There are No WMD's And There Needs to be an Investigation
Mon Jan 26 03:56:50 2004
To Not Hold Impeachment Hearings on Bush and Cheney is a Dereliction of Duty to
the American Nation. Their "Made Man" to Find WMD's Says There are No WMD's And
There Needs to be an Investigation. - BUZZFLASH
Kay Doubts Presence of Illicit Iraq Arms
by SCOTT LINDLAW, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - The outgoing chief U.S. weapons inspector says his inability to
find illicit arms in Iraq (news - web sites) raises serious questions about
Last year, David Kay had confidently predicted weapons would be found. But after
nine months of searching, he said Sunday: "I don't think they exist."
"It's an issue of the capabilities of one's intelligence service to collect
valid, truthful information," Kay said on National Public Radio.
Asked whether President Bush (news - web sites) owed the nation an explanation
for the discrepancies between his warnings and Kay's findings, Kay said: "I
actually think the intelligence community owes the president, rather than the
president owing the American people."
The CIA (news - web sites) would not comment on Kay's remarks, though one
official, speaking on condition of anonymity, noted that Kay himself was vocal
in predicting he would find weapons.
Kay said his predictions were not "coming back to haunt me in the sense that I
am embarrassed. They are coming back to haunt me in the sense of `Why could we
all be so wrong?'"
The White House stuck by its assertions that illicit weapons will be found in
But Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry (news - web sites), a Democratic presidential
candidate, said Kay's comments reinforced his belief that the Bush
administration had exaggerated the threat Iraq posed.
"It confirms what I have said for a long period of time, that we were misled —
misled not only in the intelligence, but misled in the way that the president
took us to war," Kerry said on "Fox News Sunday." "I think there's been an
enormous amount of exaggeration, stretching, deception."
Kay's comments also drew an I-told-you-so response from Hans Blix, the former
chief U.N. inspector whose work was heavily criticized by Kay and came to end
when the United States went to war with Iraq.
The United States should have known the intelligence was flawed last year when
leads followed up by U.N. inspectors didn't produce any results.
"I was beginning to wonder what was going on. Weren't they wondering too?" He
told The Associated Press by telephone. "If you find yourself on a train that's
going in the wrong direction, its best to get off at the next stop."
Kay told The New York Times in a later interview for Monday's editions that U.S.
intelligence agencies did not realize Iraqi scientists presented Saddam with
fanciful plans for weapons programs and then used the money he authorized for
"The whole thing shifted from directed programs to a corrupted process," Kay
told the Times. "The regime was no longer in control; it was like a death
spiral. Saddam was self-directing projects that were not vetted by anyone else.
The scientists were able to fake programs."
Kay said Iraq did try to restart its nuclear weapons program in 2000 and 2001,
but that evidence suggests it would have taken years to rebuild after being
largely abandoned in the 1990s.
He said it is now clear that the CIA's basic problem was that the agency lacked
its own spies in Iraq who could provide credible information, but that he does
not believe analysts were pressed by the administration to make their reports
conform to a White House agenda.
Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said he
was surprised Kay "did not find some semblance of" banned chemical, biological
or nuclear weapons in Iraq. Roberts said a report on Iraq intelligence, to be
delivered to his panel Wednesday, should help clarify the CIA's prewar
"It appears now that that intelligence — there's a lot of questions about it,"
Roberts said Sunday on CNN's "Late Edition."
In October 2002, Bush said Iraq had "a massive stockpile of biological weapons
that has never been accounted for and is capable of killing millions." In his
television address two days before launching the invasion, Bush said U.S. troops
would enter Iraq "to eliminate weapons of mass destruction," or WMD.
Kay returned permanently from Iraq last month, having found no such weapons, nor
missiles with longer range than Saddam was allowed under international
But on Sunday, Kay reiterated his conclusion that Saddam had "a large number of
WMD program-related activities." And, he said, Iraq's leaders had intended to
continue those activities but had not decided whether to begin producing such
weapons at the time of the January invasion.
Kay also said chaos in postwar Iraq made it impossible to know with certainty
whether Iraq had had banned weapons.
And, he said, there is evidence that Iraq was moving a steady stream of goods
shipments to Syria, but it is difficult to determine whether the cargoes
included weapons, in part because Syria has refused to cooperate in this part of
the weapons investigation.
Kay said he resigned Friday because the Pentagon (news - web sites) began
peeling away his staff of weapons searchers as the military struggled to put
down the Iraqi insurgency last fall.
Kay hopes to draw on his experiences to write a book on weapons intelligence.
Associated Press writers Katherine Pfleger in Washington and Dafna Linzer in
Bern, Switzerland, contributed to this report.
Intelligence services 'must answer for Iraq WMD claims'
Iraq's WMD: the big lie?
The justification for war
With the resignation of David Kay from the Iraq Survey Group, the pressure could
not be greater on Blair to explain where he got the idea that Iraq had weapons
of mass destruction. By Neil Mackay
YOU’D be forgiven for thinking that David Kay was personally out to get Tony
Blair. On Wednesday, when the Hutton report is published, the question everyone
will want to know is did Blair and his Cabinet lie about the threat of Saddam’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?
The answer according to Kay, who resigned last week as head of the Iraq Survey
Group, which had the job of finding WMD, is that there aren’t any, and none have
been manufactured since 1991. For Blair, his statement was the equivalent of
slashing a boxer’s achilles tendons minutes before he gets into the ring for the
fight of his life.
What Kay has concluded after nine futile months seems to tally with the overall
gist of Andrew Gilligan’s broadcast on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme when he
reported that the government had “sexed up” the case for war. So the key
question now is: was Blair given unreliable and over-egged information by the
intelligence services, or rather did he have the intelligence services “sex-up”
or selectively cherry-pick information to suit his case for war?
In answer to this question, the Sunday Herald has heard from dozens of senior
members of the intelligence community who passed their views on to us through a
highly-respected go-between involved with British intelligence.
The views include those from:
# The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), which helped supply intelligence for
Blair’s disputed September 2002 WMD dossier;
# The Joint Intelligence Organisation, which includes John Scarlett, the
chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) – the body which liaises
between the intelligence services and the government and which was supposed to
have sole control of the drafting of the dossier – and the JIC’s support staff;
# And MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, the main agency responsible for
gathering the intelligence which went into the dossier.
The Sunday Herald has been told that the reason the intelligence community wants
to speak out now is to get their defence in first before the expected attack
They know that Lord Hutton will apportion blame to the Ministry of Defence,
Number 10, Blair’s former spin-doctor-in-chief Alastair Campbell, the BBC, its
reporter Andrew Gilligan and even Dr David Kelly. And when that happens, the
politicians, keen to save their jobs and reputations, will try to blame the
intelligence community for giving them duff information.
This is not a mea culpa from the intelligence community, instead it is a warning
that they are not prepared to be the whipping boy for the failure to prove the
case for war, the death of David Kelly and the quagmire that the government is
now in over the lack of WMD in Iraq.
The key points the intelligence community now wants placing on the record are:
Firstly, there was a problem with Iraq, particularly over the interpretation of
the WMD issue. Many said they had been openly sceptical about the presence of
WMD in Iraq for years. There was a systematic failure, they believe, in the way
intelligence was interpreted. This was because they were under pressure to
provide the government with what it wanted, namely that Iraq possessed WMD and
that it posed a clear and present danger.
Secondly, they say intelligence was “cherry-picked” about Iraq: that damning
intelligence against Iraq was selectively chosen, whilst intelligence
assessments, which might have worked against the build-up to war, were
sidelined. The government was looking for anything that would cast Iraq in a
Thirdly, they claim that a political agenda had crept into the work of the
intelligence community and they found themselves in the position of taking
orders from politicians. When asked if direct lies were told to the British
public, the answer was that the intelligence they supplied was one- sided and
produced on demand to politicians.
Fourthly, the intelligence community got into the habit of making worst-case
scenarios and these were used to make factual claims by politicians. The
intelligence community accepts that intelligence was used for political ends.
But they also understand that intelligence is not supposed to help politicians
justify their actions as that distorts the nature of what intelligence work is
While they believe they are not in the firing line over Hutton, they also
realise that they are going to have to think long and hard about the future of
British intelligence. They stressed that they accepted that there would be
changes in the way British intelligence operates, adding that they wanted
changes in order to maintain their integrity.
The intelligence officers seemed justified in getting their first strike in
when, on Friday night, Donald Anderson, a Labour loyalist and chair of the
foreign affairs committee, attacked British intelligence in the wake of the
resignation of David Kay. Anderson admitted that it looked “increasingly
forlorn” that any WMD stockpiles would be found . When asked, however, if he
thought this was a failure by politicians or by the intelligence services, he
said: “I think more likely the latter. Remember that both the President and the
Prime Minister relied on the intelligence that was available. And indeed the
world community appeared to accept this because in the UN Security Council
resolution 1441 on November 8 it was accepted that Saddam Hussein was a danger
to world peace, he was ordered effectively to co-operate, he did not co-operate
and it seems now rather puzzling that if it be the case, as it is likely, that
there was no such weapons available, that he did not put his hands up
immediately. This does raise very important questions about the quality of that
Does it raise a question about the intelligence service or does it actually
raise questions about the politicians who were forcing the intelligence services
to jump through hoops and spin the facts on matters of national and
international security? What the large group of intelligence officers who passed
their feelings to the Sunday Herald say is not entirely new. It is potentially
crippling for Blair given the timing of their comments, but the concept that
politicians were ordering that intelligence be twisted for political ends
regarding Iraq has been aired before.
In fact, in June last year the Sunday Herald revealed that Britain ran a covert
“dirty tricks”operation designed specifically to produce misleading intelligence
that Saddam had WMD in order to give the UK an excuse to wage war on Iraq.
Scott Ritter, the former UN chief weapons inspector and US military intelligence
officer, said that Operation Rockingham was established by the Defence
Intelligence Staff – a part of the intelligence service involved in the
compilation of the September 2002 dossier on Iraqi WMD – within the Ministry of
Defence in 1991. It was set up to “cherry-pick” intelligence proving an active
Iraqi WMD programme and to ignore and quash intelligence which indicated that
Saddam’s stockpiles had been destroyed or wound down.
When Kay resigned on Friday, he left with this parting shot: “I don’t think they
(WMD) existed. What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the
end of the last Gulf War and I don’t think there was a large-scale production
programme in the 1990s.”
The day before, US Vice-President Dick Cheney was still claiming that Saddam had
been a legitimate threat. “We know … that prior to our going in that [Saddam]
had spent time and effort acquiring mobile biological weapons labs,” Cheney
said, reiterating a long-discredited claim that military trailers found in Iraq
were mobile bio-weapons labs. In fact, the labs were, according to British
weapons experts who examined them, used for producing hydrogen to fill artillery
The man appointed by the CIA to replace Kay, Charles Duelfer, a former UN
weapons inspector, said earlier this month that he did not believe banned
weapons would ever be found. Still the British and US administrations are
sticking to their claims. White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, said: “We
remain confident that the Iraq Survey Group will uncover the truth about
Saddam’s regime, the regime’s weapons of mass destruction.”
A spokesman for Tony Blair said: “It is important people are patient and we let
the Iraq Survey Group do its work. There is still more work to be done and we
await the findings of that. But our position is unchanged.”
Few are buying these claims. John Rockefeller, the senior Democrat on the Senate
intelligence committee, said: “It increasingly appears that our intelligence was
wrong about Iraq’s weapons, and the administration compounded that mistake by
exaggerating the nuclear threat and Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda. As a result, the
United States is paying a very heavy price.”
Shadow foreign secretary Michael Ancram says Kay’s resignation and comments
“raise very serious questions about the Prime Minister and why he told us what
he did last year and after the war about WMD. It is important if we are to be
able to rely … on the word of the prime minister in relation to intelligence,
that we now find out what the basis of his comments were, and we need a public
inquiry to do that.” The LibDem foreign affairs spokesman Menzies Campbell
added: “It is pretty extraordinary that first Hans Blix … David Kay and now
David Kay’s successor have all effectively said the same thing. There needs to
be an inquiry to consider whether we went to war on a flawed prospectus.”
So, just as Hutton is about to announce the findings of his investigation, there
is a rising clamour for yet another inquiry – this time not dealing with the
death of just one whistle-blowing government scientist, but rather with the
deaths of thousands of Iraqi men, women and children and hundreds of American
and British troops.
FOUR QUESTIONS HUTTON MUST ANSWER
1 Did the government ‘sex up’ the September 24 dossier justifying war against
We know the document was changed by John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint
Why ? LIE ? SOROS is Jewish George Soros, Mon Jan 26 09:34
The Terrorists : International Protocol Henry Ford, Mon Jan 26 11:24
International Protocols: Read , Know...Truth Henry Ford, Mon Jan 26 11:27
Main Page -01/26/04
Message Board by American
Patriot Friends Network [APFN]