AMERICA BLOG
NIE ON LINE
Thu Sep 28, 2006 22:27
 

(The entire text of the document is at the end of this post.)

NIE ON LINE
http://americablog.blogspot.com/declassifiednie.pdf

The document says exactly what critics have claimed. Iraq is fueling
more terrorism and terrorists. In particular, there are these two
paragraphs:

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the
movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for
the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

.. Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist
movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice,
and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a
sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq "jihad;" (3) the slow pace of
real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many
Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among
most Muslims--all of which jihadists exploit.

The first paragraph means, and I checked with AJ, our former Defense
Intelligence official (who will be weighing in shortly), that the
factors fueling international terrorism are greater than the factors
hurting international terrorism. The second paragraph says specifically
that our war in Iraq is one of the factors fueling an increase in
international terror.

Here's the entire document, there's even more in here that is bad news
for Bush. He's nuts to release this and claim that it helps him. The
only "good" news in the entire document is that it says Bush has caught
a lot of Al Qaeda leaders. Yeah, we know that. But the document makes
clear that the danger remains, and is increasing, and the war in Iraq
isn't helping.

Declassified Key Judgments of the National
Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States" dated April 2006

Key Judgments

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged
the leadership of al-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however,
we judge that al-Qa'ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to
the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist
organization. We also assess that the global jihadist
movement--which includes al- Qa'ida, affiliated and independent
terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells--is spreading and
adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

[NOTE FROM JOHN: Great, so they've hurt the leadership of Al Qaeda,
but Al Qaeda itself is still spreading and adapting.]

.. Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with
precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that
activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small
percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic
dispersion.

[NOTE FROM JOHN: So the number of radical Muslims, i.e., terrorist
supporters, is increasing in number and location.]

.. If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and
abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks
worldwide.

.. Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim
majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists
exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained,
multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist
movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida, could erode support
for the jihadists.

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks
a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New
jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are
increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and
dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist
groups.

.. We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells
will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly
abroad but also in the Homeland.

.. The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking
Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim
diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban
attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of
terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there
would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

.. The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists,
breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and
cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should
jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to
have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on
the fight.

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the
movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for
the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

.. Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist
movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice,
and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a
sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq "jihad;" (3) the slow pace of
real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many
Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among
most Muslims--all of which jihadists exploit.

Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged
that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread
of the movement. They include dependence on the continuation of
Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists'
radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation,
and criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim
citizens.

.. The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate
political solution--an ultra-conservative interpretation of
shari'a-based governance spanning the Muslim world--is unpopular
with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and
political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda
would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.

.. Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious
interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that
could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to
jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead
to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim
communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals
to capitalize on passive community support. In this way, the Muslim
mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.

.. Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require
coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to
capture or kill terrorist leaders.

If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress
over the next five years, political participation probably would
drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to
use the political process to achieve their local objectives.
Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing
transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.

Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is
exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors
and to maintain its leadership role.

.. The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would
cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although
like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the
loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and
disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would,
at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than
does al-Qa'ida.

.. Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks
against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and
present a global threat.

.. The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of
al-Qa'ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus
their efforts on external operations.

Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah
Islamiya, Ansar al- Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless
countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable
of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional
areas of operation.

.. We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland
than does al-Qa'ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our
allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is
likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or
global ones.

We judge that most jihadist groups--both well-known and newly
formed--will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks
focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric
warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained
terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in
Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing
these tactics.

.. CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups.

While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active
state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to
prevent territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists.

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling
other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist,
nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to
attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more
quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age,
raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose
members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.

.. We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the
Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain
logistical and financial support.

*A second NIE on Iraq exists according to Rep. Jane Harman
http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Er/Americablog/%7E3/27861390/second-nie-on-iraq-exists-according-to.html >*

There is evidence of a second NIE that deals solely with Iraq. You can
bet this is something the Bush administration would hide. TPMmuckraker
http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/001606.php > has the details:

As reported here earlier
http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/001603.php >, here are Rep.
Jane Harman's (D-CA) comments this morning about this second secret
Iraq report, from CQ Transcriptions:

"I have also learned that there is a [National Intelligence
Estimate] on Iraq -- specifically on Iraq -- that has been left
in draft form at the National Intelligence Council. That is
because some of our leaders don't want us to see it until after
the election. It should be clear five years after 9/11 that we
need accurate and actionable intelligence -- actionable in real
time -- and we need our leaders to read that intelligence and
cite it accurately. Sadly, we're doing better on the first
piece; we're not doing better on the second piece."

Every American needs to know what is on those reports. The traditional
media needs to know. We have all been lied to and snowed by the Bush
administration for over FIVE years. Except for a few reporters who
actually break stories like the most recent NIE bombshell, most of the
media have served as mouthpieces for the Bush spin. The White House has
lied about Iraq and national security over and over. The media is
getting a chance now to find out the truth. Are they up to it? It sure
is a lot easier to just regurgitate the spin of Karl Rove, Tony Snow and
Dan Bartlett.

You know that if this second report exists, Bush can't let it see the
light of day at least until after the elections. Despite the spin, there
is no good news from Iraq.

============
A second NIE on Iraq exists according to Rep. Jane Harman
by Joe in DC - 9/26/2006 04:08:00 PM
http://americablog.blogspot.com/2006/09/second-nie-on-iraq-exists-according-to.html

485 Contacts Between Jack Abramoff Team and Bush White House Officials
by John in DC - 9/28/2006 09:04:00 PM
http://americablog.blogspot.com/

Main Page - Thursday, 09/28/06

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