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9/11 - Full text: Donald Rumsfeld statement 3/24/04
Wed Mar 24 01:19:05 2004
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Full text: Donald Rumsfeld statement
March 24, 2004 - 3:00PM
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/24/1079939702817.html
[snip]
Dr. Rice has stated she asked the National Security Council staff in her first week in office for a new Presidential initiative on al-Qaeda. The staff conducted an overall review of al-Qaeda policy. In early March, the staff was directed to craft a more aggressive strategy aimed at eliminating the al-Qaeda threat.

The first draft of that new strategy, in the form of a Presidential directive, was circulated by the NSC staff on June 7, 2001 and I am told some five more meetings were held that summer at the Deputy Secretary level to address the policy questions involved, such as relating an aggressive strategy against the Taliban to U.S.-Pakistan relations.

By the first week of September, this process had arrived at a strategy that was presented to Principals and later became National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-9.

The objectives of the new strategy were: To eliminate the al-Qaeda network; To use all elements of national power to do so -- diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, information and law enforcement; To eliminate sanctuaries for al-Qaeda and related terrorist networks and if diplomatic efforts to do so failed, to consider additional measures. The essence of this strategy was contained in NSPD-9.

It was the first major substantive national security decision directive issued by this Administration. It was presented for decision by principals on September 4, 2001 7 days before September 11th. The directive was signed by the President, with minor changes, and a preamble to reflect the events of 9/11, on October 25, 2001.

While this review of counter-terrorism policy was taking place, the Department of Defense was developing a review of U.S. defense strategy.

When President Bush took office, he asked us to transform the Defense Department, and arrange the U.S. Armed Forces for the new threats of the 21st century, which he knew would be notably different from 20th century threats that were familiar, but unlikely. On February 2, 2001, less than two weeks after taking office, I traveled to Germany for the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy my first overseas trip since returning to the Pentagon.

Already, at that early date, we were focused on the problem of unconventional or asymmetric threats. On the flight, I was asked by reporters about the principles that would drive our defense review. I answered that the 1991 Persian Gulf War had taught the world that taking on Western armies, navies and air forces directly is not a good idea.

It was expensive and attackers were almost certain to lose a conventional conflict. It was therefore likely that potential adversaries would: look for so-called asymmetrical responses [everything] from terrorism through cyber attacks, to information warfare, to cruise missiles, to short-range ballistic missiles, to longer range ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction.

The problem we faced was that, for most of the 20th century, the U.S. Armed Forces had been organized, trained and equipped to fight opposing armies, navies and air forces. While we need to maintain the capability to fight traditional wars, we also knew that the likely threats in the 21st century would require us to conduct much different kinds of military operations.

Even traditional adversaries would be likely to threaten us in unconventional or asymmetric ways. Moreover, we knew we would increasingly face threats from non-traditional adversaries, such as terrorist networks, and that we needed to re-arrange ourselves to be able to deter and dissuade such attacks and to defeat such adversaries if they did attack.

The danger posed by proliferation is twofold: First, that hostile states will develop these weapons, and a variety of ways to deliver them against our people, and our friends and coalition partners, and thus have the power to hold our populations hostage to blackmail; and Second, that they might share those capabilities with terrorist networks, that could use them to attack us without fingerprints.

At the same time, the challenges facing the intelligence community were growing more complex. During my confirmation hearings, I was asked what one thing would keep me awake at night? I answered, without hesitation: intelligence.

I understand CIA Director Tenet will testify tomorrow and he will provide a detailed description of the challenges facing the intelligence community. Let me simply say this: during the Cold War, we faced a principal adversary the Soviet Union an enemy we grew to know and understand reasonably well over many decades.

Today, we face multiple potential adversaries both state and non-state actors operating around the globe. We are living in an age where the nature of the international economy, the volume and rate of global interactions and communication, and the spread of technologies, mean the volume of information that must be monitored and assessed has grown and is growing.

The ability of the intelligence community to monitor the rapidly growing volume of data, sort it, analyze it, and then alert policymakers to threats to the U.S. and its interests, is growing more difficult by the year. Their challenge is compounded by the fact that the ability of the intelligence community to learn the secrets of those who wish us harm, and to convey those secrets to policy-makers in confidence, continues to be compromised by frequent leaks and unauthorized disclosures.

Hardly a day goes by when the media doesnt carry a story that reveals classified information. This aids our enemies in significant ways. The harm done to the U.S. by spies and traitors the likes of Ames, Hansen, and Pollard is substantial.

The result has been that important features of our intelligence capabilities have been compromised. As part of our complicated world, adversaries of the U.S. have chosen terrorism as the preferred instrument to force free nations to submit to their agendas by inflicting death on their innocent citizens.

We were also concerned about the risk of surprise, and the danger that new threats could emerge with little or no warning. In June 2001, I attended the first meeting of NATO defense ministers in the 21st century, and my first NATO meeting since returning to government. I told my colleagues about Vice President Cheney's appearance before the Senate for his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Defense in March of 1989.

During those hearings, a wide range of security issues were discussed but not one person uttered the word "Iraq." Yet within a year, Iraq had invaded Kuwait and that word was in every headline and on everyone's lips. I wondered what word might come to dominate my term in office that wasn't raised by members of the Senate Committee during my confirmation hearings.

Three months later, we learned the answer -- Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. At that June 2001 meeting, months before September 11th -- I cautioned our NATO colleagues as follows: We know this much for certain: it is unlikely that any of us here knows what is likely.

None of us has a crystal ball through which we can clearly see the future. [But] while it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us or where or when in the coming decades, it is less difficult to anticipate how we will be threatened.

We know, for example, that as an Alliance of democracies, our open borders and open societies make it easy and inviting for terrorists to strike at our people where they live [and] work.
[snip]
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