M. F. Abernathy
Schlund Legal Motions: Conclusion
Wed Mar 24 15:06:46 2004
216.19.126.55

Because Plaintiff Schlund has filed his I.P.M.E. (Doc.’s 9 and 10), which established he is under tremendous pain and suffering through the torture activities of said Defendants, it does not serve the ends of justice and fair play for the Court to issue orders which would delay his expedited discovery attempt to prevent the torture, as denoted above (Doc.’s 9 and 10). Plaintiff is seriously concerned that Magistrate Virginia A. Mathis (“Magistrate Mathis”) may at this junction have become tainted, biased, and prejudiced to Plaintiff’s legitimate claims due to her premature statements set forth in her March 17, 2004 Order referencing Plaintiff Schlund’s I.P.M.E. (Doc. 9 and impliedly 10) “will be denied as it is facially without legal or factual support.” March 17, 2004 Order, par. 2, lns. 17-21. Magistrate Mathis could have simply denied the Motion based on the F.R.C.P. Rule 26(f) provisions to meet and confer and establish a discovery plan rather than voice her premature, unobjective, lack of impartiality, biased, prejudiced, and without any legal or factual support, conclusion contrary to direct evidence that Plaintiff’s Motion is without facially without legal or factual support unless, of course, Magistrate Mathis can demonstrate she has the sophisticated, scientific expertise to invalidate specially designed government implants utilized by the Defendants for the monitoring and torture of political witnesses and their wireless telemetry functionality long established in well known scientific arenas where such devices are used by the governments.

Further, that Magistrate Mathis has the medical expertise concerning the psychological and/or physiological effects of said torture, especially of a long-term duration such as here, to render a factual conclusion totally contrary to the direct evidence submitted by Plaintiff Schlund of his own personal knowledge. Both the scientific and medically related material and triable issues of relative facts set forth in the Verified Complaint (Doc. 1) and his I.P.M.E. and supplement (Docs. 9 and 10) are not within the genre of the personal knowledge of Virginia Mathis to jump to a premature conclusion that they are facially without legal or factual support, especially when the facts before her and the cited legal authority in support of the propositions blatantly state otherwise. The courts have long found that all witnesses being tortured with electronic implants are paranoid and delussional when in fact these people are being tortured by their governments. Electronic torture gives the necessary symptoms of paranoia and delusions needed for these outrageous court rulings. In every case the government refused to order scans to detect the electronic devices and refused to force the government to testify to its use of electronic implants in investigations.

In fact the investigations are just the legal authority to torture these people such as Plaintiff Schlund is now tortured. Torture is used to force these innocent people to in time commit some crime which is then used to imprison them or place them in a mental institution. In the Don Bolles Papers George Bush Sr. bragged in briefings that he could now force anyone to either commit suicide or under torture in time force them to be unable to live in society to where they would be forced to commit some crime or go mad under the torture to where they could be interned as a criminal or as being insane. In truth these people were just threats to the corruption in the government.


The Magistrate has the procedural power to order CAT Scans, MRI Scans, X-rays and independent experts pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 706 to find the truth, to prove that implants that are used by the Defendants to monitor and torture political witnesses in a covert manner, and similarly, to understand the nature of covert surveillance utilized to monitor those effects. See Siderman DeBlake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) [All governments use their highest levels of available technology for surveillance intrusion, in violation of law as well as torture of the targeted individual, and then always deny it used it for those purposes or otherwise] and U.S. v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991) [Koyomejian was subjected to the government’s utilization of illegal electronic aural surveillance using their system technology to integrate with his television and electrical system throughout the house, recording his conversations and others, as well as use of sophisticated optical surveillance instruments/devices to extract other information throughout the entire perimeters of the house, violating the warrants provision under the United States Constitution.

The Court found the limitless and egregious intrusion of his privacy with the use of the sophisticated electronic system, including its instruments/devices, were illegal and outside the scope of the warrants issued by the “surveillance court”]. Both of these cases are of recent vintage and constitute controlling 9th Circuit Court of Appeal law, which this lower United States District Court (Magistrate Mathis) must not invalidate on whim or her illusion that Plaintiff Schlund is a criminal. Also, there is a body of law on torture and the use of torture instruments, both primitive and sophisticated, which deals with [asylum] cases in the Immigration context before the same department, Department of Justice, which this Court can take judicial notice of by this request under F.R.E. Rule 201, which is undeniable and too numerous to set forth the avalanche of case law here.

Accordingly, Plaintiff Schlund has information and belief that Magistrate Mathis is not corrupt. Plaintiff Schlund was horribly tortured by defendants for allowing Magistrate Mathis hear this case. Plaintiff Schlund requests that Magistrate Mathis carefully assess her objectivity, impartiality, and fairness standards and disclose in writing whether she has any bias, prejudice, or other reason why she would be predisposed at this early stage of the proceedings to invalidate Plaintiff Schlund’s claims, contrary to triable material issues of fact well supported by law and provable by the proper unaltered medical scans and/or test. Especially when the Defendant again possesses every [personal] motive to engage in witness tampering, illegal surveillance, fabrication or selective extraction of surveillance data to justify the illegal surveillance of Plaintiff, exactly as they did under color of authority (in part) relating to Plaintiff’s previous criminal (bogus) charges by these exact (in part) same corrupt governmental personnel.


Rule 26 contemplates “examinations not merely for the narrow purpose of adducing testimony which may be offered in evidence, but also for the broad discovery of information which may be useful in preparation for trial” Olson Transportation Co. v. Socony-Vaccum Co., E.D. Wis. 1944, 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 34, 41, Case 2 (“….the Rules….permit ‘fishing’ for evidence as they should.”). Note: 1945, 45 Col. L. Rev. 482. Thus, hearsay, while inadmissible itself, may suggest testimony that properly may be proved. Under Rule 26(b), several cases, however, have erroneously limited discovery on the basis of admissibility, holding that the word “relevant,” in effect, meant “material and competent under the Rules of Evidence.” The contrary and better view, however, has been often stated and is the rule in the Ninth Circuit, and hearsay and other evidence may be delved into during discovery for the extraction of further factual support for the underlying premises of the case.

See Allen v. Scribner (The testimony of Plaintiff Schlund alone is sufficient to sustain a verdict); Siderman DeBlake v. Republic of Argentina (Testimony of the person being tortured is sufficient to sustain a verdict and overcome summary motions attempting to prematurely terminate the right to a jury trial); U.S. v. Koyomejian (Allows for discovery into the government’s use of any type of electronic system technology which violates a person’s rights, especially the rights to privacy or as it integrates with other known system technology utilized by the government for multi-purposes, digital in nature and limited by law in its use and scope, irrespective of the purpose, with one or two rare exceptions in the interests of national security, and always subject to the In Camera analysis of the Trial Court). See also the discussion as to the broad scope of discovery in Hoffman v. Palmer, C.C.A. 2, 1942, 129 F.2d 976, 995-997 affirmed, 63 S.Ct. 477, 318 U.S. 109 and it includes the violation of the attorney-work product privilege upon a showing of good cause under the Hickman case. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Plaintiff Schlund, on information and belief, believes that under Hickman he can demonstrate that the certain [key] attorneys (new judges) within the United States Department of Justice have entered a direct and/or tacit agreement to violate individual’s rights, such as Plaintiff Schlund, through the use of the torture and/or surveillance invasion of privacies, illegally and in an indiscriminate manner.

This includes recorded statements from Plaintiff Schlund through the use of such technology, which under the law enables him to secure production of his own statement without any special showing. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, pars. 26.23 (8.4) (2nd Ed. 1966); 2 A. Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedures Sec. 652.3 (Wright Ed., 1961); see also Note Developments in the Law-Discovery 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1039 (1961) and 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) [Jencks Act]. In areas such as exists before this Court, Rule 26(b)(4) involving experts or potential experts needed to educate this Magistrate (or the Court) concerning the intricate or difficult issues as to which expert testimony is likely to be determinative, such as in torture and electronic surveillance cases and how they are used on political witnesses and the government’s motive for fabricating evidence and obstructing justice, and maintaining perpetual, egregious and outrageous intrusion through electronic surveillance means for the political target, provides for direct exceptions to the Jencks Act led to criminal matters and even a more liberal interpretation involving civil liability matters (Plaintiff Schlund’s Complaint, Doc. 1) and the agents which arguably may be unknown. See Bevins v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).


It is beyond dispute Plaintiff Schlund has set forth in his “Notice Pleading” sufficient facts and causes of action that are facially supported both legally and factually under the known and well understood provisions of the law. Although the well understood provisions of the laws aforesaid exist, the factual and legal propositions set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint and his I.P.M.E. may not, outside normal circles, constitute propositions of generalized knowledge justifying the necessity of an expert to assist the Magistrate in these regards.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above said, Plaintiff Schlund respectfully requests the Court to:


1. Set a date certain within the next ten (10) days for the case schedule, including discovery;


2. Order a date certain for the parties to engage in discovery conference for discovery planning; and


3. Set aside and grant Plaintiff Schlund’s I.P.M.E. to with the Discovery Process which includes, but is not limited to the MRI Scans, CAT Scans, and X-rays relating to Plaintiff Schlund as requested in the motion to protect and preserve evidence.


Further, Plaintiff Schlund requests from this Court a written affirmation that Magistrate Mathis is not predisposed to reject the merits of Plaintiff’s claim as implied in its March 17, 2004 Order denying Plaintiff’s February 10, 2004 I.P.M.E., as stated herein.



Dated: March 22, 2004 By:
Charles August Schlund, III
Plaintiff in Pro Per



COPIES of the foregoing mailed this 22nd day of March, 2004 to:



Arthur G. Garcia
Assistant U.S. Attorney
United States Attorney General’s Office
Two Renaissance Square
40 North Central Avenue, Suite 1200
Phoenix, AZ 85004-4408
Attorney for Defendant



President George W. Bush
White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001



President George Bush
United States of America
White House
Washington D.C., 20001



Mr. John Ashcroft
Attorney General of the United States
950 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001



United States Attorney General’s Office
Department of Justice
555 Fourth Street N.W.
10th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20001



Office of the Solicitor General
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001



Office of the Inspector General
United States of America
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 4322
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001


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