Chapter 1, Section 10 of Title 4 of the United States Code, which is denominated “Modification of Rules and Customs by President” initiates with the sentence especially proclaiming that “Any rule or custom pertaining to the display of the flag of the United States of America, set forth herein, may be altered, modified, or repealed, or additional rules with respect thereto may be prescribed, by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, whenever he deems it to be appropriate or desirable; and any such alteration or additional rule shall be set forth in a proclamation.”, and said Section has set forth the addition of Proc. No. 2605, Feb. 18, 1944, 9 F.R. 1957, 58 Stat. 1126, which has provided: “The flag of the United States of America is universally representative of the principles of the justice, liberty, and democracy enjoyed by the people of the United States; and People all over the world recognize the flag of the United States as symbolic of the United States; and The effective prosecution of the war requires a proper understanding by the people of other countries of the material assistance being given by the Government of the United States”;
Just because an individual resides in one of the states of the several Nation-states of the Union is not a valid enough reason to presume that the individual has sworn and does intend to swear loyalty or give allegiance to a partisan flag, standard, or colors, other than the congressionally upheld Title 4 flag.
In United States vs. Cashiell, Fed.Cas.No. 14,744, I Hughes 552, the Court expressed the observation that “the military law as it exists in the United States is an exceptional code, applicable to a class of persons in given relations, and not abrogating or derogating from the general law of the land, but that the latter is left in full force and virtue.”. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brown of the Eastern District of Michigan, not without some hesitation at first as to whether a civil court could take cognizance of the case before said Justice’s Court in United States vs. Clark, (C.C.) 31 F. 710, citing United States vs. Cornell, United States vs. Carr, and the opinion of Attorney General Cushing in Steiner’s Case, 6 Op.Atty.Gen., U.S. 413, came to the conclusion that “the martial or military law does not supersede or interfere with the civil laws of the realm, and that there is a concurrent jurisdiction in the civil court.”.
Neall vs. United States, 118 F. 699, 704 - 705 (U.S. 9th Cir. 1902) accordingly maintained “Forcible reasons may be suggested why courts-martial should be given exclusive jurisdiction of all offenses which are punishable under the articles of war, but we are not convinced that either in the constitution or in the acts of congress the intention has been expressed to except from the jurisdiction of the civil courts offenses committed by any persons or class of persons, or, as was said by Mr. Justice Brown [in United States vs. Clark], to abdicate “that supremacy of the civil power which is a fundamental principle of the Anglo-Saxon polity.””.
In United States vs. Bevans, U.S. [3 Wheaton] 336, 4 L.Ed. 404 (U.S.), Chief Justice Marshall came to the conclusion that an offense committed by a marine in the service of the United States on board a ship of war belonging to the United States lying in Boston Harbor was not out of the jurisdiction of the State of Massachusetts, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, holding moreover “that the provision of the constitution extending the judicial power of the United States “to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” did not, of itself, confer jurisdiction of the offense, as it gave to congress only the power to legislate.”.
The Act of April 30th, 1790 provided that commissioned officers and others in the land forces “shall be governed by the rules and articles of war”. Thereafter, United States vs. Mackenzie, 30 Fed.Cas. 1160, No. 18,313, firmly established that the Congress passed an Act [involving the Rules and Articles of War adopted April 10th, 1806 (2 Stat. 364)] “regulating the military establishment, by the thirteenth section of which it was declared that the commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, privates, etc., of the army, shall be governed by the rules and articles of war which have been established by the United States in congress assembled, as far as the same may be applicable to the constitution of the United States. . . .The thirty-second article of the existing rules of war is pertinent to show the understanding of congress that express legislation was necessary in order to bring officers and privates of the army to trial before the civil courts for capital crimes or acts of violence to the persons or property of citizens”.
Moreover, as further extrapolated in Neall vs. United States, 118 F. 699, 704 (U.S. 9th Cir. 1902) “In U. S. v. Cornell, Fed.Cas.No. 14,867, 2 Mason, 61, decided in 1819, Mr. Justice Story took cognizance of a murder committed by one soldier upon another in Ft. Adams, and in support of his jurisdiction cited the provisions of the judiciary act of 1789. In U.S. v. Carr, Fed.Cas.No. 14,732, I Woods 480, Mr. Justice Woods, sitting with Judge Erskine, entertained jurisdiction of a similar offense.”.
In United States vs. Mackenzie, 26 Fed.Cas. 1118, No. 15,690, Judge Betts decided that the District Court of the United States would not issue a warrant to arrest certain parties charged with the crime of murder pending an inquiry instituted by the Secretary of the Navy. Said Court, directing attention to the Crimes Act of March 3rd, 1825 providing nothing therein contained “shall be construed to take away or impair the right of any court-martial to punish any offense which by the law of the United States may be punishable by such court” referred to the opinion of Attorney General Pinckney, who had expressed the view that a naval court-martial should not punish for a murder committed on board a ship of the United States, as such “jurisdiction belonged to the ordinary civil tribunals”, to which he then expressed the opinion that “the concurrent jurisdiction of courts-martial with civil courts over offenses within the cognizance of both shall not be abrogated or suspended.”.
The intention to divest the civil courts of their regular jurisdiction will not be ascribed to congress in the absence of clear and direct language to that effect, in view of the “known hostility of the American people to any interference by the military with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts” has been affirmed many times over since the rule was permanently set down in Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514, 24 L.Ed. 1118 (U.S.).
In recognition of the fact that a tribunal may also be a commission to investigate the claims of subjects of a foreign nation pursuant to a treaty, (United States vs. Ferreira, Fla., 13 U.S. [Howard] 40, 14 L.Ed. 42,) any civil court should be forced to recognize the pertinent fact that if the individual accused is not a subject to any other nation nor is under any judicature over a treaty, such a foreign tribunal has no jurisdiction.
The case to attend would be Ex parte, in the Matter of Lambdin P. Milligan, 71 U.S. [4 Wallace] 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (U.S. 1866) wherein it was established at page 141 that “We have thus far said little of martial law, nor do we propose to say much. What we have already said sufficiently indicates our opinion that there is no law for the government of the citizens, the Armies or the Navy of the United States, within American jurisdiction, which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution.” “Military government, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military commander, under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress” would be unnecessary at this time, under Governor Jeb Bush, because there can not be manipulated any jurisdiction over the citizens and persons residing in Florida under military law since the Justices of the Supreme Court of this land had concluded at page 140 that “Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail.”.
A multitudinous repository for the definition of “trust” has been included at page 1280 of Mapco Inc.. Additionally, reference has been made to numbers 11, 44, 45, 46, 50, 57, 62, 78, 84, and 85 of The Federalist Papers as well as the seminal case of Griswold vs. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2nd 510 (U.S. 1965), when addressing the plaintiffs’ claimed Ninth Amendment right, wherein Justices Black and Stewart had explained that “One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.”. Thus, as was significantly framed by Erich Fromm in the Afterword to George Orwell’s 1984, “Doublethink is already with us.”.
In a recital of Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 1.c. 537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 1.c. 516, 78 L.Ed. 940, 1.c. 957 (U.S. 1934), it was held by Judge Becker in Mapco Inc., at page 1284, “If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary or discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio.”, after a finding [in the involvement of all persons, i.e., the executive or judge], when applying Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. vs. Sawhill, (Em. App. 1975) 525 F.2nd 1068, 1.c. 1078, at page 1280, that “By their very nature, laws and regulations of the federal government are subject to change by lawful means. No law or regulation is immune to change by lawful means and no person can reasonably assume the contrary.”. This finding was based on the fact found at page 1278 that, “In our constitutional tripartite system of government, featuring checks and balances between and within the three branches, it is rarely the case, if ever the case, that all branches of the government join in a unanimous, clear statement of policy or meaning of a law that all people unanimously understand and interpret exactly the same way. Frequently, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches disagree about laws and policies. One branch of government acting within its constitutional authority sometimes nullifies or restricts action of another branch. . . . The judicial branch may declare actions of the legislative and executive branches unconstitutional, or interpret such actions contrary to contentions of the officers of the executive or legislative branches.”.
The First Session of the Proceedings and Debates of the 93rd Congress are evidenced in the Congressional Record of the United States of America. Volume 119, Part 29 is contained on pages 37439 through 38794 and was had between November 16th, 1973 and November 29th, 1973. Senator Harry F. Byrd gave testimony as to Subsection 203(b)(2) of the Energy Emergency Bill. Submitted into the record were two Essays. Said Senator identified the Essays on page 37620 as “These essays are part of a publication put out by the special committee earlier this autumn, entitled “Emergency Powers Statutes,” a compilation of provisions of Federal laws delegating to the Executive extraordinary authority in time of national emergency.”.
A most penetrating insight to callous rectitude was delivered on the same page of the same Congressional Record as detailed in the prior paragraph wherein it was stated by the eminent Senator and scholar “. . . The problem of how a constitutional democracy reacts to great crises, however, far antedates the Great Depression. As a philosophical issue, its origins reach back to the Greek city-states and the Roman Republic. And, in the United States, actions taken by the Government in times of great crises have -- from at least, the Civil War -- in important ways shaped the present phenomenon of a permanent state of national emergency.”.
Senator Byrd then surmised on page 37623 “In the view of the Special Committee, an emergency does not now exist. Congress, therefore, should act in the near future to terminate officially the states of national emergency now in effect.” He further expounded “At the same time, the Special Committee is of the view that it is essential to provide the means for the Executive to act effectively in an emergency. It is reasonable to have a body of laws in readiness to delegate to the president extraordinary powers to use in times of real national emergency. The portions of the concurring opinion given by Justice Jackson in the Youngstown Steel case [343 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1952)] with regard to emergency powers provides sound and pertinent guidelines for the maintenance of such a body of emergency laws kept in readiness to be used in times of extreme crises. Justice Jackson, supporting the majority opinion that the “President’s power must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself” wrote:
“. . . In the practical working of our Government, we already have evolved a technique within the framework of the Constitution by which normal executive powers may be considerably expanded to meet an emergency. Congress may and has granted extraordinary authorities which lie dormant in normal times but may be called into play by the Executive in war or upon proclamation of a national emergency. . ..
“In view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should affirm possession of them without statute. Such power either has no beginning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed that it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong direction.””.
Just because an individual resides in one of the states of the several Nation-states of the Union is not a valid enough reason to presume that the individual has sworn and does intend to swear loyalty or give allegiance to a partisan flag, standard, or colors, other than the congressionally upheld Title 4 flag.
In United States vs. Cashiell, Fed.Cas.No. 14,744, I Hughes 552, the Court expressed the observation that “the military law as it exists in the United States is an exceptional code, applicable to a class of persons in given relations, and not abrogating or derogating from the general law of the land, but that the latter is left in full force and virtue.”. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brown of the Eastern District of Michigan, not without some hesitation at first as to whether a civil court could take cognizance of the case before said Justice’s Court in United States vs. Clark, (C.C.) 31 F. 710, citing United States vs. Cornell, United States vs. Carr, and the opinion of Attorney General Cushing in Steiner’s Case, 6 Op.Atty.Gen., U.S. 413, came to the conclusion that “the martial or military law does not supersede or interfere with the civil laws of the realm, and that there is a concurrent jurisdiction in the civil court.”.
Neall vs. United States, 118 F. 699, 704 - 705 (U.S. 9th Cir. 1902) accordingly maintained “Forcible reasons may be suggested why courts-martial should be given exclusive jurisdiction of all offenses which are punishable under the articles of war, but we are not convinced that either in the constitution or in the acts of congress the intention has been expressed to except from the jurisdiction of the civil courts offenses committed by any persons or class of persons, or, as was said by Mr. Justice Brown [in United States vs. Clark], to abdicate “that supremacy of the civil power which is a fundamental principle of the Anglo-Saxon polity.””.
In United States vs. Bevans, U.S. [3 Wheaton] 336, 4 L.Ed. 404 (U.S.), Chief Justice Marshall came to the conclusion that an offense committed by a marine in the service of the United States on board a ship of war belonging to the United States lying in Boston Harbor was not out of the jurisdiction of the State of Massachusetts, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, holding moreover “that the provision of the constitution extending the judicial power of the United States “to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” did not, of itself, confer jurisdiction of the offense, as it gave to congress only the power to legislate.”.
The Act of April 30th, 1790 provided that commissioned officers and others in the land forces “shall be governed by the rules and articles of war”. Thereafter, United States vs. Mackenzie, 30 Fed.Cas. 1160, No. 18,313, firmly established that the Congress passed an Act [involving the Rules and Articles of War adopted April 10th, 1806 (2 Stat. 364)] “regulating the military establishment, by the thirteenth section of which it was declared that the commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, privates, etc., of the army, shall be governed by the rules and articles of war which have been established by the United States in congress assembled, as far as the same may be applicable to the constitution of the United States. . . .The thirty-second article of the existing rules of war is pertinent to show the understanding of congress that express legislation was necessary in order to bring officers and privates of the army to trial before the civil courts for capital crimes or acts of violence to the persons or property of citizens”.
Moreover, as further extrapolated in Neall vs. United States, 118 F. 699, 704 (U.S. 9th Cir. 1902) “In U. S. v. Cornell, Fed.Cas.No. 14,867, 2 Mason, 61, decided in 1819, Mr. Justice Story took cognizance of a murder committed by one soldier upon another in Ft. Adams, and in support of his jurisdiction cited the provisions of the judiciary act of 1789. In U.S. v. Carr, Fed.Cas.No. 14,732, I Woods 480, Mr. Justice Woods, sitting with Judge Erskine, entertained jurisdiction of a similar offense.”.
In United States vs. Mackenzie, 26 Fed.Cas. 1118, No. 15,690, Judge Betts decided that the District Court of the United States would not issue a warrant to arrest certain parties charged with the crime of murder pending an inquiry instituted by the Secretary of the Navy. Said Court, directing attention to the Crimes Act of March 3rd, 1825 providing nothing therein contained “shall be construed to take away or impair the right of any court-martial to punish any offense which by the law of the United States may be punishable by such court” referred to the opinion of Attorney General Pinckney, who had expressed the view that a naval court-martial should not punish for a murder committed on board a ship of the United States, as such “jurisdiction belonged to the ordinary civil tribunals”, to which he then expressed the opinion that “the concurrent jurisdiction of courts-martial with civil courts over offenses within the cognizance of both shall not be abrogated or suspended.”.
The intention to divest the civil courts of their regular jurisdiction will not be ascribed to congress in the absence of clear and direct language to that effect, in view of the “known hostility of the American people to any interference by the military with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts” has been affirmed many times over since the rule was permanently set down in Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514, 24 L.Ed. 1118 (U.S.).
In recognition of the fact that a tribunal may also be a commission to investigate the claims of subjects of a foreign nation pursuant to a treaty, (United States vs. Ferreira, Fla., 13 U.S. [Howard] 40, 14 L.Ed. 42,) any civil court should be forced to recognize the pertinent fact that if the individual accused is not a subject to any other nation nor is under any judicature over a treaty, such a foreign tribunal has no jurisdiction.
The case to attend would be Ex parte, in the Matter of Lambdin P. Milligan, 71 U.S. [4 Wallace] 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (U.S. 1866) wherein it was established at page 141 that “We have thus far said little of martial law, nor do we propose to say much. What we have already said sufficiently indicates our opinion that there is no law for the government of the citizens, the Armies or the Navy of the United States, within American jurisdiction, which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution.” “Military government, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military commander, under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress” would be unnecessary at this time, under Governor Jeb Bush, because there can not be manipulated any jurisdiction over the citizens and persons residing in Florida under military law since the Justices of the Supreme Court of this land had concluded at page 140 that “Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail.”.
A multitudinous repository for the definition of “trust” has been included at page 1280 of Mapco Inc.. Additionally, reference has been made to numbers 11, 44, 45, 46, 50, 57, 62, 78, 84, and 85 of The Federalist Papers as well as the seminal case of Griswold vs. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2nd 510 (U.S. 1965), when addressing the plaintiffs’ claimed Ninth Amendment right, wherein Justices Black and Stewart had explained that “One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.”. Thus, as was significantly framed by Erich Fromm in the Afterword to George Orwell’s 1984, “Doublethink is already with us.”.
In a recital of Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 1.c. 537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 1.c. 516, 78 L.Ed. 940, 1.c. 957 (U.S. 1934), it was held by Judge Becker in Mapco Inc., at page 1284, “If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary or discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio.”, after a finding [in the involvement of all persons, i.e., the executive or judge], when applying Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. vs. Sawhill, (Em. App. 1975) 525 F.2nd 1068, 1.c. 1078, at page 1280, that “By their very nature, laws and regulations of the federal government are subject to change by lawful means. No law or regulation is immune to change by lawful means and no person can reasonably assume the contrary.”. This finding was based on the fact found at page 1278 that, “In our constitutional tripartite system of government, featuring checks and balances between and within the three branches, it is rarely the case, if ever the case, that all branches of the government join in a unanimous, clear statement of policy or meaning of a law that all people unanimously understand and interpret exactly the same way. Frequently, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches disagree about laws and policies. One branch of government acting within its constitutional authority sometimes nullifies or restricts action of another branch. . . . The judicial branch may declare actions of the legislative and executive branches unconstitutional, or interpret such actions contrary to contentions of the officers of the executive or legislative branches.”.
The First Session of the Proceedings and Debates of the 93rd Congress are evidenced in the Congressional Record of the United States of America. Volume 119, Part 29 is contained on pages 37439 through 38794 and was had between November 16th, 1973 and November 29th, 1973. Senator Harry F. Byrd gave testimony as to Subsection 203(b)(2) of the Energy Emergency Bill. Submitted into the record were two Essays. Said Senator identified the Essays on page 37620 as “These essays are part of a publication put out by the special committee earlier this autumn, entitled “Emergency Powers Statutes,” a compilation of provisions of Federal laws delegating to the Executive extraordinary authority in time of national emergency.”.
A most penetrating insight to callous rectitude was delivered on the same page of the same Congressional Record as detailed in the prior paragraph wherein it was stated by the eminent Senator and scholar “. . . The problem of how a constitutional democracy reacts to great crises, however, far antedates the Great Depression. As a philosophical issue, its origins reach back to the Greek city-states and the Roman Republic. And, in the United States, actions taken by the Government in times of great crises have -- from at least, the Civil War -- in important ways shaped the present phenomenon of a permanent state of national emergency.”.
Senator Byrd then surmised on page 37623 “In the view of the Special Committee, an emergency does not now exist. Congress, therefore, should act in the near future to terminate officially the states of national emergency now in effect.” He further expounded “At the same time, the Special Committee is of the view that it is essential to provide the means for the Executive to act effectively in an emergency. It is reasonable to have a body of laws in readiness to delegate to the president extraordinary powers to use in times of real national emergency. The portions of the concurring opinion given by Justice Jackson in the Youngstown Steel case [343 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1952)] with regard to emergency powers provides sound and pertinent guidelines for the maintenance of such a body of emergency laws kept in readiness to be used in times of extreme crises. Justice Jackson, supporting the majority opinion that the “President’s power must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself” wrote:
“. . . In the practical working of our Government, we already have evolved a technique within the framework of the Constitution by which normal executive powers may be considerably expanded to meet an emergency. Congress may and has granted extraordinary authorities which lie dormant in normal times but may be called into play by the Executive in war or upon proclamation of a national emergency. . ..
“In view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should affirm possession of them without statute. Such power either has no beginning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed that it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong direction.””.
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