Joseph D. Douglass, Jr
Mental Processes in Covert Operations
Thu Dec 4 16:37:37 2003
Influencing Behavior and Mental Processes in Covert Operations
Special thanks to Hacienda Publishing, Inc.,
http://www.TheFinalPhase.com permission to reprint Mr. Douglass's article,
which appeared in the Winter 2001 issue of the Medical Sentinel of the
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS)
Influencing Behavior and Mental Processes in Covert Operations
Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
In the early 1950s, U.S. intelligence concluded that the KGB, Soviet
intelligence, was working hard to develop "mind control" and behavior
modification drugs. Supporting evidence included the public "confessions" of
numerous high-ranking Communist officials, the high-profile trial in Hungary of
Josef Cardinal Mindszenty, who appeared to have been drugged as he confessed to
treasonous crimes, and the unusual behavior of American POWs during the Korean
War. The filmed testimony of American POWs telling the world that America was
evil and that Communism was a far superior form of government was an especially
On April 10, 1953, Allen W. Dulles, newly confirmed CIA director, alerted a
gathering of Princeton alumni to the problem. A "sinister the battle for men’s
minds" was underway, he explained. The Soviets "have developed brain perversion
techniques, some of which are so subtle and so abhorrent to our way of life that
we have recoiled from facing up to them."
In response, the CIA had decided to initiate its own mind control and behavior
modification program. Three days after delivering his wake-up speech, Dulles
approved the top secret program MKULTRA. Its primary objectives included the
development of psychoactive drugs that would:
* "cause mental confusion,"
* "alter personality structure,"
* "diminish ambition and working efficiency,"
* "promote illogical thinking,"
* cause a "euphoria with no subsequent let-down," and
* induce "amnesia respecting events immediately preceding and during the use of
mind control drugs."
These were in addition to the "truth drugs" (TD) and "loosen-the-tongue"
drugs already in development.
The possible use of such drugs on diplomats was an especially serious concern.
Ambassador George Kennan saw himself as a likely target and, as later reported
by CIA official Peer de Silva, requested and was provided with a suicide pill to
use if he were taken captive or began experiencing a serious personality change.
The serious nature of this concern contrasted strongly with the publicity given
to MKULTRA when it was exposed during the intelligence witch hunts in the
mid-1970s. Then, MKULTRA was portrayed as an internal fiasco featuring the
unprofessional testing of LSD drugs on unsuspecting "volunteers." This
information caused considerable embarrassment and Congressional censure. As
investigators searched for more information, they were told that all of the
documentation had been destroyed by direction of CIA director Richard Helms just
before he left office in early 1973.
At the time, John Marks and Victor Marchetti were putting the finishing touches
on their book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, which was about to become
the first critical insider book on the CIA. Evidently intrigued by the rumors of
CIA mind-control programs, Marks submitted a Freedom of Information Act request
for related documents. About two years later, the CIA "found" several boxes of
documents – 16,000 pages – that they released to Marks. The New York Times
commissioned him to write a book on the CIA mind control efforts. His book, The
Search for the "Manchurian Candidate," was published in 1979. In it, MKULTRA is
portrayed as a collection of unprofessional experiments and LSD tests of a most
childish nature. There is zero indication that anything of value had been
accomplished either by the CIA or the Soviet KGB. The only contrary indications
were first, the large number of respected participating scientific research
institutes and medical laboratories and second, two interesting facts that
slipped through the censors: namely, by 1957, 6 drugs had been moved into
operational use and had been employed against 33 targets. The CIA refused
requests for more information on these data.
To his credit, Marks recognized that his was not the full story. Only a few
insiders could write that story and they would not talk. Marks was not given
access to any scientific records or to the people involved. Most of the
documents were incomplete. Almost all the names had been blacked out with the
sole exception of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, who was obviously the chosen Agency
spokesman. Marks castigated Congress for its failure to investigate.
Specifically, he described the 1977 Kennedy hearings as "ridiculous" because
they did not put any pressure on the CIA to reveal the content of their
research. The Senate Select Intelligence Committee, which originally was a
partner in the hearings, had "withdrawn" its participation in the investigation,
at the request of Senator Goldwater. This was unfortunate because this was the
only committee with oversight responsibility. Accordingly, the hearings never
got beyond the primative LSD experiments – and, there was a world of difference
between the farcical LSD testing and the actual development objectives of
MKULTRA and the emerging technology.
When MKULTRA was dropped down the memory hole, no one stopped to question what
was really known about the Soviet accomplishments. This was a glaring error
because there was no logical basis for concluding that the Soviet program was a
"bust" and many reasons to lead a prudent person to anticipate just the reverse.
The Soviet program was serious and had the backing of the First Secretary,
Nikita Khrushchev, himself. The Soviets had achieved significant progress as
early as 1949, which was precisely when the new field of psycho-active drugs –
neurophamacology – was being born. The scientists assigned to the KGB program,
including those from Czechoslovakia and Germany, were world-class scientists and
were given unlimited resources to use in their efforts. Most important was the
unlimited availability of prisoners, including prisoners of war (POWs), to use
as human guinea pigs at all stages in the development process.
In the West, the field of psychoactive drugs rapidly expanded. Before the end of
the 1950s, several psychoactive drugs were on the market; for example, Lithium,
Chlorpromazine (Thorazine), Imipramine (Tofranil), and Chlordiazepoxide
(Librium). The field was expanding so rapidly that a symposium on "Control of
the Mind" was held at the University of California (San Francisco) Medical
School in early 1961 in response to rising concern among Western physicians and
psychiatrists. "Here at our disposal," explained Provost Dr. John Saunders in
his opening remarks, "to be used wisely or unwisely, is an increasing array of
agents that manipulate human beings...the new techniques introduce social,
ethical, and religious complications of great consequence. It is now possible to
act directly on the individual to modify his behavior instead of, as in the
past, indirectly through modification of the environment."
The idea that the Soviet accomplishments should not have been of even greater
concern in the 1970s than in the 1950s – especially in light of the sinister
nature of their interests – is preposterous, as evidenced by the accomplishments
of psychoactive drug development programs in the West. Yet there has been
nothing in the open press respecting the KGB achievements. Even more disturbing,
conversations with various former U.S. officials have led me to conclude there
have been no intelligence reports or warnings to alert top-level U.S. officials
and our allies to the developing KGB capabilities.
This silence is about to be broken. Over the past fifteen years, debriefings of
a high-level Czech defector, Gen. Maj. Jan Sejna, concerning the disappearance
of thousands of American POWs from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam
War has yielded a mass of first-hand information on Soviet mind control program
objectives, accomplishments, and actual operations. The connection between
missing POWs and mind control drugs is simple. American POWs were used as
laboratory guinea pigs in the KGB program. The American POWs were the most
valued guinea pigs because it was most important to learn how the drugs affected
the American psyche.
As head of the Defense Council secretariat and Chief of Staff to the Minister of
Defense, Jan Sejna was in a position to know about the Soviet program, in which
Czechoslovakia participated. Over the years, Sejna has been an extremely
reliable source, most unusual because of his unique, high-level access. As
stated in writing by Lt. Gen. Clapper in 1992 when he was director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, "The source [Jan Sejna] has provided reliable information
to U.S. intelligence for twenty years." Sejna also was given a lie-detector test
respecting his knowledge of the use of American POWs in medical experiments
during which he "showed no signs of deception" during more than four hours of
hostile interrogation. Moreover, Sejna’s testimony about Soviet mind affecting
drugs is buttressed by numerous statements in Soviet and East German military
literature from the late 1960s, by scientific capability assessments, and by
collateral intelligence on the use of American prisoners in testing experimental
drugs during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Another source, Col. Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov (aka Ken Alibek), was deputy director
of Biopreparat, a large Soviet biological warfare development program prior to
his defection in 1992. His information in his memoirs, Biohazard, published in
1998, dovetails with Sejna’s. In it, he describes a top secret, covert KGB
development program, code-named Fleta (Flute). He learned about the project but
could not penetrate it because of its extreme secrecy. Nevertheless, he was able
to learn enough to establish its mission: the development of psycho-active drugs
and neuro-toxins to "alter personalities and modify human behavior."
Sejna was personally involved in planning and monitoring Czechoslovakia’s
participation in this program since 1956. As described by Sejna, the Soviet
efforts in mind control took on a new urgency following WWII. This was when the
Soviet development program first started producing useful drugs. A top Soviet
official in the Main Political Administration told Sejna that the triggering
event behind the progress was the movement to the Soviet Union of German
scientists who were involved in mind control research efforts. This sudden surge
in productivity following VE day was also recognized in U.S. intelligence at
The first operational use of Soviet mind-control drugs described by Sejna was in
the political trials of high-ranking Communist officials and religious leaders
such as Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary and Bishop Trochka in Czechoslovakia.
These were the first generation "confession" drugs. Another family of drugs
introduced about the same time was the "friendship drugs." These were used to
help turn people who disliked the Russians into Russian supporters; for example,
the President of Finland and the head of the Communist Party of Finland. These
drugs were also tested on American POWs during the Korean War and used to turn
American soldiers into propaganda tools for the newsreels referred to earlier.
Thus, the CIA’s concerns in the early 1950s were well grounded. What is unknown
is how significantly the CIA’s knowledge continued to grow, or whether it
stopped in the mid-1960s, at precisely the time the Soviet program began to
enter its major expansion phase during which all of Allen Dulles’ worst fears
would be realized. At precisely the time when the Soviet accomplishments became
most frightening, information in the West seems to have vanished or gone
The growth of the Soviet mind control drug development program took on even more
sinister characteristics in the mid-1950s. This is when Khrushchev revamped
Soviet strategy and made preparations to fight and win a nuclear war the top
priority task of the state. At the same time, the second major thrust of his new
strategy was to win the war against the West without fighting. Drugs were of
critical importance in this strategy: narcotic drugs to weaken the people and
mind-control drugs for use against the leadership.2 A major intelligence
operation in narcotics trafficking was developed and the mind-control drug
development program, previously oriented from counter-intelligence perspective
(that is, truth drugs, friendship drugs, and confession drugs) was reoriented to
support the needs of Soviet foreign policy; that is, to win without fighting.3
This shift paralleled the change in the KGB, whose missions also were shifted
from dominantly counter-intelligence to support foreign policy and the world
In Czechoslovakia, the change surfaced in 1956 when General Kalashnik from the
Soviet Main Political Administration flew to Prague specifically to impress upon
Sejna and other high-ranking Czech officials the importance of Khrushchev’s "new
view about drugs and other chemicals that can affect the minds and behavior of
millions of people." His task was to prepare the Czech officials for an
important formal directive that would be coming from the Soviet Defense Council
requesting the assistance of the top Czech scientists and medical doctors in the
experimental drug testing program already underway in the Soviet Union.
The Soviets had achieved so much progress by 1962 that Nikita Khrushchev stated
informally at a reception of selected top officials from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe that "deception and drugs are our first two strategic echelons in
the war against capitalism." This was also the time when scientists from other
East European countries in addition to Czechoslovak scientists became involved
in the program. In 1964, the head of the International Department, Boris
Ponomarev, was brought into the program leadership because of the increased
operational role of the drugs in support of foreign operations that came under
the purview of Ponomarev’ International Department. By 1967 the drug operations
had become so significant and sensitive that both the operational and
development portions of the program were placed exclusively under the KGB, whose
new boss then was Yuri Andropov. A year later, Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid
Brezhnev, would tell a gathering of top Czech officials with enthusiasm that "if
only we had invested ten percent of what we spent on nuclear weapons on
[mind-control] drugs, we would already control NATO."
Sejna defected in 1968, roughly twenty years after the program began its
productive surge. At this time – over thirty years ago – he was intimately
familiar with the program from his positions at the Ministry of Defense, Defense
Council, Main Political Administration, and Administrative Organs Department. He
knew of over a dozen families of mind control drugs that were actually being
used against diplomats, banking and business executives, religious leaders,
journalists, politicians, political leaders, military units, academicians, and
even Presidents and Prime Ministers. They were used to advance Soviet views, to
facilitate the implementation of their policies, to recruit agents, to obtain
inside information, to make negotiators pliable, and to destroy those who
threatened their programs. Sejna has described to me over 50 intelligence
operations he knew about or participated in, from directed uses against
individuals, to their use in complicated operations involving dozens of targeted
people at gatherings of foreign officials that different ministries, like the
Ministry of Defense, hosted during the year.
To eliminate the influence of religion, the Communists decided to shift the
allegiance of Catholic clerics from the Holy See to Communism. Friendship drugs
were used to help turn the bishops (e.g. Bishop Trochka) and priests "from the
black to the red." This process worked, but not
(Cont'd) To eliminate the influence of religion, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Thu Dec 4 16:41
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