General Westmoreland

READ the truth about General Westmoreland and his superiors aiding and abetting the enemy in 1966:
General William C. Westmoreland

Did He confess to aiding the enemy
in the Vietnam WAR?
YES!!

Read his book “A Soldier Reports”
Learn from the past
And give our men and women
a fair shake in WAR....

By
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Marvin
United States Army Special Forces (Retired)

Our Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are fighting an enemy difficult to distinguish who employ heinous methods of terror and death tactics with no regard for the innocent. As they wage a fanatic war of suicide, with hit and run tactics designed to wreck havoc on the civilian population our forces are denied the freedom to wage a war to win, forbidden to use those tactics necessary to destroy the enemy, his bases and his source of bombs and bullets.
We allow the enemy to use mosques as shelters and weapons storage caches while we are forbidden to destroy any of them. Is this policy just another way of aiding the enemy and extending the war as was the case hen the enemy was permitted safe havens in Cambodia during the Vietnam WAR?
Is it more important to maintain a continuing conflict, regardless of loss of life and limb so as to satisfy our military/industrial/political machine?
Read this & Learn why WE lost South Vietnam and why we must be alert and aware so as not to risk a similar, costly defeat when facing Islam.
perhaps you might ask
General William C. Westmoreland
He is The Man and the Myth

There are many displays and tributes to this general who we should instead have established a wall of shame to represent those who would be with us today had it not been for William C. Westmoreland, the commander of all allied forces, who knowingly aided and abetted our enemy in Vietnam and who admitted that fact in his own published testimony: A Soldier Reports © 1976. If we are unwise so as to ignore these facts of the Vietnam era and if we refuse to calculate the numbers of our forces and allied forces that were killed by those enemy who he permitted sanctuary we will acquiesce to those who would again give comfort to the enemy.
Who is calling the shots in Iraq and Afghanistan? Are the generals and admirals
of today, at the expense of KIAs, WIAs and MIAs bending to the dictates of a circle of men dedicated to maintaining a conflict of sufficient depth and length to satisfy the monetary lusts of the political/military/industrial complex power brokers?
Nearer to now: on 24 July 2003 I spoke on the telephone with General Tommy Franks’ aide, LTC Chris Goedeke, expressing my admiration of the General and my concern that he did not appear to have sufficient troops in his command in Iraq to secure the population centers after they taken the area and cleared the enemy out. I was led to believe, when told unequivocally that General Franks had only received half of the numbers of forces he asked for to properly conduct the war, that General Franks had yielded to the desires and dictates of the Secretary of Defense, and went to war with insufficient men and women to realistically get the job done. One who wishes to remain anonymous advised me that the staff who developed the invasion plans, including trrop level requirements for Secretary Rumsfeld were primarily personnel without combat experience.
My question to those who love this great nation of ours and who would want to believe that the military leadership would ever stoop to aiding the enemy is:

Why has the world press refused to publish the truth?

General William C. Westmoreland, as Commander of all American Forces in South Vietnam from June of 1964 through March of 1968, aided and abetted the enemy by permitting them safe havens inside the Cambodian territory adjacent to South Vietnam and by permitting that same enemy the unrestricted use of the Mekong River as a protected waterway to transport war materiel through South Vietnam to their sanctuaries in Cambodia. It seemed obvious to me, after putting all of the facts together, that General Westmoreland considered his own position, rank and place in history more important to him than the lives of American and Allied fighting personnel and South Vietnamese civilians (men, women and children) alike or he would have demanded an end to President Lyndon Johnson’s provision of safe-havens and protected supply routes to the enemy. Lacking positive action by the President, General Westmoreland should have resigned publicly, informing the American people that he was leaving the service not wanting to be a part of the sham that was Vietnam. He knowingly supported the enemy via the provision of sanctuaries and protected shipping routes for war supplies while subjecting our forces to death and injury of unnecessary proportions. My four best friends are on The Wall – perhaps if they had been given the opportunity to fight on a level filed of battle they would be alive and there would yet be a South Vietnam. Corroborated proof of my direct knowledge of General Westmoreland’s acts to encourage and assist the enemy is contained in my book Expendable Elite – One Soldier’s Journey Into Covert Warfare, © 2003, Trine Day Publishers.
In General Westmoreland’s book A Soldier Reports © 1976, Doubleday & Company, Inc. he states rather matter-of-factly and very clearly on page 218: “The enemy’s obvious use of Cambodia as a sanctuary and refusal of Washington authorities to allow me to do anything about it was frustrating.” He went on to write, on page 219, of the proof of major shipments of arms and other supplies “reaching the VC via international shipping passing through South Vietnam up the Mekong...” It may have been “frustrating” to General Westmoreland, but his lack of action to deny the enemy sanctuaries and a protected supply route was indeed deadly to many tens of thousands of Americans who depended on him for leadership. From what I was told by officers in Saigon at the time, General Westmoreland wasn’t so frustrated that he denied himself the playful pleasures of a daily tennis routine.
Strangely enough, General Westmoreland writes at the beginning of Chapter XV (Reflections on Command) of having a quotation of Napoleon Bonaparte under a panel on my desk which states, “A commander-in-chief cannot take as an excuse for his mistakes in warfare an order by his sovereign or his minister, when the person giving the order is absent from the field of operations and is imperfectly aware or wholly unaware of the latest state of affairs. It follows that any commander-in-chief who undertakes to carry out a plan which he considers defective is at fault; he must put forward his reasons, insist on the plan being changed, and finally tender his resignation rather than be the instrument of his army’s downfall.”
The lack of strong moral leadership in this four star general is typified in his own admission, on page 220 of his book: “For long all we could do to the enemy in Cambodia was drop propaganda leaflets on our side of the border whenever the wind was right to blow them across.” And, on page 222, he states unequivocally, “My every request to inform the world press of the enemy’s use of Cambodia was denied...” Why then, inasmuch as our permitting of “the enemy’s use of Cambodia” was somewhat akin to tying our soldiers’ hands behind their back as they were ordered into battle, didn’t he take that matter forward as the sole rationale for his resignation from the military service?
In 1983, Presidio Press published LTC Charles M. Simpson’s book, Inside the Green Berets, included the account of how LTC Dick Ruble, a member of General Westmoreland’s Intelligence staff, had without the knowledge of the Special Forces Group commander, denied their access to intelligence (“code word” documents) as retribution for Special Forces’ denying MACV non-airborne personnel, who were to be disguised as Green Berets, access to Special Forces Camps (see page 181). The Special Forces Group had been excluded purposely from their distribution list and would include intelligence gathered by CIA resources. Many of those resources were highly classified and compartmentalized, according to my source, who understandably wishes to remain anonymous.
Directly related to this denial of critical combat intelligence, was a time of solemn remembrance one summer afternoon in 1988 when I stepped through the doors of the Special Warfare Museum on Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, wanting to revisit my past. The Green Berets were, after all, a very special organization that would and could tackle any mission, anytime, anywhere and get the job done. No task was too dangerous, too onerous or too difficult as “the impossible just takes a little longer.”
I was enjoying the many and varied exhibits in that small, but awesome collection of unconventional warfare memorabilia until I was stopped in my tracks in front of an exhibit honoring none other than General Westmoreland. I understand fully that one should not despise another, but that singular word best describes my feeling for that one military man who, by his own inaction and lack of courage before Congress and his military superiors, aided and abetted the enemy in the Vietnam conflict, the same foe that had killed my four best friends, all of them Green Berets.
My best friend Jerry, his name now engraved on THE WALL - Master Sergeant Gerard V. Parmentier - was killed in action his fifth time in combat in the Southeast Asian War Theater. Jerry, a fellow Green Beret and a number of South Vietnamese irregulars, all mortally wounded in battle by Viet Cong insurgents on 17 August 1967 near Dak To, South Vietnam, were also unsuspecting victims of a power struggle between General William C. Westmoreland’s headquarters and the Special Forces Group commander.
His son Albert, a Green Beret himself, was serving in a neighboring Special Forces camp when he got word that his father had been killed. After learning details of the battle and its aftermath from his father’s commanding officer, Albert accompanied his Father’s body back to the United States where he was interred with military honors, including a Special Forces Color Guard, at Rosecrans National Cemetery in San Diego.
After the funeral I spoke with Albert and he confirmed what I’d suspected, having learned from his father’s commanding officer that Jerry’s unit had met defeat and suffered heavy casualties, with most KIA due to faulty or withheld intelligence. The enemy force that killed Jerry was many times the strength that had been gleaned from available intelligence. That fact, in and of itself, was not uncommon in war, particularly in a counter-insurgency situation. What was unusual and unforgivable in my judgment, was the fact that the enemy order of battle was known but withheld from Special Forces. Hard to believe? Yes, I would rather it had been a lie. But those facts were told Albert by Jerry’s commander before he left Vietnam escorting his father’s body to the US. Albert told me, just a few days later and agreed it was important information for the book I was writing about Special Forces in South Vietnam. We also agreed that it would be put on the back burner until his mother was gone as it would hurt too much for her to know the truth. When Jerry’s widow, Rose, died and was buried in Providence, Rhode Island, I spoke with Albert shortly after the funeral had concluded. I told Albert of my need to obtain his signed statement telling of the facts of his father’s death so as to be evidence with which I would demand an investigation and a public disclosure of facts.
I was to learn instead that Albert had retired from the U.S. Army and was working for the “company.” Needless to say, he was then conveniently forbidden from disclosing any knowledge relating to the CIA. No sense arguing, the cards were stacked against the truth.
My book, Expendable Elite – One Soldier’s Journey Into Covert Warfare, contains much detail regarding General Westmoreland’s refusal to demand an end to the enemy’s safe-havens in Cambodia and his lack of courage when given the opportunity to go before Congress and tell them that American and Allied forces and innocent civilians were being killed and maimed by the enemy operating out of the “sanctuaries” that President Johnson had provided against the wishes of then Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. He admits to these failures in his book A Soldier Reports.
Another fact of life in South Vietnam at the time I served as a Green Beret in An Phu and Chau Doc was the absence of routine resupply of Special Forces units by General Westmoreland’s Saigon depot. This was a great cause of concern to me when stationed at the B team and responsible for logistical support of Special Forces Camps under the wing of B-42 in Chau Doc in late 1966. That lack of logistical support by the Saigon depot forced me to “borrow” a Landing Craft Utility (LCU) from the US Navy, pilot it down the Bassac River and on into the Mekong to reach the Saigon Depot. We then “borrowed” two of the depot’s 2½ ton trucks and drove past the fearful guards to pick what we desperately needed from shelves, bins and pallet storage, loaded the sand bags, small generators, pallets of ammunition and other miscellaneous “stuff” on the trucks and then onto the LCU at the depot docking site on the Mekong River. From there we re-traced our way back to Chau Doc, unloaded at the B Team dock and returned the LCU to where it was originally moored. Within a year of my return to the United States, while attending the US Army Quartermaster Career Course at Fort Lee, Virginia, Colonel Pieklik, the commander of the Saigon Depot at the time we were forced to steal supplies, was our final guest lecturer. He stood in front of our class and opened the floor to questions at the end of his presentation. I was class president and fielded the first question, asking why he had shut off the supplying of our Green Beret camps in 1966. I was impressed with the fact that he answered unequivocally, telling our class that the reason his depot was not supplying the Special Forces needs in the IV Tactical Zone (the entire delta area) was that General Westmoreland had ordered him not to. I would learn that Westmoreland’s futile attempts to convince the Commanding General of IV Tactical Zone (Lieutenant General Quang Van Dang) of the need to permit the use of conventional American forces in the delta had angered him to the extent that he refused logistical support of all unconventional forces in the Delta area.
Is this of whom I write the General Westmoreland you have pictured in the past?
Interestingly enough, General Westmoreland’s personal Analysis of America’s Unique Experience in Vietnam, titled As I Saw it and Now See It © 1988 General William C. Westmoreland (Go to http://members.aol.com/USAHeroes/wcw2.htm) contains NO reference to the safe havens or protected shipping permitted our enemy during his watch.
©2005 LTC Daniel Marvin, US Army Special Forces (Retired)