USIP

How Terrorism Ends

Thu Aug 7 04:34:15 2003
64.140.158.3

SPECIAL REPORT - May 25, 1999

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990525.html
Media inquiries should be directed to Rachel Tschida (202.429.3878)

How Terrorism Ends - usip_requests@usip.org

Briefly...

* The nature of the grievance matters. Ethnically based terrorist campaigns can be harder to end decisively than politically based ones, because they often enjoy broader support among a population they seek to represent.

* Political violence by itself can rarely achieve its aims, but it can sometimes do so in conjunction with less violent political action.

* By the same token, deterring terrorism and prosecuting terrorists may be insufficient to end terrorism, especially when a large population supports the terrorists' cause. In such situations, negotiated settlements may provide the only solutions.

* In Sri Lanka, the government appears to have concluded from its victory over the Maoist JVP that law enforcement and compulsion can end a terror campaign. However, the LTTE has a much broader base of support than the JVP ever did, and the LTTE is unlikely to go away simply through government-applied force.

* One of the most effective strategies at governments' disposal may be to split off pragmatists from radical rejectionists. Such efforts can diminish public support for the terrorists and deny them a strong base from which to operate.

* In the cases of the IRA and the PLO, the initiation of political negotiations has not conclusively ended terrorism, but it has swung public support behind a peaceful solution and helped diminish popular support for the terrorists.

* Making concessions to causes espoused by terrorists can arouse hostility from those who believe that terrorism is "being rewarded." Weak governments find it difficult to make such concessions.

* Peace overtures must be well-timed. Ideally, they should come at a time when the government is strong and the terrorist organization is undergoing a period of introspection. Good intelligence can make a difference in these cases.

In an attempt to better understand what governmental actions can hasten the end of political violence, on April 12, 1999, the United States Institute of Peace, together with the British-based Airey Neave Trust, convened a working group meeting on the subject "How Terrorism Ends." The workshop began with an overview of the problem by Martha Crenshaw. Her presentation was followed by three case studies. In the first, Paul Wilkinson of St. Andrews University discussed the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and in the second, Jon B. Alterman of the United States Institute of Peace discussed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Both were considered "successful" case studies, because the organizations in question have embraced political dialogue instead of violence to pursue their aims. In the third case study, Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies discussed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who have been fighting for autonomy for Tamil-populated areas in Sri Lanka for almost two decades. The LTTE was considered a "failed" case because government actions have been unable to end the violence.

Back

Martha Crenshaw on How Terrorism Ends

As we try to create governmental policies aimed at ending terrorism, it is useful to enumerate some of the variables that distinguish different situations.

The first set of variables involves the terrorist groups themselves.

* Internal factors. How does the organization make decisions? How does the organization perceive its environment? What are the internal psychological dynamics? Is the organization divided internally? All of these things are important to know but often difficult to ascertain.

* External factors. How does the relative strength of the terrorist organization compare with that of the government it opposes? Are the terrorists ideologically or ethnically motivated? What kinds of ties do they have to outside groups who may support them? Is the conflict best characterized as a secessionist movement's civil war, or does the conflict involve a battle over civil society and representation?

The second set of variables involves the tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism. Many of these options can be pursued simultaneously.

* Deterrence. Governments can use their coercive capacity to make terrorism too costly for those who seek to use it. They can do this by military strikes against terrorist bases, assassinations of key leaders, collective punishment, or other methods. There are several drawbacks to this approach, however. On the one hand, it can lead to unacceptable human rights violations. In addition, groups may not come to government attention until movements are so well developed that efforts to contain them through deterrent methods are insufficient.

* Criminal justice. Governments can treat terrorism primarily as a crime and therefore pursue the extradition, prosecution, and incarceration of suspects. One drawback to this approach is that the prosecution of terrorists in a court of law can compromise government efforts to gather intelligence on terrorist organizations. In addition, criminal justice efforts (like deterrent efforts) are deployed mostly after terrorists have struck, meaning that significant damage and loss of life may have already occurred.

* Enhanced defense. Governments can make targets harder to attack, and they can use intelligence capabilities to gain advance knowledge of when attacks may take place. As targets are hardened, however, some terrorist groups may shift their sights to softer targets. An example is the targeting of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 by truck bombs. Although the attacks are strongly believed to have been coordinated by individuals with Middle Eastern ties, targets in Africa were chosen because of their relatively lax security compared with targets in the Middle East.

* Negotiations. Governments can elect to enter into negotiations with terrorist groups and make concessions in exchange for the groups' renunciation of violence. While governments are often reluctant to do so at the beginning of terror campaigns, negotiations may be the only way to resolve some long-standing disputes.

Given the above sets of variables, the end of terrorism may result from one or more of the following situations:
FULL REPORT HERE:
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990525.html

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Terrorism - Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/terrorism.htm#iraqnews

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