Nuclear energy policy issues facing Congress include questions about radioactive wastemanagement, research and development priorities, power plant safety and regulation,nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear weapons facilities cleanup and modernization,and technology for producing nuclear fuel.
Federal funding for nuclear energy research and development has been substantiallyreduced by the Clinton Administration, which places a higher priority on energyefficiency and alternative energy technologies. The FY1997 budget for the Departmentof Energy (DOE) continues design support for improved versions of today's commercialreactors, which might find a market within the next decade. But work on advanceddesign concepts was halted during the past 2 years with congressional approval.
Disposal of highly radioactive waste has been one of the most controversial aspects ofnuclear power. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-425), as amended in1987, requires DOE to begin detailed physical characterization of Yucca Mountain inNevada as a permanent underground repository for high-level waste.
Congress cut the nuclear waste program's funding sharply in FY1996, forcing DOE tocurtail its Yucca Mountain site characterization plans. The Senate passed legislation(S. 1936) on July 31, 1996, to establish a central interim storage facility fornuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. Facing a veto threat from the Administration,however, the House did not take up its version of the measure.
Whether progress on nuclear waste disposal and other congressional action will revivethe U.S. nuclear power industry's growth will depend on economic considerations. Natural gas- and coal-fired powerplants currently are favored over nuclear reactors fornew generating capacity. However, the nuclear industry believes that simpler, saferversions of today's commercial reactors will prove economically attractive.
The spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons throughout the world has been asignificant congressional concern, especially since the Persian Gulf War and thebreakup of the Soviet Union. Congress has provided aid to help the former Sovietstates safeguard their nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise.
Congress also is examining the deterioration of the United States' own nuclear weaponsproduction facilities, which have severe environmental and safety problems. Solving theenvironmental problems of the weapons facilities, owned by DOE, is expected to costhundreds of billions of dollars over the next several decades. After sharp growth in theearly 1990s, DOE environmental cleanup funding under the Clinton Administration hasbeen nearly flat. Congress provided $6.4 billion for the program in FY1997, slightlybelow the Administration request.
The enrichment of natural uranium to make nuclear fuel is carried out by thegovernment-owned U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), established by the EnergyPolicy Act of 1992. USEC submitted a draft privatization bill to Congress June 19,1995, and shortly afterward submitted a plan for carrying out the proposed transfer tothe private sector. Provisions to ease the sale of USEC were included in an omnibuscontinuing appropriations bill for FY1996 (P.L. 104-134).
The conference report on the FY1997 Energy and Water Developmentappropriations bill (H.R. 3816, H.Rept. 104-782), which provides funding formost Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear-related programs, was signed by thePresident September 30, 1996 (P.L. 104-206). The measure was approved by the HouseSeptember 12 and the Senate September 17. The final bill provides $6.4 billion for DOEenvironmental cleanup activities, a slight reduction from the Administration request.Congress also slightly reduced the Administration's $400 million request for nuclearwaste disposal, but dropped House language to make the funding contingent onenactment of authorizing legislation. Efforts to eliminate funding for DOE research onlight water reactors (LWRs), the type of reactor now in commercial use, were turnedback, and nearly the full Administration request was provided.
The Senate voted 63-37 July 31 for nuclear waste legislation (S. 1936) thatwould make fundamental changes in the nation's high-level waste management system.However, facing a veto threat, the House did not take up its version of the measure(H.R. 1020), and the legislation died. The bills would have required DOE to build awaste storage facility near Yucca Mountain in Nevada, the site of a planned permanentunderground waste repository, that could begin receiving highly radioactive spent fuelfrom nuclear power plants within the next few years.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided July 23 thatcurrent law requires DOE to begin disposing of nuclear waste by 1998. The courtdecision reverses a previous DOE determination that the 1998 statutory deadline wouldnot be legally binding if a disposal facility was not yet available. However, the courtcalled it "premature to determine the appropriate remedy" for any failure by DOE tobegin waste disposal by 1998. DOE announced October 22 that it would not appeal thecourt decision.
The U.S. nuclear power industry, while currently generating 22% of the nation'selectricity, faces an uncertain future. No nuclear plants have been ordered since 1978and more than 100 reactors have been canceled, including all ordered after 1973. Nounits are currently under active construction. A slowdown in the rate of growth ofelectricity demand, an escalation of nuclear power plant construction costs, publicconcern about nuclear safety and waste disposal, and a changing regulatoryenvironment have all contributed to the nuclear industry's malaise.
Escalation of construction costs is perhaps the most serious problem. Nuclear plantconstruction costs in constant dollars rose by more than 300% between 1970 and 1985. Without adjusting for inflation, the capital cost of a 1,000 megawatt nuclear plant hasgone from less than $200 million for plants completed in the early 1970s to $2-$6billion for single-unit plants completed in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the need forcostly improvements and equipment replacement have forced some operating plants toshut down as uncompetitive with other electricity sources, such as natural gas-firedplants.
Nevertheless, all is not bleak for the U.S. nuclear power industry, which
currentlycomprises 109 licensed reactors at 68 plant sites (
Global warming that may be caused by fossil fuels -- the "greenhouse effect" -- is citedby nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation ofreactors. But the large obstacles noted above must still be overcome before electricutilities will risk ordering new nuclear units. Reactor manufacturers are working ondesigns for safer, less expensive nuclear plants, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) has approved new regulations intended to speed up the nuclear licensing process,consistent with the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486). Even so, few if any newplants are likely to begin coming on-line in the United States during the next 10 years.
For the Clinton Administration, "nuclear power is not high priority," according to aFY1995 DOE budget summary, but "the option should be kept open." That ambivalenceis reflected in DOE's nuclear R&D budget under the Clinton Administration,which continues funding for improved versions of today's commercial reactors whileterminating development of advanced reactor technologies.
After substantial debate, Congress boosted FY1995 funding for advanced versions oftoday's light water reactors (LWRs) and provided level funding for one type of advancedreactor, the gas turbine modular helium reactor (GT-MHR). But Congress accepted theAdministration's plan to terminate development of the advanced liquid metal reactor(ALMR). The Administration's FY1996 budget request continued shutting down theALMR program, also known as the integral fast reactor (IFR), and again proposedtermination of the GT-MHR, and Congress agreed. For FY1997, the Administrationproposed level funding of $40 million for LWRs and the continuing shutdown ofadvanced reactor programs; that request was cut slightly by Congress, which rejectedamendments to eliminate the remainder of the funding in the FY1997 Energy andWater Development Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3816).
Shutting down the ALMR program and its associated research facilities, particularly theExperimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) in Idaho, is expected to take several years.Some ALMR facilities are being used for electrometallurgical treatment of EBR-II fuel,for which $20 million was appropriated under nuclear technology R&D in FY1997.Opponents of the program have expressed concern that such activities could help keepthe ALMR/IFR program alive and have called for Congress to halt further funding. TheHouse rejected an amendment to strike the funds in the FY1997 appropriationsmeasure.
(For background on the ALMR/IFR program, see CRS Report 93-822 ENR, IntegralFast Reactor: The Debate Over Continued Development.)
Development of improved versions of today's commercial LWRs would continue underthe FY1997 appropriation of $38 million -- $2 million below the FY1996 level. The goalof the LWR program, which is cost-shared with the nuclear industry, is to makeadvanced LWRs available for utility orders by end of the decade. Supporters of DOEfunding for advanced light water reactor (ALWR) development contend that the newreactors will be simpler, safer, and less expensive to build and operate than existingplants. Opponents call the program an unjustified subsidy to the nuclear industry,which they contend will be uncompetitive with future electricity generationalternatives. The program was targeted for elimination by the "Green Scissors" reportissued by a coalition of environmental and other groups in February 1996. The DOEeffort comprises two major elements:
Standard Design Certification. DOE is helping major U.S. nuclear reactormanufacturers obtain Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) standard designcertification for advanced LWR power plants. Once a standard design were certified byNRC, a utility could order the design with a minimum of further NRC design review.Two designs, from General Electric and Asea Brown Boveri/Combustion Engineering,received NRC final design approval in July 1994 and now are the subject of arulemaking process for standard design certification. A more advanced design, byWestinghouse, is expected by DOE to receive final design approval in FY1997, withdesign certification to follow. General Electric in February 1996 halted development ofanother advanced design that had yet to receive NRC approval.
First-of-a-kind Engineering. First-of-a-kind engineering (FOAKE) foradvanced LWR power plants is the design stage in which most of the engineering andconstruction details are completed -- details not needed for NRC-certified standarddesigns. Such additional detail is considered necessary to develop the cost estimates thatutilities would require before ordering one of the new nuclear plants, even if it alreadyhad NRC certification. The cost of the FOAKE program is being shared by DOE,electric utilities, and reactor manufacturers.
DOE's share of the FOAK engineering effort is authorized by the Energy Policy Act of1992 at $100 million, of which $82.3 million was been spent by the end of FY1996,according to DOE. Reactor manufacturers and electric utilities are expected tocontribute a total of $170 million. The DOE funding is being channeled through anindustry consortium called the Advanced Reactor Corp., which selected plant designsby General Electric (which received the NRC design approval noted above) andWestinghouse for FOAKE support. Engineering work on the General Electric plant isto be completed during FY1997, and the Westinghouse work is to be 90% complete,according to the DOE budget justification. The FY1997 nuclear energy funding is "thefinal Federal contribution to the light water reactor program," according to theconference report on the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill (H.Rept.104-782).
Other activities conducted by DOE's light water reactor program include research onextending the lives of existing nuclear power plants, analysis of impediments to nuclearpower, and development of plans for longer-lasting nuclear fuel.
The GT-MHR design that had been under development by DOE for many years consistsof encapsulated grains of nuclear fuel held in a massive graphite core, which would becooled by helium gas. Helium gas heated by the reactor would drive an electricgenerating turbine. The Administration's FY1994 and FY1995 requests sought nofunding for the program, but Congress had kept it alive until FY1996.
Anticipated benefits of the GT-MHR are based primarily on the reactor's safetycharacteristics and efficiency. GT-MHR supporters contend that, if all active coolingsystems failed, the reactor's graphite core would radiate enough heat to prevent fueldamage and radioactive releases. The technology also had been touted as an effectivemethod of destroying excess weapons-grade plutonium.
Controversy over safety has dogged nuclear power throughout its development,particularly following the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania and theApril 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union. In the United States,safety-related shortcomings have been identified in the construction quality of someplants, plant operation and maintenance, equipment reliability, emergency planning,and other areas. In addition, mishaps have occurred in which key safety systems havebeen disabled. NRC's oversight of the nuclear industry is an ongoing issue; nuclearutilities often complain that they are subject to overly rigorous and inflexibleregulation, but nuclear critics charge that NRC frequently relaxes safety standardswhen compliance may prove difficult or costly to the industry.
Domestic Reactor Safety. In terms of public health consequences, the safetyrecord of the U.S. nuclear power industry has been excellent. In about 2,000reactor-years of operation in the United States, the only incident at a commercial powerplant that might lead to any deaths or injuries to the public has been the Three MileIsland accident, in which more than half the reactor core melted. Public exposure toradioactive materials released during that accident is expected to cause fewer than fivedeaths (and perhaps none) from cancer over the following 30 years. An independentstudy released in September 1990 found no "convincing evidence" that the TMI accidenthad affected cancer rates in the area around the plant.
The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normaloperation are not generally believed to pose significant hazards. Documented publicexposure to radioactivity from nuclear power plant waste has also been minimal,although the potential long-term hazard of waste disposal remains controversial. Thereis substantial scientific uncertainty about the level of risk posed by low levels ofradiation exposure; as with many carcinogens and other hazardous substances, healtheffects can be clearly measured only at relatively high exposure levels. In the case ofradiation, the assumed risk of low-level exposure has been extrapolated mostly fromhealth effects documented among persons exposed to high levels of radiation,particularly Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing.
The consensus among most safety experts is that a severe nuclear power plant accidentin the United States is likely to occur less frequently than once every 10,000reactor-years of operation. These experts believe that most severe accidents would havesmall public health impacts, and that accidents causing as many as 100 deaths wouldbe much rarer than once every 10,000 reactor-years. On the other hand, some expertschallenge the complex calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies,contending that accidents with serious public health consequences may be morefrequent.
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc. The Chernobyl accident was byfar the worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred anywhere in the world. Atleast 31 persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other injuries, andbetween 5,000 and 45,000 fatal cancers may result over the next 40 years fromradiation released during the accident. Those cancers would represent an increase inthe cancer rate of about half a percent among the 75 million people in the western partof the former Soviet Union and a smaller increase in non-Soviet Europe, with a higherincrease possible in the contaminated region around the plant.
The 10-year anniversary of the Chernobyl accident prompted renewed interest in thedisaster's long-term consequences. According to a November 1995 report by theOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the primaryobservable health consequence of the accident has been a dramatic increase in childhoodthyroid cancer. About 1,000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer have been reported incertain regions surrounding the destroyed reactor -- a rate that is as much as a hundredtimes the pre-accident level, according to OECD. The death rate for accident cleanupworkers has also risen measurably, the organization reported. Other recent studies havefound increased genetic mutations among children born in contaminated regions.
Environmental contamination from the accident was widespread. The OECD reportestimated that about 50,000 square miles of land in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia weresubstantially contaminated with radioactive cesium. Significant levels of radioactivestrontium, plutonium, and other isotopes were also deposited. Although radiation levelshave declined during the past decade, land-use restrictions in the most contaminatedareas may remain indefinitely, according to OECD.
World concern in recent years has focused on the safety of 14 other Chernobyl-typereactors (called RBMKs) that are still operating in the former Soviet Union, includingone reactor at the Chernobyl site (a second operating reactor at the site was shut downNovember 30, 1996). Despite safety improvements made after the Chernobyl disaster,the RBMKs remain inherently unstable and dangerous, according to many Westernexperts. Also still operating in the former Soviet bloc are 10 early-model Soviet lightwater reactors (LWRs), which are similar to most Western reactors but suffer frommajor safety deficiencies, such as the lack of Western-style emergency cooling systems. More than two dozen newer Soviet-designed LWRs that are currently operating aresubstantially safer than the earlier models but still do not meet all Western standards.
Immediate shutdown of the Soviet-designed reactors appears impractical because of theex-Soviet bloc's critical need for electricity. Western help has been proposed fordeveloping replacement power sources, allowing shutdown of the riskiest nuclear units,as well as funding for short- and long-term safety improvements. Russian leaders haveestimated that total costs of the effort could range as high as $40 billion.
The seven major Western industrial nations agreed January 27, 1993, to create a fundfor nuclear safety assistance to the former Soviet bloc. Administered by the EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development, the fund is expected to pay for up to $700million in safety improvement projects. International technical assistance programsalso are underway through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the WorldAssociation of Nuclear Operators.
The United States is providing direct assistance for upgrading the safety of Sovietdesigned reactors, a program being coordinated by DOE, NRC, the Agency forInternational Development (AID), and the Department of State. U.S. internationalreactor safety assistance from FY1992-FY1996 totals $182 million, with most of thefunding coming from AID. DOE was appropriated $45 million in FY1997 for improvingthe operation and physical condition of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants.
For many years a top priority of the nuclear industry was to modify the process forlicensing new nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclearpower plant, according to the industry, unless licensing became quicker and morepredictable, and designs were less subject to mid-construction safety-related changesordered by NRC. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 largely implemented the industry'sgoals.
Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C. 2011-2282) had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permitto build a plant, and then, after construction was finished, an operating permit to runit. Each stage of the licensing process involved complicated proceedings. Environmental impact statements also are required under the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act.
Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act (P.L. 102-486) provides a clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses, allowing completedplants to operate without delay if construction criteria are met. NRC would holdpreoperational hearings on the adequacy of plant construction only in specifiedcircumstances.
A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC inissuing and enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and itssupporters have regularly complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexiblyenforced nuclear safety regulations have burdened nuclear utilities and their customerswith excessive costs. But many environmentalists, nuclear opponents, and other groupscharge NRC with being too close to the nuclear industry, a situation that they say hasresulted in lax oversight of nuclear power plants and routine exemptions for safetyrequirements.
That controversy was illustrated by a March 4, 1996, Time magazine coverarticle about regulatory violations at the three-reactor Millstone nuclear plant inConnecticut.The article described the efforts of two Millstone engineers to stop the routineplacement of greater amounts of hot nuclear fuel in the plant's storage pools than thepools were qualified to hold. NRC had been aware of the problem, but the articlefocused national attention on the situation and prompted closer NRC scrutiny of theMillstone plant and its own procedures. Because of the storage pool situation andnumerous other problems, all three Millstone reactors are currently shut down andcannot restart until NRC is satisfied with the plant's safety compliance.
In a speech on April 9, 1996, NRC Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson said that theMillstone problems "can and should be considered a wake-up call to both the regulatedindustry and the NRC." However, she contended that overall safety of commercialnuclear power plants had steadily improved during the past decade, with the numberof automatic reactor shutdowns and safety system actuations dropping dramatically.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear utilities, whichare required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC.Compliance is also monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two residentinspectors at each nuclear power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plantsystems, observe the performance of reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspectionreports. For serious safety violations, NRC often dispatches special inspection teams toplant sites. NRC Chairman Jackson testified September 5, 1996, to the Subcommitteeon Energy and Power of the House Commerce Committee that each nuclear powerplant has averaged about 10 safety violations per year since 1989.
When nuclear power plants end their useful lives, they must be safely removed fromservice, a process called decommissioning. For planning purposes, it is generallyassumed that U.S. commercial reactors could be decommissioned at the end of their40-year operating licenses, although some plants have been retired before their licensesexpired and others could seek license renewals to operate longer. NRC rules that tookeffect June 13, 1992, allow plants to apply for a 20-year license extension, for a totaloperating life of 60 years. Assuming a 40-year lifespan, more than half of today's 109licensed reactors could be decommissioned by the year 2010.
One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactivewaste, which can remain dangerous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactorproduces an annual average of about 20 tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fueland 50-200 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste.
The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel(the industry bears the costs) and federally generated radioactive waste, while states arerequired to develop disposal facilities for commercial low-level waste. Spent fuel andother highly radioactive waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository,consisting of a vast network of chambers carved from rock that has remainedgeologically undisturbed for hundreds of thousands of years. DOE is studying Nevada'sYucca Mountain as the site for such a geologic repository, as required by the NuclearWaste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA, P.L. 97-425) as amended.
Congress sharply cut the nuclear waste program's funding in the FY1996 Energy andWater Development Appropriations Act, forcing DOE to scale back its plans forstudying the safety of the Yucca Mountain site. However, the Department still hopesto meet its previous goal of opening the Yucca Mountain waste repository by 2010 --12 years later than required by NWPA. Because of concern that the permanentrepository would not open on schedule, the nuclear industry and state utility regulatorsurged Congress to authorize waste to be stored at an interim facility near YuccaMountain until the permanent repository was ready.
The 104th Congress considered industry-backed legislation that would have establishedan interim nuclear waste storage facility at the Yucca Mountain site. The Senate passedits version (S. 1936) July 31, 1996, and a counterpart measure (H.R. 1020) was passedby the House Commerce Committee August 2, 1995. But in the face of a veto threatfrom the Administration, the House never took up the bill.
DOE received $382 million for the waste program for FY1997, $18 million below theAdministration request. The House had voted to withhold the funding until authorizinglegislation was enacted, such as H.R. 1020 or S. 1936, but that restriction was droppedin conference.
As originally enacted, the 1982 nuclear waste law established procedures and timetablesfor DOE to examine candidate sites for at least one deep repository for commercialspent fuel (with the option of also taking government high-level waste), to beginoperating by January 31, 1998. The Nuclear Waste Fund, consisting of revenues froma fee on nuclear power, was created to pay for the disposal program. However, DOEcould not spend money from the fund without annual congressional appropriations.
Controversy over implementation of the waste law led to fundamental revisionsincluded in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203). The revisedwaste law singled out Yucca Mountain as the only candidate site for a permanent wasterepository and halted all activities related to a second repository. If Yucca Mountainis found unsuitable, Congress will have to decide whether to consider other sites. TheEnergy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486) attempted to remove some possible regulatoryobstacles to Yucca Mountain by requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to issuespecial standards for the site, based on a study by the National Academy of Sciencesissued August 1, 1995.
If no federal storage or disposal facility is available by the nuclear waste law's 1998deadline, nuclear power plants will have to continue storing their waste at reactor sitesmuch longer than originally anticipated. Most would have to build additional on-sitestorage facilities, a move that has drawn strong state and local opposition in severalrecent cases. As a result, 20 states and 14 utilities filed a pair of lawsuits against DOEin June 1994 to force the Department to begin accepting waste by the 1998 deadline.A federal appeals court agreed with the plaintiffs July 23, 1996, that DOE must meetthe 1998 deadline, although the court did not say what would happen if the deadlinewere missed. DOE announced Oct. 22, 1996, that it would not appeal the court ruling.(For more background, see CRS Report 96-212, Civilian Nuclear Spent FuelTemporary Storage Options.)
Disposal facilities for commercially generated low-level radioactive waste -- from nuclearpower plants, hospitals, universities and industry -- are a state responsibility. TheLow-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-240) gave statesand regions until the beginning of 1993 to begin operating their own low-level wastedisposal facilities before losing access to outside waste sites.
Only two commercial low-level sites, in South Carolina and Washington, are currentlyoperating. Access to the Washington site is allowed only to states in the PacificNorthwest and Rocky Mountain regions. A new disposal site is planned at Ward Valley,California, for use by the Southwestern disposal region, but the facility cannot proceeduntil the site is transferred from the federal government to the state. A bill toimplement the transfer was considered by the 104th Congress but not enacted. (Forfurther details, see CRS Issue Brief 92059, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal.)
From the beginning of the nuclear age, it was recognized that plutonium anduranium-235 could be used to make atom bombs and to fuel nuclear power reactors. Since enacting the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, Congress has periodicallyfaced the issue of how to keep domestic and world use of nuclear power from increasingthe spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons. In 1978 Congress enacted the NuclearNon-Proliferation Act (NNPA, P.L. 95-242), which tightened controls on nuclearexports. Heightened congressional interest in nuclear nonproliferation emerged in thewake of the Persian Gulf War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. These events havestrengthened interest in controlling sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related developments.
In 1995, the member nations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- now 183-- decided to make the Treaty permanent when it completed its initial 25-year term. TheNPT established a system of safeguards to assure that civil nuclear power does notcontribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. However, those safeguards did not stopIraq or North Korea from using civil nuclear programs as the basis for covert weaponsdevelopment. Strengthening the ability to detect and stop covert nuclear activity is apriority for nonproliferation.
The Clinton Administration made nonproliferation policy a top priority in foreign andnational security policy. It has pursued specially tailored nonproliferation strategies forproblem regions (former Soviet Union, Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia);negotiated a comprehensive test ban; and sought an international ban on productionof highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside ofinternational safeguards.
The 105th Congress will face several nonproliferation issues. One issue is China'splans to build more nuclear reactors. China is buying reactors from several countries,but not from the United States, because a 1985 agreement between the United Statesand China cannot enter into force until the President certifies China's nonproliferationcredentials. U.S. companies want the agreement to take effect to allow them to sellreactors to China. However, continuing concerns about China's exports of nuclear andmissile technology to such countries as Pakistan and Iran could make a presidentialcertification controversial.
Other near-term nonproliferation issues include nuclear smuggling from the formerSoviet Union, implementing the agreement to halt North Korea's nuclear weaponsprogram, Russia's sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, stopping proliferation in India,Pakistan, and Israel. Longer-term issues include the adequacy of internationalnonproliferation safeguards inspections, controversy surrounding the use by somecountries of plutonium for reactor fuel, and the long-term storage and disposal ofnuclear material from retired nuclear warheads. (For more information, see Issue Brief91023, Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Issues in the 105th Congress.)
The aging U.S. nuclear weapons production complex, managed by the Department ofEnergy, faces long-term problems with environmental contamination, radioactive wastedisposal, and other environmental risks. DOE's Environmental Management Program,which is responsible for cleaning up the nuclear weapons complex, received a budget of$6.4 billion for FY1997. Since the cleanup program's formal establishment in 1989, ithas grown into DOE's largest activity.
Over the next 75 years, resolving environmental problems at DOE nuclear weaponsfacilities could cost $227 billion, according to the Department's June 1996 BaselineEnvironmental Management Report. The report estimates that about half of thatfunding will be spent on storage, treatment, and disposal of waste, more than 25% oncleanup of environmental contamination, and the rest for interim safety measures,technology development, management, and overhead costs.
Most of DOE's weapons plants were built by the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)in the late 1940s and early 1950s during the height of the Cold War, when concernabout national security overshadowed safety and environmental considerations. TheAEC was responsible for its own safety and operational rules at its plants, and most ofthat authority has continued under DOE. To increase independent oversight of DOE'sdefense programs, Congress created a 5-member Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Boardas part of the FY1989 defense authorization bill, signed into law September 29, 1988(P.L. 100-456).
A key issue facing Congress is whether the Environmental Management Program willhave enough resources to meet DOE's growing environmental cleanup commitments.Congress has ordered DOE and other federal agencies to follow state and federalenvironmental requirements, and has subjected agencies to fines and other penalties forfailure to comply. At most of its sites, DOE has negotiated environmental complianceagreements that establish enforceable deadlines for a wide variety of cleanup and wastemanagement actions. (For more details, see CRS Issue Brief 90074, NuclearWeapons Production Complex: Environmental Compliance and WasteManagement.)
Only 0.7% of the uranium found in nature is the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235).The remaining 99.3% is U-238. Before uranium can be used in most nuclear reactors,the amount of U-235 must be increased (enriched) to 3-5%. Uranium is enriched in theUnited States for commercial users at plants originally built for the nuclear weaponsprogram. Until July 1, 1993, the enrichment program was run by DOE.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) established the U.S. Enrichment Corporation(USEC), a wholly owned government corporation that took over operation of DOE'suranium enrichment facilities and enrichment marketing activities. The United Statessigned an agreement February 18, 1993, to purchase Russian weapons-grade uraniumfor blending down to make civilian reactor fuel, an activity that also was transferredto USEC. The contract to purchase Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) wasmodified by a five-year contract amendment signed by USEC and Russia on Nov. 14,1996. The amended contract provides a 50% boost in the amount of Russian HEU tobe blended down and sold to USEC, to 132 metric tons over the next five years.
The corporation also has the right to commercialize DOE's experimental atomic vaporlaser isotope separation (AVLIS) technology, in exchange for royalties to the U.S.Treasury. USEC's board of directors decided July 13, 1994, to pursue commercialdevelopment of AVLIS, at an initial cost of about $36 million a year. A commercialfacility could be built sometime after 2000, USEC officials estimate.
EPACT authorized the sale of USEC to the private sector and required the corporationto prepare a privatization plan by July 1, 1995. Legislation to facilitate USECprivatization was included in an omnibus continuing appropriations bill for FY1996signed by the President April 26, 1996 (P.L. 104-134).
USEC on June 30, 1995, issued a plan to carry out the private-sector transition by early1996, although implementation has been delayed by later-than-expected enactment ofthe privatization facilitation provisions and other problems. The USEC privatizationplan calls for the corporation to be sold either through an initial offering of stock to thepublic or through acquisition by an existing firm. The plan estimates that selling stockto the public would raise total proceeds of $1.5-$1.8 billion, of which the U.S. Treasurywould receive all but up to $100 million in transaction costs. In addition, uponcompletion of the privatization procedure, the Treasury would receive a dividend of$600-$800 million from the corporation's cumulative retained earnings of about $1.2billion. (For more information, see CRS Issue Brief 95111, Privatization of theUnited States Enrichment Corporation.)
The tables below summarize current funding for DOE nuclear fission programs anduranium enrichment activities, and for the NRC. The sources for the funding figuresare Administration budget requests and committee reports on the Energy and WaterDevelopment Appropriations Acts, which fund all nuclear programs. The conferencereport on the FY1997 funding bill (H.R. 3816, H.Rept. 104-782) was approved by theHouse September 12, 1996, and by the Senate September 17, 1996. It was signed intolaw September 30, 1996 (P.L. 104-206).
***TABLE or GRAPHIC not shown here***
P.L. 104-206,
H.R. 3816
(Myers), S. 1959
(Domenici)
Energy and Water Development Appropriations for FY1997. House bill introduced
andreported by House Appropriations Committee July 16, 1996 (H.Rept.
104-679); Senatebill introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations
Committee July 16, 1996 (S.Rept.104-320).
Passed House July 25, 1996, by vote of 391-23;
H.R. 3816
passed by SenateJuly 30, 1996, by 93-6. Conference report (H.Rept.
104-782) passed House September12, 1996; passed Senate September 17, 1996.
Signed into law September 30, 1996 (P.L.104-206).
H.R. 496
(Vucanovich)
Nuclear Waste Policy Reassessment Act. Prohibits study of Yucca Mountain,
Nevada,as a site for a nuclear waste repository during FY1996 through FY1998.
Requires theNational Academy of Sciences during that period to study scientific
methods for findingsuitable waste disposal sites. Introduced January 11, 1995;
referred to Committee onCommerce.
H.R. 1020
(Upton)
Integrated Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Act of 1995. Establishes spent nuclear
fuelinterim storage facility in Nevada and establishes milestones for opening
the facility by1998. Allows nuclear utilities to recover monetary damages in
federal court if DOE failsto begin taking their spent fuel by 1998. Introduced
February 23, 1995; referred toCommittee on Commerce, approved by Committee
August 2, 1995 (H.Rept.
104-254, pt.1).
H.R. 1174
(Upton)
Nuclear Waste Disposal Funding Act. Provides automatic, nondiscretionary funding
forDOE's high-level nuclear waste disposal program, offset by revenues from the
sale ofthe U.S. Enrichment Corporation. Introduced March 8, 1995; referred to
Committee onCommerce.
S. 102
(Glenn)
Nuclear Export Reorganization Act of 1995. Improves the organization
andmanagement of nuclear export controls. Introduced January 4, 1995; referred
toCommittee on Governmental Affairs.
S. 429
(Bryan)
Independent Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Act of 1995. Authorizes fee credits to
nuclearutilities that must store spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites after 1998
because of delaysin DOE's waste management program. Introduced February 16,
1995; referred toCommittee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 443
(Grams)/H.R.
1032 (Gutknecht)
Electric Consumers and Environmental Protection Act of 1995. Reaffirms
federalgovernment's commitment to begin accepting commercial spent fuel by 1998
andeliminates restrictions on immediate site selection and development of a
monitoredretrievable storage facility. Senate bill introduced February 16, 1995;
referred toCommittee on Energy and Natural Resources. House bill introduced
February 23, 1995;referred to Committee on Commerce.
S. 554
(Bryan)
Nuclear Waste Independent Review Act. Establishes an independent commission
tocomplete a report about U.S. nuclear waste policy within 2 years after
enactment andprohibits federal licensing of off-site nuclear waste storage and
disposal facilities untilthe commission's report is submitted. Introduced March
13, 1995; referred toCommittee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 570
(Gorton)
Department of Energy Privatization Act of 1995. Authorizes DOE to enter into
longterm contracts with privately owned and operated waste treatment and
managementfacilities to help clean up defense-related sites. Such private
operations could be carriedout on land leased from DOE and would be protected
from liability for previousenvironmental contamination. Introduced March 16,
1995; referred to Committee onArmed Services.
S. 1271
(Craig)
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1995. Authorizes interim storage facility near
YuccaMountain for civilian and defense-related nuclear waste and changes
licensingrequirements for underground waste repository. Introduced September 25,
1995;referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Approved by
CommitteeMarch 13, 1996 (S.Rept.
104-248).
S. 1596
(Murkowski)
Conveys the federally owned site of the planned Ward Valley low-level
radioactive wastedisposal facility to the State of California for $500,100.
Introduced March 7, 1996;referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Approved by CommitteeMarch 13, 1996 (S.Rept.
104-247).
S. 1936
(Craig)
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996. Substitute for
S. 1271.
Authorizes interim storagefacility near Yucca Mountain. Introduced July 9, 1996;
read the first time. PassedSenate by vote of 63-37 on July 31, 1996.