Bush's Uranium Lies Could Lead to Impeachment

Bush's Uranium Lies: The Case For A Special Prosecutor That Could Lead To Impeachment by Francis T. Mandanici

July 2, 2005
Democracy Rising

Some have observed that the Bush Administration's claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were not just good faith mistakes but actual lies. Some have even recently compared President Bush's false claims about Iraq to the Watergate scandal that led to President Nixon's resignation. See Truth And Deceit by Bob Herbert and Don't Follow the Money by Frank Rich in The New York Times, June 2, 12, 2005. Some, such as the organizations AfterDowningStreet and DemocracyRising.US, have even called for the initiation of impeachment proceedings based in part on the Downing Street Memo that revealed that according to a British intelligence official the Bush Administration prior to the war against Iraq fixed the intelligence and facts to justify the war.[1]

In response to press reports on the Downing Street Memo, Congressman John Conyers and 90 other Congressional Democrats in a May 5 letter to President Bush asked him if there was a coordinated effort to fix the intelligence and facts to justify the war.[2] Congressman Conyers and other Congressional Democrats on June 16 held an unofficial hearing concerning the Downing Street Memo that resembled an impeachment inquiry.

Although the Downing Street Memo clearly raises serious questions about President Bush's honesty about Iraq and some claim it to be a smoking gun, it pales in comparison to the public record that already exists concerning his specific claim that Iraq had sought uranium for a nuclear weapon, which he presented as a key reason to justify the war rather than wait for United Nations weapons inspectors to finish their work. When the dots in the public record are connected on that matter, including a close analysis of Congressional investigative reports and resolutions, there is a strong case that President Bush and senior members of his Administration made fraudulent claims to Congress. Since criminal statutes prohibit making fraudulent statements to Congress and obstructing its functions, the Justice Department should pursuant to its regulations appoint an outside special counsel. A specific motive for the uranium claims that the Administration made would have been to thwart the efforts of Congress and the UN to delay the start of the war. The current public record is as strong as the Starr Report that commenced the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton and is surely strong enough to require the initial appointment of a special counsel to conduct a criminal investigation. Such a special counsel investigation could then lead to impeachment proceedings, as well as expand to cover other possible fraudulent claims.

President Bush and his senior officials made five uranium claims, which along with other claims were catalogued and analyzed in the report Iraq On The Record (IR) that was prepared by the Minority Staff of the House Committee On Government Reform and released on March 16, 2004.[3]

Concerning the uranium claims, that report including its database states that (1) President Bush on January 20, 2003 told Congress that Iraq's disclosure to the UN (which was supposed to reveal all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction) "failed to deal with issues which have arisen since 1998, including ... attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it"; (2) President Bush on January 28, 2003 in his State of the Union Address told Congress that the "British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa"; (3) then National Security Advisor and now Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on January 23, 2003 in an op-ed article stated that Iraq's disclosure to the UN "fail(ed) to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from abroad"; (4) then Secretary of State Colin Powell on January 26, 2003 in a speech stated "Why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium and the special equipment needed to transform it into material for nuclear weapons?"; and (5) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on January 29, 2003 at a press conference stated that Hussein's "regime has the design for a nuclear weapon, was working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa." IR pp. 13-15, and IR Database (Speaker: All; Keyword: uranium; Subject: Nuclear Capabilities; choose Show All). All five uranium statements were made within a nine-day period between January 20 and 29, 2003.

Furthermore President Bush's above two uranium claims are in documents that he submitted to Congress. President Bush's above two uranium claims are in documents that he submitted to Congress. President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address that he gave to Congress is labeled House Document 108-1.[4] The report Iraq On The Record quotes the sentence concerning uranium in President Bush's State of the Union Address but the prior sentence is also important since it mentions the purpose for the uranium. As shown by the document President Bush told Congress that the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed in the 1990's that "Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon, and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb. The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

The statement that President Bush made to Congress on January 20, 2003 that Iraq's report to the UN "failed to deal with issues which have arisen since 1998, including ... attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it" was made in a report that President Bush submitted to Congress that is labeled House Document 108-23.[5] After the above sentence, President Bush reported to Congress: "In short, we have not seen anything that indicates that the Iraqi regime has made a strategic decision to disarm. On the contrary, we believe that Iraq is actively working to disrupt, deny, and defeat (UN) inspection efforts." Public Law 107-243, which was the war resolution that Congress passed earlier in October 2002 authorizing President Bush to use military force in Iraq, required President Bush to submit the above report.

The report Iraq On The Record states that all of the Bush Administration's above uranium claims were misleading. IR pp. 3, 13-15. Concerning the importance of the claims the report states: "Another significant component of the Administration's nuclear claims was the assertion that Iraq had sought to import uranium from Africa. As one of few new pieces of intelligence, this claim was repeated multiple times by Administration officials as proof that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program." IR p. 13 (emphasis added).

The report further states that the above officials (President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell and National Security Advisor Rice) who made the uranium claims and Vice President Richard Cheney made a total of 237 misleading statements about the threat that Iraq posed (including the above mentioned uranium claims). IR pp. ii, 3. The statements started on March 17, 2002, which was one year before the start of the war. IR pp. ii, 3. Most (161) of the misleading statements were made prior to the war while 76 misleading statements were made after the war started to justify the decision to go to war. IR pp. ii, 3-4. The 237 misleading statements covered four areas: statements that Iraq posed an urgent threat, statements about Iraq's nuclear capabilities (such as the uranium claims), statements about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs, and statements about Iraq's support for al Qaeda. IR p. 6. Minus the 51 misleading statements of Vice President Cheney, the other four officials who made the misleading uranium claims made a total of 186 misleading statements. IR pp. 3, 26.

As observed in Iraq On The Record, the "Administration's statements about Iraq's nuclear capabilities had a large impact on congressional and public perceptions about the threat posed by Iraq." IR p. 8. The most glaring examples of the misleading statements are the above five uranium claims, which are discussed herein.

The report Iraq On The Record states that the uranium claims were misleading because the Central Intelligence Agency had earlier expressed doubts about the claim in two memos to the White House including one addressed to then National Security Advisor Rice, and the then CIA Director George Tenet argued personally against using the claim in a telephone call to Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley. IR pp. 14-15, and IR Database (Speaker: All; Keyword: uranium; Subject: Nuclear Capabilities; choose Show All).

In addition to Iraq On The Record, the full Senate Select Committee On Intelligence released on July 7, 2004 an investigative report entitled Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq (SR).[6] That report cites President Bush's above two uranium statements and Secretary Powell's uranium statement, SR pp. 63-64, 66, and reveals many more details of what President Bush and his senior officials did not disclose.

President Bush and his senior officials made their uranium claims in January 2003, and the Senate report mentions that some in the American intelligence community including in the CIA had believed the uranium claim. SR pp. 47, 52, 62. Also the report states that the CIA had actually cleared two proposed presidential speeches that the White House's National Security Council (NSC) had sent to the CIA in September 2002 that contained the claims that Iraq was caught trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium and that Iraq had sought large amounts of uranium from Africa. SR pp. 49, 51. President Bush did not use the approved language publicly. SR pp. 49, 51.

The Senate report states that the British government on September 24, 2002 published a White Paper stating that "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." SR p. 50. The above information in British White Paper did not state that the attempt was recent.

The Senate report then reveals that a CIA analyst in September 2002 suggested to a staff member of the White House's NSC that the White House remove from a proposed speech the claim that Iraq attempted to acquire uranium from Africa. SR p. 51. According to the CIA analyst the NSC staff member responded by stating that removing the claim would leave the British "flapping in the wind." SR p. 51.

The Senate report reveals that in October 2002, the White House's NSC sent to the CIA a draft of a speech that President Bush was to give in Cincinnati that contained the statement that Iraq had been caught attempting to purchase up to 500 tons of uranium from Africa. SR p. 55. Due to the concerns expressed by a CIA Iraq nuclear analyst, the CIA's Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence faxed a memo to the Deputy National Security Advisor (Hadley) and to the speechwriters suggesting that they remove the uranium claim from the speech because the amount was in dispute, the claim was debatable, the CIA had told Congress that the British had exaggerated the issue, and Iraq already had 500 tons of uranium in its inventory. SR pp. 55-56. (The reference to telling Congress would be to certain select intelligence committees that cannot divulge the secret information to all members of Congress).

The NSC then sent to the CIA another draft of the speech containing a revised statement that Iraq had been caught attempting to purchase substantial amounts of uranium from Africa. SR p. 56. The CIA's Associate Deputy Director believed that the NSC had not addressed the uranium information in its later draft and alerted the CIA Director (Tenet). SR p. 56. The CIA Director responded by telling the Deputy National Security Advisor (Hadley) that President Bush should not provide any facts on the issue in the speech because CIA analysts told him that the "reporting (on the uranium claim) was weak". SR p. 56. After the White House's NSC removed the claim from the speech, the CIA sent a second fax to the White House stating the "evidence (on the claim) is weak". SR p. 56. On October 7, 2002, President Bush delivered his speech in Cincinnati and kept out the uranium claim. SR p. 57.

The Senate report states that the CIA on October 11, 2002 received copies of documents that supposedly supported the claim that Iraq had a deal to obtain uranium from Africa. SR p. 58. On January 13, 2003 (which was before the first above mentioned uranium claim of January 20, 2003), the Iraq nuclear analyst for the State Department's intelligence bureau (INR) sent an e-mail to several American intelligence community analysts outlining the reasons why he believed that the document supposedly supporting the uranium deal was probably a "hoax" and a "forgery". SR p. 62.

After the State Department's intelligence bureau alerted the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency about the problems with the documents, said agencies published assessments that, as summarized in the Senate report, stated that "Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa." SR pp. 77, 62, 64 (emphasis added).

Concerning the State of the Union Address of January 28, 2003, the Senate report reveals that a NSC official at the White House and a CIA official discussed the draft of that speech that the White House had sent to the CIA that stated "we know that (Hussein) has recently sought to buy uranium in Africa." SR pp. 64-65 (emphasis added). The final draft that President Bush actually gave was that the "British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." SR p. 66 (emphasis added). Both officials stated that there was never a discussion on the credibility of the reporting. SR pp. 65-66. The stated reason for the switch from �we' to the British was the desire to identify in the speech a source for the uranium claim that was not classified, and the British White Paper source was not classified while the American source was classified. SR pp. 65-66. However, the original draft that the White House sent apparently did not name any source for America's knowledge but merely said �we'. There was really no need to further identify any sources. Concerning other claims against Hussein, President Bush in his speech actually used the phrase �intelligence sources' without providing any specifics on the sources.[7]

Thus it might be argued that the forgotten reason why the switch was made from "we know" to the "British government has learned" was that the CIA was not really comfortable with the "we know" especially since that might include the CIA Director who had previously told the White House that the President should not make any uranium claim because CIA analysts believed it was weak. It is plausible that the CIA became comfortable with the speech only when it was changed and merely repeated what the British had stated rather than what the CIA Director knew. The CIA official had originally told the Senate committee that he had told the White House official to remove parts of the draft that contained the words "Niger" and "500 tons" because of concerns about the sources and methods but he later recanted that claim since such words were not in the draft of the speech. SR p. 65.

The Senate report also states that according to the National Intelligence Officer (NIO), on January 24, 2003 the NSC "believed the nuclear case (against Iraq) was weak" and requested additional information from the intelligence community. SR p. 240. The intelligence officer then provided the NSC with portions of the earlier October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which mentioned that Iraq had vigorously tried to procure uranium and which according to the intelligence officer "outlined possible uranium acquisition attempts in Niger, Somalia, and possibly the Congo.