Frontline:
The Lost Year in Iraq
Examine the initial, critical decisions of the U.S.-led regime
in Baghdad.
WATCH THE FULL PROGRAM ON LINE:
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The Lost Year in Iraq
AUDIO:
http://www.apfn.net/pogo/L001I061017-frontline-iraq.MP3
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In the first weeks after the statue of Saddam Hussein fell, a
group of young American bureaucrats led by Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer III set off to establish democracy in Iraq. "We had an
ambitious goal," Bremer tells FRONTLINE, "to try to bring better
government to Iraq and help them rebuild their economy [and]
their country." One year later, as Bremer made a secret exit to
evade insurgent attacks, the group left behind a thriving
insurgency, economic collapse and much of its idealism. "Our
grand initiative there [was] to bring democracy to Iraq," says
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, former Baghdad bureau chief for The
Washington Post. Instead, says Chandrasekaran, "we were leaving
with our tail between our legs."
Today, as America looks for an exit strategy, FRONTLINE examines
the initial, critical decisions of the U.S.-led regime in
Baghdad in The Lost Year in Iraq. From the same team that
produced Rumsfeld's War, The Torture Question and The Dark Side,
the film is based on more than 30 interviews, most of them with
the officials charged with building a new and democratic Iraq.
The Lost Year in Iraq begins on April 9, 2003, as American
troops help a crowd of Iraqis topple a statue of Saddam Hussein.
In Washington there was celebration, but in Baghdad the looting
was beginning. Jay Garner, the retired general picked by Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to lead reconstruction, was forced to
wait in Kuwait for authorization to enter Iraq. He and his team
had arrived from Washington without computers, telephones or a
plan. "Everybody was focused on the war; they were focused on
regime change," Garner tells FRONTLINE. "That took all of their
energy. I wasn't the central focus." On the day Garner finally
arrived in Baghdad, he received a phone call from Rumsfeld: He
was being replaced by L. Paul Bremer.
Bremer, who arrived with sweeping plans to remake the country,
had a young and inexperienced team, but his staff had passed a
political litmus test in Washington. "It's a children's crusade
… of former Republican campaign workers, White House interns
[and] Heritage Foundation people," says Thomas Ricks of The
Washington Post. Col. T.X. Hammes, a counterinsurgency expert
and adviser to Iraq's Interior Ministry, felt Bremer's staff
could have been better trained. "We had so many of these very,
very young people that are dedicated Americans, brave enough to
take a chance and go into Iraq to try to do something right for
their country," he tells FRONTLINE. "But [they] didn't get any
training; they have no background. … And yet we put them in
charge of planning at [the] national level."
Bremer surprised many in the Bush administration and the
American military with far-reaching decrees that disbanded the
Iraqi military and purged former Baathists from government
employment. But as the insurgency grew, the administration lost
confidence in Bremer and his plan for democratizing the country.
Bremer was instructed to abandon his multi-year plan and
transfer sovereignty as quickly as possible.
"I think the situation on the ground was certainly worse than I
had been led to expect, particularly the state of the Iraq
economy," Bremer says. "I don't think anybody in our government
realized how much damage Saddam and the Baathists had done over
the previous 30 years. So to some degree, it's true that we just
didn't know how complicated it was going to be."
As Bremer's year in Iraq drew to a close, a blueprint for
democratic elections had been put in place. At the same time the
insurgency was exploding, shocking photographs had surfaced from
Abu Ghraib; American and Iraqi forces had failed to put down a
Sunni uprising in Fallujah; and a Shiite militia led by Moqtada
al-Sadr was flexing its muscles. During his final hours on the
ground, Bremer presided over the handoff of sovereignty to the
Iraqi interim government and then publicly boarded a C-130
transport. Afterward, in secret, he switched to a smaller plane
that would safely carry him out of the country.
"The Iraqi people were, if not the enthusiastic, liberated
populace that some of us had anticipated, were at least
open-minded, and, on balance, prepared to work with the United
States," says James Dobbins, the administration's former special
envoy to Afghanistan and adviser to the Defense Department. "And
that has largely been lost, and was largely lost over that first
year."
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