TYLER HAMILTON Smoke and mirrors security fails Tue Sep 2 17:34:51 2003 64.140.158.45 Smoke and mirrors security fails TYLER HAMILTON The federal government has officially begun treating every citizen like a criminal. No longer can we smile when we get our pictures taken for passport photos. All expressions must be neutral or, from now on, your photo will be rejected. Sounds like a mug shot to me. You know, the kind of photo that's taken at the police station when a person is being booked and fingerprinted for a crime. And fighting crime is exactly why the new passport photo rules are in effect. The federal passport office is in the midst of a trial to test facial-recognition technology. Flashing an awkward smile or an exaggerated expression could be all it takes to confuse such a high- tech (and obviously fragile) system. In essence, the government wants to create a massive database containing digital photos of all Canadians. That database can be used to find duplicate photos in the system — perhaps errors, or people who have more than one passport under different names. The idea here is to crack down on fraud and deception, and this is a good idea. Theoretically, that database can also be used to battle terrorism by comparing passport applicants with terrorist watch lists. That's where the mug-shot requirement comes into play, since the less expressive the photo, the more effective the software. There's no reason to believe the use of these systems won't be limited to passport offices. The next step will be spending hundreds of millions of dollars to equip border checkpoints and airport customs with the technology. This is not a good idea. South of the border, U.S. Congress has already set Oct. 26, 2004, as the deadline by which U.S. and foreign passports should be upgraded to include a biometric identification — a photo, fingerprint or both. The total cost of issuing new passports and deploying the appropriate biometric scanning and analysis software is pegged at billions of dollars. In the meantime, Denis Coderre, minister of Citizenship and Immigration, is planning a forum next month dedicated to arguing the pros and cons of a national biometric identity card. Such a card would likely cost Canadian taxpayers billions of dollars. It's no secret that the minister is keen on assigning each and every one of us an I.D. card that would include our digital fingerprint or iris pattern and that we'd need to carry everywhere we go. Going to the beach? Better carry that card with you. Running to the store to get some milk? Don't forget your I.D. card. Stopped on the way to a friend's Grey Cup party? Oops! Sorry officer, I left my card at my parents' house. To back his grand vision, Coderre had a poll conducted that showed 7 out of every 10 Canadians support the idea and would give up privacy rights in favour of being more secure. Yes, I'd also give up my left arm if it meant saving the rest of my body, and yes, polls can be easily manipulated depending on the types of questions asked. The big assumption in this poll is that a national I.D. card would bring added security, which Coderre has failed to prove, let alone address. What's interesting is that Coderre is promoting this invitation-only forum, held at the ritzy Chateau Laurier, as a neutral meeting place for balanced debate. It appears to be shaping up as anything but. The opening keynote speaker will be Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard law professor who has championed the use of biometric security since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The government didn't put out a call for presentations. It actively sought out Dershowitz and his American perspective, and is agreeing to pay more than $36,000 in taxpayer's money for what I expect to be pro-biometric views. Stephanie Perrin, a known privacy advocate in Canada and former director of privacy policy for Industry Canada's electronic commerce task force, put together a competing proposal. She offered up four well-known academic and industry speakers from around the world, at half the cost, but the government, intent on getting Dershowitz's message out, rejected the offer. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Huge sums of moneyare being spent on unproven security initiatives ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The other keynote speaker is Dr. Colin Soutar, the chief technology officer of Toronto-based Bioscrypt Inc., a company that has every reason to promote the benefits of biometric technology. "The government is trying to look for a reason to go with an I.D. card, but at the same time, they already appear to be committed to it," said one industry expert invited to the event. He asked that his name be withheld. So what's going on here? Security expert Bruce Schneier likes to call it "security theatre." "Elected government officials are concerned about re-election and need to be seen by the public as doing something to improve security," wrote Schneier in Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security In An Uncertain World, which was released this week. "One of the goals of a security countermeasure is to provide people with a feeling of security in addition to the reality. But some countermeasures provide the feeling of security instead of the reality. ... They're palliative at best." He points to the decision by airlines to confiscate tweezers and nail files at airports after Sept. 11. It doesn't cost much, which the airlines love, and it makes it seem like the government is taking action. Of course, they don't confiscate matches and cigarette lighters — the tobacco lobby wouldn't allow that. Tamper-proof packaging, which gained momentum after the tainted Tylenol scare, isn't tamper-proof at all. But it comforts us, right? And that's the government's main goal, to comfort us — even if we're getting a false sense of security. Pushing it toward that goal are external pressures coming from a number of directions. You've got companies that make biometric technologies beating the drum, fanning the fears of terrorism and claiming their product can be a silver bullet? Again, a government desperate to do something likes to hear the words "silver bullet." Another pressure — and a huge one it is — wears stars and stripes, and each star comes with its own elected officials performing their own security theatre. They want action. They see Canada as a haven for terrorists and thus a point of vulnerability for the United States. They're pressuring our people to take action, or else. What's most alarming about the move toward biometrics — either in a national I.D. card or as a facial-recognition system in an airport — is that huge sums of money are being spent on so-called security initiatives that haven't demonstrated an ounce of added security. Schneier writes that the use of facial-recognition software or national I.D. cards to protect citizens and identity terrorists simply won't work. Assuming facial-recognition systems are 99.9 per cent accurate, which is highly optimistic, Schneier says there is 1 chance in 1,000 that the software fails to catch a terrorist and 1 chance in 1,000 that the software falsely identifies somebody as a terrorist. Based on a percentage of population, it means 30,000 Canadians and 130,000 Americans could be falsely accused of being a terrorist. That's still a lot of false alarms, and as we've learned with car alarms and shoplifting alarms in stores, regular false alarms mean people — the public and those employed where these systems are used — eventually lose interest and stop becoming enforcers. And, as Schneier points out, "The system presumes a photo database of terrorists. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- You've got firms that make biometric technology beating the drum, fanning the fears ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "It seems unlikely that terrorists will pose for crisp, clear photographs. More likely, the photos in the database are grainy ones taken from 1,000 yards five years ago when the individuals looked different. We have to assume that terrorists will disguise themselves with beards, hats, glasses and plastic surgery to make recognition harder," Schneier says. "Automatic face-recognition systems fail miserably under these conditions." Not surprising, then, that police in Tampa, Florida, pulled the plug last month on a facial-recognition system that didn't produce any arrests after two years. Canadian politicians should take notice of that dud. Ditto with respect to national I.D. cards. Schneier says national databases, simply because of their size and complexity, are prone to failure. It's difficult to keep information up to date, software bugs are common and large databases are open to internal abuse and tampering. If it's costing more than $1 billion just to have a national gun registry, imagine what a national I.D. card system might cost? Also important is whether we can maintain adequate enforcement of such a system, as well as prevent forgeries of I.D. cards. "There hasn't been a card created yet that can't be forged," writes Schneier, who adds that "human nature dictates that those verifying the card won't do a very good job. "How often does a bartender — or an airport screener, for that matter — fail to look at the picture on an I.D., or a shopkeeper not bother checking the signature on a credit card?" All good questions, which politicians like Coderre should be asking. Until these questions are posed, and until reasoned, balanced answers are provided, the federal government's security efforts to date amount to nothing more than security theatre. And it's shaping up to be an expensive show. -------------------------------------------------------------- Tyler Hamilton writes about technology and the Internet Mondays in @Biz. Reach him at thamilt@thestar.ca Additional articles by Tyler Hamilton http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout /Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1062367811083&call_pageid=968350072197&co l=969048863851 Airport anti-terror systems flub tests USA Today - 5 hours ago ... Last year, two separate face-recognition systems at Boston's Logan Airport failed 96 times to detect volunteers who played potential terrorists as they passed ... http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2003/09/02-air-secur.htm Scanning faces still has blemishes Los Angeles Daily News, CA - 11 hours ago ... But the report also stressed that face-recognition systems are getting worse at identifying people on watch lists as the pool of wanted suspects grows. ... Tampa cops send face recognition software packing The Register, UK - Aug 20, 2003 ... purpose," a spokesman told the Palm Beach Post.The Post adds that face recognition ... better than the 50 per cent or less reliability attached to earlier systems. ... US pushes forward with biometric visas and passports Biometric technology that scans faces, fingerprints or other physical characteristics to confirm people's identities is about to get its biggest, most public test: at US border checkpoints. Yet significant questions loom about whether the US and foreign governments can meet an Oct 26, 2004, deadline set by Congress for upgrading passports and visas to include biometrics. "This is the mother of all projects - there's no question about it," said Joseph Atick, chief of Identix, a maker of biometric systems. US pushes forward with biometric visas and passports http://technology.nzoom.com/technology_detail/0,1608,216332-113-380,00.html
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