U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL.WARFARE
Fri Apr 9, 2004 00:43
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TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL.WARFARE
HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON D.C. 20515
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bod4.htm

Executive Summary
Tehran, Baghdad & Damascus: The New Axis Pact

August 10, 1992

The following paper deals with developments, issues and background material related to the creation of a tripartite alliance between Iran, Iraq and Syria in the wake of the Persian Gulf War.

* The key to current Iranian policy in the Persian Gulf region is Iran's planning for a major war in the Middle East with Iran leading a powerful bloc of Muslim states against Israel.
* Iraq's recent crisis over U.N. inspection of the Agriculture Ministry in Baghdad was part of an effort by Saddam Hussein to demonstrate his willingness to support an Iranian dominated alliance.
* Syria's support for the "New Axis" is an outgrowth of its view that it is impossible to reach an accord with Israel and that therefore it will need allies in its upcoming military confrontation with the Jewish state.
* The origins of the Tripartite alliance between Iran, Iraq and Syria go back to the early days of the Ayatollah Khomeyni's rule, when it was decided that the Islamic Revolution could succeed only with Iran at the head of a broad based Islamic alliance.
* After the Iran-Iraq War, Iran~s interest in an "Islamic Bloc" concept was renewed, although at the outset that bloc was dominated by Iraq. After the Persian Gulf War, this relationship reversed, with Sudan acting as intermediary, and Iran became the dominant member.
* Among other aspects of the Axis, Iraq is assisted by Iran and Syria in bypassing UN sanctions. Although Damascus and Tehran do not particu larly care for Saddam, they recognize that his survival irritates the United States and thus strengthens their position in the region.
* Saddam Hussein has accepted a subordinate role in the axis as his only means of retaining power, but at the same time pursues repressive policies against Iraq's Shi'ite and pro-Syrian populations as a way to assure that his "allies" do not topple him.

TEHRAN, BAGHDAD & DAMASCUS: THE NEW AXIS PACT August 10, 1992

The current escalation of the US confrontation with Iraq, including the threat of the resumption of hostilities, is but one phase in the strengthening of a Tehran-controlled strategic axis stretching from the Mediterranean to Iran. This axis-itself is an integral part of a much larger "Islamic Bloc" that is being consolidated by Tehran and that also includes Sudan and the Muslim countries of central and south Asia.

This bloc is central to a Tehran government that is making plans for a major war in the region and that has built its strategic plans around the assumption that war is inevitable. The primary objectives of this war will be to evict the US from the Muslim world, primarily the Persian Gulf region, and to "liberate Jerusalem." For its part, Syria shares Tehran's political-strategic view and believes that war is virtually imminent. Indeed, Damascus has already concluded that there can be no compromise between Israel and Syria because their respective positions are too far apart to be reconciled (irrespective of the character of government in Jerusalem).

Thus, for Damascus, the peace process is meaningless as far as its contribution to stability in the region is concerned, and is regarded as a strategic facade for a highly efficient campaign by the US to expand and consolidate its position in the Middle East. Therefore, Damascus is convinced that drastic action, likely to include war with Israel, is urgently needed in order to break the deadlock and reverse the strength ening of US influence.

Similarly, the recent crisis with the US over the UN inspections in Baghdad should be examined as part of Iraq's relationship to the Iran-Syria-Iraq alliance. From this perspective, the crisis was a means for Baghdad to prove its loyalty to Tehran and Damascus, as well as an effective method for allowing the latter two states to further solidify and cement the axis by drawing it together under the pressure of a confrontation with the US/UN.

Iraq is the least trusted member of the axis. Yet its mere location as the geographical link between Iran and Syria, makes Iraq a crucial element in Tehran's grand design. Therefore, efforts are being made to transform Baghdad into a loyal and active participant in the Iran-led bloc. The sense of urgency felt by Iran and Syria in this connection is reflected in the decision by Tehran and Damascus to accept Saddam Hussein's remaining in power. In order to ensure Iraq's ability to contribute to a war against Israel, Tehran and Damascus have even aided Saddam Hussein to weather the UN embargo, subvert the sanctions, and rebuild his military power. However, simultaneously, Iran and Syria are actively considering ways to ultimately replace Saddam Hussein with a leader more to their liking.

Saddam Hussein himself is fully aware of Tehran's approach and is responding with a twin-track strategy of his own. On the one hand, Saddam Hussein is eager to demonstrate his loyalty to Tehran and the axis. Toward that end, Baghdad has announced its willingness to participate in the anticipated war with Israel. At the same time, Saddam Hussein demonstrates his resolve to remain in power by actively purging suspicious elements in the military, (where the most dangerous challenge comes from pro-Syrian Ba'athists), and by suppressing the Shi'ites in order to deprive Tehran of the core of any popular uprising against his regime.

Ultimately, through this convoluted process of power posturing and the pursuit of seemingly contradictory goals, a strategic alliance is emerging along the lines of the axis advocated by Tehran. The ramifications of this development is that the Middle East is rapidly sliding toward a war that will be instigated by Tehran.

* * *

The axis concept itself, and its central role in a major war with Israel, are not new. In fact, the axis concept was a cornerstone of Khomeyni's grand design for an Islamist Middle East led by Tehran. By late-1981/early-1982, Ayatollah Khomeyni believed that the Islamic Revolution would be both secure and capable of exporting the Islamist revolution only if Iran constituted the core of a regional bloc. Former Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr pointed out that Khomeyni was contemplating "an 'Islamic belt in the Middle East,' a group of Shi'ite countries under his heel that would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon." Suffice it to say, it was impossible for Tehran to establish such an axis during its war with Iraq.

However, with the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the rejuvenation of a region-wide confrontational approach toward the US, albeit initially led by Iraq, Tehran's active interest in implementing Khomeyni's axis concept was revived. Thus, in the spring of 1990, Saddam Hussein contemplated a call for an All-Islamic Jihad against the Great Satan for the destruction of Israel and the restoration of a Khomeyni-style traditional Islamic rule over the Holy Shrines in Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina. Such a formulation of the objectives of Jihad would have markedly expanded popular support for Saddam Hussein's Great War. Indeed, Baghdad believed that such a grand design would prove too popular for Tehran and Damascus to ignore.

Thus, strategic agreement was reached between Baghdad and Tehran (then speaking also for Damascus) in the summer of 1990. Subsequently, in mid-June 1990, Barazan al-Takriti, Saddam Hussein's half-brother and Iraq's ambassador to Switzerland, personally negotiated the cooperation and coordination of terrorist and procurement operations in Europe with Cyrus Naseri, special representative of Hashemi-Rafsanjani. During the negotiations, Tehran insisted that support and assistance for crucial elements of the Iraqi war effort must come within the context of addressing the strategic posture in the region in which Iran and Syria were to be accorded a greater role and power.

The results of these deliberations were codified in a formal secret pact signed by Iran and Iraq on 28 July 1990. Subsequently, on August 15, Baghdad recognized and handed to Tehran a strategic victory in the Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqi agreement with Iran called for Tehran to provide Baghdad with vital support without becoming directly involved in a Gulf conflict. This grand design was supported wholeheartedly by Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Hafiz al-Assad.

However, ultimately, on the eve of the Persian Gulf War, Iran pulled out of the deal because Tehran doubted Iraq's ability to deliver strategic gains, and because of a lingering mistrust of Saddam Hussein's intentions. Thus, as the ensuing war instigated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was unfolding, both Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Assad saw no reason why a Takriti Sunni, that is Saddam Hussein, should lead and dominate a popular Jihad. Subsequently, Tehran decided against supporting Saddam Hussein's war plans because of Iraq's failure to launch a surprise attack on the US-led coalition in late-December 1990 and its subsequent adoption of a passive strategy.

Tehran and Damascus had grave doubts as to Baghdad's ability to carry out their joint world-wide terrorist campaign and therefore ordered their terrorist networks not to support Iraq. Thus, Iran stayed out of the conflict, but only after Tehran had convinced Baghdad to deploy to Iran many of Iraq's strategic reserves, such as the aircraft, tanks and artillery - weapons that are currently being used by the Iranians. For its part, Syria even went so far as to send a token force to Saudi Arabia to cover its own position.

However, despite these moves by Syria and Iran, Iraq remained committed to the axis alliance. Indeed, by early-1991, Saddam Hussein believed this strategy was his only viable option after he made the decision to absorb the US first strike and remain on the defensive. Baghdad gambled that the combination of an American threat to the Shi'ite Holy Shrines in Najaf and Qarbalah, and a call for a Shi'ite-dominated Jihad would be too volatile for Tehran and Damascus to avoid and would therefore assure him of their ultimate support.

In the event, searching deliberations took place in Tehran in January 1991 about the possibility of reversing policy and of joining with Iraq in the war against the US. However, Tehran ultimately decided not to be distracted from its pursuit of an alliance dominated by itself. Thus, Iran avoided participation in the fighting.

(Tehran's commitment to the consolidation of the strategic axis constituted a major reason for Iran's half-hearted support of the Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq in the spring of 1991. This lack of assistance came despite long standing Iranian support for Iraq's Shi'ite militants and the close affinity between the Iraqi Shi'ite elite and the mullahs in Tehran, many of whom-had received shelter in Najaf and Qarbalah during the Shah's reign.)

* * *

Thus, by mid-1991, all the main powers of the Middle East were rethinking their regional strategic posture. The Islamic Bloc dominated by Tehran and Damascus was emerging as the dominant power in the region and was joined by the ex-Soviet Central Asian republics, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This gave the "Islamic Bloc" unprecedented power in the Near East. At the same time, as far as the Arab world was concerned, this bloc was not very different from the alliance advocated by Saddam Hussein on the eve of, and during, the first phase of the Persian Gulf War. Therefore, Baghdad could link up with the Islamic Bloc ostensibly without Saddam Hussein's loosing face. Consequently, by the end of 1991, the Islamic Bloc had become the key to Iraq's ability to survive under the U.N. sanctions.

Indeed, as early as the spring of 1991, Baghdad in effect recognized Tehran as the region's dominant power. The Iraqi approach to dealing with Tehran and its allies was the outcome of a profound change in Baghdad's reading of the situation in the region. Having realized that the UN sanctions would not be lifted any time soon, Baghdad moved from pursuing ad-hoc arrangements aimed at overcoming short-term problems to seeking a long-term posture and commitments that would enable Iraq to function for the long term in a hostile world climate.

Thus, Iraq realized that Iran and Syria constituted the key to any long-term importation of military assistance, crucial to keeping Saddam Hussein in power. The use of Iran and Syria as the ports of entry for all forms of sanction-busting imports remains beneficial to Iraq because there is no Western oversight in these countries and both are hostile to the US and in cooperation with all international bodies. In-pursuing this option, Baghdad is fully aware of the extremely high strategic price it has to pay for securing these lines of communication.

In the meantime, Sudan has emerged as an instrumental intermediary in the negotiation of the new Iran-Iraq strategic deal. During the Gulf Crisis, Sudan was one of Iraq's closest allies and, in fact, a large Iraqi expeditionary force for the seizure of Islam's Holy Shrines in the Hijaz and the blocking of the Red Sea was deployed there. This was the outgrowth of the coming to power, in 1991, of Hassan al-Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood, who transformed Sudan into an Islamic Republic, thereby naturally shifting its allegiance to Iran in the process.

Thus, in due course, the first meaningful contacts between Iran and Iraq were revived in Khartoum in April 1991. Iranian officials discussed issues concerning cross-border trade with Iraqi intelligence officials concealed among representatives of an Iraqi Trade Union delegation then participating in a conference in Khartoum. In these discussions, Sa'ad al-Takriti emerged as a major figure in the Sudanese-Iranian-Iraqi negotiations. A longtime colleague of al-Turabi, Sa'ad al-Takriti was involved in such clandestine operations as the financing of the Egyptian Islamlist networks via Sudan.

These tripartite discussions dragged on inconclusively through the summer of 1991 with Tehran insisting on Baghdad's recognition of the new strategic realities in the region before any specific agreement could be reached. Meanwhile, however, Iran gradually reduced its support for the Shi'ite and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq, thus demonstrating good faith.

A turning point took place when a high-level delegation arrived from Baghdad to the terrorist conference in Tehran on 19-22 October 1991. (For details see TF Report on Confronting Pax-Americana.) It was more a symbolic gesture, an attempt to placate and appease Tehran, than anything meaningful. Indeed, the Iranian leadership still did not trust Baghdad, and left no doubt about it by giving prominence to the Shi'ite organization SAIRI. However, the Iraqi delegation held some closed-door meetings with Iranian officials which allowed them to get the measure of the Iraqis after all the strained relations of the past.

Meanwhile, the final transformation of Sudan into an Iranian fiefdom was completed in mid-December 1991 during a visit to Khartoum by a large Iranian delegation led by Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and 157 other senior officials including: Ali Akbar Velayati (Foreign Minister), Akbar Torkan (Minister of Defense and C.O. Military), Ali Fallahian (C.o. Intelligence), Muhsin Reza'i (C.O. IRGC), Zulradr' (C.o.S. IRGC), Gholam Reza Foruzesh (Minister of Construction Jihad), Abdol Hussayn Vahaji (Minister of Commerce), and Massud Roghani-Zanjani (head of budget office).

It was during Hashemi-Rafsanjani's visit that the Sudanese, led by al-Turabi and General Bashir, finally broke the ice and mediated the beginning of a new strategic realignment between Tehran and Baghdad. The first indication of a fundamental change in Iran's position came on 24 December 1991 when Tehran demanded that the new Gulf Security Body should include both Iran and Iraq if it was to truly represent the interests of the region's countries. Tehran was fully aware that problems would persist for as long as Saddam Hussein remained in po

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