Rumsfeld Ordered Abu Ghraib Torture
Aljazeera.com, UK - 22 hours ago
Speaking to 'Democracy Now', Brig. Gen. Janis ... AMY GOODMAN:
“Today, Janis Karpinski joins us for the hour here on Democracy
Now! And ...

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Speaking to 'Democracy Now', Brig. Gen. Janis ... AMY GOODMAN:
“Today, Janis Karpinski joins us for the hour here on Democracy
Now!
http://audio58.archive.org/3/audio/dn2005-1026/dn2005-1026-1_64kb.mp3
Speaking to 'Democracy Now', Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, former
military police commander at the centre of the Iraqi prisoner
scandal, published a book, "One Woman’s Army: The Commanding
General of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story", in which she described
her experience at the Iraqi prison.
Karpinski, the highest-ranking officer demoted in connection
with the abuse scandal, has admitted she violated the Geneva
Conventions, however she said that part of the blame "Goes All
the Way to The Top”, stated democracynow.org.
The abuse scandal first broke out in April 2004, when
photographs depicting the sexual abuse and torture of naked
Iraqi detainees were released by the world media, sparking
outrage worldwide.
Karpinski said that military intelligence took over part of the
Abu Ghraib jail to "Gitmoize" their interrogations, in other
words, applying methods and tactics used at the U.S. detention
center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Karpinski, who said she was being made a "convenient scapegoat"
for abuse ordered by top-ranking officials, called on holding
Donald Rumsfeld, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Alberto Gonzalez and
Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller accountable for what happened.
AMY GOODMAN: “Today, Janis Karpinski joins us for the hour here
on Democracy Now! And she has just published a book about her
experience. It's called One Woman's Army: The Commanding General
of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story. Colonel Janis Karpinski, welcome
to Democracy Now!”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “Good morning. Glad to be here. “
AMY GOODMAN: “It’s good to have you with us. How did you end up
at Abu Ghraib?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “Abu Ghraib was one of 17 prison
facilities that we were responsible for in Iraq. The units
deployed from January throughout 2003 up ’til about April of
2003 to conduct a prisoner of war mission. The units are trained
to do prisoner of war operations, and a prisoner of war camp was
established in Iraq, very close to the Kuwait border. So, the
units -- the unit members, the soldiers, all believed that they
were going to come home after victory was declared on the First
of May when the President arrived on the aircraft carrier. They
allowed me to deploy to Iraq to join my units, to take command
of the units, although I was told that the majority of the
units, the soldiers, would be coming back home because the
mission was complete. “
“When I arrived in Kuwait, I was told that the units were going
to be staying for an additional two months, because we were
assigned a new mission for prison restoration and training,
assisting the prison's experts up at Ambassador Bremer's
headquarters in Baghdad, with training Iraqi guards to conduct
prison and detention operations. So we relocated. There was
never any discussion about whether we were properly equipped or
prepared to take on this mission. It was simply assigned to us,
and very quickly the two-month extension became a four-month
extension, and then it became 365 days, boots on the ground, for
all of the units that were deployed. “
“So, soldiers were sent to war with the full expectations that
they would be home in six months or less, as they were
repeatedly told at the mobilization stations in the United
States, and once they were there, they couldn't get out. The
extension took them six additional months, tremendous impact on
reserve and National Guard soldiers, in particular, but
nonetheless, this was the mission. They went forward to
different locations in Iraq and took on this new detention
operation -- mission. “
“Abu Ghraib was the largest of our facilities. It was located in
the Sunni Triangle. It was never a good location for any kind of
detention operations, let alone the largest detention operation
and then, subsequently, the interrogation center for Iraq. We
were being mortared every night at that location. We received no
combat support for force protection to prevent any of those
attacks from occurring, and the unit that was out there doing
that mission, that particular mission at Abu Ghraib, was not
equipped with any kind of combat platforms to give adequate
protection to prisoners or soldiers.”
AMY GOODMAN: “How many M.P.s, military police, were under your
command? “
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> Home > Middle East News
Rumsfeld “ordered torture”
10/27/2005 3:30:00 PM GMT
“This was the command of Donald Rumsfeld himself?” - YES
Speaking to 'Democracy Now', Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, former
military police commander at the centre of the Iraqi prisoner
scandal, published a book, "One Woman’s Army: The Commanding
General of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story", in which she described
her experience at the Iraqi prison.
Karpinski, the highest-ranking officer demoted in connection
with the abuse scandal, has admitted she violated the Geneva
Conventions, however she said that part of the blame "Goes All
the Way to The Top”, stated democracynow.org.
The abuse scandal first broke out in April 2004, when
photographs depicting the sexual abuse and torture of naked
Iraqi detainees were released by the world media, sparking
outrage worldwide.
Karpinski said that military intelligence took over part of the
Abu Ghraib jail to "Gitmoize" their interrogations, in other
words, applying methods and tactics used at the U.S. detention
center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Karpinski, who said she was being made a "convenient scapegoat"
for abuse ordered by top-ranking officials, called on holding
Donald Rumsfeld, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Alberto Gonzalez and
Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller accountable for what happened.
AMY GOODMAN: “Today, Janis Karpinski joins us for the hour here
on Democracy Now! And she has just published a book about her
experience. It's called One Woman's Army: The Commanding General
of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story. Colonel Janis Karpinski, welcome
to Democracy Now!”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “Good morning. Glad to be here. “
AMY GOODMAN: “It’s good to have you with us. How did you end up
at Abu Ghraib?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “Abu Ghraib was one of 17 prison
facilities that we were responsible for in Iraq. The units
deployed from January throughout 2003 up ’til about April of
2003 to conduct a prisoner of war mission. The units are trained
to do prisoner of war operations, and a prisoner of war camp was
established in Iraq, very close to the Kuwait border. So, the
units -- the unit members, the soldiers, all believed that they
were going to come home after victory was declared on the First
of May when the President arrived on the aircraft carrier. They
allowed me to deploy to Iraq to join my units, to take command
of the units, although I was told that the majority of the
units, the soldiers, would be coming back home because the
mission was complete. “
“When I arrived in Kuwait, I was told that the units were going
to be staying for an additional two months, because we were
assigned a new mission for prison restoration and training,
assisting the prison's experts up at Ambassador Bremer's
headquarters in Baghdad, with training Iraqi guards to conduct
prison and detention operations. So we relocated. There was
never any discussion about whether we were properly equipped or
prepared to take on this mission. It was simply assigned to us,
and very quickly the two-month extension became a four-month
extension, and then it became 365 days, boots on the ground, for
all of the units that were deployed. “
“So, soldiers were sent to war with the full expectations that
they would be home in six months or less, as they were
repeatedly told at the mobilization stations in the United
States, and once they were there, they couldn't get out. The
extension took them six additional months, tremendous impact on
reserve and National Guard soldiers, in particular, but
nonetheless, this was the mission. They went forward to
different locations in Iraq and took on this new detention
operation -- mission. “
“Abu Ghraib was the largest of our facilities. It was located in
the Sunni Triangle. It was never a good location for any kind of
detention operations, let alone the largest detention operation
and then, subsequently, the interrogation center for Iraq. We
were being mortared every night at that location. We received no
combat support for force protection to prevent any of those
attacks from occurring, and the unit that was out there doing
that mission, that particular mission at Abu Ghraib, was not
equipped with any kind of combat platforms to give adequate
protection to prisoners or soldiers.”
AMY GOODMAN: “How many M.P.s, military police, were under your
command? “
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: 3,400 soldiers were under the 800th
Military Police Brigade, and probably 2,400 of them, 2,500 of
them were military police personnel. “
AMY GOODMAN: “And how many prisoners were there? “
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “At Abu Ghraib alone, the prisoner
population did reach over 7,000 by the end of -- nearing the end
of 2003, but we processed over 40,000 prisoners during the
course of the time that the 800th M.P. Brigade was responsible
for prisoner operations. “
AMY GOODMAN: “Talk about General Miller. Who is he?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “General Miller was sent to visit Iraq by
Secretary Rumsfeld and the Undersecretary Cambone. And they came
-- General Miller came to visit from Guantanamo Bay. He was the
commander of detention operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and
he was sent to assist the military intelligence interrogators
with enhancing their techniques. And he brought with him the
techniques that were tested and in use at Guantanamo Bay. And he
brought a team of about 20 people, 22 people with him to discuss
all aspects of interrogation operations, and actually, he did an
in-brief. I was invited to participate or to attend to listen to
his in-brief, because he was working almost exclusively with the
military intelligence people and the military intelligence
interrogators while he was there.”
“But we owned the locations that he was going to visit, and he
ultimately selected Abu Ghraib to be the focus of his efforts,
and he told me that he was going to make it the interrogation
center for Iraq. He used the term, he was going to “Gitmo-ize”
the operation and use the M.P.s to assist the interrogators to
enhance interrogations and to obtain more actionable
intelligence. “
AMY GOODMAN: “What about the dogs? Is that when the dogs were
introduced? “
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: Shortly after his visit, he -- again, he
was spending most of his time with the commander of the Military
Intelligence Brigade, Colonel Pappas. In his in-brief, his
introduction when he first arrived there with his team, he
responded to one of the interrogators, the military
interrogator's question, and he was listening to the comments,
the criticisms that they were doing these interviews and they
were not obtaining really valuable information, so he was there
to assist them with different -- implementing different
techniques to get more actionable intelligence.
And one of the interrogators just asked the question about what
he would recommend that they could do immediately, because they
thought that they were doing a pretty good job with identifying
the people who may have additional value or more military
intelligence value, and General Miller said -- his first
observation was that they were not -- they were being too nice
to them. They were not being aggressive enough. And he used the
example at Guantanamo Bay that the prisoners there, when they're
brought in, that they're handled by two military policemen.
They're escorted everywhere they go -- belly chains, leg irons,
hand irons -- and he said, “You have to treat them like dogs.”
AMY GOODMAN: “Now, Colonel Pappas ran the prison within the
prison, is that right? He ran something called the “hard site”?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “He ran the interrogation operations
within the prison, that's correct. And it was -- Cell Block 1A
and 1B were the two maximum security wings of the hard site, and
during General Miller's visit, either at his order or at his
request, General Miller told -- instructed Colonel Pappas to get
control of Cell Block 1A. “
AMY GOODMAN: “Treat the prisoners like dogs. That explains the
leashes and making prisoners bark?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “It seems to be consistent with those
photographs, yes, with the dog collar, the dog leash and
un-muzzled dogs. And, in fact, those techniques have appeared in
several memorandums that have been signed by senior people.”
AMY GOODMAN: “When did you start to understand what was
happening?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “About the situation at Abu Ghraib, I was
first informed by an email that I received on classified – what
they call “classified traffic.” I opened it up late one night on
the 12th of January of 2004. And it was from the commander of
the Criminal Investigation Division. He sent me an email and
said, “Ma'am, I just want to make you aware, I'm going in to
brief the C.G.,” meaning General Sanchez, “on the progress of
the investigation at Abu Ghraib. This involves the allegations
of abuse and the photographs.” That was the first I heard of it.
“
“I did not receive that email or phone call or a message from
General Sanchez himself, who would ultimately attempt to hold me
fully responsible for this, but from the C.I.D. Commander. And I
was alarmed at just that short email. I was not in Baghdad at
the time. I was at another location very close to the Iranian
border, so we made arrangements to leave at the crack of dawn to
drive down to Abu Ghraib to see what we could find out about
this ongoing investigation and went through the battalion over
to Cell Block 1A. The people who would normally be working on
any shift were not working. The sergeant that I spoke to said
that their records had been seized by the investigators, and
they started a new log to account for prisoners, make sure that
their meals were on time, those kind of things, and he pointed
out a memo that was posted on a column just outside of their
small administrative office. And the memorandum was signed by
the Secretary of Defense, and –
AMY GOODMAN: “By Donald Rumsfeld.”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “By Donald Rumsfeld. And said – it
discussed interrogation techniques that were authorized. It was
one page. It talked about stress positions, noise and light
discipline, the use of music, disrupting sleep patterns, those
kind of techniques. But there was a handwritten note out to the
side. And this was a copy. It was a photocopy of the original, I
would imagine. But it was unusual that an interrogation
memorandum would be posted inside of a detention cell block,
because interrogations were not conducted in the cell block.”
AMY GOODMAN: “This was the command of Donald Rumsfeld himself?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “Yes. “
AMY GOODMAN: “Talking about the techniques?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “The techniques that were allowed. And
there was a note – handwritten note out to the side of where the
list of tactics, interrogation tactics were. It said, "Make sure
this happens." And it seemed to be in the same handwriting as
the signature. That's what I could say about the memorandum.”
AMY GOODMAN: “People understood it to be from Rumsfeld?”
COL. JANIS KARPINSKI: “Yes, they certainly did. And I never
heard a word – I did – certainly did see the reference to
photographs in the original email, but when I asked the soldier,
when I asked the sergeant, when I asked the commanders out at
Abu Ghraib, what