I
think Secretary Powell saved a great many lives on both
sides, if there are two sides. There are more than two
sides in Haiti. Secretary Powell was all for and was
pushing hard for some sort of reconciliation, some sort
of reconciliation where we could recognize the
democratically elected government of Aristide and
Aristide could himself step back from the brink, a brink
that he had been largely responsible for creating, and
things could improve in Haiti and the government that
was in existence at that time could continue in office.
Once our ambassador, Ambassador Foley, who was one of
the people who changed my opinion forever about the
foreign service -- our ambassador in Liberia did the
same thing for me in Monrovia, such brave people.
They're braver than people I have even known sometimes
in combat. And Ambassador Foley, at great risk to
himself, personal risk, counseled President Aristide,
talked with President Aristide, confronted him with the
situation that Aristide was going to meet on the morn,
so to speak, confronted him with the devastation that
was likely to take place, and President Aristide, to his
credit, made the decision to take Ambassador Foley's
offer and to leave the country.
I know he said a thousand things different from that in
the subsequent weeks and months and years, but this was
a situation fraught with all kinds of chaos, and
Secretary Powell and the United States government and
our ambassador in Haiti, in particular, did a marvelous
job, I think, under the circumstances, of preventing
what could have been widespread bloodshed and getting
Aristide out of the country.
One testimony to that was the fact that even though on
the surface we had had all of these rancorous relations,
supposedly, with France, much on the part of Secretary
Rumsfeld’s having stiffed the French on almost
everything they wanted to do in the way of military
liaison and so forth, the French were willing to come in
and help us with the situation in Haiti and to provide
troops for stabilizing that situation, because they,
too, understood how desperate the situation was.
AMY GOODMAN: But this --
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: So I disagree completely with
the characterization that TransAfrica put on this
situation.
AMY GOODMAN: This all happened after the Aristides left.
Why not bring in these forces before? We were only
talking about a couple of hundred thugs that were moving
in on the capital?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Aristide was the focal point.
Aristide was the person who needed to be removed from
Haiti, and even he understood that. In the conversation
he had with our ambassador, he understood that. He knew
that he was the lightning rod, and that if he didn't
remove himself from the island, there was going to be a
lot of bloodshed.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, of course, he would contest every
point.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Of course, he would.
AMY GOODMAN: I went to the Central African Republic, and
he told the story of basically what he described as
being forced out of Haiti at the time, that you had this
small group – I mean, these were not a large number of
people – small group, known killers, people like Jodel
Chamblain, who was found guilty of murder in absentia
for the murder of the Justice Minister, Guy Malary, in
1993; Antoine Izmery. These were people who were known
-- certainly Colin Powell also knew them -- had been
back during the first coup, had been there negotiating
with those involved in the coup. This was not the
overall sentiment of the Haitian people, and he said it
was the U.S. that pressed him to leave, that pushed him
out, that put him onto this plane with U.S. military and
security. He had no idea where was going until he was
dumped in the Central African Republic.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: I can’t imagine a man like
Aristide, whose will to power is excessive, even
obsessive, saying anything differently. Colin Powell, as
you said, did know the situation in Haiti, probably as
well as anyone in America. Colin Powell made the
decision based on our ambassador in Haiti's very clear
presentation of the circumstances, and the President
made the decision ultimately, and it was a good
decision, and I would stand by that decision.
Haiti is a situation that picks at all our hearts all
the time. Haiti is right next to being a failed state.
And because of its proximity to the United States, we
know what that failure means. And Haiti is not
apparently capable of coming out of that situation. It's
a situation that, as I said, drags at all our hearts,
but in this particular instance, I think a good decision
was made, a decision that prevented further bloodshed
that would have been widespread had it not been made.
AMY GOODMAN: Why say that the president, Aristide, had
an obsession with power? This was a man who was the
democratically elected president of Haiti, certainly got
a higher percentage of the vote than President Bush got
in this country.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Please, don't refer to the
percentage of vote as equatable to democracy, as
equatable to the kinds of institutions we have
reflecting democracy in America. Hitler was elected by
popular vote.
AMY GOODMAN: I spoke to the head of the Steele
Foundation. That was the American foundation that
provided the security for the people around President
Aristide, who was not allowed to send in reinforcements.
Again, since we're talking about such a small group of
people who are moving in on the capital, the Steele
Foundation felt he could be secured, but the U.S.
government stopped Aristide's own security from being
able to come in.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Aristide felt like he couldn't
be secured. That's the only -- I was privy to the cables
that come in from our ambassador. I was privy to some of
the information that the secretary let me know about
what was happening down there in terms of telephone
calls and so forth. Aristide made the decision deep into
the night that his life was in danger and that the
bloodshed that would occur would probably fall at his
feet, and so Aristide made a mutual decision with our
ambassador to leave the country.
AMY GOODMAN: Why would --
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Despite what he says now,
that's what the record reflects.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, I don't doubt he felt threatened, but
he felt threatened, as Kenneth Kurtz said, who was the
head of the Steele Foundation, on our program, that they
were not allowed to bring in the security. Why wouldn't
the U.S. government allow the security to be brought in?
This was the president of the country.
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: That's a question you should
address to George Bush, because I'm unfamiliar with the
circumstance you're talking about. I know about all of
the elements that were converging. I know about all of
the different elements that Aristide had excited to
converge. I don't know this story about private security
people, who were willing to come in at the last moment
and guard Aristide. I heard some information to that
effect after the situation occurred, but I am unable to
comment on that with any accuracy, because I'm not
familiar with exactly what you are talking about.
AMY GOODMAN: And Gerard Latortue, the person who was put
in charge in Haiti and his connection to the United
States, how he was chosen?
COL. LAWRENCE WILKERSON: That’s a process that unfolded
after Aristide was removed, and again, I don't have any
profound insights into that.
AMY GOODMAN: We're talking to Lawrence Wilkerson, who is
the colonel who was the chief of staff to Secretary of
State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005.
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http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/11/22/1515240
========================================
We spend the hour with a former senior member of the
Bush administration:
Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson. He served as chief of staff
to former Secretary
of State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005. In the
interview, Wilkerson
discusses what he calls a "White House cabal", led by
Dick Cheney and Donald
Rumsfeld; pre-war intelligence and Powell's February
2003 speech before the
United Nations; the "memory lapse" by Gen. Peter Pace,
the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and much more.
Listen/Watch/Read
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/11/22/1515236
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