David J. Rothkopf
Inside the Committee that Runs the World
Fri Mar 4, 2005 01:26
64.140.158.137
Inside the Committee that Runs the World
By David J. Rothkopf Page 1 of 7
March/April 2005
September 11, 2001, was a catalytic event that revealed the core
character of the Bush administration's national security team. As
rival factions fought for the president's ear, the transformative
ideals espoused by the neocons gained ascendancy—triggering a rift
that has split the Republican foreign-policy establishment to its
foundations.
Click here to read:Inside the Committee that Runs the World
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2601.php
By David J. Rothkopf Page 1 of 7
March/April 2005
September 11, 2001, was a catalytic event that revealed the core
character of the Bush administration's national security team. As
rival factions fought for the president's ear, the transformative
ideals espoused by the neocons gained ascendancy—triggering a rift
that has split the Republican foreign-policy establishment to its
foundations.
Click here to read:
Two Degrees of Henry Kissinger
Inside the Committee that Runs the World
By David J. Rothkopf Page 1 of 7
March/April 2005
September 11, 2001, was a catalytic event that revealed the core
character of the Bush administration's national security team. As
rival factions fought for the president's ear, the transformative
ideals espoused by the neocons gained ascendancy—triggering a rift
that has split the Republican foreign-policy establishment to its
foundations.
Click here to
read: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2601.php
Two Degrees of Henry Kissinger
The inner circles of the U.S. national security community—members of
the National Security Council (NSC), a select number of their
deputies, and a few close advisors to the president—represent what is
probably the most powerful committee in the history of the world, one
with more resources, more power, more license to act, and more
ability to project force further and swifter than any other convened
by king, emperor, or president.
At the same time, the political party controlling that committee has
a grip on power in Washington unprecedented in recent history. For
the first time in nearly eight decades, the Republican Party has won
control of the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives in
two consecutive elections. Yet, despite this political monopoly, the
elites who exert the most influence on this little-understood,
shadowy committee are being buffeted and pulled apart by forces from
within.
An increasingly bitter philosophical debate pits the supporters of
the policies of former President George H.W. Bush and many of his one-
time team of foreign-policy experts, led by former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, against those who back views embraced by
President George W. Bush and his team, led by Vice President Dick
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. What Scowcroft calls the "traditionalists" of the
Bush 41 team are pitted against the "transformationalists" of the
Bush 43 team, pragmatists vs. neocons, internationalists vs.
unilateralists, the people who oversaw the end of the Cold War
against those who oversaw the beginning of the War on Terror. Of
course, the irony is that many of these people were not too long ago
seen as parts of a whole. All are or once were close. What happened?
Partisan critics have offered theories, many of which distort the
facts or speak for key players in ways that suit their own arguments.
However, as the transition from the first to the second term of the
Bush administration takes hold, many of its current and former
members and others inside the Republican Party foreign-policy
establishment are beginning to open up and speak their minds about
the character of the key players and their relationships within these
inner circles. More revealing and more credible than partisan
critics, the picture they paint is useful not only for what it tells
us about the operations of the administration during its first term
but also for what should be expected from the next four years.
There's Something About Condi
The NSC was established in 1947 as a coordinating mechanism to ensure
the president received the benefit of the views of the principal
members of his national security team—a reaction to President
Franklin Roosevelt's close-held, ad hoc management style. Its staff
was tiny and uninfluential. The NSC's clout grew modestly during its
first couple of decades, but it then emerged as a unique power center
during the 1970s under the leadership of national security advisors
who shaped it into a modern institution: Henry Kissinger, Scowcroft,
and Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Since that era, the NSC's power has ebbed and flowed, but the trend
has been in its favor with recent national security advisors
eclipsing the influence of their counterparts in the State and
Defense Departments. As part of the executive office of the
president, the NSC operates with unusual freedom compared to most
cabinet agencies. Neither the national security advisor nor any other
member of the NSC staff is confirmed by the Senate. As such, the NSC
as an entity is not subject to congressional oversight, even though
it now performs many of the policymaking functions once reserved for
the State Department. Indeed, it has become a preserve for those
activities that an administration wishes to conduct beyond
congressional scrutiny, as the country learned to its collective
discomfort with the revelations of the "operational" NSC of Adm. John
Poindexter and Col. Oliver North during the Reagan years.
The NSC's power has expanded since the end of the Cold War, as
critical constraints on its operations have been removed or reduced.
Virtually every major decision made during the first 45 years of the
NSC's existence was influenced by calculating what the Soviet
reaction would be. Today, the United States operates as a sole
superpower unburdened by such considerations. Policymakers no longer
must be concerned with the consequences of their actions beyond how
their domestic audience responds—and even that constraint diminished
with the national mindset that developed in the wake of the September
11 terrorist attacks.
Want to Know More?
next http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2601.php
By David J. Rothkopf Page 1 of 7
March/April 2005
September 11, 2001, was a catalytic event that revealed the core
character of the Bush administration's national security team. As
rival factions fought for the president's ear, the transformative
ideals espoused by the neocons gained ascendancy—triggering a rift
that has split the Republican foreign-policy establishment to its
foundations.
Click here to read:Inside the Committee that Runs the World
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2601.php
By David J. Rothkopf Page 1 of 7
March/April 2005
September 11, 2001, was a catalytic event that revealed the core
character of the Bush administration's national security team. As
rival factions fought for the president's ear, the transformative
ideals espoused by the neocons gained ascendancy—triggering a rift
that has split the Republican foreign-policy establishment to its
foundations.
Click here to read:
Two Degrees of Henry Kissinger
Inside the Committee that Runs the World
By David J. Rothkopf Page 1 of 7
March/April 2005
September 11, 2001, was a catalytic event that revealed the core
character of the Bush administration's national security team. As
rival factions fought for the president's ear, the transformative
ideals espoused by the neocons gained ascendancy—triggering a rift
that has split the Republican foreign-policy establishment to its
foundations.
Click here to
read: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2601.php
Two Degrees of Henry Kissinger
The inner circles of the U.S. national security community—members of
the National Security Council (NSC), a select number of their
deputies, and a few close advisors to the president—represent what is
probably the most powerful committee in the history of the world, one
with more resources, more power, more license to act, and more
ability to project force further and swifter than any other convened
by king, emperor, or president.
At the same time, the political party controlling that committee has
a grip on power in Washington unprecedented in recent history. For
the first time in nearly eight decades, the Republican Party has won
control of the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives in
two consecutive elections. Yet, despite this political monopoly, the
elites who exert the most influence on this little-understood,
shadowy committee are being buffeted and pulled apart by forces from
within.
An increasingly bitter philosophical debate pits the supporters of
the policies of former President George H.W. Bush and many of his one-
time team of foreign-policy experts, led by former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, against those who back views embraced by
President George W. Bush and his team, led by Vice President Dick
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. What Scowcroft calls the "traditionalists" of the
Bush 41 team are pitted against the "transformationalists" of the
Bush 43 team, pragmatists vs. neocons, internationalists vs.
unilateralists, the people who oversaw the end of the Cold War
against those who oversaw the beginning of the War on Terror. Of
course, the irony is that many of these people were not too long ago
seen as parts of a whole. All are or once were close. What happened?
Partisan critics have offered theories, many of which distort the
facts or speak for key players in ways that suit their own arguments.
However, as the transition from the first to the second term of the
Bush administration takes hold, many of its current and former
members and others inside the Republican Party foreign-policy
establishment are beginning to open up and speak their minds about
the character of the key players and their relationships within these
inner circles. More revealing and more credible than partisan
critics, the picture they paint is useful not only for what it tells
us about the operations of the administration during its first term
but also for what should be expected from the next four years.
There's Something About Condi
The NSC was established in 1947 as a coordinating mechanism to ensure
the president received the benefit of the views of the principal
members of his national security team—a reaction to President
Franklin Roosevelt's close-held, ad hoc management style. Its staff
was tiny and uninfluential. The NSC's clout grew modestly during its
first couple of decades, but it then emerged as a unique power center
during the 1970s under the leadership of national security advisors
who shaped it into a modern institution: Henry Kissinger, Scowcroft,
and Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Since that era, the NSC's power has ebbed and flowed, but the trend
has been in its favor with recent national security advisors
eclipsing the influence of their counterparts in the State and
Defense Departments. As part of the executive office of the
president, the NSC operates with unusual freedom compared to most
cabinet agencies. Neither the national security advisor nor any other
member of the NSC staff is confirmed by the Senate. As such, the NSC
as an entity is not subject to congressional oversight, even though
it now performs many of the policymaking functions once reserved for
the State Department. Indeed, it has become a preserve for those
activities that an administration wishes to conduct beyond
congressional scrutiny, as the country learned to its collective
discomfort with the revelations of the "operational" NSC of Adm. John
Poindexter and Col. Oliver North during the Reagan years.
The NSC's power has expanded since the end of the Cold War, as
critical constraints on its operations have been removed or reduced.
Virtually every major decision made during the first 45 years of the
NSC's existence was influenced by calculating what the Soviet
reaction would be. Today, the United States operates as a sole
superpower unburdened by such considerations. Policymakers no longer
must be concerned with the consequences of their actions beyond how
their domestic audience responds—and even that constraint diminished
with the national mindset that developed in the wake of the September
11 terrorist attacks.
Want to Know More?
next http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2601.php
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