WILLIAM
9/11 COMMISSION TO ASK ATTY. GEN. ASHCROFT
Mon Apr 12, 2004 14:34
63.228.145.202

Please Email/Phone/Fax the below 13 questions for Ashcroft to the
Commissioners. PLEASE send it addressed to each individual Commissioner. So send a
total of 10 emails/faxes/phone calls addressed to EACH individual Commissioner.
AND THEN FORWARD THIS REQUEST ON TO AS MANY OTHERS as possible, posting it on
indymedia.org sites, bulletin boards etc. URGENT ACTION FOR TODAY !!!

Thomas H. Kean / Lee H. Hamilton / Richard Ben-Veniste / Fred F.
Fielding / Jamie S. Gorelick / Slade Gorton / Bob Kerrey / John F. Lehman /
Timothy J. Roemer / James R. Thompson

Washington Office*
Tel: (202) 331-4060
Fax: (202) 296-5545 info@9-11Commission.gov

New York Office
Tel: (212) 264-1505
Fax: (212) 264-1595
info@9-11Commission.gov

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Here are 3 lead key questions the commissioners should ask the Attorney
General, and 10 follow ups:

KEY: Why has no one been punished for blocking the upward movement of Agent
Wright and Rowley's urgent reports of terrorist activity in the U.S., given
that Rice had "according to her" demanded you move on terrorist activity in the
U.S.
KEY: Why did you stop flying commercial jets before 9-11
KEY: Have you discovered who warned Mayor Willie Brown and others of coming
terrorist strikes before 9-11? WHY NOT?
1) If counterterrorism was a top priority for the Justice Department prior to
9/11, why did Ashcroft ignore the FBI's specific request in August 2001 for
additional counterterrorism resources?
That month the FBI submitted their internal budget request to the Department
of Justice, seeking 248 counterterrorism agents and support staff, 54
translators to review a backlog of foreign language intelligence and 200 professional
intelligence researchers to analyze the intelligence. Yet when Ashcroft
submitted his final budget request to the White House on Sept. 10, 2001, 24 hours
before the al-Qaida attacks, he did not request funding for any of the FBI's
urgent needs. In fact, Ashcroft proposed cuts in counterterrorism efforts,
including a $65 million reduction for counterterrorism equipment grants, a $20
million reduction for border control and a $1.4 million reduction for the National
Domestic Preparedness Office. Of the 68 programs where Ashcroft proposed
increases, not a single one involved counterterrorism. In Attorney Janet Reno's
budget for 2000, counterterrorism was her first priority. What was Ashcroft's
thinking that led him to remove it as a priority and to propose extensive cuts?
2) Why wasn't counterterrorism one of the seven strategic goals Ashcroft
outlined in a May 2001 memo to his division heads?
In that memo, he outlined his major goals for the upcoming budget year. Among
his priorities: Reducing gun violence, protecting the rights of crime victims
and strengthening internal Justice Department financial systems.
Counterterrorism was not mentioned. By contrast, Attorney General Janet Reno's budget
guidance of April 2000 listed counterterrorism as the area where "up-to-date human
and technological infrastructure" was critical.
By August 2001, Ashcroft had created a "strategic plan" document to spotlight
his priorities. Out of 36 "objectives" Ashcroft highlighted 13 in yellow. The
document explained "Highlight=AG Goal." Although objective 1.3 was "combat
terrorist activities," it was not highlighted. Tellingly, in Nov. 2001, Ashcroft
released a revised strategic plan which contained the same seven strategic
goals as the original and one addition. Now his number one goal: "Protect
America Against the Threat of Terrorism." But who had neglected it before 9/11?
3) Between Jan. 20 and Sept. 11, 2001, were the FBI field offices instructed
to increase surveillance of known suspected terrorists? If so, why hasn't
Ashcroft been able to provide any evidence to the commission proving it?
In her public testimony, Condoleezza Rice said, "The FBI tasked all 56 of its
U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of known suspected terrorists and
to reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist
activities." But Commissioner Jamie Gorelick rejected Rice's claim as not factual,
saying, "We have no record of that. The Washington field office international
terrorism people say they never heard about the threat, they never heard
about the warnings...special agents in charge around the country, Miami in
particular, no knowledge of this." According to a Newsweek report, Ashcroft rebuffed
specific requests by the FBI to discuss counterterrorism with special agents
in charge. At a spring 2001 meeting with Special Agents in charge in Quantico,
Virginia, Ashcroft told then FBI Director Louis Freeh that his priorities were
"violent crime and drugs," and when Freeh said that those were not his
priorities and began discussing counterterrorism, "Ashcroft didn't want to hear
about it." This confrontation may be particularly significant in light of
Commissioner Tim Roemer's comments during Rice's public testimony: "The FBI is the key
here. Nothing went down the chain to the FBI field offices." Can Ashcroft
recount his conversations and meetings with FBI officials about counterterrorism?
4) After 9/11, why did Ashcroft slash almost $1 billion from an emergency FBI
request to bolster counterterrorism efforts?
Immediately after 9/11 the FBI made a $1.5 billion request for emergency
resources to combat terrorism. But Ashcroft refused to provide two-thirds of these
resources. Roughly $1 billion in funding was denied for items such as
security improvements, communications equipment and technical support. Why? Where did
the money go instead?
5) Beginning in the summer of 2001, Ashcroft stopped flying commercial
airlines and traveled exclusively by private jet because of an FBI "threat
assessment." What, exactly, did the threat assessment say? Why is the threat assessment
still being withheld from the public?
In July 2001, CBS News revealed that Ashcroft, on the advice of the FBI, "was
traveling exclusively by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines."
At the time, the FBI refused to identify "what the threat was, when it was
detected or who made it." Eight months after 9/11, in an attempt to deflect
criticism, Ashcroft said his decision to stop flying commercial airlines was
"because of personal threats on his life, not out of fears about terrorist
hijackings." When Ashcroft was asked by a reporter to explain further he "walked from
the room without comment." Curiously, when Ashcroft's behavior was initially
reported, a top official at the CIA said "he was unaware of specific threats
against any Cabinet member." Whatever the rationale, Ashcroft's use of private
jets cost taxpayers more than $1600 an hour. Was he aware of threat warnings?
Will he now urge their immediate declassification?
6) Does Ashcroft regret the treatment of the 762 innocent foreign men
detained by the federal government in the US for months after 9/11? Does Ashcroft
think those men -- many of whom were subject to verbal and physical abuse and had
their due process rights violated -- deserve an apology?
A earlier report, released by Fine in June, documented how hundreds of
detainees' due process rights were violated by federal officials who imprisoned them
without charges or evidence. Of the 762 individuals who were the subject of
Fine's review "none was ever charged with terrorism-related crimes."
Nevertheless, when questioned about the situation before Congress last June, John
Ashcroft said he had "no apologies," adding, "we must be vigilant." What message
does Ashcroft believe he is sending to the world about the protection of legal
rights and civil liberties that are at the heart of the American example?
7) In Oct. 2001, Ashcroft appeared with President Bush at a press conference
to unveil a list of 22 "most wanted terrorists." Thirty months later at least
20 of those individuals are still at large. Why is the war on terrorism
lagging?
On Oct. 10, 2001 Ashcroft, President Bush and FBI Director Robert Mueller
appeared at FBI headquarters to announce the creation of the Most Wanted
Terrorists list. Bush called the 22 individuals placed on the list "the most dangerous
[terrorists] -- the leaders and key supporters, the planners and
strategists." Bush added, They must be found. They will be stopped, and they will be
punished." But only one person on the list -- Khalid Shaikh Mohammed -- has been
captured. (One other individual on the list, Muhammed Atef, may be dead). Yet
despite capturing or killing less than 5 percent of the individuals who, by
their own admission, are the world's most dangerous terrorists, Ashcroft continues
to repeatedly tout the success of his counterterrorism efforts against
al-Qaida. In a speech in Oct. 2003, Ashcroft bragged that two-thirds of al-Qaida's
leadership worldwide is either in custody or dead." It seems that, when success
proves elusive, Ashcroft simply changes the definition of success. Were
resources moved from the war on terrorism to the war in Iraq? Would additional
resources assist in the capture of the terrorists on the Most Wanted list?
8) Why, in the days after 9/11, did Ashcroft, along with White House and
State Department officials, allow two dozen members of the bin Laden and Saudi
royal families to circumvent FAA restrictions forbidding flights and leave the
country without full FBI questioning?
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks all domestic aircraft were grounded. While
some commercial flights slowly resumed, private aviation was completely
prohibited for weeks. Despite the fact that 14 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis,
Craig Unger's new book, "House of Bush, House of Saud," reveals numerous Saudi
citizens -- including two dozen members of the bin Laden family -- were
permitted to violate the ban so they could quickly return to Saudi Arabia. Not one of
the bin Ladens were questioned by the FBI or the Justice Department before
departing, even though many had direct ties to Osama bin Laden and might have
provided valuable information about Osama's finances, associates and supporters.
U.S. officials later learned from a captured al-Qaida operative that one of
the men permitted to leave without questioning, Saudi Prince Ahmed, "knew
beforehand that an attack was scheduled for American soil" on 9/11. On Sept. 19,
2001, as Saudis with close associations to Osama bin Laden were permitted to
freely leave the country, Ashcroft said he had "a responsibility to use every
legal means at our disposal to prevent further terrorist activity by taking people
into custody who have violated the law and who may pose a threat to America."
But instead of focusing on the Saudis who likely had valuable information,
Ashcroft launched a dragnet that avoided Saudis. Why?
9) Condoleezza Rice testified that, during the summer of 2001, "there were 70
full field investigations underway of [al-Qaida] cells." Why didn't Ashcroft
demand that the National Security Adviser organize daily meetings at the White
House of the highest officials with national security responsibility,
including himself, to force information from the bureaucracy to the top and locate
the terrorist threat? Why did Ashcroft not raise the subject of those field
investigations at the one Principals Meeting of national security officials that
discussed terrorism (specifically, the Predator drone aircraft) before 9/11?
Rice has insisted that Principals meetings on the al-Qaida threat were
unnecessary. She testified that she did not believe "bringing the principals over to
the White House every day...was a good way to go about this. It wasn't an
efficient way to go about it." Yet the only knowledge she had of the 70
investigations into al-Qaida cells operating in the United States was from the still
classified Aug. 6 President's Daily Brief. That memo was not enough to induce
Rice to act. She testified that reading there were 70 investigations into
al-Qaida cells operating domestically, at a time al-Qaida had publicly declared war
on America, suggested to her that she did not need to do more. She explained
that the Aug. 6 PDB contained "no recommendation that we do something about
this." In contrast, during the Clinton administration, frequent high level
meetings conducted by then National Security advisor Samuel Berger in 1999, spurred
action that disrupted the al-Qaida Millenium plots. Will Ashcroft produce and
declassify the memos on these 70 investigations? Detail any discussion he ever
had with Rice or President Bush about the investigations? If not, why not?
10) If there were structural impediments to information sharing among federal
agencies prior to 9/11, why did you testify under oath before the Congress in
May 2001 that the National Security Council was a "highly effective
instrument" in coordinating federal agencies dealing with counterterrorism?
The Bush administration has repeatedly attempted to deflect responsibility
for the intelligence failures prior to 9/11 by claiming that structural
impediments to information sharing among agencies precluded effective counterterrorism
efforts. Condoleezza Rice testified, "If anything might have helped stop 9/11
it would have been better information about threats inside the United
States...[but] structural and legal impediments...prevented the collection and
sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. So the
attacks came." But Ashcroft told the Congress in May 2001 that the National
Security Council was a highly effective instrument in facilitating coordination
among the pertinent federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities." Why
did the Justice Department and the NSC fail to coordinate federal agencies
with counterterrorism responsibilities prior to 9/11?
Attorney General Ashcroft, what is your responsibility -- and the
responsibility of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and President Bush -- for
this failure?
About the writer
Judd Legum is deputy research director at the Center for American Progress in
Washington, D.C. and co-author of the Progress Report. Additional research
was provided by Christy Harvey and David Sirota.