BBC
Israeli Interrogator at Abu Ghraib Prison
Mon Jul 5, 2004 02:50
64.140.158.19

Israeli Interrogator at Abu Ghraib Prison Claim on BBC
"PA"
http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=3158747

The American general formerly in charge of Abu Ghraib prison has told the BBC that she has evidence that the Israelis were involved in interrogating Iraqi detainees at another facility.

Brig Gen Janis Karpinski, who was suspended in May over allegations of prisoner abuse, said she met a man claiming to be Israeli during a visit to a Baghdad intelligence centre with a senior coalition general.

“I saw an individual there that I hadn’t had the opportunity to meet before, and I asked him what did he do there, was he an interpreter – he was clearly from the Middle East,” Karpinski told BBC radio in an interview broadcast today.

“He said, ’Well I do some of the interrogation here. I speak Arabic but I’m not an Arab I’m from Israel.’ “I was really kind of surprised by that ... He didn’t elaborate any more than to say he was working with them and there were people from lots of different places that were involved in the operation,” Karpinski added.

Israel’s Foreign Ministry told the BBC that reports of Israeli troops or interrogators in Iraq were “completely untrue.” Israeli officials could not immediately be reached.

The presence of Israeli forces in Iraq would inflame opinion in the Muslim world, where many compare the abuse of prisoners by US forces to Israel’s treatment of Palestinian detainees.

Until a 1999 ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court, Israeli secret service interrogators were allowed to use “moderate physical pressure” – a euphemism, critics said, for torture.

Among the practices allowed prior to 1999 were sleep deprivation, keeping prisoners in uncomfortable positions for long periods and covering their heads with filthy sacks.

Former prisoners say those techniques also were used by US forces in Iraq.

Karpinski was suspended from command of the 800th Military Police Brigade after the publication in April of photos showing soldiers abusing and humiliating naked Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib.

She has said she did not know about the abuse and is being made a scapegoat in the scandal.
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SCV NEWSMAKER OF THE WEEK:
Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski
Fmr. Commander, 800th Military Police Brigade

Interview by Leon Worden
Signal City Editor

Sunday, July 4, 2004
(Telephone interview conducted June 29, 2004)

**MEDIA—MANDATORY CREDIT: The Signal newspaper of Santa Clarita, Calif.
**OK to republish in whole or part for news purposes WITH CREDIT.
http://www.scvhistory.com/scvhistory/signal/iraq/sg070404.htm

Signal: You said these happened in late October or early November. Was this an isolated incident? Was it just a few bad apples who were doing this? Did it happen more than once?

Karpinski: I don't know. I believe that they're — it looks like they were all taken on one night, at one setting. And likely, when those pictures surfaced via the CID commander to Gen. Sanchez, he probably was shocked.
Now, I'm not suggesting that there's not a possibility that he didn't know photographs were being taken and that those photographs were going to be used at the leading edge of an interrogation. But when he saw those souvenir photos on personally owned compact disks, he was probably shocked.
And I don't think that this was six or seven bad apples. I think that this was six or seven individuals who may have been specifically selected. Because they were likely to participate. I don't know.

Signal: Last week the Pentagon released memos showing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved particular interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay. To your knowledge, are there documents showing he also approved particular interrogation techniques for Abu Ghraib?

Karpinski: I did not see it personally, but since all of this has come out, I've not only seen, but I've been asked about some of those documents, that he signed and agreed to.

Signal: About Abu Ghraib?

Karpinski: Yes. About using the same techniques that were successful in Guantanamo Bay, at Abu Ghraib.

Signal: Those documents have not been released yet.

Karpinski: No.

Signal: What can you characterize about them?

Karpinski: I know that Col. Pappas, on three occasions, sent a request to Gen. Sanchez to escalate their interrogations, and that involved using — and he lists them. And in one case he said they wanted to use dogs, and they wanted to increase the length of time that they could be isolated, food deprivation, that kind of — sleep deprivation. And in at least two of those cases, there is a signature of approval from Gen. Sanchez.

Signal: And you've seen these documents.

Karpinski: Yes, I have.

Signal: When Mr. Rumsfeld tells us that the next set of photos and videos to be released will be a lot worse, what are they going to show?

Karpinski: I have no idea. I have no idea. I can only imagine. Umm, I heard a reference to a video clip of a soldier actually having sex, or what appeared to be having sex, with one of the prisoners. But I have not seen it. I asked the CID commander about it specifically, and he said they heard rumors about it, too, but had not uncovered any such photos at that point.

Signal: Four military intelligence people are identified in the Taguba report as having been "directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses" — Col. Pappas and Lt. Col. Jordan, along with two civilian contractors, Steve Stefanowicz, an interrogator, and John B. Israel, a translator. As I believe you know, here in Santa Clarita, John Israel is a local resident.

Karpinski: Uh-huh.

Signal: Did you ever know or meet either John Israel or Steve Stefanowicz?

Karpinski: I did meet Steve Stefanowicz.

Signal: Would you know John Israel, too?

Karpinski: No. I may very well know him, but I don't know him by that name.

Signal: Do you know why Maj. Gen. Taguba singled out these two civilians in terms of being responsible?

Karpinski: No. And as a matter of fact, I will tell you that I saw Steve Stefanowicz out in what they called the intelligence coordination element, which was a separate facility all together. I never saw him during an interrogation, and I never saw him in cellblock 1A or B. Ever.

Signal: John Israel was provided to the Army by Titan Corp, which has an estmiated 4,400 translators in Iraq. Did you have Titan translators working for your MP brigade?

Karpinski: Yes, I did.

Signal: How does the chain of command work?

Karpinski: We have no control over them at all.

Signal: How does it work?

Karpinski: Titan Corp. would — my guy who was the point of contact for the brigade would call them and tell them, "We need six more interpreters." And then he would say, "But here's the limitations: They're going to be working out at, for example, at Abu Ghraib; they won't be able to leave; we'll take care of feeding them, housing them, blah blah blah blah blah," and they'll find interpreters that will agree to those conditions.
And they will remain at the facility — because the interpreters are not vetted successfully. If you get one in there that can speak English and speak the language and he hasn't been vetted successfully or completely — or at all, in most cases — if they leave, they could be giving information to the insurgency or the opposition or whatever.
So that was the only control. But their work schedules or their uniforms or what they did or — we had no control over them at all.

Signal: There has been discussion recently that some of these contracting firms are basically acting as employment agencies for the military.

Karpinski: That's exactly what they're doing.

Signal: And that may not conform strictly to federal guidelines.

Karpinski: No, I'm sure it doesn't. I was extremely frustrated with it because, you know, we'd look for the interpreter — and we didn't have nearly enough interpreters — but I'd look for one and they'd say, "Oh, he's sleeping." Or, "He doesn't usually come in on time." And we couldn't fire them, we couldn't — and they were so — the military in Iraq — was so desperate to get more translators that they were — the divisions were asking for more and more and more translators, and they were the priority, and they didn't have nearly what they needed. So these people, these contracting — Titan Corp. and I guess there were similar corporations — they had practically a blank check.

Signal: There are chain of command issues, too —

Karpinski: There was none for them.

Signal: Reading through the Army regulation, "Contractors Accompanying the Force," evidently the contracting company is supposed to provide a job site manager to supervise the civilian employees, and the Army would designate a liaison to confer with the manager —

Karpinski: Right. Or Col. Jordan would.

Signal: So in the field, when contractors were assigned to the MP brigade, would the MP person in charge ever give direct orders to civilians?

Karpinski: No.

Signal: How did it work?

Karpinski: Well, if there was a problem with the interpreter — or, like, for us, because we didn't have interrogators — but for interpreters, they would call my point of contact in the brigade and he would try to get it resolved. And the job manager, or the site manager, was down in the CPA building. They were never out at the site. Never.
But the battalion commander or the company commander would voice those concerns to my lieutenant commander, who would work on getting it resolved. But even documentation to poor performance or poor English language skills or whatever, it was just a document. Nobody was ever fired.

Signal: And as you've mentioned, not all the translators were Americans who were shipped over there. A lot of native Iraqis were among the civilians.

Karpinski: Right. And then — initially, the first ones that were brought over were from the United States, from throughout the United States. They were paid very, very well. Which is why they were — like a lot of contractors over there, they agreed to work under those hostile fire conditions because they were paid extremely well.

Signal: How well is extremely well? What did they earn a month?

Karpinski: A month? At least $12,000 (to) $20,000. Sometimes they were paid $100 an hour, depending on what location they were in.

Signal: Translators?

Karpinski: Yes. Now, I don't know what the interrogators were paid. I can't even begin to imagine.

Signal: Taguba determined that "third country nationals" were involved in the interrogation process at Abu Ghraib. Reading Army policy, it looks like you're not supposed to have foreigners around the intelligence gathering process.

Karpinski: That's right. Gen. Miller's position is, this is a war. Extraordinary measures have to be taken.

Signal: Gen. Miller's position?

Karpinski: Yes.

Signal: And of course Gen. Miller is in charge of — he basically has your job, right?

Karpinski: That's right.

Signal: Today.

Karpinski: That's right.

Signal: He's in charge of the prisons in Iraq.

Karpinski: Yup. He sure is.

Signal: Did you have any knowledge of third-country nationals around the interrogation process at Abu Ghraib?

Karpinski: No. Because — I knew that there were third-country nationals out there, and we had contractors coming out to Abu Ghraib to do a lot of work, and then — I mean, the MPs were vigilant in keeping them away from the detainees. But occasionally a detainee would slip a note out to one of them, or put it in the food bucket as it was being returned to the contractor or whatever it was. But there were literally hundreds of contractors out there, third-country nationals.
Now, the ones that were around the interrogation? I don't know. I was visiting an interrogation facility one time — not under my control, but I was escorting a four-star. And he wanted to go back and observe an interrogation that was taking place. They asked me if I wanted to go and I said no. So I was standing there and, you know, the usual conversation, just kind of chit-chat, there (were) three individuals there and two of them had DCU pants on, one had a pair of blue jeans on, but they all had T-shirts on. They did not appear to be military people. And I said to one of the — one of them asked me, "So what's new?" Or, "What's challenging about being a female general officer over here?" And I said, "Oh! Too long a story, but it's all fun." And I said to this guy who was sitting up on the counter, I said to him, "Are you local?" Because he looked like he was Kuwaiti. I said, "Are you an interpreter?" He said, "No, I'm an interrogator." And I said, "Oh, are you from here?" And he said, "No, actually, I'm from Israel." And I was kind of shocked. And I think I laughed. And I said, "No, really?" And he said, "No, really, I am." And — but it was — I didn't pursue it, I just said, "Oh, I visited your country a couple of years ago and I was amazed that there's so little difference between the appearance of Israelis and Americans," and — I really was just kind of making chit-chat at that point.
But it didn't strike me as unusual, I guess, until after the fact. And I remember making a comment to him, I said, "Wow, that's kind of unusual." And he said, "No, not really." Like that.
So — I do know for a fact that at least in that one case — now, I didn't ask him for identity papers or anything. It was none of my business. But that's what he said.

Signal: And that was an interrogator at —

Karpinski: At an interrogation facility, yes.

Signal: He said he was from Israel.

Karpinski: Right.

Signal: Did you have any indication that there were any foreign secret operations going on at Abu Ghraib?

Karpinski: No. No indication whatsoever.

Signal: What about CIA activities? Specially, Mr. Rumsfeld's recent acknowledgement that he hid a so-called "ghost detainee" at another detention facility in Baghdad at the request of ex-CIA director George Tenet.

Karpinski: Right.

Signal: Did you have knowledge of that?

Karpinski: I certainly did.

Signal: So you knew at the time that there was a ghost detainee.

Karpinski: I absolutely did. And we objected.

Signal: How? Why?

Karpinski: Well, because we follow the procedures. And the procedure is, when you take a prisoner into your facility, you process them. And that means they get an identification number, and their basic data is entered into the database. And that's how we account for all of our detainees.

Signal: The purpose for hiding the detainee — Mr. Rumsfeld was hiding this person from the Red Cross so the Red Cross wouldn't find out the person existed. Do you know why?

Karpinski: No, but I heard speculation about it, and all of it was believable.

Signal: How many ghost detainees, to your knowledge, were there last year?

Karpinski: To my knowledge, we had that one, and we were directed to hold him. And we had three other detainees that were allegedly Saudi citizens, and they were hiding them, as well.

Signal: Gen. Taguba's investigation ball-parked it at six to eight ghost detainees at Abu Ghraib.

Karpinski: Well, you know, Gen. Taguba probably took that information from a person who didn't know what they were talking about, and he recorded it. Because if he had just done a little bit of work, he would have found that FRAGO instructing us to hold that detainee, and that FRAGO was signed by Gen. Sanchez. And he didn't bother to do that.
So what he — again, another hole in his report was that we were not processing appropriately all of our detainees and we had "ghost detainees" that we were hiding. And that's not true. We did have ghost detainees, but we were directed to not process them into the facility.
As I told Gen. Taguba, we always knew where they were. They weren't ghosts to us. But they were not processed because we were directed not to process them.

Signal: I'm sorry, who was it who directed you not to process those detainees?

Karpinski: Gen. Sanchez signed the FRAGO.

Signal: Specifically not to process those ghost detainees.

Karpinski: Yes.

Signal: Was there a p