Colonel says Military Coup is Coming
Retired Colonel Donn de Grand-Pre told Alex Jones in an
interview last year about a 72 hour symposium that he
conducted in Washington D.C. in September 2001, where he
assembled a group of military, commercial, and civilian
pilots to discuss 911 for 3 days. They came up with a 24
page report, which the colonel submitted to the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on January 23, 2002. The
colonel said the chairman made 500 copies and sent them
out to various places including the white house. The
report concluded that the flight crews of the 4 planes
on 911 had no control over their aircrafts.
Colonel de Grand-Pre said that what happened on 911 was
an administrative coup. The culprits, he said, are part
of a neocon group, now in power in the pentagon, that
planned it for years. He said there is a rift between
the pentagon and the military, and that, if it wasn’t
for the fact that the government and civilian hierarchy
have control over retirements, there would have been a
rebellion by now. The colonel told Alex Jones that the
only way to stop these people is with a counter-coup,
where the military steps in and disengages the civilian
hierarchy and takes over and re-runs or reorganizes the
government. The colonel said that the neocons only
understand one ingredient and that is force, and that is
why the counter-coup has to emanate from the military.
He said military tribunals will take over.
Colonel de Grand-pre said that a cruise missile hit the
pentagon, and flight 93 was taken out by the North
Dakota Air Guard, which was stationed in Langley,
Virginia. He personally knows the pilot, who fired two
sidewinder missiles at the plane, after getting the
command from the Adj. General of the State of North
Dakota. The colonel said flight 93 had totally
unconscious people on board.
http://suitcaseman.gnn.tv/blogs/3099/Colonel_says_Military_Coup_is_Coming
Book adds to evidence of 9/11 panel's doubts about
Pentagon
USA Today - 5 hours ago
... also raised questions about the effectiveness of the
military's response on 9/11. ... to the 2001 terror
attacks that it considered an investigation into
possible ...
Book: Sept. 11 Panel Doubted Officials Washington Post
Book: Sept. 11 panel doubted officials The Kindred Times
Book: 9/11 Panel Considered Pentagon Deceptive NBC
10.com
all 132 related »
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A Military Coup Coming?
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Book: 9/11 Panel Considered Pentagon Deceptive
POSTED: 3:45 pm CDT August 4, 2006
UPDATED: 3:59 pm CDT August 4, 2006
NEW YORK -- The Sept. 11 commission was so frustrated
with repeated misstatements by the Pentagon and Federal
Aviation Administration about their response to the 2001
terror attacks that it considered an investigation into
possible deception, the panel's chairmen say in a new
book.
Republican Thomas Kean and Democrat Lee Hamilton also
say in "Without Precedent" that their panel was too soft
in questioning former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani - and
that the 20-month investigation may have suffered for
it.
The book, a behind-the-scenes look at the investigation,
recounts obstacles the authors say were thrown up by the
Bush administration, internal disputes over President
Bush's use of the attacks as a reason for invading Iraq,
and the way the final report avoided questioning whether
U.S. policy in the Middle East may have contributed to
the attacks.
Kean and Hamilton said the commission found it
mind-boggling that authorities had asserted during
hearings that their air defenses had reacted quickly and
were prepared to shoot down United Airlines Flight 93,
which appeared headed toward Washington.
In fact, the commission determined - after it subpoenaed
audiotapes and e-mails of the sequence of events - that
the shootdown order did not reach North American
Aerospace Command pilots until after all of the hijacked
planes had crashed.
The book states that commission staff, "exceedingly
frustrated" by what they thought could be deception,
proposed a full review into why the FAA and the
Pentagon's NORAD had presented inaccurate information.
That ultimately could have led to sanctions.
Due to a lack of time, the panel ultimately referred the
matter to the inspectors general at the Pentagon and
Transportation Department. Both are preparing reports,
spokesmen said this week.
"Fog of war could explain why some people were confused
on the day of 9/11, but it could not explain why all of
the after-action reports, accident investigations and
public testimony by FAA and NORAD officials advanced an
account of 9/11 that was untrue," the book states.
Authors: Giuliani Was 'Low Point'
The questioning of Giuliani was considered by Kean and
Hamilton "a low point" in the commission's examination
of witnesses during public hearings. "We did not ask
tough questions, nor did we get all of the information
we needed to put on the public record," they wrote.
Commission members backed off, Kean and Hamilton said,
after drawing criticism in newspaper editorials for
sharp questioning of New York fire and police officials
at earlier hearings. The editorials said the commission
was insensitive to the officials' bravery on the day of
the attacks.
"It proved difficult, if not impossible, to raise hard
questions about 9/11 in New York without it being
perceived as criticism of the individual police and
firefighters or of Mayor Giuliani," Kean and Hamilton
said.
Congress established the commission in 2002 to
investigate government missteps leading to the Sept. 11
attacks. Its 567-page unanimous report, which was
released in July 2004 and became a national best seller,
does not blame Bush or former President Clinton but does
say they failed to make anti-terrorism a high priority
before the attacks.
The panel of five Republicans and five Democrats also
concluded that the Sept. 11 attacks would not be the
nation's last, noting that al-Qaida had tried for at
least 10 years to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
In their book, which goes on sale Aug. 15, Kean and
Hamilton recap obstacles they say the panel faced in
putting out a credible report in a presidential election
year, including fights for access to government
documents and an effort to reach unanimity.
Issues Considered
* Iraq. The commission threatened to splinter over the
question of investigating the administration's use of
9/11 as a reason for going to war. The strongest
proponent was original member Max Cleland, a Democratic
former senator who later stepped down for separate
reasons.
If Cleland had not resigned, the commission probably
would not have reached unanimity, according to the book.
Ultimately, commissioners decided to touch briefly on
the Iraq war by concluding there was no "collaborative
relationship" between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida; the
administration had asserted there were substantial
contacts between the two.
* Israel. The commission disagreed as to how to
characterize al-Qaida's motives for attacking the U.S.,
with Hamilton arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the presence of U.S. forces in the Middle
East were major contributors.
Unidentified members believed that "listing U.S. support
for Israel as a root cause of al-Qaida's opposition to
the United States indicated that the United States
should reassess that policy," which those commission
members did not want.
Ultimately, the panel made a brief statement noting that
U.S. policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and Iraq are "dominant staples of popular commentary
across the Arab and Muslim world."
* Access to detainees. The panel pushed for direct
access to detainees, at one point proposing to be at
least physically present or to listen by telephone
during interrogations so they could gauge credibility
and get unvarnished accounts.
The administration resisted, citing concerns about
national security. Officials also said they feared
setting a precedent of access by a nongovernment entity
that could undermine the administration's position that
the Geneva Conventions did not apply to detainees
classified as "enemy combatants."
The commission agreed to submit questions and receive
written responses. Later, allegations emerged of
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay that
probably played a factor in the government's resistance,
the book states.
