Costa Rican Legislative Assembly Special Commission

1. PREAMBLE

From the beginning of its work, the Commission verified the appearance in Costa Rica, just as in other countries, of the phenomenon of the penetration by drug trafficking of the State branches, credit institutions, and many other public and private activities with the goal of procuring influence and assistance when ever they would be necessary for the transshipment of drugs or laundering of money.

transport of persons and agricultural fumigation through

which they request the cancellation of the certificates of

the companies represented by Mr. Jose Angel Guerra Laspiur,

as well as refusing any effort for extension or deadlines for

the operation or expansion of rights and/or in any other form

of undertaking that requires the approval of this Council or

of the General Office of Civil Aviation, it is agreed: to

remit the document to the Legal Counsel's Office of the

General Office of Civil Aviation so they will evaluate it ant

give us the recommendations on the actions to follow from the

aeronautic point of view, and that it forward a copy of the

document to the competent authorities, such as the Ministry

of Government and the Ministry of Public Security" (Civil

Aviation File, p. 296).

19) On January 20, 1989, the pilot applicants submitted the

document of correction of the defeat of form requested by the

Civil Aviation Technical Council relative to legitimation

(Civil Aviation File, p. 2sn).

CRS-37

20) On April 20, 1989, through agreement No. 13, the

Technical Council agreed to allow Guerrs Laspiur a period of

10 days to execute his right to defense (Civil Aviation File,

pp. 324-327).

21) On May 12, 1989, Guerra Laspiur presented to the Civil

Aviation Technical Council the document of reply to the

request for cancellation of the certificates of operation of

the companies in which he appears as agent (Civil Aviation

File, pp. 335-347).

22) On May 18, 1989 the Civil Aviation Technical Council

received in a hearing Mr. Manuel Enrique Guerra,

representative of the companies affected by the cancellation

procedures, in the company of two lawyers (Civil Aviation

File, pp. 302-317).

23) As stated in the minutes for those purposes, that hearing

was granted in the understanding that there is going to be a

hearing under what is provided by Article 309 of the Public

Administration Law (sic) i.e. the formal hearing, oral and

private, of the administrative procedure that has been

initiated because of this denunciation..." (Civil Aviation

file, p. 317).

24) On May 29, 1989, Lic. Vargas Barguil made known to the

Director of Civil Aviation, Carlos Viquez Jara, for the

knowledge and subsequent approval of the Technical Council,

the draft resolution of the final document on the

administrative procedures for cancellation of the

certificates of operation of the companies questioned.

25) To date, that draft resolution has not been taken up by

the Technical Council, the procedure not concluded. (Civil

Aviation file, pp. 371-375).

26) The companies Servicio Nacional de Helicopteros SRL,

Aviones Taxi Aereo S.A. and Taxi Aereo Centroamericano S A.

dominate the activities dedicated to special services with

65% of the flights; and, in those for fumigation, 80% of the

areas under cultivation at the national level.

27) The companies Servicio Nacional de Helicopteros SRL and

Taxi Aereo Centroamericano S.A. have been operating since

1987 on the basis of temporary permits.

3.3. In Relation to the Essence of the Matter:

The facts that have been stated above about the request for

an investigation of the activities undertaken by the

companies tied to Mr. Jose Angel Guerra Laspiur, as well as

about the proceedings to cancel their operating certificates,

make it possible to point out certain considerations and

specify some of the acts described, as follows:

l) It is a public fact that said person is extensively tied

to the companies "Taxi Aereo S.A.," Taxi Aereo

Centroamericano S.A. and "Servicio Nacional de Helicopteros

S.R.L. in which, according to information obtained from the

Costa Rican Aeronautical Registry, he serves as vice

president in the first two and as manager in the latter one,

the reason why,

CRS-38

if the commission of the crime is shown to be true (see 4.2.1

supra) using the recourse and facilities of his companies,

they cannot go without the corresponding legal sanction,

independently of the penal one that may correspond to their

representative.

2) A same act or human conduct may have repercussions on

diverse jurisdictions since the penalizing procedures in the

administrative and penal areas are independent; therefore the

concept of "pending case" does not seem appropriate but

rather only when the administrative sanction depends on the

fact being declared a crime. In this respect it should not be

forgotten that the failure to comply with the obligations

contained in the General Civil Aviation Law and its

regulations, or in the certificates of operation, are

sufficient cause for the cancellation of the certificate when

in the judgment of the Civil Aviation Technical Council there

should be justification for that (Art. 294, d)). It being

clearly established in the law cited above that the

application of that sanction will not prejudice the exercise

of the corresponding penal actions (Art. 297). This provision

through which our legislator tried to establish the

independence of the penalizing procedure.

3) Even though a formal document of denunciation was filed

(see 4.2.3) in which an investigation is requested, and even

though, in the opinion of this Commission, "sufficient merit"

exists to consider that possible infractions of seriousness

were committed against the General Civil Aviation Law and its

related ones, the Technical Council omitted ordering the

General Office of Civil Aviation to issue the corresponding

administrative information to which Article 299 of said law

refers.

4) According to what was established by Art. 299 of the

General Civil Aviation Law, in order to request the

administrative information, it is sufficient to have "a

written denunciation or a request of any party that has

competency to obligate itself or take responsibility

according to the law." In this respect, and even though a

total and exhaustive investigation was requested of the

activities of the companies in which Jose Angel Guerra

Laspiur is a partner, the Technical Council limited itself to

considering the facts denounced to be very serious and to

forwarding the document submitted by the pilots to the Legal

Counsel's Office of the institution for its evaluation and

subsequent forwarding of the recommendations on the actions

to be followed "from the aeronautical point of view."

5) Even though the Technical Council asked the Legal

Counsel's Office for its evaluation and recommendation of the

actions to follow from the aeronautical point of view, that

department never issued a judgment on the legal basis or

correctness of the investigation requested, or on the legal

basis of the administrative information to which Article 299

of the Civil Aviation Law refers. And it limited itself,

exclusively, in the execution of what was decided at session

70-88 of November 29, 1988, Article 8, to sending the

competent authorities (Ministries of Government and

Security), a copy of the document signed by the pilots for

the investigation in the area of their competence.

6) Information exists, referring to the case of Mr. Werner

Lotz, according to which the Civil Aviation Technical

Council, under the powers granted it in that respect by

Article 152, through resolution 22 of April 22, 1985, decided

to suspend "the operation of the company Servicio Aereo

Costeno Sociedad Anonima (SACSA) (Coastal Air Service), until

the

CRS-39

conclusion of the investigation being carried out by the

respective authorities, on the acts committed by this

company," a resolution that was approved by the Executive

Branch through agreement No. 164 of October 10, 1985 (Gaceta

No. 222, of November 20, 1985).

7) Although sufficient elements of judgment existed so as to

presume that possible infractions of the Civil Aviation Law

and its related laws had been committed, the Technical

Council, ignoring those elements of merit, the existence of a

document asking for a "total and exhaustive" investigation,

the background of the Lotz case and the communique of the

Ministry of Government of December 6, 1988, in which the

remittance of the documents of the pilots to the Office of

Investigations, Narcotics and Intelligence (DEI) was clear,

with the object of an investigation being carried out,

decided, through agreement No. 51 of December 20, 1988, to

renew the certificate of operation of the company Taxi Aereo

S A., of which Jose Angel Guerra Laspiur is its vice

president.

8) Said company, whose certificate of operation had expired

in 1981, the time from which the corresponding application of

renewal also dates, had been operating through provisional

permits issued every three months and "officially

extendible," the last being issued on October 20, 1988.

9) The Civil Aviation Technical Council, basing itself only

on Article 10 par 1), has been issuing to companies, with a

certificate of operation in the process of renewal,

provisional permits 90 that the companies can continue

offering the public service, thus turning an act lacking in

true legal and regulatory regulation into a reiterated

administrative practice, as a means of offsetting the lack of

diligence of the administration in the certificate renewal

process.

l) Even though that renewal had been requested through the

document of April 6, 1982, it was not until December 10, 1988

that the Technical Council resolved the question, thus taking

more than 6 years to resolve it. An agreement of the

Technical Council that to date has yet to be ratified by the

Executive.

11) Even though the General Law on Civil Aviation is clear

with respect to the procedure for granting and renewing

certificates of operation, the General Directorate of Civil

Aviation has been repeatedly failing to comply with that

procedure. In this respect, and in the concrete case of the

renewal of the certificate of operation of the company "Taxi

Aereo 5" there is a period of more than 13 months between the

public hearing and the resolution of the Council, when

article 141 of the Law points out that it shall resolve each

application and grant or deny the certificate requested, in

all or in part, within the 30 days following the hearing.

12) Even though a document exists requesting a total and

exhaustive" investigation of the companies to which Jose

Angel Guerra Laspuir, since it is presumed that he, "for the

realization of his acts contrary to morality and the legal

order, has been acting through his companies, the Civil

Aviation Technical Council, without taking into consideration

the gravity, if true, of the acts, decided to renew the

certificate of operation for a period of five years.

CRS-40

13) On January 9, 1989, a group of pilots filed a document

addressed to the Civil Aviation Technical Council through

which they asked for the cancellation of the certificates of

operation for the companies in which Jose Angel Guerra

Laspiur figures as, the attorney, as, well as the denial of

any extension of time for the operation or expansion of

rights, and of any other form of activity that may require

the approval of the Council.

14) The applicants, not having their legitimate interest and

the status that enabled them to petition accredited, they

were granted a term of 8 days to correct the defect of form,

which was, corrected through a document filed by the

petitioners on January 20, 1989.

15) It was, not until April 20, 1989, that is, 3 months after

having filed the document of correction, that the Technical

Council granted a hearing on the cancellation procedure to,

Mr. Jose Angel Guerra Saspiur, granting him a period of 10

days for exercising his rights of defense, which he did

through a document of response filed with the Council on May

12, 1989.

16) On May 18, 1989, the Civil Aviation Technical Council

received in hearing persons, from the companies, affected by

the cancellation efforts, the person appearing at it, as, a

representative of the companies affected, being Mr. Manuel

Enrique Guerra Velazquez in the company of two attorneys. A

hearing granted in accordance with Article 309, para 1), of

the General Law on Public Administration, which establishes

an oral and private appearance before the administration, in

which all of the evidence and allegation., of the parties

that were pertinent are admitted and received. An appearance

where, in spite of the above, the pilots petitioning were not

summoned.

17) To date, although the procedure has not been concluded, a

draft resolution has already been prepared that decrees the

final act of the cancellation procedure, in which the

denunciation aimed at the cancellation of the certificates of

operation in which Mr. Jose Angel Guerra Laspiur is a

representative is decreed dismissed, under the inadmissible

argument that the imposition of administrative sanction would

go against Art. 15, of the Magna Carta. In that respect the

Legal Counsel's Office forgets that at NO time was, an effort

made by the petitioners to obtain a judgment on penal

aspects,, but rather just on administrative aspects that fall

to the competence of the Technical Council and that, as has

been mentioned above, a same act may have repercussions in

various jurisdictions since the sanction procedures are

independent in the administrative and penal areas, one not

being the obstacle to the other, but just when the first

depends on the second, since it is founded on the fact of

being the punishment in virtue of a crime existing.

18) With respect to the companies Servicio Nacional de

Helicopteros SRL and Taxi Aereo Centroamericano SA, the

General Office of Civil Aviation once more is failing to

follow the procedure for renewal of operational certificates

with respect to the time between the public hearing and the

resolution of the Technical Council (Art. 141). In this

respect, andùaccording to information supplied by the same

General Office of Civil Aviation, the public hearings for the

renewal of the operational certificates of the companies

Senricio Nacional de Helicopteros SRL and Taxi Aereo

Centroamericano S.A. were held May 25, 1988 and

CRS-41

November 13, 1987 respectively.

19) Civil Aviation cannot protect itself behind the argument

that since it is being heard by the courts, it cannot be

heard by the administration in order to determine the

possible infraction of norms relative to the sphere of their

competence. This Commission does not affirm that such

infractions have been effectively committed; but it toes

consider of sufficient merit the elements that at the time

the Civil Aviation Technical Council had in its reach in

order to consider the possibility of their commission.

20) Even though those elements were of sufficient merit in

order to consider the possible commission of infractions of

the General Law of Civil Aviation and its related ones or, at

least, to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the

members of the Technical Council on their feasibility, they

did not order administrative information as was appropriate,

according to what to that effect Article 299 of the Law

establishes. It should be kept in mind that the document

filed by the pilots was not limited to denouncing the

judicial case pending against Jose Angel Guerra Laspiur, but

rather, in addition, it expressly requested a "total and

exhaustive investigation of the activities undertaken by the

companies to which Mr. Guerra is tied, considering that "for

the realization of his acts contrary to morality and the

legal order" he is acting through them.

21) If at some moment the Technical Council felt that the

information at its disposal did not offer sufficient elements

of judgment for being able to evaluate the existence or not

of infractions of the General Law on Civil Aviation, the

logical thing was to order the administrative information

requested, or rather, to await the result of the

investigation ordered by the Ministry of Government and on

which Civil Aviation was duly informed on December 6, 1988.

Before any renewal of the certificates of the companies

questioned it was the unavoidable obligation of the Technical

Council, for the sake of the public interest, to totally

clear up the facts denounced as the only proper means for

determining the correctness of the renewal.

22) The procedure followed in the renewal of the certificate

of operation of the company "Taxi Aereo S.A." is censurable,

not only because of its duration, which is six years, but

also because of some of the procedures used which are totally

contrary to the Law.

23) The provisional permits through which the companies

continuing operating with a certificate of operation in the

renewal process have become an administrative vice through

which the administration has tried to palliate its own

negligence and lack of celerity in the processing of the

renewal application. Censurable is the fact that such permits

are granted without having a true regulation in the General

Civil Aviation Law, or in its regulations. In addition, no

less censurable is the fact that they are renewed officially,

without allowing third parties to oppose it, and that it is

done in an indefinite form as long as the administration does

not make a resolution.

24) Finally, this Commission does not agree with the

procedure followed in the proceedings to cancel the

certificates of operation, but rather, states deep

reservations both related to the length of time between the

document of initiation and the granting of the hearing to the

affected party, and regarding the hearing questioned,

according to article 309 of the

CRS-42

General Law on Public Administration.

4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRANSFER OF ARMS IN COSTA RICA

4.1 On International Relations

4.1.1 Introduction

In 1982, the Monge Alvarez Government took over the country

in difficult economic conditions. This made his government

ask for financial aid from the traditional sources. From data

in the possession of the Commission, it is confirmed that

some U.S. Government officials exercised pressure on the

Costa Rican Government so that it would help the Nicaraguan

resistance to operate from our territory, and that was how an

operational space opened up for this organization.

From the above it turned out that a group that had

transported weapons for the Sandinista guerrillas against the

government of General Somoza later operated to the benefit of

the Nicaraguan resistance and against the Sandinista

government.

In 1983, the problem of consumption of psychotropic drugs in

the U.S. reached levels that turned it into a very lucrative

business. In concomitance with this peak in the drug

business, that organization whose original purpose was the

transport of weapons for the Sandinista guerrillas became an

organization in the service of the transportation of weapons

for the Nicaraguan resistance and of drugs for the U.S.

market.

This organization had drug traffickers among its members,

who, making use of the situation, took Costa Rica as a bridge

for the transshipment of drugs headed for Mexico and the U.S.

market.

It is possible that the Costa Rican citizen, ignorant in

security matters, does not know of the relationship existing

between drug trafficking and terrorism; but it is

unjustifiable that it not be known by those that are the ones

that agree to assume positions with responsibilities over the

control of these problems.

4.1.2 Background

(l) In March 1984, a DC-3 crashed into a mountain in a place

near the border with Nicaragua. Days later, according to

versions of residents, unidentified men arrived at the place

of the accident and burned the crews' bodies. The aircraft

was found by Mr. Bruce Jones, together with John Hull, Joe

Fernandez, who was acting as Chief of the CIA in Costa Rica,

two more agents, and members of the group of Mr. Eden Pastora

Later, Mr. Hull, Mr. Fernandez, and staff of the U.S. Embassy

returned to the place and gathered up the remains, which were

finally sent to El Salvador. This incident was known, a few

days after it occurred, by at least one of the police

authorities who testified privately before this

CRS-43

Commission. (83)

2) In early May 1985, in Liberia a camouflaged plane was

found with the registration number erased. According to

statements of former Minister of Security Benjamin Piza, it

was presumed that the plane was being used for drug

trafficking. (84)

3) In December 1986, Floyd Carlton Caceres, a Panamanian

pilot, was arrested in Costa Rica and extradited to the U.S.

In his testimonies he offered ample information on the

transshipment of weapons and drugs at the northern border of

our country, and on General Noriega's participation in that

field.

4) On June 25, 1984, the U.S. National Security Planning

Group /sic/, including President Reagan, Vice President Bush,

Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defence Weinberger,

CIA Director Casey, Admiral Poindexter and others, discussed

the support of the Contras by third countries. Casey

suggested that the U.S. Government increase economic aid to

Costa Rica as an incentive for this country to support the

Nicaraguan resistance. (85)

5) On July 10, 1986, Lewis Tambs was named U.S. Ambassador in

Costa Rica His mission was the creation of the southern

front, according to his own statements. It has been stated

that the idea of building a landing strip for supplying the

Contras arose at a meeting between Mr. James Tull, Deputy

Chief of Mission of the Embassy, Ambassador Tambs, and Joe

Fernandez. Ambassador Tambs commented that a private group of

Americans wanted to open or reopen an old airstrip so that it

would serve the Contras in cases of emergency, and Ambassador

Tambs was given the task of finding out if the Costa Rican

Government would agree. In his statements before this

Commission, Mr. Piza stated that the idea of the airstrip had

been his, without the intervention of any foreign official.

6) Former President Monge Alvarez has indicated that he

authorized the construction of an airport in Potrero Grande,

in exchange for the U.S. helping Costa Rica in matters of

security and defence, in the case of Nicaragua attacking our

country. That same month, the Minister of Security, Mr.

Benjamin Piza, authorized the construction of a landing strip

in Potrero Grande. In addition, payments were made to Colonel

Ramon Montero Quesada, for official services in the vigilance

of the airstrip. (86)

On March 23, 1986, Joe Fernandez, Colonel North, Admiral

Poindexter, and Minister Piza and his wife had a hearing with

President Reagan, which they obtained through Admiral

Poindexter, on the basis of a memorandum from North, who

pointed out that Piza had been "instrumental" in the

organization of the Southern Front. It is explained that Piza

had collaborated, together with another high-level Costa

Rican official, in the development of a logistical support

base for the resistance forces located in the north of Costa

Rica. In his appearance before this Commission, Mr. Piza

denied that he had offered any type of support for the

Contras and he indicated that he never attended any meeting

with Poindexter. The latter hag indicated that during his

visit to Central America, he met with Piza to discuss future

plans for the Resistance and support of it through Costa

Rica. In the afternoon of the same day of the hearing with

President Reagan, a meeting was held at which were present

General Richard Secord (one of the persons in charge of the

Contra

CRS-44

supply network), Mr. Rafael Quintero (supervisor of the

construction of the landing strip in Potrero Grande) and Joe

Fernandez, at which they discussed the ownership of the land

and airstrip. From the statements of Mr. Fernandez it ia

deduced that Mr. Piza was present, a fact that he denied to

this Commission. (87)

8) On April 10, 1986, an L-100 plane unloaded 20,000 pounds

of lethal material in some part of the Southern Front. Joe

Fernandez stated that from to April to September 1986, nine

flights were made with lethal cargo, under the supervision of

General Secord. Two of these flights, made with a C-123,

loaded fuel at the Juan Santamaria Airport, passing

themselves off as planes of the Panamanian Air Force. (88)

9) In early June 1986, a plane loaded with weapons for the

Contras got stuck in Potrero Grande. This led to concern on

the part of Ambassador Tambs and Mr. Joe Fernandez, since

days before, President Arias had been guaranteed that the

airstrip would not be used. The Ambassador and Mr. Fernandez

got in touch with Colonel North so he would resolve the

situation. This was achieved by bringing two additional

aircraft: to one was transferred part of the cargo that the

grounded plane was carrying, with which it was managed to

decrease its weight, and another so that it would push it,

since the motors would no longer start up. (89)

10) William Haskell, known as Robert Olmsted, who negotiated

the land for the airstrip, stated that in June 1986 he was

called by the U.S. Ambassador in Costa Rica, since Mr. Guido

Fernandez, Minister of Government, wanted a letter "with an

official appearance," with a retroactive date to December 19,

1985, in order to make it clear that the decision to build

the strip had been made during the Monge Alvarez

Administration; in addition, use of the land should be ceded

to the Costa Rican Government, in order to justify the

security that was being offered to it. (90)

11) On September 30, 1986, Colonel North indicated that from

July 1986 to February 1986 (sic) the airstrip had been used

for the supplying of the Contras and that ag of that date,

for the aborting of flights of damaged planes. He added that

the Minister of Security, Mr. Hernan Garron, had divulged the

existence of the Potrero Grande landing strip, and that

President Arias had failed to comply with his agreement with

the American government. (91)

12) Mr. Benjamin Piza, before the Legislative Commission that

investigated matters related to Caro Quintero, stated that at

the time at which the negotiations were undertaken for the

use of the land, he wag unaware of any tie on the part of

Colonel Oliver North with the matter. In addition, he

indicated that he believes that on two occasions aircraft of

the Ministry of Public Security landed on that strip, and

before this Commission, he denied having knowledge of the

landing of airplanes on the strip, including those of the

Ministry of Security. (92)

13) On November 24, 1987, the Prosecutor's Office drew up

charges against former Minister Benjamin Piza, for the

supposed crime of failure of performance of obligations in

relation to the construction of the airstrip in Potrero

Grande, since he did not have the

CRS-45

permits from Civil Aviation and the Municipality. (93)

14) On November 24, 1987, the Prosecutor's Office drew up

charges against the former Commander from Liberia, Jose Ramon

Montero, for the supposed crimes of contradictory

transactions and embezzlement, in relation to the

construction of the airstrip in Potrero Grande, since he was

a partner in the company building the landing strip. In

addition, it is presumed that Montero made a change of

destination of resources, assets and labor force that

belonged to the Command of Liberia. (94)

15) Mr. Edwin Viales Rodriguez stated before the Criminal

Court of Santa Cruz that the Government policy was totally

open aid (sic) the Nicaraguan counterrevolution and from the

time that I began as Canton Delegate of Santa Cruz until the

position of Regional Director that I received later, I had

higher orders for direct aid to everything that was

humanitarian supplies for the Contras, in the sense of

obtaining for it and even...letting pass unperceived what

they were doing in the zone since I had higher orders'' which

came from Mr. Enrique Chacon, Deputy Minister of Public

Security. (95)

16) On July 4, 1989, before this Commission, Mr. Piza

Carranza stated the following

a) He said that he did not know that the landing strip was

used for Contra support activities;

b) He denied any coordination with U.S. authorities for

purposes of utilization of the landing strip;

c) He said that he was not interested in revising the juridic

status of the company that had rented the land, (Udall

Research Corporation);

d) He indicated that in the period during which he exercised

the post of Minister of Security (end of 1984 to April 30,

1986), the transshipment of weapons was not an important

problem;

e) He stated that Colonel Montero, Mr. Johnny Campos (former

Deputy Minister of Public Security, the Office of

Intelligence and National Security), Mr. Luis Carlos Araya

(person from Civil Aviation), knew about the landing strip,

about the aid that was being received, and, above all, what

was being done by the Ministry of Public Security in terms of

security of the country.

4.1.3 In Relation to the Essence of the Matter

l) The facts that have been referred to show on the one hand,

the lack of respect of national and foreign citizens for our

decreed policy of neutrality and, in addition, an evident

relationship between the interests of the U.S. and the

respect for those interests

CRS-46

by some of our political authorities.

2) In statements given to the press and privately, Mr. Luis

Alberto Monge Alvarez has admitted his approval of

construction of the landing strip in Potrero Grande,

justifying this fact with the danger that an invasion by the

Sandinistas could represent for Costa Rica.

3) Mr. Piza's statement is surprising in the sense that from

1984 to 1986 the main problem of contraband in the northern

zone was of livestock, adding that the transshipment of

weapons was after the dates cited; it is incomprehensible

that the Minister has not been informed, since it was

precisely in that period when the transshipment of weapons

and drugs in our country grew.

4) Mr. Piza Carranza's explanations given to this Commission

concerning the deal to use the lands in Potrero Grande are

weak. It seems incredible that one negotiates the use of the

land simply through just one phone call to a supposed

representative of a Panamanian company whose legal status was

not verified; since if this had been done it would have been

learned that it only has management corresponding to the

lawyer that registered it and who said that he did not know

about the company. (96) Mr. Piza indicated to us that the

land where the strip would be widened had been rented, with

an option to buy, by a company that wanted to do tourist

development of the zone. It does not seem strange to the

former Minister of Security that this company would give up

its rights without asking for any indemnization, and in

addition, according to what he himself described, the

characteristics of the land and its access made a touristic

proposal in that place far from feasible.

5) Mr. Piza denies any knowledge of Colonel North's plans and

objectives or those of Ambassador Tambs, Mr. Joe Fernandez,

or Admiral Poindexter. The facts pointed out contradict this

position, especially since there is public knowledge of a

series of attitudes and statements of politicians of the

nation of the north. In addition, in Case No. 1022F-87, there

is testimony on meetings held between Mr. Piza, former

Colonel Montero and Joe Fernandez, in relation to the Potrero

Grande strip. There are also contradictions from Mr. Piza

when the statements he has given to this Assembly are

compared to those to the two Special Commissions that have

investigated drug trafficking in Costa Rica, and today's

situation shows that knowledge and collaboration did exist.

4.2 Private Support for the Contras

In the previous section, the existence of a private network

of support to the Contras was pointed out; it operated in

northern Costa Rica, under the leadership of Colonel Oliver

North. The amount and frequency of the transshipment of drugs

that passed through that zone were the causes that led this

Commission to proceed to the study of the organization of

that mechanism.

CRS-47

4.2.11 Background

l) Mr. John Floyd Hull Clark, after living in Costa Rica for

approximately 20 years, in 1983 applied for Costa Rican

citizenship, which was granted to him on June 22, 1984, under

resolution No. 968 of the Options and Naturalization Section

of the Supreme Elections Tribunal. This date coincides with

the period in which the "Boland Amendment" was issued in the

U.S., which prohibits the government and any citizen of that

nation from offering military support to the Contra movement.

It is important to note that his naturalization was carried

out after renunciation of his U.S. citizenship, a fact that

apparently Mr. Hull has not had any interest in divulging in

his country of origin, and much less to the Congressmen that

interceded for him with the Costa Rican Executive Branch,

with evident lack of respect for our sovereignty and the

independence of branches that exist in our homeland.

2) In Costa Rica John Hull devotes himself to agriculture,

administering his own and others' lands, owned by Americans

residing abroad. As of the time of the struggle of the

Contras to overthrow the Sandinista Government Junta, Mr.

Hull devoted himself, with other persons, to organizing the

so-called Southern Front, a mission for which Ambassador

Lewis Tambs was sent to Costa Rica, according to what Mr.

Tambs himself testified.

3) Now Mr. Hull denies that his collaboration was of a

military nature, a statement that contradicts others given in

the past by him himself, and public and private information

in the hands of this Commission. (97)

4) In Colonel North's personal book (in which the name of Mr.

Hull appears at least on 10 occasions), and in statements

given by Mr. Robert Owen, there is talk of the need to give

protection to Mr. Hull, at the same time that in that

document there is an annotation of June 26, 1984, indicating

that "John now has a private army of 75 to 100." (98)

5) About the suspicion that Mr. Hull is a CIA agent (by

contract)--a statement that Mr. Hull has denied repeatedly

during recent years, just like he denies any special

relationship with officials of that agency in our country--

Mr. Joe Fernandez confirms it in his statements; and in

addition in documents of the U.S. Department of Justice, it

is indicated that John Hull was recruited by the CIA as one

of their operatives in the fight against the

Sandinista government. In addition, Mr. Hull himself has agreed that the

CIA financed his

bodyguards.

6) Mr. Hull's public statements on his support for the

Contras also led the then Minister of Security, Mr. Benjamin

Piza Carranza, to call their attention, not to the activities

that he was carrying out, but rather to the ostentation that

Mr. Hull was making of them. (100)

7) Mr. Hull has maintained close relations with persons

closely tied in to the creation of the so-called "Southern

Front," some of them being

a) Robert Owen, who, after working under the orders of Adolfo

Calero, was hired by the Office for Humanitarian Aid to

Nicaraguans (NHAO), an organization created by the

CRS-48

Department of State, whose objective is the channeling of

funds for the Contras. Being under Mr. Calero's orders, and

when he was working for NHAO, Mr. Owen acted as emissary and

informer of Colonel Oliver North. (101)

b) Thomas Posey, organizer of the group of Civil Military

Assistance (CMA), whose objective was to help the Contras.

Mr. Posey coordinated with John Hull the arrival in the

country of 8 series of soldiers of fortune and mercenaries.

(102)

c) Jesus, a Nicaraguan Contra, expert in logistics. Detained

on April 25, 1985 by the Rural Guard, and accused of hostile

acts. (103)

8) Even though Mr. Hull now says that the assistance that he

provided was only of a humanitarian nature, in a letter dated

April 1, 1985, signed by Colonel North, reference is made to

two camps, one of which is under the immediate orders of

"Jesus" (see 7c above), the other under the alias of "Pape,"

who is identified as Hull; in the same letter it is said that

"Pape" has divided the camp into four, thus managing to

disperse the men, and that he is awaiting the arrival of the

equipment from El Salvador. (104)

9) In an interview with Newsday, Hull admitted he was the

"owner of lands that have served as secret landing strips for

the Contras, that he has flown airplanes for the Contras and

that he has helped to supply them and that he helped a

mercenary group that was carrying out attacks inside of

Nicaragua." In relation to this group, he said that "I (Hull)

invited them here.' He gave similar statements to the Wall

Street Journal, in which he said that he had "orchestrated

deliveries of U.S. arms coming from El Salvador, supplying

camps for the supplying of the Contras, provided to troops

before and after the battles.

(105)

10) Mr. William Crone stated that both he and Mr. Hull

militarily helped the Contras. Other persons have testified

on the support that Mr. Hull provided to members of the

resistance movement. One of the declarants has indicated that

in 1983, John Hull was participating in the logistical

planning of a great offensive that was going to be carried

out against the Sandinistas. (106)

11) On April 25, 1985, 15 persons were arrested on a farm

supposedly administered by John Hull; they were accused of

hostile acts. Among them were five foreign mercenaries, with

special ties to Mr. Hull:

Steven Carr and Robert Thompson, Americans; they arrived in

Costa Rica in March 1985 with the purpose of training

Contras. John Hull paid Thompson's bail and he and Carr fled

the country.

John Davies and Peter Glibbery, British, arrived in Costa

Rica with John Hull in March 1985 in order to train Contras,

the plane ticket of the second one being paid by John Hull.

Mr. Davis' bail was paid by Mr. Hull; Davies fled the

country.

Claude Chafford, French, came to Costa Rica with Mr. Hull in

March 1985 in order

CRS-49

to train Contras. Hull paid his bail; he was sentenced to

five years in prison.

12) Mr. William Crone stated that Peter Glibbery gave him a

note for Hull, whose contents indicated that John Hull was

the supervisor of the group. Hull told a reporter from

Channel 7 that he had only seen them on one occasion on which

they passed by his farm asking for directions; however, he

himself contradicts this statement on other occasions. (107)

13) On August 9, 1984, a plane crashed on the landing strip

of Muelle de San Carlos, property of Mr. Hull. It was piloted

by Octavio Barrera (Condorito) and it was bringing military

tools and medicines from El Salvador. Bruce Jones (declared a

persona non grata by the Costa Rican Government in 1986 for

his military activities with the Contras), got in touch with

Mr. Hull, who told him to obliterate the plane registration,

empty it and leave it there, saying that he knew nothing of

its origin; Jones opted to cut up the plane and throw it into

the river. (108)

14) Mr. Hull's secretary received from Felipe Vidal Santiago

a list of telephones numbers for the case that something

happened to them or if in an emergency he needed to contact

them; the phone numbers were of the following persons and

places: Felipe Vidal, Moises Dagoberto, Nunez Ruiz, Frank

Chanes, Rene Corvo, Sandra Corvo, Pedro Gil, Hotel Galilea,

Porfirio Bonet, Jose Macias and Rene Corvo's parents-in-law.

The first four have been formally accused of drug trafficking

in the U.S. (109)

15) Many people have stated that on occasions weapons were

kept, excluding those referring to personal protection, on

Mr. Hull lands, but that they were never discovered by the

authorities because every time that a raid was going to be

conducted, Mr. Hull was warned. In turn, Mr. Crone said that

arms were not stored at Hull's farm, but it was used as 8

point of transit. (110)

16) On March 9, 1985, Jesus Garcia and Steven Carr helped to

load weapons and to transport them to the Fort Lauderdale

Airport, from which they were taken to Ilopango, El Salvador.

The weapons had been stored in the house of Francisco Chanes,

one of the owners of Ocean Hunter Seafood Inc. Once in

Ilopango, they were unloaded by Salvadoran soldiers and

stored in nearby warehouses. At the end of a week, the

weapons were taken to John Hull's farm. Thomas Posey was also

involved in the shipment of the cargo, a fact

that can be proved since the serial number of a weapon

corresponds to one owned by Mr. Posey and it had been included in that shipment. Part of the weapons were later confiscated by the Costa Rican authorities from a group of mercenaries (see 11 above).

The plane was rented by Rene Corvo. An FBI report indicates that the plane was piloted by Daniel Vasquez m, and passengers were his son, Steven Carr, Rene Corvo and Robert Thompson. (111)

4.2.1.2 In Relation to the Essence of the Matter

The series of facts cited fully ratifies (62) Mr. Hull's

direct and permanent participation in the network of military

support to the Contras was organized by Colonel Oliver

North. In addition, a series of persons whose activities

related to drug trafficking have been proven. What interests

this commission is that these illicit acts were committed

during the period in which said subjects were collaborating

with John Hull, the reason why it is not acceptable that Mr.

Hull was unaware of what was happening around him. However,

this Commission has not been able to find evidence of any

kind that Mr. Hull had notified the authorities about these

acts.

4.3 Transshipments of Drugs

4.3.1 Introduction

At the beginning of this section of the report, reference was

made to the collaboration existing between drug trafFIckers

and guerrilla groups. In Latin America the cartels that move

the drug have established different types of ties with

movements such as the M-l9, Shining Path, Cinchoneros, etc.

In Central America, that ominous relationship between

organized crime and military and political authorities has

been seen through the Noriega-Medellin Cartel relationship.

Costa Rica, as will be seen further on, has been the victim

of this clandestine action, favored precisely by the support

that some Costa Ricans gave to the network established in our

country by Colonel North. On the other hand, some Costa

Ricans, without necessarily participating in the

transshipment of arms, did make use of the organization that

it led to in Costa Rica for the transshipment of drugs.

4.3.2 Werner Lotz Artavia

l) Mr. Werner Lotz Artavia admitted to the U.S. Senate that

he had participated in the illicit transshipment of drugs,

especially of cocaine coming from Bolivia. (112)

2) This Commission has reliable information that complements

and expands upon the statements by Mr. Lotz. Both Mr. Lotz'

statements to the Senate and the additional information in

the possession (63) of the Commission will be placed at the

disposal of the respective authorities so that they will

decide what is pertinent.

3) The study of the files of the General Office of Civil

Aviation and of the Judicial Investigative Office referring

to the arrival of Rafael Caro Quintero in Costa Rica and the

appearance of witnesses before this Commission (113) clearly

establishes that:

a) The port of embarkation for Rafael Caro Quintero and his

companions at the time of heading for Costa Rica was not

Mazatlan, as Mr. Lotz has insistently reiterated.

b) Some type of complicity existed between officials of the

Juan Santamaria Airport, which allowed the undocumented entry

of Caro Quintero and the persons who accompanied him.

CRS-51 Once in the Juan Santamaria Airport, Mr. Lotz piloted

his aircraft with the passengers aboard to his hangar, where

they were transferred to Quinta California, in the personal

car of Mr. Lotz and a vehicle belonging to an employee of Mr.

Lotz.

4.3.3. Relationship of the Network of Support for the Contras

and Drug Trafficking 1) Since 1970 the American authorities

had suspected General Noriega's participation in

international drug trafficking, suspicions that were

reinforced over the years. (114)

2) In 1985, Colonel Oliver North asked General Noriega for

his collaboration in the fight against the Sandinista

Government.(115)

3) In early 1985, Teofilo Watson mistakenly used one of Mr.

Hull's runways to land, carrying a shipment of 553 kilos of

cocaine coming from Pereira, Colombia. Watson was under the

orders of Floyd Carlton Caceres, who was the person

responsible for the shipment; the merchandise got lost and at

the beginning the cartel believed that John Hull had been

involved, the reason why they kidnapped his daughter; later

it was learned that Mr. Hull had no participation in the

matter and they released his daughter. Mr. Carlton was

General Noriega's pilot and was devoted to the transshipment

of drugs for the General.(116)

4) George Morales, arrested on June 12, 1986 in Miami for

drug trafficking, stated that he had entered into

arrangements, supposedly with the CIA, to collaborate with

the logistical and financial support of the Contras, in

exchange for a reduction of his sentence he would receive,

since at the time this agreement was made, he was awaiting

the trial in which he was accused of international drug

trafficking. The agreement consisted of sending weapons to

the Contras, transporting drugs from Colombia to the U.S. and

seeing they reached the "wholesalers." Supposedly the benefit

generated by the drug sale would be used to finance weapons.

Mr. Morales had the money, planes and the pilots that were

required for this operation, since he directed an extensive

narcotics network.

5) Mr. Morales stated that in December 1984, 8 flight was

made from Costa Rica (Tamarindo) to Great Harbor, taking 163

kilos of cocaine. The following one, with the same route as

the above, was planned for the 27th of the same month, but

due to some problems that came up in overflying Nicaragua he

had to return and departure was postponed to January 1985,

the date on which he left with a shipment of 421 kilos. For

this flight, he inadvertently hired an undercover DEA agent

as the pilot, since Gerardo Duran Ayanegui, one of the

regular pilots of George Morales, was unable to do it. (117)

Part of what Morales said in relation to the transshipment of

weapons is verified by pilot Francisco Ugalde Varela, who

stated before the OIJ that he had made flights for the

Contras and that Hull's strip was used for these purposes; in

addition, evidence exists that he flew to Hull's farm to the

U.S., and to San Andres, on these last two occasions in the

company of John Hull. (118)

CRS-52

7) With respect to what Morales says of Duran's

participation, Mr. William Crone stated that Hull knew

Gerardo Duran quite well. (119)

8) Mr. Rene Corvo, accused in the U.S. in 1986, frequented

Mr. Hull's office and farm. He sought financing and recruited

mercenaries for the Contras. (120)

9) Felipe Vidal Santiago, known as "Morgan," accused of drug

trafficking in the U.S., is currently a fugitive. Together

with Mr. Hull and other Cubans, he devoted himself to

organizing the "Southern Front." Mr. Vidal also had close

relations with the syndicated company Frigorificos de

Puntarenas, from which he received money in order to make

purchases for the Contras. He frequented John Hull's office

and farm. (121)

10) November 28, 1988 is the beginning of the case for

International Cocaine Trafficking against Edwin Lorenzo

Viales Rodriguez, Fernando Loaiciga Delgado and others in the

Superior Court of Liberia, file No. 282-88, a case that has

already had a verdict in the lower courts. The presumed

events occur in Guanacaste and it is indicated in that

document that from October 1984 until the end of 1985, in our

country an organization operated made up of Panamanians,

Colombians, Costa Ricans and citizens of other nationalities,

who dedicated themselves to international cocaine

trafficking, using Costa Rica as a bridge for refueling of

planes that came from Colombia. (122)

11) In case 282-88 it is pointed out that the cocaine

trafficking had the collaboration of Colonel Edwin Viales

Rodriguez, former Department Chief of the Rural Assistance

Guard in Guanacaste, who offered security for the flights

that were made from and to our air trips. The landing strips

of Tamarindo, Sardinal, Ciruelas, Coyolar, Las Loras and

Llano Grande were used.

12) From October 1984 to the end of 1985, an international

organization of drug traffickers operated in our country

headed by Panamanian Floyd Carlton Caceres, and which was

responsible for at least 10 shipments of cocaine, with a

total approximate amount of 5,000 kilos. In the

transportation of these Costa Rica was used as a bridge for

the subsequent distribution of the drug in the U.S. and

Mexico. (123) Precisely, use was made of the same landing

strips and the collaboration of the same Costa Rican

authorities that had aided the Contras. (124)

13) Among the pilots that formed part of the group headed by

Floyd Carlton were: Miguel Alemany Soto, Spanish; Rodrigo

Ortiz, Colombian; Alejandro Benitez and Cecilio Saenz,

Mexicans; Teofilo Watson and Anibal Antonio Aizprua,

Panamanians. (125)

14) In the Viales case, reference is made to Colonel Jose

Ramon Montero Quessda, about whom doubt seems to be expressed

on his participation in this case, since according to

testimonies that appear in the file, it was the then Colonel

Montero who recommended that there be a conversation with

Colonel Viales, in order to obtain landing strips that would

meet the necessary security conditions for the transshipment

of the drug. It is indicated that Colonel Montero bought a

vehicle from a former U.S. Embassy official for the

CRS-53

An approximate sum of US $18,000, which was paid in cash and

by check. The same questions about the origin of Mr. Montero

Quesada's income as of 1985, which bear no relation to his

salary, are set forth in the case cited in point 4.1.2, para

14, above.

15) The gasoline that was used for refueling the planes of

the organization located in Costa Rica and directed by Floyd

Carlton Caceres, was obtained through Mr. Jose Angel Guerra

Laspiur, who has been accused in a separate case of the

illicit act of drug

trafficking, together with Mr. Gerardo Duran Ayanegui. (126).

16) On January 23, 1986, Floyd Carlton Caceres was accused in

the South District of Florida of several infractions of

federal laws, including importation and possession of

marihuana. (127)

l4.3.4 In Relation to the Essence of the Matter

In August 1988 Mr. Hull requested a hearing with this

Commission, in order to have the opportunity, according to

his own words, to leave his name clean. The response was

that he would be invited at the appropriate time, which was

done at the moment corresponding to the Commission's agenda.

When he was summoned, Mr. Hull excused himself for reasons of

health, being given another opportunity, which he did not

attend.

Finally, under the order that he would be brought by public

force if he did not respond to the third summons, he appeared

and through the advice of his counsel, he refused to take

the oath and to testify, even about aspects unrelated to the

penal case being pursued against him. This Commission

believes that Mr. Hull lost the opportunity to clear up

several of the facts described.

Many of the persons that were related directly and indirectly

for the effects of Mr. Hull's participation in the network of

support to the Contras have been accused and sentenced for

drug trafficking: Steven Carr (accused, in his statements he

involved Mr. Hull in the military aid to the Contras, Carr

died from an overdose of cocaine in December 1986); Rene

Corvo (accused in the U.S.), admitted before a Grand Jury to

his participation in the military support to the Contras and

he implicated Mr. Hull); Felipe Vidal Santiago (accused of

drug trafficking, currently a fugitive); Octavio Barrera

"Condorito" (accused, deceased); Moises Dagoberto Nunez Ruiz

and Francisco Chanes (accused in Miami of drug trafficking

and dollar laundering, using as a means of operation the

company Frigorificos de Puntarenas); Teofilo Watson (member

of the group of pilots of Floyd Carlton Cacereras, who had a

network in the service of General Manuel Antonio Noriega and

was also

working for a Costa Rican network); Gerardo Duran Ayanegui

(accused by the Costa Rican courts of drug trafficking);

Marcos Aguado (accused of drug trafficking by the Costa Rican

courts); Sebastian Gonzalez "Guachan" (sentenced for cocaine

trafficking in Costa Rica); Felix Roberto Guillen "Bodington"

(accused, with a record of drug trafficking in the Dominican

Republic).

On the other hand, General Noriega's participation in the

anti-Sandinista struggle resulted in the entry into Costa

Rica of a series of pilots who, under the General's orders,

CRS-54

had been devoted to the transhipment of drugs; and who under

the circumstance of support to the Contras, did not in any

way give up their habitual illicit activity; they simply

added a new source of income through the transshipment of

arms. Thus Floyd Carlton Caceres, Miguel Alemany Soto,

Teofilo Watson, Gerardo Duran Ayanegui, Jose Angel Guerra

Laspiur, Marco Aguado Arguello and Sebastian Gonzalez used

Costa Rica as a bridge for refueling and storage of drugs

corning from South America.

The facts cited reiterate the evidence of the use by drug

trafficking of the organization established to aid the

Nicaraguan resistance. Even more serious, the infiltration of

international rings in Costa Rica is noticeable; they make

use of this organization. Beginning with the requests for

help from Colonel North of General Noriega, the door is

opened for Noriega's cohorts to use national territory for

transshipment of arms and drugs. Rapidly, this mafia finds

the collaboration of Costa Ricans, some perhaps of good

faith, but others who simply make use of the excuse that they

want to aid the Contras, and they find a cornucopia whose

abundance makes them ignore the evil consequences of this

traffic. The first in joining in this infamous activity are a

series of national pilots whose participation in the

transshipment of arms was broadly known.

l5. COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC

5.1 Introduction

In the first report that was submitted to this Commission,

the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the

Prosecutor's Office were asked for an analysis of some

legal files in which, according to reports received by this

Commission, some irregularities or distortions could have

come about that would show very serious deficiencies in the

Administration of Justice.

The opinion of the Office of the Attorney General was

received by the Commission on June 11, 1989, with some

comments and evaluations that require a thorough and slow

study, since the deficiencies that the Office indicates point

to the need to foster reforms that will allow transforming

the Judiciary.

With respect to the facts and comments contained in the

report of the Office of the Attorney General, the Commission

accepts that opinion, transcribing it as an annex to this

report (see Annex c).

5.2 Background

In the cases that the Office of the Attorney General

analyzes, it points to serious irregularities that could

constitute, in some of them, the crime of prevarication,

since officials of certain political importance and persons

with family ties very close to certain

CRS-55

magistrates benefitted unjustifiably.

Thus, in the case against Mario Torelli V., it is a person

with close blood ties with former magistrate Lic. Eduardo

Ching Murillo.

In files 477-V87, 294-2-85 and 2151-84, in all of them a son

of former magistrate Alvarado Carvajal Lozano was favored.

With respect to the judicial cases 909-3-83 (against Jorge

Sanchez) and 124-Q-84 (against William Malavassi), the

accused benefitted in those cases with decisions that were

very questionable juridically speaking and which were decreed

by the Tribunal presided by Lic. Jesus Ramirez Quiros. They

were proceedings in which one very seriously questions the

correctness and impartiality required by the administration

of justice. These deviations may be the result of multiple

factors that, in some cases, come from structural defects in

the Judiciary; in others, they may derive from an

inappropriate concentration of powers and authority and, in

other circumstances, they are but the consequence of human

weaknesses.

All these deficiencies call for a profound transformation of

the Judiciary. It is an urgent task, because a weak,

vulnerable, deficient administration of justice will be easy

prey to the subtle influences of powerful criminal

organizations, as occurs with drug trafficking.

The Judiciary needs an administrative transformation which

will allow the magistrates to exercise their genuine function

better, which is that of administering justice and not that

of becoming overburdened administrators of the Judiciary. In

this process it is urgent to institute the Council of the

Magistracy /i.e. the Bench/, in which a part of its members

are elected by the vote of all judges of any hierarchy, and

another formed with university professors, named by the

Parliament, or by the latter and other institutions. This

system has the advantage that it encourages a reciprocal

control among diverse sectors of the Magistracy and also

allows pluralist membership.

It is a system that is already known in Italy, Spain,

Portugal and Peru and about which the majority opinion is

that its operation favors a much more democratic atmosphere

in the Judiciary (See "Penal Systems and Human Rights in

Latin America," Editorial De Palma, p. 132 and following /in

Spanish/).

The Council of the Magistracy does not administer justice;

this function, the most important one of the Judiciary, is

reserved, as is logical, to the judges and magistrates. The

Council of the Magistracy would be no more than a body that

would be in charge of the administration of the Judicial

System. However, it is a political decision that introduces a

healthy and interesting transformation in the Judiciary.

It is also important to point out an attitude of concern that

has been adopted by some judiciary officials, since they do

not dare to refer, publicly or privately, to the insinuations

or pressures that, in come cases, high-level officials of the

Judiciary could have had. This fear, this insecurity, shows

very clearly that the independence of Costa Rican judges is

not guaranteed satisfactorily. The weakness of the Costa

Rican judiciary, in relation to this aspect, is clearly seen

in two senses: in the first place, there is no judicial

CRS-56

career system that substantially reduces the discretionality

that currently exists in the designation and promotion of

judges. It is appropriate to cite, with respect to this

aspect, the recommendation of the Inter-American Institute on

Human Rights, when it suggests the implantation of

"...rational systems of selection and promotion of judicial

magistrates, with evidence of sufficiency or open proceedings

in all instances...'' (Ibid, p. 134). If the judge does not

have the guarantee that his promotion does not depend on

predominantly discretionary criteria, it is very difficult

for him to dare to refer to the pressures to which he has

been subjected on the part of an official of higher rank,

since he knows perfectly well that his promotion would be

seriously threatened, especially if the officials that

pressure him are also the ones who decide it.

Another aspect exists that may also weaken the independence

of the judges within the Judiciary; this is disciplinary

jurisdiction, since in this procedure there is a failure to

comply satisfactorily with the principle of legality and with

some of the guarantees characterizing due process. These are

not defined clearly, thug creating a series of questions and

imprecisions that may turn the disciplinary procedure into an

arbitrary instrument that infuses terror in the judge and may

limit his autonomy unjustifiably.

If one better defines the content of the infractions, as well

ag the rules of procedure, adjusting them to due process, no

official will be able to think that disciplinary jurisdiction

can be turned into a potential instrument of pressure, as

occurs currently. This perception may not be real but, in

these situations, perceptions, although they may be

imaginary, produce the game effects as real acts.

About this aspect, it should be noted that the attitude of

Lic. Luz M. Bolanos has been exceptional, as she is the only

official that dared, privately, to refer to an inadmissible

intervention of a magistrate; however, it should be pointed

out that said official, in view of the deficiencies already

noted, has the conviction that she suffers from persecution

on the part of the Judicial Inspection, the body in charge of

disciplinary jurisdiction inside the Judiciary.

It should be recognized that the reaction that the Judiciary

has had to its errors and deficiencies has been satisfactory.

However, the Legislative Assembly should be vigilant to this

process of revision and renovation of the Judiciary. If the

procedure is not that way, it will be necessary to form a

Legislative Commission that investigates it in depth. The

Legislative Assembly being the one to designate the

magistrates, such authority demands, ag a,n inevitable

corollary, the political control over the Judiciary. It is a

control that is not secret, but rather public and express.

The positive law on checks and balances should function not

only from the Judiciary to the Parliament, but also from the

latter toward the administration of justice. In the State no

power can exist that is exempt from a healthy political

control that in the end is no more than the legitimate

exercise of popular sovereignty. Judges cannot escape this

control. No sector of the State can be above the dialectic

imposed by the famous law of checks and balances.

In the text of our Political Constitution which regulates the

legislative investigatory commissions, in no form is it

established that the Judiciary is excluded from the

CRS-57

investigative action of these Commissions. In comparative

law, one should cite Article 76, first paragraph of the

Spanish Constitution and 82 of the Italian Political

Constitution. In both texts it is established that

legislative commissions shall be able to investigate any

matter of "...public interest..." At no moment do these

constitutional norms, just like our Political Constitution

establish exceptions in relation to the competence of the

commissions.

Dusuit, famous Dean of the Law School of Burdeog, stated that

"...Chamber may, perfectly, appoint an investigative

commission so that it will examine how a judicial service

operates..." (See Garrido Falla, Fernando and others.

"Comments on the Constitution." Ed. Civitas Espana -1985 -

pp. 1174-1175). The quoting of this opinion is timely, since

it confirms the interpretation that hag been made in relation

to the competence of the legislative commissions, respect to

the Judiciary.

It is difficult to state that the investigation of a

legislative commission of the Judiciary is an interference of

powers and, at the same time, not question the election by

the parliament of the magistrates of the Supreme Court of

Justice; because by applying the same argument, it would be

necessary to state, also, that the election of the Supreme

Court Justices by the Legislative Assembly is an inadmissible

invasion of the Legislative Branch with respect to the

Judiciary. It is difficult to uphold this statement but, if

one tries to be consistent, it would be necessary to admit it

in case that it is also stated that the legislative

commissions are to the detriment of the separation of powers

when they investigate the Judiciary. However, even in the

case that the Legislative Assembly does not elect

magistrates, their competence exists for exercising the

political control that corresponds to the legislative

commissions over the Judiciary, because as a public service,

the Judiciary does not differ from the Executive, and about

this there is no questioning with respect to the competence

of the legislative commissions for investigating it, even

though it does not designate its officials.

The Judiciary should not fear the investigation of a

parliamentary commission because it is a legitimate action

and one of public knowledge. What it should fear are the

surreptitious interventions, the cliques and the complete

gamut of underhanded interference that is not of public

knowledge and which works against the independence of the

Judiciary.

The Commission reiterates its gratitude to the Judiciary for

the positive reaction that it hag had, but this fact does not

exclude the undeniable competence of the parliament in

relation to the possibility of investigating the

administration of justice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We endorse in all their details the recommendations

contained in the First Report of this Commission, presented

to the Legislative Assembly on November 23, 1988.

2. That Mr. Ricardo Alem Leon not be named to any public

position in the future.

CRS-58

3. That Luis Alberto Cortes Chaves, Juan Carlos Campos

Barrantes, Tobias Chacon Ramirez, and Mario Valverde Zamora

not be named to any public position in the future.

4. That the status of retiree of independent means of Mr.

Lionel Casey Brothers be canceled and that he not be allowed

entry into the country subsequent to his extradition. In cage

the latter is not executed, he should be expelled from Costa

Rica.

5. That Mr. Rodolfo Ulloa Antillon should reign from his

position as General Manager of the Bank of Costa Rica, and

should he not do so the Board of Directors should not reelect

him to his position when the term for which he was elected

expires (See corresponding Annex).

6. That file number 963-21-4-1978, drawn up by the Options

and Naturalization Section of the Civil Registry

(naturalization of Mr. Fernando Melo), be the object of an

investigation by the Office of the Attorney General of the

Republic and of the Public Prosecutor /or Defender/, and

should there be cause, action be taken according to the law

against the responsible officials.

7. That former President Lic. Daniel Oduber Quiros must

return to Mr. Lionel Cagey Brothers the million colons that

he received under conditions already analyzed.

8. That former President Oduber Quiros should resign from the

public posts that he fills.

9. That Mr. Tajudeen's status of retiree of independent means

be canceled and that he not be allowed entry into the country

subsequent to his extradition. In cage this is not executed,

he should be expelled from Costa Rica.

10. That Mr. John Hull's naturalization be canceled, that he

be expelled from the country--when appropriate under law--and

his entry into the country be prohibited.

11. That former Minister Benjamin Piza Carranza be censured

for his acts ag minister, and if in the pending cage for

"failure to fulfill duties" he should be found guilty, that

he not be appointed again to public positions.

12. That Ramon Montero Quesada and Edwin Viales Rodriguez not

be named to any public position.

13. That Mr. Lewis Tambs, Joe Fernandez, Oliver North, John

M. Poindexter, and Richard V. Secord not be allowed entry

into the country.

14. That the administrative file on certificates of operation

issues by the General Office of Civil Aviation, to companies

which Jose Angel Guerra Laspiur represents, be handed over

with the files and proceedings to the Prosecutor's also

Defender's Office and the Office of the Attorney General of

the Republic, and if there should be liability on the part of

officials in charge of their handling and resolution, that

action be taken according to law.

CRS-59

In addition, the Board of Directors of Civil Aviation, as

long as the investigation lasts, should suspend the director

of Civil Aviation, Carlos Viquez Jara, and Mr. Javier Vargas

Barguil, Chief of the Legal Department from their positions.

15. That the General Office of Civil Aviation suspend the

aircraft pilot's license of any person who is taken to trial

for violation of the Law on Psychotropics, and if he should

be convicted, his license be revoked definitively.

16. That the permit and certificates for air operation be

canceled or revoked for companies whose managers, partners or

general agents are convicted of infractions of the Law on

Psychotropics.

17. That the General Office of Civil Aviation apply the

recommendations of points 15 and 16 above to Werner Lotz

Artavia, Jose Angel Guerra Laspiur, Gerardo Duran Ayanegui

and any others in the same conditions.

In the case of Werner Lotz Artavia there is no case taken to

trial, nor sentenced for any infraction whatsoever of the Law

on Psychotropics. The recommendation is made on the basis of

the statements made under oath by Mr. Lotz before the U.S.

Senate on August 8, 1988, where he admits his participation

in the transhipment of arms.

18. That we deputies immediately return one of the two sets

of plates that were delivered to us. The other will be used

exclusively by the Deputy on the vehicle he owns.

19. That the Judiciary initiate the proceedings for the

respective legal Casey, if in law there is a basis, of the

files numbers 909-3-83, 1011-1-86, 477-V-87, 2230-86, 294-2-

85, 21-184, 124-Q-84.

20. To take testimonies and send them to the Prosecutor's

Office so that he will initiate the respective suit for the

presumed crime of perjury that Magistrate Lic. Jesus Ramirez

Quiros may have committed in his appearance before this

Commission.

21. That the Legislative Assembly, with the regulatory

exemptions of the case, remit the file on constitutional

amendments that prohibits deputies from legislating to their

own benefit. (This file is pending legislation.)

22. That with the exemptions of the case, the file that

creates the Council of the Magistracy be forwarded in order

to guarantee the Costa Rican people that their judges are

going to decree justice and are not going to use their time

in administrative functions.

23. That the Regulations on Order, Management and Internal

Discipline of the Legislative Assembly be reformed, in order

to create a Permanent Special Commission to study the entire

problem related to drug trafficking, corruption and

parliamentary ethics, which should be named by 38 votes, in

secret voting.

24. Remit, with the exemptions of the case, the following

reforms, according to the annex;

CRS-60

a) Family Code, chapter on adoption.

b) Penal Code, chapter referring to swearing in of witnesses,

according to the Annex.

25. Reform Article 19 of the Political Constitution,

according to the judgment proposed in Legislative File No.

10776.

26. Remit, with the exemptions of the Cage, file no. 10339,

referring to the issuance of diplomatic passports.

27. That the Law on the General Office of Civil Aviation be

reformed with the exemptions of the case, according to what

is established in the annex.

28. That in the organic law of RECOPE the necessary clauses

be established in order to establish proper control over the

sales of fuel for airplanes. The General Office of Civil

Aviation should inform the Minister of Transportation of any

anomaly that it discovers after the corresponding audit.

29. That through the necessary reform of the law, there be

exclusion from banking secrecy of the current accounts which

receive deposits in cash in foreign currency for more than US

$5,000 or its equivalent in other currency, which shall be

examined by any competent authority, without the necessity of

authorization by a judge. Said reform shall include, also,

points 31 and 32 below.

30. The representative of any banking or financial

institution shall report to the General Auditor's Office of

Banks any operation or transaction of foreign currency in

cash whose value is more than US $5,000, or its equivalent in

other currencies. Failure to comply with this obligation

shall be a crime whose punishment will be 20-100 days fine.

This information shall state the total of the operation and

the identity of the persons participating in it.

31. Prohibit the banks and other financial institutions from

the receipt of deposits in foreign currently through third

parties, and especially from subsidiary or parallel companies

abroad, according to the bill presented as an annex to this

report.

32. That among other reforms of the Electoral Code the

following should be made:

a) Companies of any nature, both national and foreign, shall

not be able to contribute to political parties.

b) Costa Rican physical persons shall be able to contribute

to political parties up to the sum of 500,000 colons a year.

The parties shall hand over to the Supreme Elections Tribunal

and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic the

list of contributors ag well ag the complete records on

revenues. The donors shall, through sworn testimony, point

out that the funds donated are of their private property.

CRS-61

c) Political parties shall not be able to channel the payment

of the political debt advanced through companies to which a

assignment of the political debt has been made.

33. That this report be forwarded to the Prosecutor's Office

for the proper action.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

The reaction shown by broad sectors of Costa Rican opinion to

the task that we undertook through mandate of the Assembly,

and the encouragement that has been given us in such a

generalized manner, allow us to conclude this report with a

fervent invitation to the Costa Rican people so that we will

view the future of our homeland with optimism and hope. The

task of discovering and pointing out our bad habits and vices

has been disagreeable but we sincerely believe that we should

see tomorrow with hope and optimism. We believe that there is

no space for a defeatist attitude, because Costa Rica is

repudiating the forces of drug trafficking. There are moral

reservations and there is national will to say 'stop' to that

scourge. There is awareness that the country is on its feet

and alert to prevent the moral and social deterioration that

some sister nations already show. There is an awareness that

we can lose the best of our Christian and democratic

traditions, if we lower the guard toward a powerful and

unscrupulous enemy. There is a broad and deep national

solidarity for defending the health of our population,

honesty in the public operations, and moral cleanliness in

all the activities of our public and private life.

GIVEN IN THE SESSIONS CHAMBER OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION, AT

ONE THIRTY P.M. ON JULY 20, 1989.

ALBERTO FAIT LIZANO, PRESIDENT

LUIS ML. CHACON JIMENEZ, SECRETARY

OSCAR AVILA SOLE, DEPUTY

JOSE MIGUEL CORRALES BOLANOS, DEPUTY

LUIS FISHMAN ZONZINSKI, DEPUTY

JORGE ROSSI CHAVARRIA, DEPUTY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 Oduber, p. 14

2 Oduber, p. 15

3 Oduber, p. 15

4 Oduber, p. 37, 42, 57

CRS-62

5 Rolando Araya Monge, p. 37-38

6 Ibid., p. 39

7 Oduber, p. 16

8 Mauricio Martinez-La Nacion, 6/1/89

9 Nolan Campos, p. 28

10 Baltodano Guillen, p. 30

11 Tajudeen, p. 8 and 9.9.

12 Tajudeen, pp. 12 and 13

13 Tajudeen, p. 17

14 Nestor Baltodano Guillen, p. 53

15 Secret session of the Commission

16 Tajudeen, pp. 11-14

17 Tajudeen, pp. 31 and 32

18 Tajudeen, p. 40

19 Baltodano Guillen, p. 5

20 Baltodano Guillen, p. 10

21 Baltodano Guillen, p. 15, 16, 17, and 18

22 Baltodano Vargas, No. 59, p. 35 and 36

23 Tajudeen, p. 25 and p. 38

24 Baltodano Guillen, p. 14

25 Baltodano Guillen, p. 14, 47, and 48

26 Baltodano Guillen, p. 136

27 Baltodano Vargas, No. 59, p. 4

28 Baltodano Guillen, pp. 38-39

29 Baltodano Vargas, session No. 59, p. 24

30 Baltodano Vargas, session No. 59, p. 25

31 Casey, p. 2

32 Casey, p. 4

33 Casey, pp. 40-41

34 Casey, p. 5

35 Casey, p. 8

36 Gonzalez Figuls, p. 3-4-5. Casey-p. 27

37 Casey-p. 11-65

38 Casey-p. 11

39 Casey-p. 12

40 Casey-p. 6465-Ulloa Antillon-p. 5

41 Casey-p. 10

42 Casey-p. 14

43 Casey-p. 21-22

44 Casey-p. 31-32

45 Casey-p. 32

46 Casey-p. 43

47 Casey-p. 45

48 Mary Castro-p. 7

49 Oduber-p. 13 and information received by the Commission in

secret session

50 Casey-p. 38

CRS-63

51 Casey-p. 63 52 Casey-p. 66-67 53 Casey-p. 52-Castro

Hernandez-p. 30 54 Casey-p. 38-42 (see seizure papers from

DEI 55 See Commission report of June 27, 1989 56 See verdict

on Casey's radio communications system--of May 10, 1989--

Warren Murillo Martinez 57 Chacon-pp. 31-32-33 58 Alem, p.

34-Chacon, p. 38-Miranda, p. 2 59 Alem, p. 34.35 60 Alem, p.

35 61 Chacon-p. 57-58 62 Alem, p. 36 63 Alem, p. 37 64 Nolan

Campos, p. 3 and 6; Hidalgo Vindas, p. 39 and 40. 65 Alem, p.

42 66 Alem, p. 43 67 Campos-No. 66-p. 25 68 Campos-No. 66-p.

15 69 Campos-No. 66-p. 20 70 Nolan Campos-p. 6 71 Tobias

Chacon-p. 19 72 Rolando Araya-p. 5 73 Campos-No. 66-p. 6 74

Campos-No. 66-p. 8 75 Hernan Garron-p. 24 76 Campos No. 66-p.

41-Alem-p. 32 77 Alem-p. 37 78 Alem-p. 38 79 Alem-p. 41 80

Alem-p. 41 81 Alem, p. 42 82 Alem, p. 71 and 84 83

Legislative Assembly, Commission investigating drug

trafficking, sworn statements, secret sessions; The National

Security Archive, The Chronology, Warner Books., Inc.,

Washington, DC, 1987, p. 54; sworn statement of Bruce Jones

Bradford, before the South District Court of Florida,

December 3, 1987; sworn statement of William Crone before the

South District Court of Florida, January 7, 1989, pp. 340-

345. 84 La Nacion. Plane Discovered in Liberia was

camouflaged by crew, May 6, 1985, p. lOA. 85 District of

Columbia Court, U.S. vs Oliver L. North, criminal case No.

88-008-02-GAG,

certain facts according to the U.S. Government, pp. 3-4.

86 Statements of Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez to the Tico Times, January

16,198 7;

confidential information handed over to this Commission; Legislative

Assembly,op. cit.,

Document No. 96, July 4, 1989, p. 6; Court of District of Columbia, op.

cit.,pp. 27-

28.

87 Legislative Assembly, op. cit., Document No. 96, July 4,

1989; sworn statement of Joe

CRS-64

Fernandez (Tomas Castillo) before the Senate Committee that

investigated the Iran-Contra affair, April 20, 1987, pp. 396-

399; May 4, 1987; 468-469; May 29, 1987, pp. 91 and 94; the

Nations' Security Archive, op. cit., p. 349; Court of the

District of Columbia, op. cit., p. 35.

88 Sworn statement of Joe Fernandez (Tomas Castillo), op.

cit.

89 Idem; April 20, 1987, pp. 475-478; May 4, 1987, pp. 475-

478; May 29, 1987; pp. 88-90. The National Security Archive,

op. cit., p. 393.

90 Court of the District of Columbia op. cit., volume 36A, p.

6564-6569.

91 The National Security Archive, op. cit., p. 491; U.S.

Senate, Tower Report, pp. 11 and 12; District of Columbia

Court, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

92 Legislative Assembly, Special Caro Quintero Commission,

Document No. 30, March 26, 1987, pp. 10-12; Legislative

Assembly, Special Committee to Investigate Drug Trafficking,

Doc. No. 96, July 4, 1989.

93 File of Case No. 1022-F-87.

94 Idem.

95 Superior Court of Liberia, File No. 282-88.

96 File of Case No. 1022-F-87.

97 Private statements under oath before this Commission;

sworn statement of William Davis to this Commission;

statements of John Hull to the Wall Street Journal, May 21,

1988 and to Newsday, May 19, 1988; statements under oath of

William Crone to the District Court of Florida and the U.S.

Senate; voice Only Foot Soldiers Take the Rap, January 18,

1989, pp. 23ss.

98 Statements of John Hull to Channel 7, March 1989; to the

Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987 and to Newsday, May 10,

1987; sworn statement of Robert Owen to the South District

Court of Florida, May 19, 1988, pp. 721-711, 724. Book of

Col. Oliver North.

99 Statements of John Hull to Channel 7, March 1989; The

National Security Archive, op. cit., p. xvii; Statements of

Joe Fernandez (Tomas Castillo) before the Senate, op. cit.,

Los Angeles Weekly. The Miami Network, October 7-13, 1988.

100 Sworn statement of Benjamin Piza Carranza before this

Commission. Doc. No. 96, July 4, 1989.

101 Statements of John Hull to Channel 7, March 1989;

Statement of Robert Owen, Florida, op. cit., February 8,

1988, pp. 50, 75, 82-83, 176.

102 Sworn statement before this Commission, private session;

statement of Robert Owen, idem., p. 289.

103 Sworn statement before this Commission, private session;

sworn statement of William Crone-Florida op. cit., p. 260,

sworn statement of Sheila Ugalda, op. cit., pages 103108.

104 Statements of John Hull to Channel 7, March 1989,

interview and report on John Hull by Ron Arias. Semanario

People, John Hull, once Oliver North's man in Costa Rica, is

now accused of running guns and drugs. May 1, 1989, p. 53;

sworn statement of Robert Owen-Florida, op. cit., February 9,

1988, pp. 519, 533, 537, 547 and May 19, 1988, p. 734; book

of Col. Oliver North.

105 Wall Street Journal, Contra Connection, by Jonathan

Kwitny, May 21,1987; Newsday, The Private War of John Hull,

by Sandra Peddie and Brian Donovan, May 10, 1987.

106 Sworn statement before this Commission-Secret Session;

sworn statement of Sheila

CRS-65

Ugalde, op. cit., p. 89; sworn statement of W. Crone-Florida,

op. cit., pp. 309 and 365 and before the Subcommittee on

Terrorism, Narcotics and international Communications and

International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and the

Environment, of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

October 30, 1987, p. 148.

107 Sworn statement before this Commission-private session;

statements of John Hull to Channel 7, March 1989; interview

of John Hull with the Wall Street Journal, op. cit.,

Statement by R. Owen-Florida, op. cit., February 8, 1988, pp.

10, 171, 220, 22, and before the Senate, op. cit., October 1,

1987, p. 10; statement of W. Crone, Florida, op. cit., pp.

263-269.

108 Investigation of the OIJ: rep. 052-DV-89, January 12,

1989, p. 3; sworn statement of Sheila Ugalde Sanchez, op.

cit., pp. 135-139; statement of W. Crone-Florida, op. cit.

109. Statement under oath by William Davis to this

Commission; statement under oath before this Commission-

private session; statement of Sheila Ugalde-Florida, op.

cit., Voice, op. cit.

110 Statements under oath before this commission-private

sessions; statement of Sheila Ugalde, op. cit., pp. 117-120,

117; Statement of R. Owen, Florida, op. cit., February 8,

1988, pp. 184-185.

111 The National Security Archives, op. cit., pp. 88-89; Log

Angeles Weekly, The Miami Network, by Murray Waas, October 7-

13, 1988.

112 Statement under oath by Werner Lotz Artavia before the

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International

Operations of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

April 8, 1988, pp. 664-715.

113 Appearances of Willy Alvarez and Hugo Miranda.

114 Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International

Communications, U.S. Senate, February 8, 1988, p. 46.

115 Court of the District of Columbia, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

116 Statement under oath before this Commission-private

session; statement under oath by Floyd Carlton Caceres before

the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International

Communications, U.S. Senate, February 8, 1988, pp. 1050106.

117 Statement under oath of George Morales before the

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International

Communications of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, July 15, 1987, pp. 83-83, 92-93.

118 OIJ investigation: Rep. 052-DV-89, January 12, 1989.

119 Statement of W. Crone-Florida, op. cit., p. 337.

120 Idem, p. 223; Statement of Sheila Ugalde, op. cit., p.

47.

121 Statements of Robert Owen, op. cit., Statement of Sheila

Ugalde, op. cit.

122 File 282-88, Superior Court of Liberia

123 Idem.

124 Document No. 006-E-87, of the OIJ, p. 6.

125 File 282-88, Superior Court of Liberia

126 Idem.

127 File 282-88

Translated by Deanna Hammond, CRS, Language Services, April

26, 1990

PUBLIC PROSECUTORS

INVESTIGATION ON "LA PENCA" CASE

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA 26 DECEMBER 1989

1

there is a printed 1000

THE JUDICIARY (For official use.

REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA No.______________1

INTRODUCTION

Taking into consideration that, in appearance, the primary

objective of the criminal assault that took place on May 30 of

1984 in the camp known as "La Penca". was the physical

elimination of Eden Pastora Gomez. Commander of the "ARDE"

forces. in the Southern Front of the Nicaraguan Counter

Revolution, we took upon ourselves the task of analyzing, based

on the investigations of the Sub-Committee on Terrorism.

Narcotics and International Communications and of the U.S. Senate

Committee named to investigate the lran-Contra affair. the

context of the facts surrounding the crime. trying to verify and

complement said investigations with our inquiries in Costa Rica.

From the study of the file prepared by the Officina de

Asuntos Especiales <Office of Special Affairs> of the Organismo

de Investigacion Judicial <Organization of Judicial

Investigation>, we consider as a certainty that the perpetrator

of the criminal assault was a subject publicly known under the

false name of PEER ANKER ANSEN, for this reason, our inquiries

were directed towards establishing the possible participation of

mediate perpetrators, accomplices and accessories after the fact

as well as the true identity of the perpetrator of the crime.

The investigation is not over, but in view of the complexity

of the matter and the conjunction of events that merit a seParate

investigation, we decided to present this preliminary report.

1

I- CONTEXT OF THE EVENTS

A- The Medellin Cartel

1.- Generaiities

At the beginning of the decade of the eighties, the so

called "Medellin Cartel" is formed in Colombia made up of, among

others, by Pablo Escobar Gaviria, Gustavo de Jesus Gaviria, jorge

Ochoa Vasquez and Fabio Ochoa Engacha (1).

The founding of this criminal organization comes out of an

agreement between these drug "barons" and the M-19 Colombian

guerrilla movement after having carried out a hard and bloody

armed fight with serious loss of life on both sides (2).

Around 1983 the Medellin Cartel already has a sophisticated

organization, with specialized personnel in the different

production areas, which cover the cultivation, the manufacture,

the transport, the distribution and the money laundering. In that

year, the production zones of the coca leaf are located in the

jungles of Bolivia, Peru, Brazil and Ecuador from where it is

transported to Colombia already processed as coca paste. In this

country the paste is refined, obtaining the cocaine which is

shipped to Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Bahamas,

Panama, Jamaica and the Cayman Islands, where it is stored for

later shipment to the United States. For the unworried use of

the monies obtained from the sale of the cocaine, the Medellin

Cartel has a staff highly specialized in finances, bank

strategies, stock exchanges, etc. that are in charge of the

laundering of the cash, and for the safe

(1) Jose Blandon's statement before the U.S. Senate SubCommittee

on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Relations. (2) Ibid.

2

development of its activity, the Medeliin Cartel.by this time.

has established areas of influence through the recruiting of

officers of the armies and even popularly elected functionaries

of Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Bahamas. Panama

and Jamaica to whom are paid sums that range from hundreds to

millions of dollars according to the level of their positions in

the government (3).

2- The Medellin Cartel and the Latin American armed

conflicts.

Floyd Carlton Caceres, who bossed an organization made up of

more than 25 persons dedicated to the cocaine traffic among

Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico and the United States

between 1983 and 1986 (4). participated, together with pilots

Richard Belonick, Cesar Rodriguez, Teofilo Watson and Enrique

Pretel. beginning in 1978 in the supplying of arms to various

armed Latin American groups, among whom were the Frente

Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional in the war against Somoza, the

Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional de El Salvador

(5), the M-19 and the Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Colombia.

This arm traffic, as he stated, was managed from Panama by

General MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA (6) for whom he made 17 flights

beginning in 1980, carrying arms to the F.M.L.N.

In 1982, Pablo Escobar Gaviria and Gustavo Gaviria, through

Carlton Caceres, established a commercial relation with General

Noriega so that he would provide security to the flights in which

(3) Milian Rodriguez and Jose Blandon, Op.cit.l. (4) Floyd

Carlton Caceres's extradition proceedings. Case No.

284-J-2-86. Criminal Court of Heredia.

(5) Floyd Carlton Caceres and Jose Blandon. Op.cit.l.

(6) Ibid.

3

cocaine was being transPorted. The deal was started with the

carrying out of three flights from Colombia to previously

selected runways controlled by the Panamanian government, and

each flight carrying more than 400 kilos of cocaine. Manuel

Antonio Noriega was paid, through Carlton. $100,000; $150,000 and

$200.000, respectively for each one of the trips (7).

General Manuel Antonio Norieca also made himself a basic

part for the protection of the Medellin Cartel in the money

laundering through the Panamanian banking and finance systems.

The cash money would come in through Panamanian airports in boxes

that were picked up by vehicles of the Defence Force, a task for

which he was paid millions of dollars. (8).

Simultaneously, General Noriega was maintaining a close

commercial activity with the Cuban government through two

entities controlled by him, call "Reciclaje Agency" and "Simone".

Using these entities he sold advanced American technology to Cuba

and at the same time introduced Cuban shrimps and lobsters in the

American market, evading, in this manner, the economic blockade

established by United States laws. Manuel Antonio Noriega's

relations with the Cuban regime are so close that towards the end

of the month of June, 1984 Fidel Castro made possible a meeting

in Havana between the representatives of the Medellin Cartel and

him, accompanied by Jose Blandon (9).

(7) Floyd Carlton Caceres, Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Jose

Blandon Op.cit.l

(8) Floyd Carlton Caceres, Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Jose

Blandon Op.cit.l

(9) Jose Blandon. Op.cit.l

4

The meeting was originated by a discord between the Cartel

and Noriega on account of the capture of a laboratory in the

Darien Province by one of his subordinates. apparently without

his authorization, for the installation of which he has been

given five million dollars. This originated a plot, propitiated

by the Cartel, to murder Noriega, that was detected by the Israel

intelligence service while he <Noriega> was on a trip through

Europe. Alerted about the plot, Noriega proPitiated the meeting

in Havana, where the return of equipments, helicopters and

captured planes, the freeing of 23 prisoners and the return of

the five million dollars were agreed upon in exchange for his

life (10).

3- The Medellin Cartel and the Southern Front: General

Manuel Antonio Noriega also supplied arms to the

Brigada Internacional Simon Bolivar (11), whose commander, Dr.

Hugo Spadafora, joined the Southern Front in the anti-Sandinista

struggle. Before his murder, which took place on November 13,

1985, Dr. Spadafora had talked with Floyd Carlton Caceres and

Cesar Rodriguez and he had a notebook in which he had noted all

the details in connection with the involvement of General Manuel

Antonio Noriega in the drug traffic, telling Carlton that he was

going to "make a bomb explode" in Panama by divulging this

information (12). After the murder, Noriega commented to Jose

Blandon that the homicidal was a subordinate of his named

(10) Jose Blandon and Floyd Carlton Caceres. Op.cit.l

(11) Jose Blandon. Op.cit.l.

(12) Floyd Carlton Caceres, Op.cit.l; Jose Rodrigo Ortiz Leiva

before the Prosecutor's Office. Case No.282-88 T.S.P. from

Liberia for cocaine international trafficking c/Edwin Viales

and others.

5

cordoba. with the rank of Major who was in charge of a military

unit (13) in Chiriqui. Noriega and Niraido Madrinan. Chief of

the D.E.N.I., also commented, in Jose Blandon's presence, about a

prepared statement through Amantillo Cordoba, officer of the

D.E.N.I., that would be given by a witness named Manfred Hoffman

Wittemberg, German resident of Costa Rica, affirming that the

murder had been carried out by the F.M.L.N. of El Salvador (14)

Alfredo Caballero, who was in charge of laundering money from

the narcotrafficking and the plane purchases for Floyd Carlton

Caceres, gave his help to Eden Pastora between 1983 and 1984

(15). In addition he participated, through a company of his, with

office in Miami, called SIACSA. as middleman in the purchase of

planes for A.R.D.E. (16).

George Morales, sentenced in the U.S. for illegal imports of

drugs and connected to the Medellin Cartel, had under his

control, close to thirty pilots dedicated to the drug traffic.

Among them was Richard Healey, who was Chief of Pilots, married

to the former wife of Adolfo "Popo" Chamorro, commander of

A.R.D.E. (17).

On June 25, 1983, John Hull left the Tobias Bolanos Airport

accompanied by Jose Robelo Gonzalez, member of A.R.D.E., on board

plane N-91 CB bound for the United States. Accompanying them

(13) Jose Blandon. Op.cit.l

(14) Ibid.

(15) Floyd Carlton Caceres, Op.cit.l. See extradition

proceedings for Carlton Caceres. Op.cit 12.

(16) Eden Pastora Gomez before the O.I.J.

(17) George Morales & Gary Setzner. Op. cit. 1.

6

on board Plane N-666P.F., were Marcos Acuado. Emiciio Prado.

Roberto Esoinoza and Gerardo Duran Ayanegui, all also members of

A.R.D.E. (18..

On leaving Costa Rica they reported as their destination to

the Civil Air authorities the United States, nevertheless, they

landed at San Andres. where they took on fuel, reporting as their

next destination Cozumel, in Mexico, and Miami, Florida. In this

last place they took lodgings at the Quality Inn Airport Hotel on

the 26 of June, 1983 at 15:47 hours (19).

On that occasion (June of 1983), John Hull, Marcos Aguado

and George Duran, taking with them a Colombian friend of George

Morales, named Gustavo Velez, visited the office o+. the former

located in Building 415 next to Hangar No. 1 at the Opa-Loca

airport, requesting his help to take 40 grenade launchers

illegally out of the United States to Ilopango, El Salvador.

destined for the Contras. Morales lent his cooperation. the 40

grenade launchers being transferred to a warehouse of his located

at 135th Street, 17th Avenue in Miami and he designated pilots

Gary Betzner and Richard Healy to effect the clandestine flight,

which was carried out, leaving from the Opa-Loca Airport, Miami,

with a stop at Boca Chica, where anti-vessel mines were loaded,

to finally deliver the cargo at Ilopango, El Salvador, guarded

(18) Marcos Aguado before the O.I.J. Proceedings for Various

Crimes case against John Hull for Hostile Acts. Trial Judge

of San Carlos.

(19) Marcos Aguado, invoices in hearing against John Hull. Op.

Cit. 18.

7

by military <personnel>. There they were supplied with fuel and

they continued their trip to Rio Hacha in Colombia. from where

they returned to the United States with a cargo of marijuana

(20). The plane in which the flight was made was a C-47 that

later Morales gave to A.R.D.E. in 1984 (21).

As George Morales affirms, before this occasion in which he

is visited by John Hull, he had heard about his person <sic>.

since 1981. when speaking with Colombian narco-trafficker friends

of his, they discussed about stopping points to store merchandise

and to refuel (22).

Between April and May of 1984, Adolfo "Popo" Chamorro,

Marcos Aguado and Octaviano Cesar got together with George

Morales requesting his collaboration for A.R.D.E., talking to him

about the need for cloth for uniforms and the transportation of

40 thousand pounds of armaments and military implements to the

South of Nicaragua. Octaviano Cesar and Marcos Aguado said that

they were connected with the C.I.A. and offered to help him in

connection with the charge that he faced for illegal importation

of drugs in the Federal Court of the United States. In exchange

he should provide money, planes, boats and other implements.

Also, they indicated that the flights that would be made would

have the protection of agents of the United States government.

Morales accepted the deal and they took him to see the weapons

(20) George Morales before the O.I.J. and before the U S Senate.

Gary Betzner before the U.S. Senate. Op.Cit.l.

(21) George Morales before the Senate. Op.cit. 1.

(22) George Morales before the Senate. Op.cit. 1.

8

that had to be transported to Costa Rica in one of his planes.

The first flight was going to be made by Morales and Aguado.

returning with cocaine. but at the last moment Marcos Aguado told

him that he could not run the risk of being caught with drugs as

he was a pilot connected with the C.I.A., so eventually who flew

was Gary Setzner in July of 1984, carrying M-60 machine guns. M16

rifles and some C-4 explosives. The flight originated in Fort

Lauderdale and its destination was a runway located on John

Hull's farm in Muelle de San Carlos. There it was met by John

Hull. with a blond fellow and two Latins, the plane was unloaded

and was loaded again with 7 suitcases and 56 boxes all containing

cocaine. This load was taken to Fort Lauderdale to an airport

controlled by United States authorities (23).

Some ten days later Gary Betzner carried out another flight

leaving from the Opa-Loca airport with armaments, landing on a

runway located in Los Llanos, San Carlos where John Hull with two

Latins waited for him. There the plane was loaded with 15 small

suitcases containing 30 kilos of cocaine each (24).

George Morales gave the A.R.D.E. a C-47 plane that was

picked up in Haiti by Gerardo Duran and Marcos Aguado, as well as

another plane, a 404, that was delivered to Adolfo Chamorro. The

C-47 was based in El Salvador and the 404 in Costa Rica at the

service of Gerardo Duran Ayanegui (25). In addition, he donated

(23) George Morales. Op.cit. 1.

(24) Gary Betzner and George Morales. Op.cit. 1.

(25) Carol Prado before the O.I.J. Op.cit. 18.

9

between 4 and 5 million dollars in cash from the drug traffic and

he trained pilots for them (26).

In September of 1984, Sebastian Gonzalez Mendieta. alias

"Guachan". leader of a group of A.R.D.E. known as the M-3,

Pastora's dissidents (27) and Alberto Albaunza participated in a

drug trafficking in Liberia, Guanacaste, a case that is pending

before the Superior Court of that place, because Gonzalez

Mendieta ran away to Panama where, until 1988, he was working for

former President Del Valle in a stable that belonged to him (28).

Ramon Milian Rodriguez lent his services as an accountant

for the Medellin Cartel between 1979 and 1982, designing an

ingenious system for the laundering of money from drug

trafficking through the use of the Panamanian banking system and

the creation of "shell" companies in the United States as well as

in Panama, with the protection of Noriega. This allowed him, only

in the year 1980, to handle a flow of cash for more than two

million millions dollars and to have access to eleven million

millions dollars of investments of the mentioned Cartel (29).

<Translator's note: A "billon" (in Spanish) is one million

millions; a "billion" (in English) is one thousand millions>.

(26) George Morales before the O.I.J. Op.cit. 18 and before the

U.S. Senate. Op.cit.l; Octaviano Cesar, Adolfo Chamorro

Cesar, Carol Prado Hernandez before the O.I.J. Op.cit. 18.

Eden Pastora before the O.I.J.

(27) Case against Ernesto Albaunza and others. Superior Court of

Liberia; Jose Blandon before the Senate. Op.cit.l.

(28) Jose Blandon. Op.cit.l.

(29) Ramon Milian Rodriguez before the Senate. Op.cit.l and

before the FBI.

10

Among the traffickers to whom Milian Rocrquez lent his money

laundering services were Ubaldo Fernandez, Carlos Soto and Luis

Rodriguez (30). who, in 1982 participated in an importation of

marihuana to Massachussets (31).

Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Luis Rodriguez founded and

established for money laundering the entities A.K.A.B.A.S.A. and

AHOREMUSA HOLDING S.A.. Ubaldo Fernandez and Carlos Soto lent and

used for the same purpose Wong Fat Chin Farms S.A., and Carlos

Soto and Ramon Rodriguez foundeo KARACHI International S.A. (32).

Luis Rodriguez, Ubaldo Fernandez and Carlos Soto, founded in

Panama, Inversiones DEVISA S.A., which at the same time made

investments with money coming from the narcotraffick, in

Frigorificos de Puntarenas S.A., in Costa Rica. Frigorificos de

Puntarenas S.A. operated with an agent representative in Miami

called Ocean Hunter, omened by Luis Rodriguez (33).

Ramon Milian Rodriguez was the link for the money laundering

through all the entities mentioned (34). Luis Rodriguez named

Moises Dagoberto Nunez to be in charge of the management of

Frigorificos de Puntarenas S.A. as a man of his complete trust.

Through Ocean Hunter Inc. and Frigorificos de Puntarenas, monies

coming from the narcotrafficking were delivered to the Nicaraguan

"Contras" (35).

(30) Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Carlos Soto before Special Agents

of the Federal Grand Jury in Florida on 4-3-87.

(31) Carlos Soto. Op.cit.30.

(32) Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Carlos Soto. Op.cit.30.

(33) Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Carlos Soto. Op.cit.30.

(34) Ramon Milian Rodriguez before the Senate Op.cit.l.

(35) Carlos Soto. Op.cit.30. Ramon Milian Rodriguez. Op.cit.l.

11

Frank Chanes. identified as a narcotrafficker with economic

interests in Ocean Hunter Inc.. supplied financing to A.R.D.E.

and to Cuban anti-Castro grouPs with money coming from the drug

traffic (36).

According the Public Property Record, on 22 June 1982.

Moises Nunez Ruiz. sPecially commissioned for it. records the

following agreements taken in General Assembly of partners (37).

FIRST: The resignation of the previous Board of Directors is

accepted.

THIRD: Named are Carlos Soto Collado as President, Moises

Nunez Ruiz as First Vice President and Ubaldo Fernandez

Monterules as Second Vice President.

On 2 July 1985 the statutes are changed, establishing that

the Board of Directors will be made up by three partner members

or third parties and Moises Nunez Ruiz is named as President,

Luis Rodriguez Morales as Secretary and Luis Rodriguez Mesa as

Treasurer.

Frigorificos de Puntarenas S.A. also had granted ample power

to Francisco or Frank Chanes which was revoked on 5 May 1988

(38).

(36) Jose Coutin before the F.B.I.

(37) Certification of the Statutes of Frigorificos de Puntarenas

S.A.

(38) Ibid.

12

Ocean Hunter and Frigorificos de Puntarenas S.A. were also

used by Robert Owen and Oliver North to channel clean resources

coming from the N.H.A.O.. an office established for the

management of humanitarian aid approved by the Congress of the

United States towards the end of 1984, with the approval of the

"Boland Amendment" (39).

Moises Nunez also entered in contact with the Department of

Narcotics of the Ministry of Public Safety through Gilberth

Jimenez Retana, an official in that department, who introduced

him to Sr. Luis Barrantes, at that time the director. A close

friendship sprung between Luis Barrantes and Moises Nunez to the

point that he <Barrantes> gave him an I.D. that accredited him

as an officer of that department. Nunez collaborated at the same

time with the Department of Narcotics, providing money and

vehicles to carry out drug operations. Nunez got to be known by

our authorities as a collaborator of the D.E.A. and of other

police bodies (40).

Alfonso Cruz Corrales, D.I.S. agent in San Carlos, relates

that on one occasion in which he took John Hull to a meeting of

the directors of that dependency, when he was returning to San

Carlos, Hull went to the offices of Frigorificos de Puntarenas,

where he introduced to him Moises Nunez, who identified himself

with a badge of the Public Safety narcotic police. Later Nunez

(39) Robert Owen before the U.S. Senate Iran-Contra Committee.

Facts taken from the records of the Sub-Committee on

Terrorism, Narcotics and International relations of the

U.S. Senate.

(40) Gilbert Jimnez Retana and Rodolfo Jimenez before the O.I.J.

13

called him telling him that he was at Hull' s house and that he

wanted to talk with him. Cruz went to the meeting in which Nunez

tried to obtain information on the drug cases that were being

investigated in the zone (41). Later, in command of a narcotic

patrol of Public Safety, in which Gilberth Jimenez was going

along, he carried out the premature arrest of a Colombian named

Echeverri, which caused the failure of an operation which the

delegation of the O.I.J. of San Carlos had been carrying out from

four months back on this individual and a band of

narcotraffickers (42).

At present Moises Nunez Ruiz appears in the anti-druqs

international registries, registered as a narcotrafficker that

passes himself off as an intelligence agent to cover his activity

(43).

Moises Nunez used to say that he belonged to the 2506

Brigade that fought in Bahia Cochinos, Cuba and, in 1983,

received training (44) in a camp located in Naples, Florida in

which anti-communist Cubans and Nicaraguans were trained, that

later were sent to the Southern Front. The camp which was named

"Comandos 307" (45), was helped economically in Miami by Frank

Castro and Lilli Mestre and in Costa Rica by Francisco Chanes

(46).

(41) Alfonso Cruz Corales before the O.I.J.

(42) Fausto Rojas, Edgardo Alpizar, Alfonso Cruz before the

O.I.J.

(43) Cable from C.I.C.A.D.

(44) Rodolfo Jimenez before the O.I.J., Rene Corvo before the

F.B.I.

(45) Rene Corvo, Frank Castro before the F.B.I. (46) Rene Corvo

before the F.B.I.

14

That training camp that was opened in january 1983 on land

belonging to Gerardo Silva. ex-combatant of the "2506

Brigade"(47), came about as a result of a Cuban movement that was

formed with the participation of several groups united under the

idea of overthrowing the sandinista government and later.

Nicaragua freed, use its territory as a base to overthrow Fidel

Castro, idea that was promoted by Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro.

commander of the Southern Front and Adolfo Calero, leader of the

A.R.D.E. (48).

Some of Cubans that enrolled in the movement were

excambatants of Bahia de Cochinos and others were immigrants that

arrived to the U.S. coasts on board of the vessel "Mariel" (49)

and they came from groups identified as "Brigada Cubana 2506",

"Legion Cubana", " Cuba Independiente Democratica (CID)", "Omega

7" and "Alfa 66" (50),

In the recruiting of these persons took part Fernando "El

Negro" Chamorro and an individual known as Ernesto Cruche, who

was pointed out as an agent of the C.I.A.(51) and who, in Costa

Rica had the backing of Colonel Rodrigo Paniagua Pacheco,

director of the O.P.E.N. (52).

(47) Frank Castro, Rene Corvo, Rafael Tower before the F.B.I.

(48) Juan Jose Parra, Wilfredo Leiva before the D.I.J., Thomas

Posey before the F.B.I.

(49) <missing>

(50) Thomas Posey, Jose Coutin, Jose Sossa, Rafael Torres

Jimenez, Marcelino Rodriguez before the F.B.I.; Juan Parra

Garcia before the O.I.J.

(51) Juan Jose Parra Garcia before the O.I.J.

(52) Ibid.

15

the militay chiefs were Rene Corvo and Feiipe Vida. .53)

and the economic backing was furnished by Frank Castro or Eulaiio

Francisco Castro. Francisco or Frank Chanes and Moises Nunez (54)

through Ocean Hunter and Frigorificcs de Puntarenas S.A. with

money coming from the drug traffic (55).

At the beginning of 1983, Armando Looez Estrada. Cuban. who

promoted the economic aid to this group (56). Frank Castro, John

Hull, Bill Crone and Adolfo Jimenez got together at a farm of the

latter in Guanacaste where they discussed the help needed by

Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro. Later. at the Balmoral Hotel,

Frank Castro met with Bill Crone, who resides in San Carlos and

was John Hull'=- partner. with the purpose of contacting Pastora

and Robelo to integrate to their forces the Cuban group that was

in Miami. Crone travelled a month later to the camp in Florida

where he met Felipe Vidal and Rene Corvo, nevertheless, he did

not lend any aid as he was informed at the U.S. Embassy in Costa

Rica, that Frank Castro was being investigated for trafficking in

arms (57).

John Hull became the link of the Cubans in Costa Rica and

finally assumed the command over them (58).

The first group of Cuban elements arrived at Costa Rica in a

commercial flight on 5 June 1983 being met by Colonel Rodrigo

Paniagua Pacheco, who furnished transportation to them

(53) Rene Corvo

(54) Frank Castro, Francisco Hernandez.

(55) Carlos Soto, Ramon Milian Rodriguez before the F.B.I. and

the U.S. Senate.

(56) Jose Coutin before the F.B.I.

(57) Bill Crone before the O.I.J.

(58) Rene Corvo, Francisco Hernandez, Frank Castro, Jose Coutin,

Jose Sossa before the F.B.I.; Peter Glivery before the

O.I.J.; report of Special Affairs.

16

to La Chaiupa" farm belonging to Ciimaco Daiazar (59). At the

beginning some of these elements were integrated as

combatants of A.R.D.E. (60), but finally they were based between

the indicators 9 and 10 where they established a camp called

"Comando Saturnino Beltran" (61). it being known by the Costa

Ricans as the camp of the "Cubiches" (62).

B- THE ANTAGONIC POSITIONS OF PASTORA AND HULL As told by

Eden Pastora, in 1983, the Central Intelligence

Agency of the United States (C.I.A.), was interested in that the

North Front, controlled by the F.D.N., and the South Front. would

unite. To that effect the Agent Duke Klarich. known as Mr.

Maroni. who was the Chief of the C.I.A.for Latin America.

convoked Fernando Chamorro. Broklin Rivera, Alfonso Robelo and

Pastora to a meeting in Panama where General Manuei Antonio

Noriega proposed the unification of all forces opposed to the

Nicaraguan government. This proposal was turned down by Pastora,

who refused to fight together with former Somoza guards,

sheltered under the F.D.N. (63).

John Hull was in Costa Rica an operative agent of the C.I.A.

who was under Philip Holtz, known as Felipe, who was accredited

in Costa Rica as Second Secretary and official of the Economic

Section of the U. S. Embassy in our country. Holtz would

(59) Wilfredo Leiva, Juan Jose Parra before the O.I.J.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Rene Corvo, Frank Castro before the F.B.I.

(62) Fausto Rojas and Alfonso Cruz before the O.I.J.

(63) Eden Pastora Gomez before the O.I.J.

17

coordinate with Hull, or with Luis Rivas. who was his contact.

the dates on which the arms or other type of assistance would

arrive. and. through Margarita Acosta Baidomero, Hull's

companion, he rented various safe houses for periods of from four

to six months. where meetings of interest to him were carried

out. These houses were used by Hull and Robert Owen when they

travelled to San Jose. Holtz in his role of linkage with Hull

was later substituted by Joe Fernandez, known as Thomas Castillo

(64).

As it was pointed out previously. as indicated by the

witness, the Cubans that arrived at Costa Rica were recruited by

Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro and an individual who, it was said.

was from the C.I.A., named Ernesto Cruche. who coordinated the

arrival of these people with Colonel Paniagua (65).

Eden Pastora, in addition to being opposed to the

unification of his military forces with those of the F.D.N.,

fostered by the C.I.A. through Noriega, was also opposed to the

Cubans being integrated into his ranks, which were the ones that

practically dominated the Southern Front (66). To outwit this

opposition the Cuban went so far as to pass themselves off as

Puerto Rican so as to be accepted as combatants (67).

In view of Comandante Pastora's attitude, John Hull, in

partnership with Felipe Vidal, started a campaign to recruit

(64) Eden Pastora, Bill Crone and Margarita Acosta before the

O.I.J.

(65) Juan Jose Parra Garcia before the O.I.J.

(66) Bill Crone, Miguel Urroz Blando and Eden Pastora before the

O.I.J.

(67) Frank Castro before the F.B.I.

18

the commanders near him. trying to convince them to abadom him

and to join their group (68).

John Hull not only tried to recruit Pastora's commanders.

but he also made a trip to Washington, D.C. in June of 1983 in

the company of Bill Crone and Luis Rivas, commander of A.R.D.E.,

where he met with Robert Owen. assistant to Senator DAN QUAYLE,

who took charge of making the contacts so that the situation of

the Southern Front could be explained. Hull lobbied against

Pastora, whom he pictured as a communist at the service of the

sandinistas, also indicating that the Southern Front was

disorganized and the troops were without food and medicine (69).

Robert Owen put John Hull in contact with Oliver North.

Colonel of the N.S.C., it being decided that Owen would go to the

Southern Front with the purpose of determining the prevailing

condition (70). In September of 1983 Owen arrived at Costa Rica

and visited John Hull, Luis Rivas taking him to various meetings

with some of the leaders of the Southern Front, among them

Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora (71).

Owen also met in Costa Rica with Leonel Poveda Siles, Carlos

Coronel, Guillermo Mendieta, Luis Rivas, Alejandro Martinez

Saenz, Harold Martinez Saenz and Juan Zavala, who

(68) Miguel Urroz Blanco, Eden Pastora before the O.I.J.

(69) Bill Crone before the O.I.J. and before the U.S. Senate;

Robert Owen before the Senate (Iran-Contra Commission).

(70) Robert Owen before the Iran-Contra Sub-Committee; Bill

Crone before the U.S. Senate Sub-Committe on Terrorism,

Narcotics, etc.

(71) Bill Crone before the O.I.J.

19

offered him to organize and structure a new Southern Front.

claiming to represent the camp of "Neoro" Chamorro and the group

of Cubans. According to them. Calero was in agreement with the

organization of a new Southern Front, which should be under the

command of U.N.O. and the Resistencia Democratica Nicaraouense.

They would keep far away from Pastora and would not infringe into

his territory. They also affirmed that some of Pastora s

commanders. that did not have food nor medicine, were willing to

abandon him. They were Leonel, San and Naveoante (72).

About that time (the end of 1983. beginning of 1984), John

Hull met with Adolfo Calero. President of F.D.N., which was the

organization that was fighting in the North Front, and told him

that he was disappointed with Pastora and that he wanted to

organize the Southern Front, helping the F.D.N. At that meeting

John Hull was opposed to "El Negro" Chamorro being the one to

reorganize the Southern Front. The leaders of the F.D.N. then

named "Comandante Jesus" as their representative in the

reorganization (73) and placed the Cuban group under his command.

Jesus, whose full name was Jesus Garcia, kept his center of

operations in John Hull's offices in San Carlos, from where he

coordinated the logistic help to the Cubans (74).

(72) Department of State document in the Kerry Report.

(73) Adolfo Calero before the court of the Southern District of

Florida, case against John HUll and Others brought by Tony

Avirgan.

(74) Fausto Rojas, Edgardo Alpizar, Alfonso Cruz before the

O.I.J.

20

it is important to indicate here. as narcotraffickers George

Moraies and Gary Betzner said. that it is at this precise time in

which Hull is confronting Pastora. when he. Adolfo "Popo"

Chamorro and Marcos Aguado begin to associate with them and the

flights are started, which are prolonged in 84, carrying stores

and ammunition to Hull and returning to the Unites States with

cocaine.

As per Miguel Urroz Blanco, Pastora's Chief of Security, he

<Pastora> considers that to accept help originating from

narcotrafficking means the political death of A.R.D.E. and his

own, reason for which he was opposed to this type of financing

(75). Carol Prado, ARDE commander, states that when Eden Pastora

realized that George Morales was a narcotrafficker, in an

aggressive manner, he forbade his help, ordering the return of

the 404 plane that had been based in Costa Rica under the command

of Gerardo Duran Ayanegui (76).

As can be observed from what has been stated by the

mentioned witnesses, between mid 1983 and 1984, John Hull became

Pastora's principal opponent, backed by Oliver North, the F.D.N.,

Adolfo Calero, the Cubans and the narcotraffickers.

That dislike for Pastora was even discussed in the presence

of national authorities. In the investigation we have established

that in the law office of Licenciate Carlos Manuel Coto Alban,

(75) Miguel Urroz Blanco before the O.I.J., Carol Prado before

the O.I.J., case against John Hull for Hostile Acts, Trial

Court of San Carlos.

(76) Carlos Prado before the O.I.J., Trial Court of San Carlos

case against John Hull for Hostile Acts.

21

there were meetings. with certain frequency. of anti-communist

groups, to some of which. the then Minister of Interior and

Police <Gobernacion y Policia>, Dr. Alfonso Carro. attended. In

one of those meetings, at the beginning of 1984. attended by the

Sub-Director of the Rural Assitance Guard. Sr. Carlos Alvarez

Camacho Araya, John Hull, Juan Jose Saborio, aka Carlos Sanchez

and others, the latter one stated that Eden Pastora was harmful

to the "Contra" as he was a henchman or accomplice of the

sandinistas, reason for which he had to be eliminated or taken

out of the Southern Front (77).

II- THE COSTA RICAN SITUATION

In our country John Hull was affiliated with Asociacion

Democratica Huetar Norte, with residence in the city of San

Carlos. This association organized paramilitary training that

were carried out in Hull's and other farms at Muelle and Buena

Vista de San Carlos. Even officials of the Organismo de

Investigacion Judicial attended those trainings, it being at one

of those military practices that one of these officials

accidentally killed a person that was participating in them (78).

John Hull, in turn, kept a close relationship with Colonel

Rodrigo Paniagua Salazar (79), who was the director of the

O.P.E.N., from 1 July 1982 to 25 April 1984 (80). Paniagua was

the person who met the Cubans that arrived from Miami and took

(77) Carlos Camacho Araya and Victor Wolf before the O.I.J.

(78) Rodolfo Alvarado Rosales before the Judicial Inspection.

(79) Eden Pastora Gomez before the O.I.J.

(80) Certification of the Personnel Office of the Ministry of

Public Safety.

22

them to "La Chalupa farm (81), helped to introduce the exPlosives

that were brought illegally into the country. through the Juan

Santamaria Airport. in L.A.C.S.A. commercial flights (82):

used his influence to free Rene Corvo, one of the Cuban leaders

in Costa Rica that was detained (83) and negotiated the return of

weaPons seized from the Contras by the Direccion de Inteligencia

y Seguridad (84). Paniagua recommended Felipe Vidal to the

Ministry of Public Safety so that he would be allowed to register

and carry 5 light weaPons (85). Vidal was being introduced by

Paniagua as his friend and he was seen with him at the offices of

the Ministry of Public Safety (86).

Hull's trust in some of our authorities was such that, as it

has been seen, at a meeting in which he and the Sub-Director of

the Rural Assistance Guard participated, the problem that Pastora

represented to the Southern Front and the need to eliminate him

or to take him out, was even discussed. Also discussed at that

meeting were the differences that existed between the Ministry of

Public Safety and the Ministry of Interior and Police on account

of the way they were focussing the anti-sandinista war. They

also spoke of the problem that National Security <Seguridad

Nacional - DIS> represented due to the "chumminess" that

supposedly was taking place between that department and the

sandinista regime (87).

(81) Wilfredo Leiva, Juan Parra, Climaco Salazar before the

O.I.J.

(82) Jose Sossa before the F.B.I.

(83) Rene Corvo before the F.B.I.

(84) Guillermo Marin Ulloa before the O.I.J.

(85) Weapons Registry Card of the M.S.P.

(86) Luis Fernandez Quiros before the O.I.J.

(87) Carlos Camacho Araya before the O.I.J.

23

Indeed. by that time the frontier posts in the North part of

the Country were under the control of the Rural Assistant Guard

but they were Placed under the responsibility of the National

Security (DIS) in charge of Carlos Monge Quesada. Monge and the

Minister of Public Security, Angel Edmundo Solano Calderon, who

were trying to put into effect the neutrality decree, issued 17

November 1983, were accused of being communist at the service of

the Sandinista Army, which had caused serious differences in the

Headquarters of Intelligence and Security (D.I.S.) (88).

Don Angel Edmundo Bustillo had maintained the thesis that

for the benefit of Costa Rican political stability and peace it

was necessary to appeal to the dialogue and political negotiation

with our neighboring countries, but as it has been pointed out,

another sector of the government, represented by the Ministry of

Interior and Police, considered, as of national interest, to

offer backing to the Nicaraguan counter-revolution (89)

Within the guidelines drawn by Minister Solano. in his

office was that of strengthening the corps of intelligence agents

(D.I.S.), as Costa Rica was a country without an army. For that

purpose, it was appealed mainly, among other countries, to

Israel, training personnel in that field and another that shaped

an anti-terrorist unit (90).

(88) Carlos Monge Quesada, Angel Edmundo Solano, Carlos Camacho

Araya, Jose Rafael Gomez Aguilar before the O.I.J.

(89) Angel Edmundo Solano Calderon before the O.I.J.

(90) Angel Edmundo Solano and Johnny Campos Loaiza before the

O.I.J.

24

The U.S. Embassy offered to the Ministry of Public Safety to

form a group of agents in pure intelligence to give them a high

level of professionalism (91). an offer that the government of

Costa Rica accepted and 15 agents of the Headquarters of

Intelligence and Safety were selected to receive the training

(92). That group, that was called "The Babies" was placed under

a U.S. instructor called "Dimitrius Papas", who was pointed out

as a C.I.A. agent (93) and who was known as "Papi". "PaPi"

transferred "The Babies" out of the offices of the Ministry,

renting a building that was financed by the U.S. Embassy, which

also gave them desks, telephones, typewriters and two vehicles

(94).

This group of officials although supposedly answering to the

orders of Vice-Minister Johnny Campos Loaiza, practically lost

all connections with that authority. obeying the direct command

of "Papas" and of Francisco Tacsan (95).

"The Babies", who lost loyalty to their superiors, were used

in pursuit of the President of the Republic, Don Luis Alberto

Monge, of Minister Fernando Berrocal, of Vice-Minister Manuel

Carballo and of the Minister of Public Safety himself, don Angel

Edmundo Solano (96).

(91) Juan Campos Loaiza, Angel Edmundo Solano before the O.I.J.

(92) Angel Edmundo Solano, Juan Campos Loaiza, Rodolfo Jimenez

Monge before the O.I.J.

(93) Rodolfo Jimenez before the O.I.J.

(94) Rodolfo Jimenez, Angel Edmundo Solano, Juan Campos Loaiza

before the O.I.J.

(95) Ibidem.

(96) Angel Edmundo Solano, Juan Campos Loaiza before the O.I.J.

25

Dimitrius Papas in addition established a relation with the

Organization o+ Judicial Investioations in 1982 through a

training program on anti-terrorism that was given to the

personnel of this police <force> (97).

Immediately after these courses organized by Paoas, a close

bond emerged between the Officina de Asuntos Esoeciales <Office

of Special Affairs> of the O.I.J., which was created to handle

all crimes connected with State Security and the Agents trained

by PaPas in the D.I.S. That relationship turned into a true

economic dependency on the Office of Special Affairs, to such a

degree that, through the D.I.S. that office was furnished not

only telephone tapping equipments, recorders and photographic

equipments, but also money in cash that was used for the purchase

of supplies, payment of vehicle rentals, rentals of apartments

for surveyance and per diem (98).

The liberality with which the D.I.S. managed its resources

took us to inquire about which was its budget.

It was detected in the investigation that to the agents and

to the administrative personnel of D.I.S. a monthly or

fortnightly bonus in cash was being delivered, a totally

irregular situation and in contradiction to the payment system of

the State that is controlled by the Ministry of the Treasury. As

such a matter could constitute the crime of Illicit Enrichment as

described in Article 344 of the Penal Code, an investigation

(97) Allan Solano, Albert Llorente, Fernando Centeno before the

O.I.J.

(98) Edgar Monge Luton, Allan Solano, Albert Llorente, Fernando

Centeno, Jose Mo. Machado Ramirez, Olman Alvarado, Guillermo

Marin Ulloa, Mario Murillo Salazar before the O.I.J.

26

was made in that respect, it being established that the

SubDirector of the office was delivering, monthly or fortnightly,

to the person in charge of a petty cash. a list with the names

of the persons to whom the bonus would be given, this person

being in charge of the cash payment (99).

The funds of that petty cash originally were between 30 and

40 thousand colones, and its flow increasing to a million or a

million six hundred thousand colones per month. The person in

charge of cash was Sra. Vera Arguedas Serrano, member of "The

Babies". who would prepare a monthly liquidation of which she

would deliver a copy to a U.S. Embassy official and then she

would go to the law offices of Zurcher, Montoya, Zurcher. in the

neighborhood of the I.N.V.U. in San Jose, where she would present

the liquidation and would be given a new amount in cash (100).

As it can be seen, the procedure followed contradicted not

only the principles of the financial administration of the State.

but also the established legal controls.

According to testimonies received, those funds were supplied

by a private organization called U.N.O. (101), that in 1985

transformed itself into the "Asociacion de Asistencia Civica

Costarricence" <Costa Rican Civic Assistance Association>, which

until this date has been supplying funds to the D.I.S., from,

among other sources, a private organization with offices in New

York, called "The Cardenal Association" (102).

(99) Vera Enid Serrano,, Olman Alvarado, Johnny Campos before the

O.I.J.

(100) Vera Enid Serrano before the O.I.J.

(101) Harry Zurcher, Jose MoMachado before the O.I.J.

(102) Harry Zucher before the O.I.J.

27

Dimitrius Papas maintained a relation of great

camaraderie with the personnel of the Office of Special Affairs

and of other dependencies of the Organization of Judicial

Investioation. but in particular this relationship was closer

with Sr. Albert Llorente, who at his request, even named him

baptism Godfather of one of his children (103).

Sr. Albert Llorente became. in this manner, first

de facto and later by appointment by Lic. Mainor Calvo, the

Director of O.I.J. at that time, the person in charge of

coordinating the relations between the Organization of judicial

Investigation and the U.S. Embassy (104).

The Llorente's relationship with PaPas got to be of

such trust, that the latter would give to the former the monies

that would be used for per-diem (105).

The trust of U.S. Embassy representatives with

Llorente goes on until 1988. Thus we verified that he chose and

paid in cash, in the offices of the O.I.J. (106), for a

photocopier and an electronic typewriter that said diplomatic

delegation donated to Special Affairs (107). The cash payment

made was for C274.244.00 on 19 April 1988 to a bill collector

from Lachner and Saenz, entity with which the purchase was

contracted (108).

(103) Rodrigo Castro, Albert Llorente before the O.I.J.

(104) Fernando Centeno, Allan Solano, Albert Llorente before the

O.I.J.

(105) Edgard Monge Leiton, Jose MoMachado before the O.I.J.

(106) Fernando Centeno, Albert Llorente before the O.I.J.

(107) Magaly Patricia Scott, Albert Llorente, Luis F. Centeno,

income of goods documents.

(108) Manuel Emilio Valverde Zuniga before the O.I.J. and

purchase invoices.

28

That donation was not informeo neither to the Pienarv

Court nor to the Administrative Office of the Judicial Power. it

provoking Lic. Randall Granados Arias, through writ No. 1375, to

inform the Administrative Sub-Director, on 2 May 1988, that as

the Purveyor's office did not have an agreement or higher

authorization in connection with the donation, he was unable

to processes the corresponding exoneration (109).

III-FACTS RELATED TO THE CRIME

1- The Convocation to the Press Conference. On 7

November 1983, the Judicial Power. through decree,established the neutrality of Costa Rica in Central American conflicts. Tnis policy of President Luis Alberto Monge provocked serious reactions in wide private sectors and within the

government, above all, as it has been seen, in the security forces (110).

On the other hand, the Nicaraguan government was engaged

in a campaign to discredit Costa Rica, above all, in Europe,

that picturing the government as a "puppet of the United States",

trained men and directed operations against Nicaragua (111).

President Monge then took the decision to make a trip

through Europe that was called "Mission of Truth" with the

purpose of counteracting the aggresive Nicaraguan diplomacy

(112).

(109) Writ 1375 from the Judicial Purveyor.

(110) Angel EDmundo Solano, Johnny Campos, Carlos Alberto

Camacho before the O.I.J.

(111) Johnny Campos, Angel E. Solano before the O.I.J.

(112) Ibid.

29

Immediately after this trio, the deputies of the Communist

Fraction in the Legislative Assembly said that "Mission of Truth"

was a farce. as. while the President was travelling through

Europe. Pastora and his men were promenading in San Jose. with

the complacency of the national authorities (113).

The denunciation was commented in the Security Council and

the decision was taken to ask Pastora to leave the national

territory and to make some public statement that would reflect

the fact that he was in Nicaraguan territory (114).

Vice-Minister Johnny Campos was assigned the mission to

locate Pastora and to force him out of the country. For that

purpose Sr. Campos telephoned Alfonso Robelo. director of

A.R.D.E. and communicated to him the decision of the Costa Rican

government so that he would transmit it to Pastora. Robelo

answered by saying that he could not help him as he had broken

off relations with Pastora, but eventually he said he would do

it.

In the evening hours of that day, Sr. Campos asked Col.

Rodrigo Paniagua to make contact with Pastora and to tell him

about the order of the government. Paniagua told him that

Commander Pastora wanted to talk personally with him about a very

important matter, interview that don Johnny Campos refused (115).

That day Paniagua insisted several times on the interview

and finally, while at a farewell party for the Chief of Personnel

(113) Ibid.

(114) Ibid.

(115) Johnny Campos before the O.I.J.

30

of the Ministry of Public Safety. Don Johnny Campos decided to

attend the interview (116).

Around one in the morning, Paniagua took Vice-Minister

Campos to a house in Ronmorser, where he talked with Pastora,

telling him of the order to leave the national territory and

asking him to publicly make the world see that ne was in

Nicaragua (117).

Eden Pastora accepted the request of Vice-Minister Campos

and gave instructions to "Popo" Chamorro and to Carol Prado so

that Orion Pastora would convoke the national and international

press and that same morning he went over to the San Juan river

(118).

On 29 May 1983, around eleven at night, Orion Pastora

telephoned the international newspapermen, convoking them for the

30th at six in the morning at the Irazu Hotel, and indicating

that A.R.D.E. was going to supply the transportation (119).

The press conference was organized by Orion Pastora without

telling Miguel Urroz Blanco, Pastora's Chief of Security,

anything about it (120).

On 30 May 1983, Orion Pastora picked up the newspapermen at

the Irazu Hotel and took them to the San Juan river. Among them

was PEER ANKER HANSEN, who had been in the country for a month

before this (121).

(116) Ibid.

(117) Johnny Campos, Eden Pastora Gomez before the O.I.J.

(118) Ibid.

(119) Antony Avirgan.

(120) Miguel Urroz Blanco before the O.I.J.

(121) Tony Avirgan and investigation of Special Affairs.

31

2- John Hull. FeliPe Vidal, Robert Owen and the Crime: On

the morning of 30 May 1983, John Hull was called by

Robert Owen, who was in Costa Rica and went in the early morning

hours from San Carlos to San Jose. to one of the houses rented by

Philip Holtz, through Margarita Acosta (122).

On the night of that day, when the bomb explosion took

place, Hull, Owen and several pilots of the Southern Front were

together in that house. Hull, in spite of a falling out with his

ex-partner Bill Crone, called him on the phone and told him that

if anyone would ask him for the small plane to help the wounded,

not to lend it (123).

That same night, Chepon Robelo, Carol Prado and others

arrived at Hull's house in San Carlos looking for help and

requesting the small plane that he possesed, with the purpose of

taking out Pastora and the other wounded. Margarita Acosta

Baldomero, Hull's companion, put them in contact with his office

by radio but no help was given (124).

The following day, 31 May 1983, Robert Owen left the country

on SAHSA Flight 416 bound for Tegucigalpa, Honduras (125).

Approximately a month before this date, at a meeting in

which Hull, Juan Jose Saborio, Mariano Montealegre and Marcos

Aguado participated, at El Higueron, at Muelle de San Carlos,

Juan Jose

Saborio stated that it was imperative to kill Pastora, a

(122) Margarita Acosta B. before the O.I.J.

(123) Robert Owen before the U.S. Senate Iran-Contra Committee;

Alvaro Arroyo Rojas and Bill Crone before the O.I.J.

(124) Margarita Acosta B. before the O.I.J.

(125) Shipping card and passenger list of the M.S.P.

32

remark that caused the indignation and the withdrawal of Marcos

Aguado from the place (126).

After the crime was committed, in December 1984 to be

precise, at a meeting that took place at the Shamrock Hilton

Hotel in Houston, Texas, John Hull accompanied by Robert Owen,

commented to Jack Terrel that Eden Pastora was a communist, that

he had become a problem for them in the consolidation of the

Southern Front, for which reason he had to be killed, a point of

view that would be discussed later in another meeting that would

take place three days later in Miami. In this last meeting, at

which Adolfo Calero, Enrique Bermudez, Robert Owen, John Hull and

other persons were present, another person was present who was

introduced as Amac Galil. Adolfo Calero, talking about the

necessity of unifying the Southern Front and the obstacle that

Pastora represented, pointed with his hand to John Hull and told

him that he <Pastora> had to be eliminated. At this moment

Felipe Vidal turned towards John Hull and told him that they had

placed the bomb to Pastora but that it had been detonated ahead

of time, Hull assenting with his head. At this same meeting, at

lunch, Felipe Vidal commented to Terrel that Amac Galil carried

the bomb to Pastora's camp in a metallic box, that the bomb was

made up C-4 plastic explosive and that it was remote controlled

operated. He also commented that Galil went out to urinate and

that a Pastora security guard surprised him, so thinking that he

had been discovered, he detonated the bomb (127).

(126) Marcos Aguado before a public notary.

(127) Jack Tenel before the Fourth Trial Court of San Jose.

33

At that meeting. Adolfo Calero. President of the F.D.N.

presented a new plan to eliminate Pastora. which consisted in his

traveling to San jose and inviting Pastora to attend a meeting.

When Pastora would leave his camp and arrived at Chiles de Uoala,

thirty men, dressed as sandinista soldiers would kidnap him and

take him to John Hull's farm. During the night he would be

transferred to El Castillo, Nicaragua, where he would be publicly

hanged, in the presence of neighbors, who would be told that in

case that they would help the "Contra", they would suffer the

same punishment. Later the thirty men would be taken to John

Hull's farm, where they would burn the uniforms and a plane from

Ilopango, El Salvador, would pick them at that place to be

transported to "El Aguacate" in Honduras and from there they

would be transported in cars to Las Vegas, in the same country, a

place where the principal base of the F.D.N. was located. There

they would be dispersed in small groups that would be integrated

in the armed struggle (128).

Without being able to be precise as to the date, but also

after the crime, Thomas Castillo, aka Joe Fernandez, CIA chief in

Costa Rica, visited Eden Pastora and indicated to him that he

would make him responsible for anything that could happen to John

Hull, as he <Hull> feared for his life (129).

(128) Ibid.

(129) Carol Humberto Prado Hernandez before the O.I.J. in errands

carried out in the cause for hostile acts against John

Hull. Trial Court of San Carlos.

34

3-The Escape of Peer Anker hansen, Amac Galii or Ahmed

Khalil:

After the explosion, the Costa Rican government

ordered that humanitarian aid be given to the wounded, sending

launches to La Penca. These were taken to the Hospital of San

Carlos, where they were given medical attention (130).

Among the wounded were Peer Anker Hansen or Amac

Galil who presented trauma on the lower thigh, with wounds in the

dermis and lineal superficial wounds on the external lateral side

of the left arm that did not merit hospitalization (131).

That night, Dr. Maximo Pacheco Paniaoua, Chief of

Emergency of the Hospital of San Carios, personal friend of John

Hull (132) and fellow member in the Asociacion Huetar Norte (133)

and who is also pointed out as a Hull collaborator in the traffic

of arms (134), showed up at the house of Sheila Ugalde, Hull's

secretary. and asked to be put in contact with him, as he wanted

to go to take the wounded out. Sheila called Hull by phone and

Pacheco talked with him (135).

In the morning hours of the 31st Peter Thorbinson and Peer

Anker Hansen, requested that a taxi be called for them to leave

the hospital, a matter in which they were helped, putting them in

(130) Johnny Campos and Angel E. Solano before the O.I.J.

(131) <Patient> Entry Sheet and medico-legal opinion.

(132) Maximo Pacheco before the O.I.J.

(133) Rodolfo Alvarado Rosales before the Judicial Inspection.

(134) Luis Fernando Chacon Leon before the O.I.J.

(135) Rodolfo Alvarado before the Judicial Inspection and Sheila

Ugalde before the O.I.J.

35

contact with Sr. Napoleon Lopez Robleto. Chief of tne Medical

Reoistry at the hospital, who was the owner of a public service

vehicle. Dr. Pacheco does not remember whetner it was he or

anotner oerson who made tne request to Lopez Robleto, but he does

remember having accompanied Thorbinson and Peer Anker Hansen up

to the Emergency exit (136).

As Sr. Lopez's taxi was in bad condition, he called an

inlaw of his, Jorge Aguilar Mena around eight in the morning.

Thorbinson, who left in hospital oarb, and Peer Anker

boarded the taxi headed for San Jose accompanied by Don Napoleon

Lopez, who stayed in San Carlos center (137).

Jorge Aguilar took Peer Anker and Thorbinson to the Hotel La

Gran Via, located in Avenida Central, where he left them,

returning to San Carlos (138). That same day Anker Hansen or

Amac Galil, left the hotel without the knowledge, to this date.

of his whereabouts (139).

4- The Intervention of the Office of Intelligence and

Security

<D.I.S.>.

When the first news of what had taken place were received,

Sr. Alfonso Cruz Corrales, agent of the D.I.S stationed in San

Carlos, called the central offices requesting instructions and he

was ordered, by the officer on guard, to go to the hospital to

wait for the wounded to arrive so as to identify them and gather

information (140).

(136) Maximo Pacheco and NApoleon Lopez before the O.I.J.

(137) Napoleon Lopez and Jorge Aguilar before the O.I.J.

(138) --missing---

(139) Investigation of the Office of Special Affairs.

(140) Alfonso Cruz Corrales before the O.I.J.

36

Cruz complied with the order and hours later delivered that

information to Sr. Carlos Monge Quesada, Director of the D.I.S.

who went to the place, in the company of Jose Martin Castro

Jimenez, to obtain the first information on what took place

(141).

On 31 May, around eight in the morning, Sr. Alfonso Cruz

received a call from the Hospital of San Carlos in which he was

asked whether the wounded that had been medically discharged

could leave the hospital. Cruz called the central offices and

there the officer on guard told him that on superior orders he

should allow the wounded to leave the hospital and that they, in

San Jose. would interrogate them on their arrival. Cruz went to

the hospital, gathered the names of the ones that had left and

reported them to base.

Consigned on the list was the name of Peer Anker Hansen, who

was not awaited in San Jose as was said to Cruz (142).

Sres. Carlos Monge and Jose Martin Castro deny having been

the ones who gave the order in the way stated, indicating that

their function was only to gather information, the O.I.J being

the one that had the competence to act (143).

(141) Alfonso Cruz, Carlos Monge, Jose M. Castro before the

O.I.J.

(142) Alfonso Cruz before the O.I.J.

(143) Carlos Monge, Jose M. Castro before the O.I.J.

37

For his part, Dimitrius Paoas ordered the Chief of

Operation of "The Babies", Guillermo Marin Ulloa, to verify

whether Eder Pastora was in the Clinica Biblica, matter with

which he was not able to comply because the Officials of the

D.I.S. prevented it (144).

5- Preliminary proceedings of the Organization

of Judicial Investigation:

On the day of May 30th, between 10 and 11 in the

evening, the Sub-Delegation of the O.I.J received information

from the Hospital of San Carlos in that city, about the

admittance of wounded persons as the result of the bomb that had

exploded in "La Penca (145).

Sr. Fausto Rojas Cordero, Chief of the Sub-

Delegation communicated with Lic. Mainor Calvo, Director of the

Organization, who ordered him to keep out of the situation as it

was an event that took place in Nicaraguan territory, but to

verify the admission of the wounded to the hospital (146).

It was done so and the officials of the

delegation showed up at the Hospital of San Carlos where they

complied with the task of identifying the wounded and taking note

of the injuries suffered (147).

As a precautionary measure, the vigilance

personnel of the hospital was ordered not to allow the exit of

anyone until the resolution of the situation, but in view of the

issued order, pressure began to grow on the part of the

newspapermen

(144) Guillermo Marin Ulloa before the O.I.J.

(145) Fausto Rojas before the O.I.J.

(146) Fausto Rojas, Minor Calvo before the O.I.J.

(147) Ibid.

38

that covereo the event anc some reiatives of the wounded. among

them. those of tne newspaperman Vargas Gene. As a result of tnese

oetitions and the criticism being maoe. It was pecided to let go

the persons that had already been attented and those that were

going to be transferred to arother hospitai center. Among the

first persons that left was Peer Anker Hansen. who as it has

been seen went towards San jose (148).

In the dawn hours Fausto Rojas went to the southern margin

of the San Juan River, in front of "La Penca", inquirying furtner

into what happened, running on the road into Comandante "Adrian"

of the A.R.D.E., who informed him that the perpetrator of the

criminal attempt was one of the newspapermen, possibly Tony

Avirgan or Peer Anker Hansen. Fausto Rojas gathered other

versions about the event and from part of the members of A.R.D.E.

he was given several bags containing equipment belonging to the

newspapermen and evidences of the explosive artifact, among them

pellets and "chaneles" that had been inbedded in the wall, triple

A bateries without a brand name, and others, which were sent to

the office of Special Affairs and to the laboratory in San Jose

(149).

6- The Investigation of the Office of Specail Affairs: As

Lic. Mainor Calvo Piedra, at that time Director of the

Organization of Judicial Investigation, affirms, in view of the

fact that the wounded had been transferred to San Jose, and that

(148) Ibid.

(149) Ibid.

39

political structure of the Nicaraguan "Contra" was at the

capital, the decision was taken of opening another investigating

front, ordering the Office of Special Affairs to take charge of

the matter(150).

Taking into consideration that the investigation of this

office has been publicly questioned, that Albert Liorent & Allan

Solano were the directors of the case and that these persons, as

it was seen, were under the sphere of influence of Dimitrius

Papas, who showed interest in the matter when he ordered "The

Babies" to verify whether Eden Pastora was confined at the

Clinica Biblica, it was decided to review the investigation

obtaining the following result:

a) In spite of an intelligence report received in the Office

of Special Affairs that indicated that the event could have been

carried out by the Ejercito Popular Sandinista or by the C.I.A.,

it was appealed, through the Director of the Organization, Lic.

Mainor Calvo, to contact Dimitrius Papas so that he would procure

through the embassy of the country to which the C.I.A. precisely

belongs, the sending of a technician in explosives (151).

b) The evidence obtained on the scene of the crime was under

the free handling of the U.S. expert that was sent (152).

ci Dimitrius Papas was allowed access to the information on

the case (153).

(150) Minor Calvo before the O.I.J.

(151) Minor Calvo, Allan Solano, ALbert Llorente, Luis Fernando

Centeno before the O.I.J.

(152) Gustavo Castillo, Allan Solano. Aloert Llorente. Luis

Fernando Centeno before the O.I.J.

(153) Edgar Monge Leiton. Jose Mo. Machaco

40

d) When Allan Solano had established that the perpetrator

of the crime was Peer Anker Hansen, Dimitrius Papas went before

him and told him that according with what the U.S. Embassy

functionaries had investigated, the person identified as Anker

Hansen was HECTOR ARMODIO PEREZ, of Uruguayan nationality,

connected with a tupamaro group (154)

At that very moment Allan Solano prevented that the efforts

of the investigation be directed in the manner suggested by

Papas, indicating to him that was impossible, as the height of

the man who placed the bomb was from 1.85 mt. to 1.90 mt. while

that of Armodio Perez was of approximately 1.74 mt.

Dimitrius Papas not only gave that information to Allan

Solano. but also to Lic. Minor Calvo, Director of O.I.J., reason

for which the latter called Solano to his office and told him of

the information, it being necessary, to convince Don Minor as to

the incorrectness of the report, to bring to his office an U.H.F.

equipment so that he could appreciate the stature and other

physical characteristics of Anker Hansen (155).

e) The intervention of Dimitrius Papa is also indicated in

two triPs that Allan Solano took. In the first one he was

informed that Peer Anker Hansen was in Miami, the U.S. Embassy

supplying him with the tickets and the per diem, resulting that

the person mentioned resided in Nicaragua, he was married to a

Nicaraguan woman and was not the perpetrator of the criminal

assault. In the second trio Solano was told that in

Honduras

(154) Allan Solano, Luis Fdo. Centeno.

(155) ----mising---

41

there were several persons suspected of having participated in

"La Penca" and Papas told some of the members of "The Babies"

that Peer Anker Hansen was in that country and that he wanted

that Allan Solano would go there to verify it. Indeed, Solano

went to Honduras with the tickets and expenses paid by the U.S.

Embassy, the suspicious ones turning out to be Peter Tourbinson,

his daughter and the Danish newspaper team (156).

In both cases the trips were unnecessary and the

verification of the identities was easily clear, to the F.B.I.,

as well as to the Honduran police, with the basis of data which

the O.I.J. as well as Dimitrius Papas had.

In the trip to Honduras. nevertheless. Allan Solano,

deviating from the purpose for which he was sent, corroborated

the stay of Peer Anker Hansen in that country in the month of

March of 1984 (157).

f) In connection with the private investigations of

journalists Tony Avirghan and Marta Honey, published in a book on

the crime at "La Penca", in spite of the fact that these oersons

delivered typed copies of it to the Office of Special Affairs,

none of the events related there were investigated, because

accordino to what the officials allege, the authors refused to

reveal the identity of the witnesses, adducing that their lives

were in danger. That is why they were told to make them go to

(156) Allan Solano, Albert Llorente,Luis Centeno, Guillermo Marin

before the O.I.J.

(157) Allan Solano.

42

the office later so as to interview them.

It should be stated here that in the referred to private

investigation, mention is made of John Hull's activity, which was

of full knowledge as much on the part of the D.I.S. as of the

Regional Delegation of the O.I.J. in San Carlos, in such a way

that the investigation of Special Affairs was able to orient

itself through these aspects and not to depend on what the

authors of the book saw fit to offer (158).

g) On 23 May 1986 the journalists Honey and Avirgon brought

Jack Terrel before the Sub-Chief of the Public Prosecutors, a

witness that as it was seen. gave concrete information on the

identity of the perpetrator of the event and the possible

participation of other persons. The content of this deposition,

as Allan Solano states, was not investigated because that witness

had appeared in a trial among Avirgam. Honey and John Hull. He

also adds that as the witness statements tied the conclusions of

the investigation with the conclusions of the book, as these

journalists had not wanted to reveal the sources that let them to

those conclusions, and, because immediately after an accusation

brought up by them, efforts were made so that Special Affairs

would investigate other police forces, it looked as though they

wanted to control things. For these reasons. in addition to the

fact that Jack Terrel told them that he was a policeman and that

(158) Luis Centeno, Allan Solano, Albert Liorente before the

O.I.J.

43

he had military training, something that he did not believe, he

consulted the U.S. Embassy, being told some time later that this

individual had a police record, so he took the determination to

act with prudence and leave the matter dormant until he would

have new facts to formulate an opinion (159).

As Edgar Monge Leiton and Jose Mo. Machado, officials that

belonged to that office, relate it, what happened was that a

person known as Alberto, who was the one that had substituted

Papas, who by that time was no longer in the country, told Albert

Llorente that what that witness was saying was false and that man

was known as a delinquent by the C.I.A. (160).

None of the reasons given was sufficient to take the

decision of not investigating the contents of that clarification,

above all because by Mandate at 9 hours and 40 minutes of 30 May

1986, the Judge of the Fourth Trial Court had ordered that an "in

depth investigation" of the events be made (161)

AS TO THE CONTENTS OF JACK TERREL'S DECLARATION

a- According to what Robert Owen and Adolfo Calero stated

before different U.S. authorities, the meetings that Terrel

accounts, were really carried out (162).

b- According to the report No. 84-2568-QUI from the Forensic

science Department of the O.I.J., in what was left of the

small

159) Allan Solano before the O.I.J.

160) ----missing---

161) File 2297-1-88 c Ignored in detriment of Linda Frazier.

162) Robert Owen before the Iran-Contra Commission: Adolfo

Calero before the District Court of South Florida, Civil

Action No. 86-1146-CIV-King; Tony Avirgan vs John Hull and

Others.

44

suitcase which carried the bomb, it was found haxahidro 1, 3, 5,

trinitro 1, 3, 5, trianzina, a compound xnown as "ciclonite"

(R.D.X.), components of the military explosive C-4. No T.N.T.,

D.N.T., nor nitrates or nitritos were found. Neither

nitroglycerine nor dynamite of the hydrosoluble gelatine type

(M.N.AN.) were found, which reaffirms the accounts that Terrel

gives (163).

c- Through photographic inspection before the Fourth

Trial Judge, Jack Terrel identified the person known as Peer

Ankar Hansen as the person that in the last meeting mentioned by

him, was introduced to him under the name of Amac Galil (164).

ch- In accordance with what has been investigated, it has

been established that there is a person that came into the

country in 1983 under the name of AHMED FAIG KHALIL, whose

pronunciation corresponds to a hispanicized version of the name

referred to by the witness (165).

Having consulted INTERPOL as to the name, it is informed

that in their records appears reported the name KHALIL TAWFICK

AHMED, who uses a great number of aliases and who is wanted by

the German police for the highjacking of a plane and the murder

of three persons. We are awaiting an answer from that police

unit with the identification data on that individual (166).

d- Even though Robert Owen and Adolfo Calero deny that

inthe meeting it was talked about what Terrels recounts,

the

(163) Judgement made in proceedings instituted by Special

Affairs.

(164) Case 2297-1-88 IV Trial Court Charge - Unknown.

(165) Shipping card.

(166) CableC.I.C.A.D. and from INTERPOL.

45

evidence indicates that his depositions should be considered with

caution on account of the possible interest that it could have in

the matter. In addition Terrel mentions with clarity that part

of the declarations that Felipe Vidal made to him in connection

with the crime at "La Penca", were given in an exclusive

conversation between the two of them during lunch (167).

e- The content of Terrel's statement, due to its

seriousness, cannot continue to be in the proceedings as an

additional data, as it has been up to this day, but it should be

investigated until its veracity or falsity is determined,

independently of the qualitative qualifications that have been

given to the witness.

ON WITNESS JACK TERREL

Jack Terrel, known as "el Flaco" < The Skinny one> or

"Coronel Flaco" <Colonel Skinny>, belonged to a group of American

mercenaries called "Civilian Military Assistance" (C.M.A.)

commanded by Thomas Posey and linked to "Legion Cubana" group in

Miami headed by Jose Coutin (168). Tom Posey was invited in

January 1984 by Enrique Bermudez, Military Director of the F.D.N.

to give his help to the anti-communist struggle (169). Posey as

well as Terrel maintained relations with John Hull and Robert

Owen and they had developed a plan called "Pegasus", designed to

attack military objectives in Nicaragua. that plan was known to

(167) Jack Terrel before the IV Trial Court.

(168) Rene Corvo before the F.B.I., RePort of the F.B.l. (Kerry

commission).

(169) Letter from Enrioue Bermudez (in Kerry Report).

46

Owen, Calero and the leaders of the F.D.N. (170).

In the month of September of 1984, immediately after

an investigation carried out by the F.B.I. in connection with a

bomb that exploded in the Continental Bank in Miami on 27 May

1983, the special agents of that police force became

knowledgeable of the activities of the C.M.A., the Cuban groups,

John Hull and Rodrigo Paniagua (171). An investigation was then

started in relation with the traffic of arms between the United

States and the Southern Front, for infringement of the neutrality

laws of that country. Jack Terrel, Tom Posey and others were

subjected to surveillance some time later. As a consequence of

this investigation a trip was made to Costa Rica by Officers

George Kiszinsky and Kevin Curriers, accompanied by a prosecutor

from Florida, who apparently were hindered in their

investigations by Joe Fernandez, Chief of the C.I.A. in our

country. In his report Prosecutor Feldman concludes that there

is evidence that between the end of 1984 and the beginning of

1985 the C.M.A. and Rene Corvo actively recruited mercenaries in

the United States that were later sent to Honduras and Costa Rica

to train or fight together with the anti-sandinist groups.

Adding that the F.B.I. has requested that an investigation be

started by the Grand Jury in connection with these activities,

among other reasons because the Bureau considers that this would

dissipate complaints in the

sense that the Justice Department has not pursued this

matter

(170) Document on the "Pegasus plan" in Kerry report: Robert

Owen and Adolfo Calero. Oo.cit.162.

(171) F.B.I. Report.

47

aggresively. Nevertheless, Feldman considers oremature to take

this matter to the Grand Jury and considers that the

investigation should continue (172).

While the F.B.I. was carrying out these investigations, from

what it can be deduced from the meetings that Terrel, Posey,

Owen, Calero and Hull had, they kept a pretty active

relationship. Nevertheless, after Terrel testified first before

the national authorities and later before the U.S. Senate

Commission, Oliver North discribed him in a memorandum, as a

misinformer harmful to the interests of the United States and

suggests that he be formally accused (173). Terrel, after his

statements, was accused in Florida and faces charges of violation

of the U.S. neutrality laws for his help to the "Contras" (174).

Robert Owen and Adolfo Calero in their depositions admit

their relationship with Terrel, but tney refer to him as an

unstable and imaginative oerson (175).

7- The Affiliation of the Perpetrator of the Crime: a- It

has been mentioned during the investioation that the

perpetrator of the crime was someone sent by Omar Khadafi. The

sources of this information are John Hull, who commented it with

Alvaro Arroyo some two months after the crime, and Victor Wolf,

Hull s partner in the help to the Southern Front, who affirms to

have received this information from a Central American official,

(172) Report in documents of the U.S. Senate Sub-committe on

Terrorism, etc. (Kerry Report).

(173) Document in Kerry report.

(174) ---missing---

(175) #o.cit.162.

48

indicating as the motive the fact that Pastora took some money.

when he was Vice Minister in Nicaragua, that the former had sent

to the government of that country (176).

b- As to the possibility that the perpetrator of the crime

would have been one sent by the Ejercito Popular Sandinista, up

to this date there is no evidence leading in that sense. While

we were in San Carlos we were invited by a representative

Costarricence to a meeting in which of the Asociacion Democratica

we were told that they had proof that the criminal attack was

induced by the sandinista regime. When requested for the

sources, we were shown a series of newspaper clippings and some

publications of a group of friends of General Singlaub. As for us

we interviewed Sr. David Moises Orozco Garcia, a spy who worked

as a diplomat in the Nicaraguan Embassy in Costa Rica between

1984 and 1988. and who deserted in this last year. placing

himself under the protection of the D.l.S. and the C.I.A. As per

Crozco Garcia's information, the Nicaraguan government had

several agents infiltrated in the A.R.D.E. since its foundation.

Among them were Marielos Serrano Guillen, who was personal

assistant to Eden Pastora, Roberto Rascosky Ramirez, Chief of La

Penca base, Oscar El Najo and Fernanoo Morales, Chief of Security

of the area known as "'Los Zorros". The witness recounts that.

notwithstanding, that the crime at La Penca served the Nicaraguan

interests since the use of Costa Rican soil on the part of the

Contra became evidentd the government of Nicaragua did not rotate

the personnel accredited before the Costa Rican government and

(176) Alvaro Arrovo and Victor Wolf before the O.l.J.

49

the structure of the agents infiltrated in was maintained after

the event. The government of Nicaragua. as a normal measure.

could have proceeded to take out the country, legally or

illegally the agents for their protection, something that, as it

was said, did not happen (177).

c- Another version that was told to us by Sr. Ecgardo

Alpizar Montero, in the investigation was recounted to him by

Oscar El Najo, who, as it was seen. was a sandinista spy

infiltrated in A.R.D.E.. According to Alpizar. "El Najo"

suggested to him that after exploding the bomb. the man that

placed it had been arrested at the site of the event, guarded by

two Nicaraguans, but Pastora ordered that he be released (178).

ch- From the evidence shown up to here, it results Probable

that Peer Anker Hansen or Amac Galil or Ahmed Khalil would have

been contacted and contracted by the narcotrafficker group that

backed John Hull, Felipe Vidal and his Cuban movement. Equally,

the evidence indicates as probable that the initiative to kill

Pastora and its implementation were made by John Hull and Felipe

Vidal. Given the prohibitions in the laws of the United States

for its agents to participate or Promote the murdering of

persons, it does not seem viable that the crime had been planned

and implemented by the C.I.A., as Eden Pastora affirms, and there

is no evidence in that respect.

(177) David Orozco before the O.I.J.

(178) Edgardo Alpizar before the O.I.J.

50

It does seem probable that Robert Owen. who was salaried by

Adolfo Calero and was Oliver North's link or courier, would have

known of the plan that was forged.

It is equally probable that Dimitrius Papas's action in

trying to disorient the investigation had. as its purpose, to

protect Oliver North's net and the operation that the United

States was carrying out in the Southern Front. in the Northern

Front and in Costa Rica for reasons of security of that country;

although, of course, with his action he also covered the event.

8-The investigations of the U.S. Senate Commissions: In the

documents examined, both in the Sub-Committed on

Terrorism, Narcotics and International Relations as well as the

Iran-Contra Commission, all the parts referring to the crime of

"La Penca" and a great deal of what refers to the activities of

John Hull, Robert Owen, Oliver North, Joe Fernandez and others.

in the testimonial depositions, are censured and appear covered

with black ink.

IV- OTHER EVENTS KNOWN IN THE INVESTIGATION: A- The Dr.

Hugo Spadafora's Homicide:

On 13 September 1985, Dr. Hugo Spadafora left his house in

Costa Rica, at eight in the morning, bound for Panama (179).

Approximately at 13:10 hours (180), he crossed the frontier with

(179) Arihane Bejarano Acuna before the O.I.J.

(180) Mario Barrantes Escorcia before the O.I.J.

51

Panama and took a microbus that stopped at the first military

cost of the Panama Defence Forces. where a corporal asked him for

his ID and talked through a walkie-talkie (181).

Later he again boarded the microbus and definitely left it

in Concepcion, Chiriqui, accompanied by Francisco Gonzalez, who

is known as a member of the G-2 of the Panamanian Defence Forces

(182). In that place he got off without paying his fare,

together with Gonzalez, the reason for which the driver got down

and followed him to collect it. When he was able to reach him,

Dr. Spadafora tells him his name and tries to that this person

see his I.D., showing it to him, but the collector did not get to

see it (183).

At 18 hours. Alvaro Sequeira Ramirez, observed a white

Toyota jeep, on the Costa Rican side, and near the frontier with

Panama, close to the "la Vaca" river. Believing that it was a

question of smugglers, he got near avoiding being seen and

observed three military men that were laughing and introducing a

bag, like a sleeping bag, with difficulty into the jeep, which

took off bound for the Consejo Nacional de Produccion in Saragoza

(184), a road that communicates with the place where the body was

found.

(181) Edwin Noel Nunez, Orlando Ortega, Ricanti Esquivel before

Office of Supplies of the Republic of Panama.

(182) Report from the Office of Special Affairs.

(183) Edwin Noel Nunez before the Paymaster's Office of the

Republic of Panama.

(184) Alvaro Sequeira Ramirez before the O.I.J.

52

At 24 hours, Jose Angel Chinchilla, heard. while at home.the

noise of two vehicles on the Costa Rican side. he looked out the

window and observed two green colored vehicles, Susuki type, such

as the ones used by the Panamanian guard, that were coming from

the Roble, Costa Rica towards Panama at a high rate of speed

(185).

On 14 September at 13:30 hours the body of Dr. Soadafora

was found under the bridge of the Roblito river in the locality

of Roble de Laurel, Costa Rica (186). The body showed multiple

lineal excoriations around the neck in different directions,

forming a band of 7 cm in width, some of which went down to the

chest, back and left shoulder. It was decaPitated and it had

ecchymosis on the left side of the chest, fracture of three ribs,

lineal excoriations in both arms and excoriations forming the

initials "F-8" in the back (187).

The body was found covered by a green canvas from the waist

up, tied from back to front, with the printed legend "Domestic

U.S. Mail, J-469" with number 1 inside a circle (188).

Before travelling to Panama, Dr. Hugo Spadafora was

gathering information as to the involvement of General Manuel

Antonio Noriega and other elements in the Southern Front (189).

Among the persons with whom Dr. Hugo Spadafora talked about this

(185) Jose Angel Chinchilla Rios before the O.I.J.

(186) Report of the O.I.J. Record of Visual Inspection.

(187) Medico-Legal Report of the O.I.J.

(188) Report from the Delegation of the O.I.J. from Corredores.

(189) Jose Rodrigo Ortiz Leiva before the O.I.J. and the Trial

Court of Santa Cruz Case 282-88, Superior Court of Liberia

for drug trafficking, case Edwin Viales and others.

53

subject were Floyd Carlton Caceres and Cesar Rodriouez. to whom

he stated that he was going "to make a bomb explode" in Panama

with that information, out that it would involve them (190).

The day before his trip to Panama, 12 September 1983. he

commented to his wife, in Costa Rica. that something important

was going to take place in Panama. for which reason he had

deiced to travel there (191).

That night he visited Julio Valverde Arguello in Santo

Domingc de Heredia to talk to him about the reediting of a book

of his that he had in mind (192).

On 26 September 1985, in New York. General Manuel A. Noriega

commented with Sr. Jose Blandon, at that time a man of his trust

in the Panamanian government, that Major Cordoba, who was

stationed a the Military Unit of Chiriqui, had been the one who

assassinated Dr. Spadafora and he was very anxious to know about

the declarations that Amantillo Cordoba, officer of the D.E.N.I.,

had prepared so that a German residing in Costa Rica, would give

it to the press in Panama. This German was Manfred Hoffman

Winttemberg, who appeared in the Panamanian press, saying that

Dr. Spadafora's homicide had been carried out by the F.L.M.N. of

El Salvador. As it is indicated, Hoffman was working for Joe

Fernandez, agent of the C.I.A. in Costa Rica, known as Thomas

Castillo (193).

(190) Floyd Carlton, Jose Blandon and Francis McNeil

before the Sub-Committee. Op.cit.l.

(191) Ariahana Bejarano Acuna before the O.I.J.

(192) Julio Valverde Arguello before the O.I.J.

(193) Jose Blandon

54

B- THE KELSO CASE:

In July of 1986, an informant of the U.S. Treasury

Department named Richard James William. who called himself Joseph

Robert Kelso, was inquiring in Costa Rica about the counterfeit

dollar market. the laundering of dollars and the drug trafficking

in the country (194).

William made contact in our country with Warren Wyant Treece

Osdway, who apparently, was also an informant for the U.S.

authorities and was known by various authorities of the Ministry

of Public Security and the Presidency of the Republic (195).

Warren Treece had requested information in connection with

the possible purchase of the Hotel Holiday Inn in San Jose by

Pablo Escobar; on the possible participation of Daniel Oduber,

Luis Barrantes, Alberto Gonzalez, Lee Abel Sinclair, a German

with the surname of Wagerman and other persons in the cocaine

traffic (195).

Kelso or William was investigating in Costa Rica about these

matters with Brian Cadwell, both being directed by an agent of

the U.S. Treasury Department named Krochemberg (196).

Within the information that these persons had, there was

one, according to which an individual with the surname Hope, was

the one that had made contact with Augusto Rodriguez, son, to use

the Hotel Holiday Inn to launder dollars (197) with the purpose

(194) Warren Treeoe and Alexander Suniga Mc Nulty before the

D.I.S., Gilberto Huete before the O.I.J. Case File on the

death of Augusto Rodriguez, Homicide SEction.

(195) Wasrren Treece, Alexander Zuniga before the D.I.S.

(196) Gilberto Hutt, Manuel Carrilllo, before the O.I.J.

Alexander Zuniga before the D.I.S.

(197) John Hull'.s letter in the Senate document Oo.cit.l

55

of investigating the accounting system of the hotel. Brian asked

Lic. Manuel A. Carrillo Pacheco in 1985, to draw a purchase

option that would include a clause in that since, to be signed by

him and by Augusto Rodriguez, son, who was going to sign in the

name of Landmark S.A., entity owner of the hotel: which was done

(198), the agreement not being finalized due to Sr. Rodriguez

death during those days (199).

Information on the existence of a cocaine laboratory in the

Nicoya peninsula and another one in Talamanca were transmitted by

Treece to an official of the D.E.A. with the surname of Gonzalez,

in Costa Rica, but they were not investigated on account of the

leak of information from this agent. As Treece and Kelso

affirmed, that person was protecting those laboratories (200).

On 8 August 1986, Richard James, William and Bryan Cadwell

were arrested by drug officials of the Organization of Judicial

Investigation and by members of the D.E.A., they were taken to a

building of the I.C.E., where, as they affirm, they were beaten

and threatened.

Later they were transferred to the Offices of Narcotics of

the O.I.J., where Sr. Nieves of the D.E.A. threatened them with

death (201).

(198) Manuel Carrillo Pacheco before the O.I.J.

(199) Ibid. See proceeding on the death of Augusto Rodriguez

in the Homicide Section of the O.I.J.

(200) Warren Treece before the D.I.S. Letter from John Hull to

Robert Owen, in documents in the Sub-Commission on

Terrorism, etc. of the U.S. Senate.

(201) Attachment to the memorandum No. 601-86 of D.I.S., inter-

rogation of Warren Treece, Alexander Zuniga Mc.Nulty before

the D.I.S., Gilberto Huete before the O.I.J.

56

After being set free. Richard James williams appealed to

Alexander Zunica Mc.Nultv. First Commander of the Presidency of

the Republic, and told him what had happened, telling him that he

had called to the United States and they had indicated to him to

place himself in safety as soon as possible (202).

Williams aka Kelso asked Zuniga to transport him to John

Hull's farm to protect himself (203), which the latter indeed

did, transporting him to San Carlos in a vehicle of the

Presidency (204).

Zuniga Mc.Nulty arrived at night at San Carlos and asked

Edgardo AlPizar Montero to give lodging to Kelso because it was

very late and to take him the next day to where John Hull was.

where he received him (205).

Hull, after talking with Kelso and after this told him all

that had taken place, lodged him in a boarding house that is

located in the farm and called by phone to find out who he was

(206).

In the afternoon hours of that day, 9 August 1986, Sr.

Alvaro Ramos Rechnitz, Vice Minister of the Interior, was told

that Rural Guards of Ciudad Quesada and a member of the U.S.

Embassy were looking for him. During the night hours Sr. Ramos

called said embassy and Sr. Robert Nieves indicated to him that

(202) Alexander Zuniga Mc Nulty before the D.I.S., and a letter

his sent to his wife.

(203) Ibid.

(204) Alexander Zuniga before the D.I.S., Edgardo Alpizar before

the O.I.J.; letter from john Hull already mentioned. Robert

Owen before the Senate.

(205) Edgardo Alpizar before the O.I.J.

(206) Margarita Acosta B. before the O.I.J.

57

John Hull' s farm there was a person who had falsified his

identity. he was a foreigner, and that he was highly suspicious

(207).

Lic. Ramos then called the Departmental Delegate of the

Rural Guard of Ciudao Quesada and the Suo-Director of that body,

Antonio Espinoza, asking them to investigate the matter (208).

The Departmental Delegate of the G.A.R.. Luis Humberto

Alfaro, accompanied by various members of his office and by

Alfonso Cruz. Roberto EsPinoza and Minor Ramirez of the Office of

Intelligence and Security, went to Hull's farm, where he told

them that the individual was extremely dangerous. giving them

authorization to enter, nevertheless, as it was during the night.

they decided to circle the place and wait for daybreak (209).

Around four in the morning Antonio Espinoza Calderon.

Director of G.A.R. and Marco Daniel Calderon Loaiza, Director of

the Central Region of the G.A.R., arrived at the place and

ordered that the house be entered and the individual captured

(210).

Before entering the house, Calderon fired a burst from an

AK-47 with the idea of scaring him (211), the door was kicked

open, taking out William, aka Kelso in his underwear and

transporting him to Hull's house (212).

When William was being transported to Hull's house, Roberto

(207) Alvaro Ramos before the O.I.J.

(208) Ibid.

(209) Roberto Espinoza, Alfonso Cruz, Minor Ramirez, Luis Alfaro,

Margarita Acosta before the O.I.J.

(210) Ibid.

(211) Marco Daniel Calderon, Roberto Espinoza and the before

mentiond proof. Op.cit.208.

(212) Margarita Acosta Baldomero before the O.I.J.

58

Esoincza Duran kicked him and hit him several times, hitting him

on the head with the butt of the rifle. at least on one occasion

(213).

From John Hull's farm, Richard James Williams was taken to

the central offices of the Direccion de Inteligencia y Segurioad

where he was interrogated, and. as he had entered the country

under another name, his deportation was ordered on 10 August.

That day Alfonso Cruz was ordered to accompany John Hull in

his vehicle to the D.I.S. offices in San Jose, as he had asked to

speak about the detention with the Directors. Cruz accompanied

Hull, who had an interview with Rodrigo Chavez and later, on the

return to San Carlos. they passed by the airport, place where,

due to Cruz's intervention, the officers of Migration allowed him

to talk with Williams.

Later, on the road, Hull commented to Cruz that Williams was

a U.S. custom agent (214).

FATHER DAVIS'S CASE:

On 17 January 1986, the Catholic priest of U.S.

nationality, David William John arrived at this country

commissioned by the U.S. Federal Court to serve notice in a civil

suit brought by Tony Avirgan against Felipe Vidal for the crime

of La Penca.

Father Davis found an individual by the name of Augusto

Navarro, through whom he tried to find Vidal, giving him his

telephone number. Narcotic officials called that number leaving

(213) Margarita Acosta B., Minor Ramirez Gonzalez, Alfonso Cruz

Corrales before the O.I.J. John Hull's letter and the

statement of Robert Owen in the Sub-Committe on Terrorism,

etc. of the U.S. Senate.

(214) Alfonso Cruz before the O.I.J.

59

him the number 37-28-28 so that he would call. which he did.

being told to present himself at the office. near the Patines

salon. Father Davis showed up at that place accompanied by

attorney Otto Castro, who was set aside and was not allowed to

talk to him.

The officer who ordered his arrest told him that he was

Fernando Leiva, but in reality he was Gilbert Jimenez. aka "Flaco

Jimenez", who interrogated him on the documentation or proofs

that the Avirgans had in connection with "La Penca" case.

Jimenez opened the small case that he was carrying and reviewed

and read all the documents that he was bringing.

At midday he was transported to the D.I.S. where he was

interrogated about the Avirgans, La Penca and on drugs.

Around five in the afternoon he was transported to Migration

and later he was taken to the airport to be deported. As there

was no flight to the United States they tried to place him on a

flight to Puerto Rico, something that could not be achieved, as

the ticket did not cover it, reason for which he was allowed to

board a flight to Managua.

As they were not able to deport him, they confiscated his

passport and told him to present himself the following day, it

being through President Arias's intervention that the passport

and the ticket were returned (215).

It must be remembered here that, Gilbert Jimenez, as it is

indicated above, was a personal friend of Moises Nunez and he

(215) Davis Williams John before the O.I.J.

60

was the one who introduced him to Luis Barrantes. In the same way

Moises Nunez belonged to the Cubans affiliated to John Hull and

was also linked to the Medellin Cartel.

Asked about it Gilberth Jimenez stated that Luis Barrantes

ordered him to investigate Father Davis because there was an

information to the eftec that this person would meet with

narcotraffickers in Soda Palace. He went to investigate and there

no one knew him. so, without giving an explanation to that

resPect, he connected him with a telephone belonging to the

Avirgans. They called him and he was asked to come by the

office. The following day Father Davis arrived at Narcotics

where ne was interrogated about the meetings with persons at the

Soda Palace, something he denied. They searched through the

documents that he was carrying in the suitcase and found some

travel checks signed by Thomas Borge. As he did not have

anything to do with drugs, they took him to the D.I.S., telling

the officials of that body that he was suspicious of being an

"Arab" or a "Jesuit" (216).

D- MARIO CASTRO SANCHEZ'S CASE:

Mario Castro Sanchez was commissioned by the Federal Court

of the United States to notify Moises Nunez Ruiz as to

proceedings, so he appeared at the offices of Frigorificos de

Puntarenas, where he was asked to come into his office. Once

there, Moises Nunez closed the door and after reading the

documents he took out a weapon, a pistol, and an I.D. from Public

(216) Gilbert Jimenez before the O.I.J.

61

Safety - Narcotics with its corresponding badge and he started to

insult him. Later three individuals arrived and stood by him.

Nunez proceeding to make several telephone calls. After an hour,

some officials who said they were from D.I.S. and others from

O.I.J., arrived. taking him to the central offices of the

Organization of Judicial Investigation, telling him that although

there was no crime <committed> to hold him, they were going to

consult their superiors (217).

When Gilberth Jimenez was interrogated about the matter, ne

stated that on one occasion he became aware that a brother of

Lic. Otto Castro had gone to summon Moises Nunez for something

that came from a county in Miami. and that he detected that it

was from Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan. He said that Moises Nunez

told him that was not the way to summon him and that it would

constitute a legal infraction. As there was an argument between

Moises and Castro, a Narcotics Unit was sent but they went to

Moises's house, resulting that the problem was not there.

He adds that it seems that patrols arrived at the place and

detained Castro, seizing a weapon, but that he is not certain

because he was not there (218).

V- RECOMMENDATIONS:

I consider that from the evidence accumulated to this date,

sufficient elements of judgement are derived to start, in

conformity with Article 5 of the Code of Penal Procedures, the

public penal action against:

(217) Mario Castro before the D.I.J.

(218) Gilberth Jimenez Retana before the O.I.J.

62

a- JOHN HULL and FELIPE VIDAL for the crime of qualified

homicide as mediate perPetrators. Article 112 clauses 7 and 45 of

the Penal Code. in detriment of LINDA FRAZIER and others. in

addition the existing Proceeding requirement should be lengthened

against John Hull in the Trial Court of Ciudad Quesada because of

the new events that are narrated in this pleading and which

comprise the crime of Hostile Acts. as per description of Article

280 of the Penal Code.

b- FELIPE VIDAL, ROBERT OWEN, PHILLIPS HOLTZ, RENE CORVO,

MOISES NUNEZ RUIZ, FRANK CASTRO, THOMAS POSEY, GEORGE MORALES,

RICHARD HEALY, BRUCE JONES, JESUS GARCIA, FERNANDO CHAMORRO,

MARCOS AGUADO, CAROL PRADO, EDEN PASTORA. for the crime of

hostile acts, Article 280 of the Penal Code.

c- MAJOR CORDOBA, capacities unknown, officer of the defence

forces of Panama for the crime of qualified homicide. in

detriment of Dr. Hugo Spadafora (Article 212 of the Penal Code).

d- GILBERT JIMENEZ RETANA, for the crime of illegal

privation of freedom (Article 192, Clause 4th of the Penal Code).

e- ANTONIO ESPINOZA CALDERON, for the crime of illegal

privation of freedom (Article 192 Clause 4th of the Penal Code).

f- FERNANDO DURAN AYANEGUI, for the crime of hostile acts

(Article 280 of the Penal Code).

g- LEONEL POVEDA SILES, CARLOS CORONEL, GUILLERMO MENDIETA,

LUIS RIVAS, ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ SAENZ, HAROLD MARTINEZ SAENZ AND

JUAN ZABALA, for the crimes of hostile acts (Article 280 of the

Penal Code).

h- In connection with the behavior of the members of the

63

group called "THE BABIES", I consider that they incurred in the

crime of ILLICIT ENRICHMENT in conformity with Article 344 of the

Penal Code in its 3rd. Clause, however the legal acttion has

prescribed (Article 82 of the Penal Code). Given the seriousness

of the actions by the members of this group against the interest

of the nation and the sources of financing of the D.I.S.. I

consider that it is unavoidable to designate one of the Deputy

Prosecutors from the main office to delve deeply into the

investigations to determine whether in the last two years the

delivery of the "gifts" to personnel of D.I.S., has continued ,

taking the corresponding legal actions if such a thing has

occurred.

i- Colonel RODRIGO PANIAGUA SALAZAR, according to what the

evidence reveals, incurred in the crime of hostile acts, but as

he has passed away, its dismissal should be requested.

j- Sres. ALLAN SOLANO and ALBERT LLORENTE could have

uncured, with their behavior in the crime of unfulfillment of

their duties that Article 230 of the Penal Code provides, but at

this date the public penal action has prescribed. However, on

account of its seriousness, the Full Court should be informed so

that the disciplinary regime be applied as it concerns.

In the investigation it has not been possible to establish

the identity of O.I.J. officials that participated in the arrest

of Richard James Williams and Mario Castro Sanchez. As such

actions could constitute a crime against aggravated privation of

freedom, I consider that the Office of Internal Affairs of this

Organization should be commissioned so that in conjunction with a

64

identification and the fixing of responsibilities, so that penal

action can be taken if it is warranted.

To finalize. this report does not out an end to the

investigation of the crime of LA PENCA, which should continue in

the clarification of the events. A great deal of useful

information is in the United States, and it will depend on the

good faith of the authorities of that country to give access to

what has been censored in the Senate reports. In the same way,

without the help of those authorities it will be impossible to

interviews witnesses in that countrY, for which reason I consider

it important that the respective steps be carried out by the

Government Attorney and the Plenary Court.

Sincerely,

Illegible signature

Lic. Jorge Chavarria Guzman TRIAL

PROSECUTOR OF SAN JOSE

PUBLIC PROSECUTOS

(There is an illegible imprint

of a rubber stamp.)

cc:arch.

jf.

Translated from the original Spanish

into English by John B. Anderson, Cer-

tified Court Interpreter.

Coral Gables, 18 January 1990.

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF DADE

SUSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

18Th JANUARY,1990. (

NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF FLA.

My commission expires