Schlund v. Bush: Part 3 of 4

Trial was had before the District Court solely on the issue of jurisdiction, and the District Court dismissed the amended complaint on the grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action; and for that reason Plaintiff had not been denied a right or privilege as a national of the U.S. when the A.C.G. denied his application for a passport on facts different from the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint. In fact, the Court never reach any issues of the alleged fraud on the part of Plaintiff/Appellant in filing the Amended Complaint, despite Dulles/Appellee set forth in its Answer to the Amended Complaint as a separate defense alleging the fraud on the part of Plaintiff that the filing constituted an affront to and imposition upon the dignity of the Court. Thus, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered the case be remanded to the District Court "for trial," asserting the District Court may conclude from the evidence before it that the Amended Complaint was filed in bad faith and that the allegations contained therein are false and constitute a fraud and willful imposition on the dignity of the Court. (Id. at 827).

Therefore, because Plaintiff Schlund has not asserted any verified allegations to this Court that are false and constitute a fraud, there is no willful imposition on the dignity of the Court that would justify dismissal of his claim. In fact, this Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the factual averments set forth by Plaintiff are false, and Defendants' claim through Attorney Patrick are merely speculative and conjectural, and if not, are subject to a trial by this Court on the relevant and material issues of fact now before it. Plaintiff has demanded a trial by jury filed with his First Amended Complaint under F.R.C.P. Rule 38 and 39. Certainly, if Defendant is taking the position that Plaintiff Schlund's claims are false and he is perpetuating a fraud and willful imposition upon the dignity of the Court under the holding of Chew Wing Luk v. Dulles, he would be entitled to a trial by jury, as the Ninth Circuit required therein. (Id. at p. 827, col. 1, par(s) 4 and 5).

DEFENDANTS' STATUE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE DOES NOT CONTROL AGAINST A CONTINUING WRONG BY DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff has clearly alleged Defendant Bush's acts as an individual continued after he was appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court to President of the United States. And that these acts are carried out and continue to systematically carried out to satisfy Defendant's individual or under color of authority plan, scheme, and design of deprivation of Plaintiff Schlund's civil rights through racketeering activities of using electronic wireless telemetry and associate product(s) to invade his privacy, harass, persecute, and torture him due to his status as a "political witness" or/and whistleblower against Defendant individually and in his capacity as President.

Including but not limited to these continuous acts is Defendant's systematic establishing and use of Dorn v. McGinness, 158 F.R.D. 383 (1994) (Complaint, p. 17, par. 40) to attempt to systematically use to invalidate valid civil rights cases filed against Defendant for his individual (or, now under color of authority) use of wireless technology and associated product technology which includes wireless telemetry and electronic implants used by Defendant and his agents for different purposes to violate Plaintiff Schlund's rights, which is continuous and ongoing due to his status as a political witness or whistleblower against Defendant and his agents (Complaint, pgs. 1-19).

The systematic use of wireless telemetry to violate Plaintiff Schlund's rights to privacy and the guarantee under the Constitution that he be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures "shall not be violated" is continuously being violated by said Defendant through the electronic means as aforesaid. See, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) and Bevins v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) [Petitioner sued to recover damages from the agents was dismissed by the District Court on the grounds (1) it failed to state a federal cause of action, and (2) that the agents were immune from suit by virtue of their official position. United Supreme Court Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the District Court and Court of Appeals due to the existence of triable issues of fact based on the verified complaint and its allegations of injuries and damages, based on Defendants' unconstitutional conduct and/or governmental capacity in the violation of Plaintiff's right to privacy, etc.

The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected, reversed, and remanded the District Court/Appellate Court's decisions the Defendant and its agents were immune from liability by virtue of their official capacity (Id. 275 F.Supp. at 15) on allegations of Defendants' wrongful conduct was done unreasonably and contrary to law. Plaintiff Schlund has certainly alleged the Defendants' unlawful conduct and the nature, type, degree, and its effect of injuring and damaging him, which is continuing and ongoing, is a violation of his civil rights and a deprivation of his civil rights through wrongful racketeering activity(ies) is sufficient to overcome Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which admits these claims.

Defendant's Attorney Patrick's opinions, impressions, and conclusions are statements that are both irrelevant and prejudicial as to the truth of Plaintiff's claim and must not be given any weight by the Court, infra. Plaintiff Schlund objects, which shall constitute a continuing objection to each and all of Attorney Patrick's impressions, opinions, and conclusions concerning Plaintiff's claims and moves to strike all of the aforesaid as set forth in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. An example on point, Nike Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enterprises, 33 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1472 (1994); and Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531 (1977) [continued electronic trespass through use of wireless electronic telemetry and associated product(s) shackling individual FBI agents with liability, resulting in "blacklisting" or "black balling" based on Plaintiff's status. The FBI's violation of his rights constituted a deprivation of civil rights of a continuous nature, constituting an electronic trespass, violating his rights to privacy and racketeering activity] a continuing activity. No immunity was available for them. See, Taylor v. Merricks , 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.1983).

Thus, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be denied.

DEFENDANT, IN HIS STATUS AS PRESIDENT, IS LIABLE UNDER THE LAW

Plaintiff Schlund has alleged in his Verified Complaint the specific conduct of Defendant Bush as an individual, which continues after he was appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court as President. The deprivation of Plaintiff's civil rights does not shield Defendant as the President from personal liability from injury and damages to Plaintiff Schlund in his status as a "political witness" or/and "whistleblower," or just simply as an individual who has been specifically targeted by Defendant in either capacity. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). Clinton did not have Jones injected with implants and tortured to remove Jones as a witness against Clinton such as the corrupt agents and judges working for the Bush family have done in this case after Plaintiff briefed the FBI on the detailed plans to fix the presidential elections of the United States. Plaintiff Schlund has not alleged any cause of action whereby the President, acting as an individual or/and in his capacity or status as the President of the United States, with his "agents," forces liability upon the President through respondent superior principles.

Plaintiff Schlund has clearly and directly alleged a viable cause of action against Defendant Bush as an individual based on acts and conduct of a wrongful nature which have continued after he acquired the status as President of the United States, for which he is individually liable, irrespective of whether they have continued to be done under color of authority or office by him. Plaintiff Schlund is not suing Defendant Bush individually or/and Bush in his capacity as President due to the wrongful acts and conduct of any asserted "agent," as set forth in the Complaint. Plaintiff Schlund is only suing Defendant Bush as an individual for his wrongful acts and conduct in that capacity. Plaintiff Schlund is suing Defendant Bush for his continuous wrongful acts and conduct violating Plaintiff's rights, as an individual now with the status as President of the United States, and not any individual agent under his authority or chain of command.

Therefore, Defendant's respondent superior principle and its Motion to Dismiss is irrelevant and off point.

DEFENDANTS' CLAIM PLAINTIFF SCHLUND HAS NOT PLED A PROPER RICO CLAIM IS MISPLACED. IT'S NOT PLEAD AT ALL.

In short, Plaintiff Schlund has simply, concisely, and directly pled a cause of action for deprivation of civil rights based on wrongful/illegal acts and conduct of the electronic and other harassment, persecution, and torture of Plaintiff through use of wireless telemetry and associated product(s) which can be proved are in existence and used in that manner for that purpose, in violation of Plaintiff Schlund's rights. In fact, the conduct, individually and collectively of Defendant as an individual, and continued on after he acquired the status and capacity of President of the United States does not negate the nature, decree, and caliber of such acts and conduct of a racketeering nature. Plaintiff Schlund has fully complied with R.F.C.P. Rule 9(b), (f), and (g). See argument supra. See Argument supra. Defendant first admits there is too much verified specific facts asserted by Plaintiff Schlund supporting his causes of action against Defendant, demanding a little more generalized and conclusionary framed Complaint to place them on "notice" so that an answer can be filed to the Complaint. In reverse, Plaintiff Schlund files his First Amended Complaint, and now Defendants cry to the Court that it purportedly contains "only general and conclusionary allegations," wrongfully representing to the Court it is strictly a RICO claim, requiring more specificity of pleading or it should be dismissed. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at p. 3.

Therefore, because Plaintiff Schlund has not pled a racketeering cause of action, the argument is irrelevant, moot, and misplaced as a matter of law. Plaintiff Schlund's Complaint alleges "planning level" and/or "operational" level activities in the use of wireless telemetry and associated products to invade his privacy through illegal surveillance used for torture, subjecting Defendant individually to liability, or as an individual conducting same under color of authority or office, shackled with the same liability. Brown v. U.S., 193 F.Supp. 692 (1961); United States v. Newstadt, 281 F.2d 597, 602 (1964); Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 103 (1975); and Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).

Defendants' assertion Plaintiff Schlund fails to plead in his First Amended Complaint Defendants' violation of his right to vote and religious freedoms is misplaced.

The construction of the specific averments in Plaintiff Schlund's Complaint state that his United States' constitutional right to vote and right to express his religious activities are being interfered with by Defendant through Defendants' illegal and wrongful use of electronic, wireless telemetry and associated electronic product(s), causing injury and damage to him, which is continuous and ongoing. Complaint p. 11 and 13-17. The Court is to look at the substance of the Complaint, not the form, and uphold Plaintiff Schlund's right of action. Plaintiff Schlund has alleged that Defendants' use of the wireless technology to intrude and violate his rights or privacy persecute, harass, and torture him and spills over to interfering with his rights to vote and expressions of his religious freedoms under the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff has pointed to the laws and rules of general applicability under the United States Constitution (First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment), in violation of those rights, irrespective of the supplemental allegations of the violation of those rights connected to statutory and federal law, as set forth in the Complaint. See First Amended Complaint to be read and considered in its entirety, not specifically. Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. Rule 8 and 9. See ive of the supplemental allegations of the violation of those rights connected to statutory and federal law, as set forth in the Complaint. See First Amended Complaint to be read and considered in its entirety, not specifically. Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. Rule 8 and 9. See Yamaguchi v. United States Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997) [Federal courts must liberally construe a pleading, and the pleading rules only require that a complaint sufficiently establish some basis for a judgment against the Defendant].

Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [Complaint need not establish all that Plaintiff must eventually prove, cross-over allegations of a general and specific nature do not negate themselves in order to be read in a manner considering the Complaint sufficiently establishes a basis for a judgment against a Defendant].

As to Defendants' other misplaced contentions, if the Court was to accept Defendant as an individual or/and in his official status as President, he would be entitled to qualified immunity for the intentional deprivation of Plaintiff Schlund's civil rights through the use of electronic wireless telemetry and associated electronic product(s) used for torture and the illegal surveillance of a perpetual ongoing nature and would place the Defendant above the law.

This is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding to render all individuals liable (irrespective of their status) for wrongful deprivation of another's civil rights, and especially when it involves electronic intrusions of invasion of privacy, harassment, persecution, and electronic torture of the person through such mediums previously acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court.

DEFENDANT ADMITS AND CONCEDES PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AVERMENTS OF HARASSMENT, PERSECUTION, AND TORTURE OF PLAINTIFF THROUGH ELECTRONIC MEANS.

Defendant admits beyond the Motion to Dismiss he electronically trespasses, harasses, persecutes, and tortures Plaintiff Schlund but attempts to justify it. See, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at p. 5, 15: "Defendant acts pursuant to the laws of the United States." But Defendant does not cite (nor can he) any law that allows him to use electronic wireless telemetry and associated electronic product(s) to deprive Plaintiff Schlund of his rights to privacy and torture him. Nor justify Defendant's interference with Plaintiff Schlund's expression of free speech, religion, or right to vote unfettered by Defendant's electronic intrusive influence electronically. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), [holding the individual potentially liable for the manufacturing of the chemical and the government for negligently using it.

As an aside, Plaintiff Schlund has not expressed a generalized beef with the U.S. Government (Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1109 9the Cir. 1995) as Defendant improperly contends. Motion to Dismiss, p. 6.