George W. Bush and Kenneth Lay
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t | Report
Monday 29 May 2006
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/052906Z.shtml
The Bush administration knew Enron was on a collision course two
months before the high-flying energy company collapsed in a wave
of accounting scandals that wiped out $60 billion in shareholder
value and left thousands of company employees penniless.
It was August 15, 2001, when Enron lobbyist Pat Shortridge met
with then-White House Economic Adviser Robert McNally, one day
after Jeff Skilling made a stunning announcement that he was
stepping down as president of Enron.
Shortridge confided in McNally that Enron was headed for a
financial meltdown - one that could very well cripple the
country's energy markets - and urged the White House economic
adviser to alert President Bush about the company's financial
problems so he could help put together a federal bailout,
according to thousands of pages of documents about the meeting
released by the government's Enron Task Force.
It certainly made sense for Enron to seek help from the White
House. In August of 2001, Ken Lay was still known as "Kenny Boy"
to President Bush, a nickname Bush bestowed upon him when the
two men were up and comers in the Texas energy and political
industries respectively.
When Bush announced his intention to run for president, Enron
and its employees gave more than $1 million to Bush's 2000
election campaign, the Republican Party and the Bush Inaugural,
and Bush aides used the Enron corporate jet during the
post-election fracas in Florida.
With Thursday's guilty verdicts against Lay and Skilling on
numerous counts of accounting fraud, conspiracy, and dozens of
other charges, perhaps Enron should be remembered as - in
addition to a symbol of greed - the first in what has become a
long list of scandals that can be directly linked to the White
House.
Back in 2002, White House spokeswoman Anne Womack pointed out
that the McNally/Shortridge meeting was acknowledged by the
White House on May 22, 2002, in documents released to reporters
and Senator Joe Lieberman, D-Conn.
In those documents, it was noted that "Mr. McNally met with Mr.
Shortridge and another individual who was not from Enron." Asked
whether Enron's future had been discussed, Womack said, "If the
meeting was about that, I would assume there wouldn't be anyone
else there besides Mr. McNally and Mr. Shortridge."
To this day, no one knows exactly what happened after the
meeting between Shortridge and McNally in the summer of 2001.
President Bush has never answered questions about what he knew
and when he knew it and whether he took steps to save the
company's long-time employees from losing their savings.
One thing is for certain, however: once Enron's accounting
machinations became public in October 2001, the Bush
administration wasted no time in covering up its close ties with
the energy company.
In late 2001, Alberto Gonzales, who at the time was Bush's chief
counsel, refused to comment on the substance of the August 15,
2001, meeting between McNally and Shortridge in which McNally
was tipped off to Enron's coming demise.
Gonzales said there was no known instance of Enron asking the
White House for help prior to its bankruptcy proceedings. But
according to Enron's December 2001 bankruptcy filing the company
did just that.
According to those documents, Lay called Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill on October 28 to advise him that Enron was heading
toward bankruptcy. The following day, Lay asked Commerce
Secretary Don Evans for help in heading off a downgrading of
Enron's credit rating by Wall Street credit rating agencies that
would push the company into bankruptcy.
A week later, former Enron president Greg Whalley called
then-Treasury Under Secretary Peter Fisher six to eight times,
seeking help in getting banks to lend more money to Enron.
The White House also announced in January 2002 that Lawrence B.
Lindsey, who headed Bush's National Economic Council, had
directed a review in October - before the calls received by
O'Neill and Evans - to see whether an Enron collapse could have
a strong impact on the American economy. That admission prompted
critics of the administration to sound several alarms.
As Jennifer Palmieri, a spokeswoman for the Democratic National
Committee, said at the time, "It shows once again that the
administration did a lot of thinking about the fact that the
company was going to collapse but they did absolutely nothing to
make sure that 50,000 Enron employees would not lose their life
savings."
It also drew closer attention to the intensely close ties
between Enron and the Bush administration. Lindsey had been a
paid consultant for Enron, receiving $50,000 in 2000.
And he was just one of several top White House and Republican
Party officials who have had close Enron ties, including Robert
Zoellick, former United States trade representative, who sat on
an Enron advisory board in 2000; Karl Rove, senior White House
political strategist, who held more than 1,000 Enron shares
before selling them in June 2001; and Marc Racicot, onetime
chairman of the Republican National Committee, who worked as an
Enron lobbyist last year.
When the White House finally complied with a subpoena in May of
2002 and released thousands of pages of documents about its
contacts with Enron, it revealed that the company wielded
enormous power and influence at the highest levels of
government. One such document was a January 8, 2001, letter
written to Bush's personnel director, Clay Johnson, recommending
seven candidates to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Two of the candidates Lay recommended, Pat Wood and Nora
Brownell, were appointed to FERC by Bush; Wood was appointed
chairman.
When Wood left his post as chairman of FERC in 2005, Bush
appointed Joseph Kelliher, a former policy adviser with the
Department of Energy and a member of Vice President Cheney's
energy task force, to head up FERC, the agency that controls the
country's natural gas industry, hydroelectric projects, electric
utilities, and oil pipelines and has played a critical role in
the deregulation of those industries.
However, what's most troubling about Kelliher's appointment to
head FERC, a role in which his main priority will now be to
protect consumers from the manipulative tactics of the very
industry he enjoys a cozy relationship with, is the relentless
lobbying of bigwigs in the energy industry in early 2001, as a
member of Vice President Dick Cheney's energy task force, to
help write President Bush's National Energy Policy in a way that
would be financially beneficial to energy corporations - at the
expense of consumers.
The lengths to which Kelliher went to solicit key players in the
energy industry to help write the National Energy Policy became
apparent in 2003 when Judicial Watch, a bipartisan watchdog
group that sued Vice President Dick Cheney to gain access to
Cheney's list of industry insiders who participated in secret
meetings with Cheney's energy task force, won a legal battle
that forced the White House to release several hundred pages of
task force related documents.
One such document, a March 10, 2001, email to energy lobbyist
Dana Contratto, was damning - in it, Kelliher asked Contratto,
if he were "King" or "Il Duce," "what would you include in a
national energy policy, especially with respect to natural gas
issues?"
On another occasion, Kelliher sought out Stephen Craig Sayle, an
Enron lobbyist, to make similar recommendations. Sayle, former
counsel for the House Commerce Committee, sent Kelliher Enron's
"dream list," including a recommendation that the administration
commit to market-based emissions trading, which was also used in
administration's National Energy Policy.
Sayle wrote to Kelliher that "a multi-pollutant regulatory
strategy should be estimated for the power generation sector
including: Gradually phased in [mercury, nitrogen oxides and
sulfur dioxide emissions] reductions; Reform/replacement of NSR;
Use of market-based/emission trading programs; Inclusion of both
existing and new plants and equal treatment for both. The last
bullet is the critical one to ensure that: a) we encourage the
new generation that is required b) we ensure that the new
technologies developed through DOE programs can come into the
market."
"Obviously, this is a dream list," Sayle said in the March 23,
2001, email he sent to Kelliher. "Not all will be done. But
perhaps some of these ideas could be floated and adopted."
Sayle also provided Kelliher with a PowerPoint presentation on
behalf of his other energy clients in the so-called Clean Power
Group, a consortium made up of a handful of the country's
biggest energy companies, including NiSource Inc., Calpine
Corp., Trigen Energy Corp., and El Paso Corp, whose mission,
according to the group's web site, is to "streamline
requirements under the Clean Air Act for electric generating
facilities while at the same time making major reductions in air
emissions."
The PowerPoint presentation, "A Comprehensive Multi-Pollutant
Emission Control Strategy for Power Generation," summarized the
Clean Power Group's support of a "cap and trade" method in
addressing emissions of mercury, nitrogen oxides and sulfur
dioxide from power plants, but included a proposal for a
voluntary cap on carbon dioxide. The Clean Power Group stood to
benefit from the initiative it urged Kelliher to get the White
House to adopt - the companies could release more emissions
under its proposed plan than under the more restrictive rules
the Clinton administration had put in place.
After receiving Sayle's email and supporting material, Kelliher
recommended that President Bush "direct the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to propose multi-pollutant
legislation that would establish a flexible, market-based
program to significantly reduce and cap emissions; provide
regulatory certainty to allow utilities to make modifications to
their plants without fear of new litigation; provide market
based incentives, such as emissions-trading credits to help
achieve the required reductions," all of which was approved by
the president and eventually incorporated into the National
Energy Policy.
In fact, President Bush's "Clear Skies" initiative consists of
many of the bullet points laid out months earlier in Sayle's
email to Kelliher.
In addition to Kelliher's correspondence with Sayle, he also met
with oil and gas industry lobbyists, who helped write executive
orders that Kelliher passed on directly to the White House. Two
months later, the president issued executive orders nearly
identical to those Kelliher received from the lobbyists months
earlier.
But perhaps the most egregious of crimes involving Enron and the
Bush administration is how the White House turned a blind eye to
the Enron's manipulation to the California electricity market,
which ignited a crisis in 2000 that resulted in several days of
rolling blackouts.
On May 29, 2001, when the energy crisis reached its peak,
Governor Gray Davis met with Bush at the Century Plaza Hotel in
West Los Angeles, and pleaded with him to enact much-needed
price controls on electricity sold in the state, which had
skyrocketed to more than $200 per megawatt-hour.
Davis asked Bush for federal assistance, such as imposing
federally mandated price caps, to rein in soaring energy prices.
But Bush refused, saying California legislators had designed an
electricity market that left too many regulatory restrictions in
place and that it was that which had caused electricity prices
in the state to skyrocket.
It was up to the governor to fix the problem, Bush said, adding
that the crisis had nothing to do with energy companies'
manipulating the market.
But Bush's response, in hindsight, appeared to be part of a
coordinated effort launched by Lay to have Davis shoulder the
blame for the crisis, which ultimately led to an unprecedented
recall of the governor and Republican-funded attack ads on
Davis's handling of the energy crisis.
A couple of weeks before the Davis and Bush meeting, the PBS
news program Frontline interviewed Cheney. Cheney was asked by a
correspondent from Frontline whether energy companies were
acting like a cartel and using manipulative tactics to cause
electricity prices to spike in California.
"No," Cheney said. "The problem you had in California was caused
by a combination of things - an unwise regulatory scheme,
because they didn't really deregulate. Now they're trapped from
unwise regulatory schemes, plus not having addressed the supply
side of the issue. They've obviously created major problems for
themselves and bankrupted PG&E in the process."
In April 2001, a month before the Frontline interview and Bush's
meeting with Davis, Cheney, who chaired Bush's energy task
force, met with Lay to discuss Bush's National Energy Policy.
Lay recommended some energy policy initiatives that would
financially benefit his company, and gave Cheney a memo that
included eight recommendations for the energy policy. Of the
eight, seven were included in the energy policy's final draft.
The energy policy was released in late May 2001, after the
meeting between Bush and Davis, and after Cheney's Frontline
interview.
What many people have failed to realize is that Davis was right
in his assessment that energy companies, including Enron, were
manipulating the state's wholesale power market. To this day,
neither Cheney nor Bush has acknowledged that they got it wrong
and that their inaction helped fuel the California energy
crisis.
Jason Leopold spent two years covering California's electricity
crisis as Los Angeles bureau chief of Dow Jones Newswires. Jason
has spent the last year cultivating sources close to the CIA
leak investigation, and is a regular contributor to t r u t h o
u t. He is the author of the new book NEWS JUNKIE. Visit
http://www.newsjunkiebook.com for a preview.
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