(CIA) Report Says Iraq Problems Were Expected
Saturday May 26, 2007 12:01 AM
AP Photo BAG1O9, NYET778, BAG114
By KATHERINE SHRADER
Associated Press Writer
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6661615,00.html
WASHINGTON (AP) - Intelligence analysts predicted, in secret
papers circulated within the government before the Iraq
invasion, that al-Qaida would see U.S. military action as an
opportunity to increase its operations and that Iran would try
to shape a post-Saddam Iraq.
The top analysts in government also said that establishing a
stable democracy in Iraq would be a ``long, difficult and
probably turbulent process.''
Democrats said the newly declassified documents, part of a
Senate Intelligence Committee investigation released Friday,
make clear that the Bush administration was warned about the
very challenges it now faces as it tries to stabilize Iraq.
``Sadly, the administration's refusal to heed these dire
warnings - and worse, to plan for them - has led to tragic
consequences for which our nation is paying a terrible price,''
said Senate Intelligence Chairman Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va.
Some Republicans rejected the committee's work as flawed. The
panel's top Republican, Sen. Kit Bond of Missouri, said the
report's conclusions selectively highlight the intelligence
agencies' findings that seem to be important now, distorting the
picture of what was presented to policy-makers.
He said the committee's work on the Iraq intelligence ``has
become too embroiled in politics and partisanship to produce an
accurate and meaningful report.''
Publication of the 229-page document was approved by a vote of
10-5, with two Republicans - Sens. Olympia Snowe of Maine and
Chuck Hagel of Nebraska - voting with Democrats to release it.
Asked about the report at his Thursday news conference, in
advance of its release, President Bush stood by his decision to
topple the Iraqi regime. He said he firmly believes the world is
better off without Saddam Hussein in power.
``Going into Iraq, we were warned about a lot of things, some of
which happened, some of which didn't happen,'' he said.
``Obviously, as I made a decision ... I weighed the risks and
rewards of any decision.''
The investigation reviewed assessments from a number of agencies
but focused on two January 2003 papers from the National
Intelligence Council: ``Regional Consequences of Regime Change
in Iraq'' and ``Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq.''
Those papers drew from expertise within a number spy agencies
and were distributed to scores of White House, national
security, diplomatic and congressional officials - most of whom
were listed in 81 pages of the Senate report.
Among other conclusions, the analysts found:
- Establishing a stable democracy in Iraq would be a long, steep
and probably turbulent challenge. They said that contributions
could be made by 4 million Iraqi exiles and Iraq's impoverished,
underemployed middle class. But they noted that opposition
parties would need sustained economic, political and military
support.
- Al-Qaida would see the invasion as a chance to accelerate its
attacks, and the lines between al-Qaida and other terrorist
groups ``could become blurred.'' In a weak spot in the analysis,
one paper said that the risk of terror attacks would spike after
the invasion and slow over the next three to five years.
However, the State Department recently found that attacks last
year alone rose sharply.
- Groups in Iraq's deeply divided society would become violent,
unless stopped by the occupying force. ``Score settling would
occur throughout Iraq between those associated with Saddam's
regime and those who have suffered most under it,'' one report
stated.
- Iraq's neighbors would jockey for influence and Iranian
leaders would try to shape the post-Saddam era to demonstrate
Tehran's importance in the region. The less Tehran felt
threatened by U.S. actions, the analysts said, ``the better the
chance that they could cooperate in the postwar period.''
- Postwar Iraq would face significant economic challenges,
having few resources beyond oil. Analysts predicted that Iraq's
large petroleum resources would make economic reconstruction
easier, but they didn't anticipate that continued fighting and
sabotage would drag down oil production.
- Military action to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction would not cause other governments in the region to
give up such programs.
As numerous investigations have found, the intelligence agencies
of the United States and its allies were wrong about Iraq's
supposed weapons programs.
The report is the latest chapter in the Intelligence Committee's
ongoing investigation into the prewar Iraq intelligence. Because
committee members couldn't agree on clear conclusions about the
postwar predictions, they saved their analyses for appendices
attached to the report.
``The most chilling and prescient warning from the intelligence
community prior to the war was that the American invasion would
bring about instability in Iraq that would be exploited by Iran
and al-Qaida,'' wrote four Democratic senators - Rockefeller,
Ron Wyden of Oregon, Evan Bayh of Indiana and Sheldon Whitehouse
of Rhode Island.
Meanwhile, four Republican senators - Bond, John Warner of
Virginia, Orrin Hatch of Utah and Richard Burr of North Carolina
- wrote that the report exaggerates the importance of the
pre-invasion assessments. They said the reports weren't based on
intelligence information, but instead were speculation from
experts in and out of government.
``They were no more authoritative than the many other educated
opinions that were available in the same time frame,'' the
Republicans wrote.
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On the Net:
Senate Intelligence Committee:
http://intelligence.senate.gov/index.htm
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