brad
GPS + 9-11
Thu Mar 8, 2007 20:21

 
http://911review.org/Wiki/GPS.html

Aug. 31, 2001 Ground-Based Midcourse Boost Verification Intercept Flight Test History - CDI
The flight test was 18 months behind schedule. The three-stage Boeing rocket tested with a mass-simulated kill vehicle payload, did not attempt a missile intercept. It appears there was an anomaly in vehicle roll control in first-stage operation beginning at about 33 sec. into the mission and that could affect kill vehicle performance in an operational scenario. The second- and third-stage motors performed normally.
www.cdi.org/missile-defense/tests-gmd-boost.cfm


The geodynamic GPS network SUDETES, that is established in close cooperation of Polish and Czech geodesists, covers the area of Middle- and East-Sudety Mts. and Sudety Foreland and joins all existing Czech and Polish local GPS networks in this area. The Polish part of this network includes selected points of network GEOSUD, established in 1996 by the Department of Geodesy and Photogrammetry of Agriculture University of Wroclaw. The Czech part (network SILESIA) was designed and monumented in 1997 by the team of Institute of Rock Structure and Mechanics of the Czech Academy of Science in Prague. The whole SUDETES network will be measured during GPS campaign scheduled for September 2001.
www.navcen.uscg.gov/cgsic/meetings/summaryrpts/38thmeeting/CGSIC-SLC2001-NatRep.doc

At press time, technical experts from the FAA, the U.S. Coast Guard and researchers from Ohio and Stanford Universities were due to begin a two-week flight-test program in Alaska to assess the use of loran transmitters to send out GPS WAAS messages across the state.
WAAS was designed to transmit GPS integrity (such as failure, warnings and accuracy corrections) to surface and airborne GPS users from 25,000-mi-high geostationary satellites (GEOs) above the equator. Because their orbital speed is equal to the earth’s rotational speed, GEOs appear in the northern hemisphere to be fixed in the southern sky, where they perform a number of key tasks, including ground and airborne telephone relays, TV retransmission and various long-distance data-handling requirements.
In the flight-test program, the loran transmitter at Tok, Alaska, was to transmit the WAAS integrity and accuracy correction data on the 100-kHz loran frequency, which was to be received by loran sets aboard an FAA Technical Center Convair CV-580 and an Ohio University King Air. The loran/WAAS signals would then be converted to conventional GPS formats and fed to the onboard GPS receivers and also recorded for later analysis.
Loran was chosen for this task because of its powerful long-range signals, which extend from the surface to above jet altitudes and also penetrate mountain passes and valleys where other higher-frequency signals are blocked. The system is also impervious to intentional jamming. Should the tests prove successful–and ground and air tests performed in New England earlier this year
www.ainonline.com/issues/09_01/09_01_loranalaskapg64.html


LAAS Integrity Risk Due to Satellite Ephemeris Faults*
September 2001
Curtis A. Shively, The MITRE Corporation
ABSTRACT
Standards are under development for use of the FAA's Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) for both Category I (CAT I) precision approach and Differentially Corrected Positioning Service (DCPS) are navigation applications. An ephemeris fault occurs when the actual satellite position in space differs from the position based on the broadcast ephemeris parameters by more than the usual tolerance. Of particular interest is the total integrity risk ensured by an ephemeris fault detection process of the LAAS ground Facility (LGF) in conjunction with protection level (PL) equations that limit geometry of satellites used in the position solution of the aircraft.
* The content of this material reflect the views of the author. Neither the Federal Aviation Administration nor the Department of Transportation makes any warranty or guarantee, or promise, expressed or implied concerning the content or accuracy of the views expressed herein.
www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_01/shively_integrity/shively_integrity.pdf
09/10/01

The L-Band navigation signals on SVN19/PRN19 were turned off today at 1750Z (L1)
and 1753Z (L2). After beginning the scheduled Signal Quality Monitor Test,
problems were encountered and a decision was made by 2 SOPS
to end the test and begin disposal actions. It is expected that
SVN19 will be removed from the operational almanac within two days.
http://www.schriever.af.mil/GpsSupportCenter/archive/advisory/2001_archived_advisories.htm
2003: Missing Iraq expert - body found
A body believed to be that of government scientist Dr David Kelly is found
http://www.911review.org: Home Page 911review

http://911review.org/Sept11_news/archives/hijacker_GPS2.html
Hijackers used GPS to pinpoint WTC

Rebuttal to the IG's Able Danger Report
http://911review.org/Alex/Able_Danger_9-11.html

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