"From the moment a soldier enlists, we inculcate loyalty, duty,
honor, integrity, and selfless service," Taguba said. "And yet
when we get to the senior-officer level we forget those values.
I know that my peers in the Army will be mad at me for speaking
out, but the fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare
in Abu Ghraib. We violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention.
We violated our own principles and we violated the core of our
military values. The stress of combat is not an excuse, and I
believe, even today, that those civilian and military leaders
responsible should be held accountable." ?
The General's Report
by Seymour M. Hersh
June 17, 2007
The New Yorker
How Antonio Taguba, who investigated the Abu Ghraib scandal,
became one of its casualties.
On the afternoon of May 6, 2004, Army Major General Antonio M.
Taguba was summoned to meet, for the first time, with Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his Pentagon conference room.
Rumsfeld and his senior staff were to testify the next day, in
televised hearings before the Senate and the House Armed
Services Committees, about abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq.
The previous week, revelations about Abu Ghraib, including
photographs showing prisoners stripped, abused, and sexually
humiliated, had appeared on CBS and in The New Yorker. In
response, Administration officials had insisted that only a few
low-ranking soldiers were involved and that America did not
torture prisoners. They emphasized that the Army itself had
uncovered the scandal.
SOURCE:>>
If there was a redeeming aspect to the affair, it was in the
thoroughness and the passion of the Army's initial
investigation. The inquiry had begun in January, and was led by
General Taguba, who was stationed in Kuwait at the time. Taguba
filed his report in March. In it he found:
Numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses were inflicted on several detainees ... systemic and
illegal abuse.
Taguba was met at the door of the conference room by an old
friend, Lieutenant General Bantz J. Craddock, who was Rumsfeld's
senior military assistant. Craddock's daughter had been a
babysitter for Taguba's two children when the officers served
together years earlier at Fort Stewart, Georgia. But that
afternoon, Taguba recalled, "Craddock just said, very coldly,
'Wait here.' " In a series of interviews early this year, the
first he has given, Taguba told me that he understood when he
began the inquiry that it could damage his career; early on, a
senior general in Iraq had pointed out to him that the abused
detainees were "only Iraqis." Even so, he was not prepared for
the greeting he received when he was finally ushered in.
"Here ... comes ... that famous General Taguba - of the Taguba
report!" Rumsfeld declared, in a mocking voice. The meeting was
attended by Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's deputy; Stephen Cambone,
the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; General Richard
Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.); and
General Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, along with
Craddock and other officials. Taguba, describing the moment
nearly three years later, said, sadly, "I thought they wanted to
know. I assumed they wanted to know. I was ignorant of the
setting."
In the meeting, the officials professed ignorance about Abu
Ghraib. "Could you tell us what happened?" Wolfowitz asked.
Someone else asked, "Is it abuse or torture?" At that point,
Taguba recalled, "I described a naked detainee lying on the wet
floor, handcuffed, with an interrogator shoving things up his
rectum, and said, 'That's not abuse. That's torture.' There was
quiet."
Rumsfeld was particularly concerned about how the classified
report had become public. "General," he asked, "who do you think
leaked the report?" Taguba responded that perhaps a senior
military leader who knew about the investigation had done so.
"It was just my speculation," he recalled. "Rumsfeld didn't say
anything." (I did not meet Taguba until mid-2006 and obtained
his report elsewhere.) Rumsfeld also complained about not being
given the information he needed. "Here I am," Taguba recalled
Rumsfeld saying, "just a Secretary of Defense, and we have not
seen a copy of your report. I have not seen the photographs, and
I have to testify to Congress tomorrow and talk about this." As
Rumsfeld spoke, Taguba said, "He's looking at me. It was a
statement."
At best, Taguba said, "Rumsfeld was in denial." Taguba had
submitted more than a dozen copies of his report through several
channels at the Pentagon and to the Central Command
headquarters, in Tampa, Florida, which ran the war in Iraq. By
the time he walked into Rumsfeld's conference room, he had spent
weeks briefing senior military leaders on the report, but he
received no indication that any of them, with the exception of
General Schoomaker, had actually read it. (Schoomaker later sent
Taguba a note praising his honesty and leadership.) When Taguba
urged one lieutenant general to look at the photographs, he
rebuffed him, saying, "I don't want to get involved by looking,
because what do you do with that information, once you know what
they show?"
Taguba also knew that senior officials in Rumsfeld's office and
elsewhere in the Pentagon had been given a graphic account of
the pictures from Abu Ghraib, and told of their potential
strategic significance, within days of the first complaint. On
January 13, 2004, a military policeman named Joseph Darby gave
the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (C.I.D.) a CD full of
images of abuse. Two days later, General Craddock and
Vice-Admiral Timothy Keating, the director of the Joint Staff of
the J.C.S., were e-mailed a summary of the abuses depicted on
the CD. It said that approximately ten soldiers were shown,
involved in acts that included:
Having male detainees pose nude while female guards pointed at
their genitals; having female detainees exposing themselves to
the guards; having detainees perform indecent acts with each
other; and guards physically assaulting detainees by beating and
dragging them with choker chains.
Taguba said, "You didn't need to 'see' anything - just take the
secure e-mail traffic at face value."
I learned from Taguba that the first wave of materials included
descriptions of the sexual humiliation of a father with his son,
who were both detainees. Several of these images, including one
of an Iraqi woman detainee baring her breasts, have since
surfaced; others have not. (Taguba's report noted that
photographs and videos were being held by the C.I.D. because of
ongoing criminal investigations and their "extremely sensitive
nature.") Taguba said that he saw "a video of a male American
soldier in uniform sodomizing a female detainee." The video was
not made public in any of the subsequent court proceedings, nor
has there been any public government mention of it. Such images
would have added an even more inflammatory element to the outcry
over Abu Ghraib. "It's bad enough that there were photographs of
Arab men wearing women's panties," Taguba said.
On January 20th, the chief of staff at Central Command sent
another e-mail to Admiral Keating, copied to General Craddock
and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the Army commander in
Iraq. The chief of staff wrote, "Sir: update on alleged detainee
abuse per our discussion. DID IT REALLY HAPPEN? Yes, currently
have 4 confessions implicating perhaps 10 soldiers. DO PHOTOS
EXIST? Yes. A CD with approx 100 photos and a video - CID has
these in their possession."
In subsequent testimony, General Myers, the J.C.S. chairman,
acknowledged, without mentioning the e-mails, that in January
information about the photographs had been given "to me and the
Secretary up through the chain of command... . And the general
nature of the photos, about nudity, some mock sexual acts and
other abuse, was described."
Nevertheless, Rumsfeld, in his appearances before the Senate and
the House Armed Services Committees on May 7th, claimed to have
had no idea of the extensive abuse. "It breaks our hearts that
in fact someone didn't say, 'Wait, look, this is terrible. We
need to do something,' " Rumsfeld told the congressmen. "I wish
we had known more, sooner, and been able to tell you more
sooner, but we didn't."
Rumsfeld told the legislators that, when stories about the
Taguba report appeared, "it was not yet in the Pentagon, to my
knowledge." As for the photographs, Rumsfeld told the senators,
"I say no one in the Pentagon had seen them"; at the House
hearing, he said, "I didn't see them until last night at 7:30."
Asked specifically when he had been made aware of the
photographs, Rumsfeld said:
SOURCE: FULL REPORT MUCH MORE>>