Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq
By Paul R. Pillar
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006
Summary: During the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, writes the
intelligence community's former senior analyst for the Middle
East, the Bush administration disregarded the community's
expertise, politicized the intelligence process, and selected
unrepresentative raw intelligence to make its public case.
PAUL R. PILLAR is on the faculty of the Security Studies Program
at Georgetown University. Concluding a long career in the
Central Intelligence Agency, he served as National Intelligence
Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005.
A DYSFUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
The most serious problem with U.S. intelligence today is that
its relationship with the policymaking process is broken and
badly needs repair. In the wake of the Iraq war, it has become
clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in
making even the most significant national security decisions,
that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions
already made, that damaging ill will developed between
policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the
intelligence community's own work was politicized. As the
national intelligence officer responsible for the Middle East
from 2000 to 2005, I witnessed all of these disturbing
developments.
Public discussion of prewar intelligence on Iraq has focused on
the errors made in assessing Saddam Hussein's unconventional
weapons programs. A commission chaired by Judge Laurence
Silberman and former Senator Charles Robb usefully documented
the intelligence community's mistakes in a solid and
comprehensive report released in March 2005. Corrections were
indeed in order, and the intelligence community has begun to
make them.
At the same time, an acrimonious and highly partisan debate
broke out over whether the Bush administration manipulated and
misused intelligence in making its case for war. The
administration defended itself by pointing out that it was not
alone in its view that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and active weapons programs, however mistaken that view may have
been.
In this regard, the Bush administration was quite right: its
perception of Saddam's weapons capacities was shared by the
Clinton administration, congressional Democrats, and most other
Western governments and intelligence services. But in making
this defense, the White House also inadvertently pointed out the
real problem: intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs did not
drive its decision to go to war. A view broadly held in the
United States and even more so overseas was that deterrence of
Iraq was working, that Saddam was being kept "in his box," and
that the best way to deal with the weapons problem was through
an aggressive inspections program to supplement the sanctions
already in place. That the administration arrived at so
different a policy solution indicates that its decision to
topple Saddam was driven by other factors -- namely, the desire
to shake up the sclerotic power structures of the Middle East
and hasten the spread of more liberal politics and economics in
the region.
If the entire body of official intelligence analysis on Iraq had
a policy implication, it was to avoid war -- or, if war was
going to be launched, to prepare for a messy aftermath. What is
most remarkable about prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq is not
that it got things wrong and thereby misled policymakers; it is
that it played so small a role in one of the most important U.S.
policy decisions in recent decades.
A MODEL UPENDED
The proper relationship between intelligence gathering and
policymaking sharply separates the two functions. The
intelligence community collects information, evaluates its
credibility, and combines it with other information to help make
sense of situations abroad that could affect U.S. interests.
Intelligence officers decide which topics should get their
limited collection and analytic resources according to both
their own judgments and the concerns of policymakers.
Policymakers thus influence which topics intelligence agencies
address but not the conclusions that they reach. The
intelligence community, meanwhile, limits its judgments to what
is happening or what might happen overseas, avoiding policy
judgments about what the United States should do in response.
In practice, this distinction is often blurred, especially
because analytic projections may have policy implications even
if they are not explicitly stated. But the distinction is still
important. National security abounds with problems that are
clearer than the solutions to them; the case of Iraq is hardly a
unique example of how similar perceptions of a threat can lead
people to recommend very different policy responses.
Accordingly, it is critical that the intelligence community not
advocate policy, especially not openly. If it does, it loses the
most important basis for its credibility and its claims to
objectivity. When intelligence analysts critique one another's
work, they use the phrase "policy prescriptive" as a pejorative,
and rightly so.
The Bush administration's use of intelligence on Iraq did not
just blur this distinction; it turned the entire model upside
down. The administration used intelligence not to inform
decision-making, but to justify a decision already made. It went
to war without requesting -- and evidently without being
influenced by -- any strategic-level intelligence assessments on
any aspect of Iraq. (The military made extensive use of
intelligence in its war planning, although much of it was of a
more tactical nature.) Congress, not the administration, asked
for the now-infamous October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, although few
members of Congress actually read it. (According to several
congressional aides responsible for safeguarding the classified
material, no more than six senators and only a handful of House
members got beyond the five-page executive summary.) As the
national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was in
charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community's
assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I received from
any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not
until a year into the war.
Official intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs was flawed, but
even with its flaws, it was not what led to the war. On the
issue that mattered most, the intelligence community judged that
Iraq probably was several years away from developing a nuclear
weapon. The October 2002 NIE also judged that Saddam was
unlikely to use WMD against the United States unless his regime
was placed in mortal danger.
Before the war, on its own initiative, the intelligence
community considered the principal challenges that any
postinvasion authority in Iraq would be likely to face. It
presented a picture of a political culture that would not
provide fertile ground for democracy and foretold a long,
difficult, and turbulent transition. It projected that a
Marshall Plan-type effort would be required to restore the Iraqi
economy, despite Iraq's abundant oil resources. It forecast that
in a deeply divided Iraqi society, with Sunnis resentful over
the loss of their dominant position and Shiites seeking power
commensurate with their majority status, there was a significant
chance that the groups would engage in violent conflict unless
an occupying power prevented it. And it anticipated that a
foreign occupying force would itself be the target of resentment
and attacks -- including by guerrilla warfare -- unless it
established security and put Iraq on the road to prosperity in
the first few weeks or months after the fall of Saddam.
In addition, the intelligence community offered its assessment
of the likely regional repercussions of ousting Saddam. It
argued that any value Iraq might have as a democratic exemplar
would be minimal and would depend on the stability of a new
Iraqi government and the extent to which democracy in Iraq was
seen as developing from within rather than being imposed by an
outside power. More likely, war and occupation would boost
political Islam and increase sympathy for terrorists' objectives
-- and Iraq would become a magnet for extremists from elsewhere
in the Middle East.
STANDARD DEVIATIONS
The Bush administration deviated from the professional standard
not only in using policy to drive intelligence, but also in
aggressively using intelligence to win public support for its
decision to go to war. This meant selectively adducing data --
"cherry-picking" -- rather than using the intelligence
community's own analytic judgments. In fact, key portions of the
administration's case explicitly rejected those judgments. In an
August 2002 speech, for example, Vice President Dick Cheney
observed that "intelligence is an uncertain business" and noted
how intelligence analysts had underestimated how close Iraq had
been to developing a nuclear weapon before the 1991 Persian Gulf
War. His conclusion -- at odds with that of the intelligence
community -- was that "many of us are convinced that Saddam will
acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon."
In the upside-down relationship between intelligence and policy
that prevailed in the case of Iraq, the administration selected
pieces of raw intelligence to use in its public case for war,
leaving the intelligence community to register varying degrees
of private protest when such use started to go beyond what
analysts deemed credible or reasonable. The best-known example
was the assertion by President George W. Bush in his 2003 State
of the Union address that Iraq was purchasing uranium ore in
Africa. U.S. intelligence analysts had questioned the
credibility of the report making this claim, had kept it out of
their own unclassified products, and had advised the White House
not to use it publicly. But the administration put the claim
into the speech anyway, referring to it as information from
British sources in order to make the point without explicitly
vouching for the intelligence.
The reexamination of prewar public statements is a necessary
part of understanding the process that led to the Iraq war. But
a narrow focus on rhetorical details tends to overlook more
fundamental problems in the intelligence-policy relationship.
Any time policymakers, rather than intelligence agencies, take
the lead in selecting which bits of raw intelligence to present,
there is -- regardless of the issue -- a bias. The resulting
public statements ostensibly reflect intelligence, but they do
not reflect intelligence analysis, which is an essential part of
determining what the pieces of raw reporting mean. The
policymaker acts with an eye not to what is indicative of a
larger pattern or underlying truth, but to what supports his
case.
Another problem is that on Iraq, the intelligence community was
pulled over the line into policy advocacy -- not so much by what
it said as by its conspicuous role in the administration's
public case for war. This was especially true when the
intelligence community was made highly visible (with the
director of central intelligence literally in the camera frame)
in an intelligence-laden presentation by Secretary of State
Colin Powell to the UN Security Council a month before the war
began. It was also true in the fall of 2002, when, at the
administration's behest, the intelligence community published a
white paper on Iraq's WMD programs -- but without including any
of the community's judgments about the likelihood of those
weapons' being used.
But the greatest discrepancy between the administration's public
statements and the intelligence community's judgments concerned
not WMD (there was indeed a broad consensus that such programs
existed), but the relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda. The
enormous attention devoted to this subject did not reflect any
judgment by intelligence officials that there was or was likely
to be anything like the "alliance" the administration said
existed. The reason the connection got so much attention was
that the administration wanted to hitch the Iraq expedition to
the "war on terror" and the threat the American public feared
most, thereby capitalizing on the country's militant post-9/11
mood.
The issue of possible ties between Saddam and al Qaeda was
especially prone to the selective use of raw intelligence to
make a public case for war. In the shadowy world of
international terrorism, almost anyone can be "linked" to almost
anyone else if enough effort is made to find evidence of casual
contacts, the mentioning of names in the same breath, or
indications of common travels or experiences. Even the most
minimal and circumstantial data can be adduced as evidence of a
"relationship," ignoring the important question of whether a
given regime actually supports a given terrorist group and the
fact that relationships can be competitive or distrustful rather
than cooperative.
The intelligence community never offered any analysis that
supported the notion of an alliance between Saddam and al Qaeda.
Yet it was drawn into a public effort to support that notion. To
be fair, Secretary Powell's presentation at the UN never
explicitly asserted that there was a cooperative relationship
between Saddam and al Qaeda. But the presentation was clearly
meant to create the impression that one existed. To the extent
that the intelligence community was a party to such efforts, it
crossed the line into policy advocacy -- and did so in a way
that fostered public misconceptions contrary to the intelligence
community's own judgments.
VARIETIES OF POLITICIZATION
In its report on prewar intelligence concerning Iraqi WMD, the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said it found no
evidence that analysts had altered or shaped their judgments in
response to political pressure. The Silberman-Robb commission
reached the same conclusion, although it conceded that analysts
worked in an "environment" affected by "intense" policymaker
interest. But the method of investigation used by the panels --
essentially, asking analysts whether their arms had been twisted
-- would have caught only the crudest attempts at
politicization. Such attempts are rare and, when they do occur
(as with former Undersecretary of State John Bolton's attempts
to get the intelligence community to sign on to his judgments
about Cuba and Syria), are almost always unsuccessful. Moreover,
it is unlikely that analysts would ever acknowledge that their
own judgments have been politicized, since that would be far
more damning than admitting more mundane types of analytic
error.
The actual politicization of intelligence occurs subtly and can
take many forms. Context is all-important. Well before March
2003, intelligence analysts and their managers knew that the
United States was heading for war with Iraq. It was clear that
the Bush administration would frown on or ignore analysis that
called into question a decision to go to war and welcome
analysis that supported such a decision. Intelligence analysts
-- for whom attention, especially favorable attention, from
policymakers is a measure of success -- felt a strong wind
consistently blowing in one direction. The desire to bend with
such a wind is natural and strong, even if unconscious.
On the issue of Iraqi WMD, dozens of analysts throughout the
intelligence community were making many judgments on many
different issues based on fragmentary and ambiguous evidence.
The differences between sound intelligence analysis (bearing in
mind the gaps in information) and the flawed analysis that
actually was produced had to do mainly with matters of caveat,
nuance, and word choice. The opportunities for bias were
numerous. It may not be possible to point to one key instance of
such bending or to measure the cumulative effect of such
pressure. But the effect was probably significant.
A clearer form of politicization is the inconsistent review of
analysis: reports that conform to policy preferences have an
easier time