The Original Thesis by a postgraduate who.... Part 3

Military Security is responsible for 1) detecting and countering dissent in the Iraqi armed forces; 2) investigating corruption and embezzlement within the armed services; and 3) monitoring all formations and units in the armed forces. Its task of internal security and detecting dissention in the armed forces was designed to overlap with some of the functions of Military Intelligence. Part of this strategy included infiltrating loyal officers into every military unit.(98)

Divisions

The Security Unit of this agency monitors al-Amn al-Askari as an internal surveillance body. Like other agencies, it has its own military brigade.(99)

OTHER SECURITY UNITS

The Socialist Arab Resurrection Party (Hizb al-Ba�th al-�Arab al-Ishtiraki)

While not an official state security agency, the Ba�th party is a crucial element in maintaining state security. The Ba�th Party is officially independent from the state, with its structure separate from that of government institutions. However, the Ba�th Party has ruled Iraq since 1968, and Saddam Hussein acts as its secretary-general.

The party has a wide membership throughout public institutions, the armed forces, work places, educational institutions and the local community as a whole. Such community-based organs serve as surveillance units as well. The Ba�th Party promotes its ideology in Iraq through its regional bureaus. The Ba�th Party Northern Bureau under the leadership of �Ali Hassan al-Majid was given sweeping government sanction to suppress rebellious Kurdish activity from 1987 to 1988. It has its own internal security agency known as Amn al-Hizb (Party Security), which monitors party members and ensures their loyalty.(100)

The Special Protection Apparatus (Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa)

Another unit in Saddam�s security apparatus is known as Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa (The Special Protection Apparatus.)(101) This unit is always headed by Saddam�s immediate family, and is the only unit which has armed men in the direct proximity of the President, serving as bodyguards.(102) Special Security exercises operational control over this apparatus.(103)

The Special Republican Guard, (al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas)

Al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas (The Special Republican Guard) is also referred to as the Republican Guard Special Protection Forces. As the Republican Guard expanded rapidly during the Iran-Iraq War, the Special Republican Guard was created to serve as a praetorian guard. Qusay heads this unit, which provides protection for all presidential sites, including offices and personal residences, as well as escorting Saddam when he is traveling within Iraq. The Special Republican Guard usually has around 15,000 men, but some estimates state that it has up to 13 battalions with 26,000 men.(104) The Special Republican Guard is organized into four brigades, with three brigades guarding the northern, southern and western routes into Baghdad. Additionally, it has an artillery and air defense command. Special Security exercises operational control over the Special Republican Guard.(105)

The Ministry of Information

The Ministry also has close links to intelligence services so it can control or spy on foreign visitors and journalists and manipulate crowds and media events in Iraq.(106)

CONCLUSION

The security apparatus that emerged as a small unit under the guidance of Saddam Hussein during the 1960s has emerged as a vast and complex network that has kept him in power by swiftly dealing with threats to his regime, both real or imagined. The system was created, expanded, controlled and managed by Saddam. Iraq�s intelligence and security network permeates every aspect of Iraqi life, ensuring his total control over the state. No organization, agency or military unit, nor even opposition groups outside of Iraq are ever secure from Saddam�s surveillance or free of penetration from his intelligence agencies.

While agencies rival and overlap each other for intelligence in the field of foreign and domestic operations, Saddam still has managed to develop a security network closely adopted to his needs and centralized only through his personal control. Given Saddam�s personal role in structuring and molding this security network, it remains to be seen whether it will survive in its current form in case of his departure from the Iraqi political scene. At the same time, of course, its effectiveness makes it less likely that Saddam would be ousted.

NOTES

1. Amazia Baram, "Between Impediment and Advantage: Saddam�s Iraq," United States Institute of Peace Special Report and "Saddam Husayn Between His Power Base and the International Community," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000), p. 11-12. <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a2.html>.
2. Boyne, July 1997, p. 312.
3. Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998).
4. See Sean Boyne, "Inside Iraq�s Security Network, Part One," Jane�s Intelligence Review, Vol. 9, No. 7 (July 1997), and No. 8 (August 1997). The Federation of American Scientists supplement the information provided in his article is on their website under the section "Iraq�s Intelligence Agencies" <http://www.fas.org>.
5. See Saddam�s Documents: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 1992. Also see Peter W. Galbraith, "Genocide and the Kurdish Documents Report," Kurdistan Times, No. 3 (December 1993).
6. Human Rights Watch/Middle East Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), and Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).
7. Ali Abdul-Lateef Khalifouh and Youssef Abdul-Moa�ti, Kuwait Resistance As Revealed by Iraqi Documents (Kuwait: Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 1994). This volume is also available in Arabic from the same center under the title, al-Maqawama al-Kuwaitiyya Min Khilal al-Watha�iq al-Iraqiyya.
8. Both sets of documents can be viewed on the Iraq Research and Documentation website <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~irdp>.
9. Also referred to as al-Maktab al-Amn al-Qawmi (The National Security Bureau).
10. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 54.
11. Boyne, July 1997, p. 313.
12. Ibid.
13. Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security) is also known as Mudiriyyat al-Amn al-Khas (The Special Security Directorate) or Jihaz al-Amn al-Khas (The Special Security Apparatus, The Special Security Organization or The Special Security Service). It is also referred to as Jihaz Mukhabarat al-Ra�isa (The Presidential Intelligence Apparatus, The Presidential Affairs Department or The Presidential Intelligence Bureau). In some publications it is abbreviated by the acronym, SS, SSS or SSO.
14. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 55.
15. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), p. 254.
16. Michael Eisenstadt, Like A Phoenix From the Ashes: The Future of Iraqi Mlilitary Power (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), p. 11.
17. Hiro, p. 56. This figure is also claimed by Federation of American Scientists, see "Iraq�s Intelligence Agencies" <http://www.fas.org>.
18. Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War on Sanctions (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 152.
19. Unattributed article, "The Secret War Between the CIA and Iraqi Intelligence," in al-Hawadith (London, in Arabic), February 2, 2001, p. 21. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).
20. Unattributed article, "The Secret War Between the CIA and Iraqi Intelligence," in al-Hawadith (London, in Arabic), February 2, 2001, p. 21. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).
21. Mustafa Alani, "Saddam�s Support Structure" in Sean McKnight, Neil Patrick and Francis Toase (eds.), Gulf Security: Opportunities and Challenges for the New Generation (London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 2000), p. 43.
22. Boyne, July 1997, p. 314.
23. Boyne, August 1997, p. 367.
24. Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and For All (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 125.
25. Sean, July 1997, p. 314, and see "Iraq�s Intelligence Agencies" <http://www.fas.org>.
26. Gregory R. Copley, Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1999 (Alexandria, Virginia: International Strategic Studies Association, 1998), p. 714.
27. Boyne, July 1997, p. 314.
28. Ritter, p. 77
29. Ritter, p. 97.
30. Ritter, p. 75.
31. Boyne, July 1997, p. 314.
32. Ritter, p. 102.
33. Unattributed article, "Fifteen Years Jail Sentence for Iraqi Intelligence Deputy Chief,"al-Zaman June 26, 2000, translated in FBIS.
34. It is also known as Mudiriyyat al-Amn al-�Amm (General Security Directorate or General Security Service) and also referred to as "The Secret Police," and is sometimes written with the acronym GS or GSS.
35. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars, p. 54.
36. Makiya, p. 12.
37. Ritter, p. 62.
38. Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 3
39. Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 3.
40. Boyne, August 1997, p. 367.
41. Dilip Hiro, p. 55.
42. During the 1991 Gulf War, Sabawi was the chief of the Mukhabarat.
43. Hiro, p. 55.
44. Makiya, p. 12.
45. Sean Boyne, July 1997, p. 312
46. According to the Human Rights Watch publications, there also existed "Emergency Forces" prior to the 1991 Gulf War, under the control of the Ba�th Party.
47. Ritter, p. 122.
48. Ritter, p. 122.
49. Boyne, August 1997, p. 367.
50. Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. xvii.
51. Ritter, p. 122.
52. Ritter, p. 88.
53. It is also known as al-Mukhabarat al-Amma (General Intelligence), and is also referred to as Da�irat al-Mukhbarat al-�Amma (The General Intelligence Directorate, The General Intelligence Department, The General Intelligence Service or The Iraqi Intelligence Service). It is sometimes written with the acronym, IIS, GID or GIS.
54. Makiya, p. 15.
55. Mustafa Alani, p. 42.
56. Eberhard Kienle, Ba�th v Ba�th: The Conflict Between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989 (New York: St. Martin�s Press, 1990), p. 85.
57. Makiya, p. 15.
58. Helm Chapin Metz, Iraq: A Country Study (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1988), p. 245. The 1982 assassination attempt was the primary force behind the creation of al-Amn al-Khas from within al-Amn al-�Amm
59. Fadil al-Barak was arrested in 1989 on espionage charges and later executed. See Cordesman, p. 153.
60. Eisenstadt, p. 11.
61. Sabir al-Duri was the former head of the military al-Istikhbarat.
62. Ali Abd al-Amir, "Plan to �Track Down� Iraqi Oppositionists Put into Effect," al-Hayat, March 12, 2000. Translated in FBIS.
63. Unattributed article, "The Secret War Between the CIA and Iraqi Intelligence."
64. Boyne, p. 367.
65. Hiro, p. 56.
66. See Federation of American Scientists, "Iraq�s Intelligence Agencies" <http://www.fas.org>.
67. Boyne, August 1997, p. 365.
68. Ibid.
69. Boyne, August 1997, p. 365.
70. Boyne, August 1997, p.365-6.
71. See Federation of American Scientists, "Iraq�s Intelligence Agencies" <http://www.fas.org>.
72. Boyne, p. 65.
73. Ritter, p. 116.
74. Hiro, p. 56.
75. Ali Abd al-Amir, "Plan to �Track Down� Iraqi Oppositionists Put into Effect."
76. "Anti-regime secret cells in the Republican Guard units; Iraqi intelligence expands activities abroad," Iraqi Communist Party, August 26, 2000. Transcribed in FBIS.
77. Muhammad al-Salih, "Saddam Husayn is Trying to Revive his Media Empire Abroad," al-Ra�y al-Amm (Kuwait in Arabic), November 12, 2000. Transcribed in FBIS.
78. Unattributed article, "Fifteen Years Jail Sentence for Iraqi Intelligence Deputy Chief."
79. Hiro, p. 56.
80. Sabir Abd al-Aziz al-Duri was then placed as head of al-Mukhabarat after the 1991 Gulf War.
81. Eisenstadt, p. 11.
82. Sammarai would later defect to the north of Iraq and then to Syria.
83. Muhammad Nimah al-Tikriti was made the head of another unit called al-Amn al-Askariyya (or Military Security) after 1992.
84. Hiro, p. 57.
85. Eisenstadt, p. 11. Fanar al-Tikriti served as the head of al-Amn al-Khas during the 1991 Gulf War.
86. Cordesman, p. 154.
87. Amazia Baram, "Saddam Husayn Between His Power Base and the International Community," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000), p. 12. <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a2.html>.
88. Exceptions to this rule include Ali Hassan al-Majid, who directed al-Amn al-Amm for seven years and Qusay, Saddam�s son who has headed al-Amn al-Khas since 1992.
89. Boyne, August 1997, p. 366.
90. Makiya, p. 14.
91. Copley, p. 714.
92. Ibid.
93. Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 4.
94. Cordesman, p. 155
95. Makiya, p. 13.
96. Boyne, August 1997, p. 367.
97. Hiro, p. 57.
98. Ibid.
99. Cordesman, p. 155.
100. Hiro, p. 57.
101. It is also referred to as "The President�s Personal Protection Unit" with the acronym PPPU or referred to as "The Presidential Palaces Security Unit" or as Himayat al-Ra�isa (The Presidential Guard).
102. Alani, p. 43.
103. Eisenstadt, p. 10.
104. Boyne, July 1997, p. 313.
105. Eisenstadt, p. 10.
106. Cordesman, p. 156-7.

Ibrahim al-Marashi is a research associate at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, California as well as a lecturer at the US Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently working on a project on Iraqi intelligence operations in northern Iraq and Kuwait.
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