6. On behalf of the intelligence services, Matthew Kydd said
that they found some of the material very useful indeed with a
direct bearing on the war on terror. Linda Duffield said that
she had been asked to assure me that my qualms of conscience
were respected and understood.
7. Sir Michael Jay's circular of 26 May stated that there was a
reporting obligation on us to report torture by allies (and I
have been instructed to refer to Uzbekistan as such in the
context of the war on terror). You, Sir, have made a number of
striking, and I believe heartfelt, condemnations of torture in
the last few weeks. I had in the light of this decided to return
to this question and to highlight an apparent contradiction in
our policy. I had intimated as much to the Head of Eastern
Department.
8. I was therefore somewhat surprised to hear that without
informing me of the meeting, or since informing me of the result
of the meeting, a meeting was convened in the FCO at the level
of Heads of Department and above, precisely to consider the
question of the receipt of Uzbek intelligence material obtained
under torture. As the office knew, I was in London at the time
and perfectly able to attend the meeting. I still have only
gleaned that it happened.
9. I understand that the meeting decided to continue to obtain
the Uzbek torture material. I understand that the principal
argument deployed was that the intelligence material disguises
the precise source, ie it does not ordinarily reveal the name of
the individual who is tortured. Indeed this is true – the
material is marked with a euphemism such as "From detainee
debriefing." The argument runs that if the individual is not
named, we cannot prove that he was tortured.
10. I will not attempt to hide my utter contempt for such
casuistry, nor my shame that I work in and organisation where
colleagues would resort to it to justify torture. I have dealt
with hundreds of individual cases of political or religious
prisoners in Uzbekistan, and I have met with very few where
torture, as defined in the UN convention, was not employed. When
my then DHM raised the question with the CIA head of station 15
months ago, he readily acknowledged torture was deployed in
obtaining intelligence. I do not think there is any doubt as to
the fact
11. The torture record of the Uzbek security services could
hardly be more widely known. Plainly there are, at the very
least, reasonable grounds for believing the material is obtained
under torture. There is helpful guidance at Article 3 of the UN
Convention; "The competent authorities shall take into account
all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights." While this
article forbids extradition or deportation to Uzbekistan, it is
the right test for the present question also.
12. On the usefulness of the material obtained, this is
irrelevant. Article 2 of the Convention, to which we are a
party, could not be plainer: "No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture."
13. Nonetheless, I repeat that this material is useless – we are
selling our souls for dross. It is in fact positively harmful.
It is designed to give the message the Uzbeks want the West to
hear. It exaggerates the role, size, organisation and activity
of the IMU and its links with Al Qaida. The aim is to convince
the West that the Uzbeks are a vital cog against a common foe,
that they should keep the assistance, especially military
assistance, coming, and that they should mute the international
criticism on human rights and economic reform.
14. I was taken aback when Matthew Kydd said this stuff was
valuable. Sixteen months ago it was difficult to argue with SIS
in the area of intelligence assessment. But post Butler we know,
not only that they can get it wrong on even the most vital and
high profile issues, but that they have a particular yen for
highly coloured material which exaggerates the threat. That is
precisely what the Uzbeks give them. Furthermore MI6 have no
operative within a thousand miles of me and certainly no
expertise that can come close to my own in making this
assessment.
15. At the Khuderbegainov trial I met an old man from Andizhan.
Two of his children had been tortured in front of him until he
signed a confession on the family's links with Bin Laden. Tears
were streaming down his face. I have no doubt they had as much
connection with Bin Laden as I do. This is the standard of the
Uzbek intelligence services.
16. I have been considering Michael Wood's legal view, which he
kindly gave in writing. I cannot understand why Michael
concentrated only on Article 15 of the Convention. This
certainly bans the use of material obtained under torture as
evidence in proceedings, but it does not state that this is the
sole exclusion of the use of such material.
17. The relevant article seems to me Article 4, which talks of
complicity in torture. Knowingly to receive its results appears
to be at least arguable as complicity. It does not appear that
being in a different country to the actual torture would
preclude complicity. I talked this over in a hypothetical sense
with my old friend Prof Francois Hampson, I believe an
acknowledged World authority on the Convention, who said that
the complicity argument and the spirit of the Convention would
be likely to be winning points. I should be grateful to hear
Michael's views on this.
18. It seems to me that there are degrees of complicity and
guilt, but being at one or two removes does not make us
blameless. There are other factors. Plainly it was a breach of
Article 3 of the Convention for the coalition to deport
detainees back here from Baghram, but it has been done. That
seems plainly complicit.
19. This is a difficult and dangerous part of the World. Dire
and increasing poverty and harsh repression are undoubtedly
turning young people here towards radical Islam. The Uzbek
government are thus creating this threat, and perceived US
support for Karimov strengthens anti-Western feeling. SIS ought
to establish a presence here, but not as partners of the Uzbek
Security Services, whose sheer brutality puts them beyond the
pale.
MURRAY
Second Document - summary of legal opinion from Michael Wood
arguing that it is legal to use information extracted under
torture:
From: Michael Wood, Legal Advisor
Date: 13 March 2003
CC: PS/PUS; Matthew Kidd, WLD Linda Duffield
UZBEKISTAN: INTELLIGENCE POSSIBLY OBTAINED UNDER TORTURE
1. Your record of our meeting with HMA Tashkent recorded that
Craig had said that his understanding was that it was also an
offence under the UN Convention on Torture to receive or possess
information under torture. I said that I did not believe that
this was the case, but undertook to re-read the Convention.
2. I have done so. There is nothing in the Convention to this
effect. The nearest thing is article 15 which provides: "Each
State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established
to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of
torture as evidence that the statement was made."
3. This does not create any offence. I would expect that under
UK law any statement established to have been made as a result
of torture would not be admissible as evidence.
[signed] M C Wood Legal Adviser
http://www.craigmurray.co.uk/archives/2005/12/damning_documen.html
American Patriot Friends Network
Mirrored:
http://www.apfn.org/apfn/torture_memos.htm